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Countervailing incentives in value-based payment.
Arnold, Daniel R.
Afiliación
  • Arnold DR; School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley, United States; Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States. Electronic address: danielarnold@berkeley.edu.
Healthc (Amst) ; 5(3): 125-128, 2017 Sep.
Article en En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28822499
Payment reform has been at the forefront of the movement toward higher-value care in the U.S. health care system. A common belief is that volume-based incentives embedded in fee-for-service need to be replaced with value-based payments. While this belief is well-intended, value-based payment also contains perverse incentives. In particular, behavioral economists have identified several features of individual decision making that reverse some of the typical recommendations for inducing desirable behavior through financial incentives. This paper discusses the countervailing incentives associated with four behavioral economic concepts: loss aversion, relative social ranking, inertia or status quo bias, and extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation.
Asunto(s)

Texto completo: 1 Colección: 01-internacional Base de datos: MEDLINE Asunto principal: Planes de Incentivos para los Médicos / Planes de Aranceles por Servicios / Motivación Tipo de estudio: Prognostic_studies Límite: Humans Idioma: En Revista: Healthc (Amst) Año: 2017 Tipo del documento: Article Pais de publicación: Países Bajos

Texto completo: 1 Colección: 01-internacional Base de datos: MEDLINE Asunto principal: Planes de Incentivos para los Médicos / Planes de Aranceles por Servicios / Motivación Tipo de estudio: Prognostic_studies Límite: Humans Idioma: En Revista: Healthc (Amst) Año: 2017 Tipo del documento: Article Pais de publicación: Países Bajos