Biopreparedness in the Age of Genetically Engineered Pathogens and Open Access Science: An Urgent Need for a Paradigm Shift.
Mil Med
; 180(9): 943-9, 2015 Sep.
Article
en En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-26327545
ABSTRACT
Our systems, thinking, training, legislation, and policies are lagging far behind momentous changes in science, and leaving us vulnerable in biosecurity. Synthetic viruses and genetic engineering of pathogens are a reality, with a rapid acceleration of dual-use science. The public availability of methods for dual-use genetic engineering, coupled with the insider threat, poses an unprecedented risk for biosecurity. Case studies including the 1984 Rajneesh salmonella bioterrorism attack and the controversy over engineered transmissible H5N1 influenza are analyzed. Simple probability analysis shows that the risks of dual-use research are likely to outweigh potential benefits, yet this type of analysis has not been done to date. Many bioterrorism agents may also occur naturally. Distinguishing natural from unnatural epidemics is far more difficult than other types of terrorism. Public health systems do not have mechanisms for routinely considering bioterrorism, and an organizational culture that is reluctant to consider it. A collaborative model for flagging aberrant outbreak patterns and referral from the health to security sectors is proposed. Vulnerabilities in current approaches to biosecurity need to be reviewed and strengthened collaboratively by all stakeholders. New systems, legislation, collaborative operational models, and ways of thinking are required to effectively address the threat to global biosecurity.
Texto completo:
1
Colección:
01-internacional
Base de datos:
MEDLINE
Asunto principal:
Ingeniería Genética
/
Defensa Civil
/
Bioterrorismo
/
Armas Biológicas
Tipo de estudio:
Etiology_studies
/
Risk_factors_studies
Límite:
Humans
Idioma:
En
Revista:
Mil Med
Año:
2015
Tipo del documento:
Article
País de afiliación:
Australia