A Bayesian approach to investment in innovation projects with the presence of fake innovators.
Heliyon
; 6(11): e05603, 2020 Nov.
Article
en En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-33294719
ABSTRACT
The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of interaction between investors and innovators, taking into account the existence of so-called "fake" innovators offering knowingly unprofitable projects. The model is a Bayesian non-cooperative, repetitive game with recalculated payments and partly unobservable ex interim player types. It allows quantifying the parameters of the strategy for all player types to find equilibrium solutions. The model describes rational modes for screening "fake" innovators based on adjusting players' probabilistic estimates.
Texto completo:
1
Colección:
01-internacional
Base de datos:
MEDLINE
Tipo de estudio:
Prognostic_studies
Idioma:
En
Revista:
Heliyon
Año:
2020
Tipo del documento:
Article
País de afiliación:
Rusia