The impact of pharmaceutical marketing on market access, treatment coverage, pricing, and social welfare.

ABSTRACT

Pharmaceutical spending in the United States, Canada, and the EU is growing. Public payers cover a large portion of these costs and have responded by instituting various pricing and access policies to limit their expenditure. One challenge that public payers face is additional demand induced by a manufacturer's marketing effort. We use a game theoretic approach to study the impact of pharmaceutical marketing on six practical pricing and access policies negotiated pricing, open pricing, controlled pricing, a listing process, a risk-sharing arrangement, and a value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement. We find that all non-value-based policies result in either restricted access or suboptimal treatment coverage. We find that marketing is the highest in the first-best setting where all decisions are made by a social planner. We also find that the value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement is preferred by the manufacturer and from a societal perspective whereas no policy is universally preferred by a health care payer. A value-based pricing with risk-sharing arrangement always results in zero net monetary benefit for a health care payer. Therefore, considering non-value-based arrangements, we find that a negotiated pricing policy, a controlled pricing policy, or a risk-sharing arrangement may be socially preferred.