The Unification of Evolutionary Dynamics through the Bayesian Decay Factor in a Game on a Graph.
Bull Math Biol
; 86(6): 69, 2024 May 07.
Article
in En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-38714590
ABSTRACT
We unify evolutionary dynamics on graphs in strategic uncertainty through a decaying Bayesian update. Our analysis focuses on the Price theorem of selection, which governs replicator(-mutator) dynamics, based on a stratified interaction mechanism and a composite strategy update rule. Our findings suggest that the replication of a certain mutation in a strategy, leading to a shift from competition to cooperation in a well-mixed population, is equivalent to the replication of a strategy in a Bayesian-structured population without any mutation. Likewise, the replication of a strategy in a Bayesian-structured population with a certain mutation, resulting in a move from competition to cooperation, is equivalent to the replication of a strategy in a well-mixed population without any mutation. This equivalence holds when the transition rate from competition to cooperation is equal to the relative strength of selection acting on either competition or cooperation in relation to the selection differential between cooperators and competitors. Our research allows us to identify situations where cooperation is more likely, irrespective of the specific payoff levels. This approach provides new perspectives into the intended purpose of Price's equation, which was initially not designed for this type of analysis.
Key words
Full text:
1
Collection:
01-internacional
Database:
MEDLINE
Main subject:
Selection, Genetic
/
Bayes Theorem
/
Biological Evolution
/
Mathematical Concepts
/
Game Theory
/
Models, Genetic
/
Mutation
Limits:
Humans
Language:
En
Journal:
Bull Math Biol
Year:
2024
Document type:
Article
Affiliation country:
Thailand