Using Logistics Companies to Regulate Online Food Safety: Feasibility and Impacts Based on Social Cogovernance in China.

ABSTRACT

China's traditional governance model, featuring localized management by local governments, has been unable to effectively manage the increasing cross-regional flow of food safety risks caused by the emerging trends in online food consumption. This weakness highlights the urgent need to reform the online food safety regulation mechanism. To support this effort, this study uses the social cogovernance framework to investigate the effects of regulation by logistics companies on the behavioral strategy choices of sellers and the social cogovernance level. This study constructs a three-party evolutionary game model among online food sellers, platforms, and logistics companies authorized by the government to regulate online food safety. The equilibrium points are verified by Matlab numerical simulation, and the relationship between equilibrium points and social cogovernance level is also examined. The results show that (1) The probability of sampling inspection, financial penalties imposed by the government, financial subsidies, and financial penalties within the supply chain influence logistics companies in fulfilling their responsibilities for regulating online food safety; (2)Utilizing logistics companies to regulate online food safety has a restraining effect on sellers' risky behaviors, effectively mitigating online food safety risks;.(3)Different equilibrium points in the system represent varying levels of social cogovernance, and leveraging logistics companies to regulate challenging online food safety can enhance the system's social cogovernance level. Based on these results, this study supports the feasibility and impacts of utilizing logistics companies to regulate online food safety.