Can Independently Elicited Adult- and Child-Perspective Health-State Utilities Explain Priority Setting?

OBJECTIVES: Time trade-off (TTO) utilities for EQ-5D-Y-3L health states valued by adults taking a child's perspective are generally higher than their valuations of the same state for themselves. Ceteris paribus, the use of these utilities in economic evaluation implies that children gain less from treatments returning them to full health for a specified amount of time than adults. In this study, we explore if this implication affects individuals' views of priority-setting choices between treatments for adults and children. METHODS: We elicited TTO utilities for 4 health states in online interviews, in which respondents valued states for a 10-year-old child and another adult their age. Views on priority setting were studied with person trade-off (PTO) tasks involving the same health states. We tested the ability of the subjects' TTO utilities to predict these societal choices in PTO. RESULTS: There are no significant differences between adult and child health state valuations in our study, but we do observe a substantial preference for treating children over adults in the PTO task. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that perspective-dependent health-state utilities only explain a small part of views on priority setting between adults and children. External equity weights might be useful to better explain the higher priority given to children.

The Role of Perceived Utility of Full Health in Age Weighting.

OBJECTIVES: People often give different weights to quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) gained by different socioeconomic groups. It is well known that QALY gains of younger patients generally get more weight than the same QALY gains accruing to older patients. This study aims to separate these age-related preferences into "pure age weighting" and age weighting caused by full health not perceived as being the same for the old as for the young. METHODS: We apply a person trade-off method in a large sample representative (N = 500) of the Dutch general adult population to estimate age weighting factors. We describe health as a percentage of what is considered full health for a given age, for which we obtain a proxy in a separate task. RESULTS: A high amount of age weighting is observed, with QALYs to 20-year-old patients receiving approximately 1.5 times as much weight as QALYs to 80-year-old patients. At the same time, we see that individuals do not perceive full health to be the same for young and older people. In fact, the age weighting disappears once we control for these differences in full health perceptions. CONCLUSIONS: Respondents had strong preferences for the young relative to the old, but these preferences were related to full health perceptions, that is, more weight being assigned to younger because full health is at a higher absolute level for them than for the old.

Correcting for discounting and loss aversion in composite time trade-off.

Time trade-off utilities have been suggested to be biased upwards. This bias is a result of the method being applied assuming linear utility of life duration, which is violated when individuals discount future life years or are loss averse for health. Applying a "corrective approach", that is, measuring individuals' discount function and loss aversion and correcting time trade-off utilities for these individual characteristics, may reduce this bias in utilities. Earlier work has developed this approach for time trade-off in a student sample. In this study, the corrective approach was extended to composite time trade-off (cTTO) methodology, which enabled correcting utilities for health states worse than dead. In digital interviews a sample of 150 members of the general public completed cTTO tasks for six health states, and afterward they completed measurements of loss aversion and discounting. cTTO utilities were corrected using these measurements under multiple specifications. Respondents were also asked to reflect on and adjust their cTTO utilities directly. Our results show considerable loss aversion and both positive and negative discounting were prevalent. As predicted, correction generally resulted in lower utilities. This was in accordance with the direction of adjustments made by respondents themselves.

Reference-dependent age weighting of quality-adjusted life years.

People do not only care about maximizing health gains but also about their distribution. For example, they give more weight to younger patients than older patients. This pilot study aims to investigate if age weighting is reinforced by loss aversion if young people are falling behind one's perceived 'normal' quality of life (QoL), while older people do not. We apply a person trade-off method in a large representative sample (n = 990) to estimate age weighting factors. We also measure QoL levels that individuals regard as 'normal' for different ages, serving as reference points. We observe a considerable amount of age weighting, with 20-year-old patients on average receiving 1.7 times as much weight as 80-year-old patients. Perceived 'normal' QoL rapidly decreases with age of a patient. Older people are more optimistic about what constitutes 'normal QoL' than younger people, but they express a faster decline in normal QoL due to aging. Respondents who view all improvements to be gain enlarging show the least age weighting, but loss aversion cannot explain the results. Still, one's age-related reference level is an important predictor of age weights. Given the explorative nature of this study, further studies are called for to generate more robust evidence.

Multivariate risk preferences in the quality-adjusted life year model.

The interest in multivariate and higher-order risk preferences has increased. A growing body of literature has demonstrated the relevance and impact of these preferences, but for health the evidence is lacking. We measure multivariate and higher-order risk preferences for quality of life (QoL) and longevity, the two attributes of the Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) model. We observe preferences for a positive correlation between these attributes and for pooling together a fixed loss in one of the attributes and a mean-zero risk in the other, and for pooling together mean-zero risks in QoL and longevity. The findings indicate that higher-order risk preferences are stronger for health than for money. Furthermore, we test if preferences for a risky treatment for a disease affecting only QoL, depend on life expectancy. We find no such a relation, but there is a positive relation between riskiness of a comorbidity affecting life expectancy and risk aversion for a QoL treatment. We therefore observe no definitive deviation from the QALY model, although the model is more robust when expected longevity is high. Our findings suggest that the current practice of cost-effectiveness analysis should be generalized to account for risk aversion in QoL and longevity, and higher-order preferences.

Eliciting risk preferences that predict risky health behavior: A comparison of two approaches.

Information on attitudes to risk could increase understanding of and explain risky health behaviors. We investigate two approaches to eliciting risk preferences in the health domain, a novel "indirect" lottery elicitation approach with health states as outcomes and a "direct" approach where respondents are asked directly about their willingness to take risks. We compare the ability of the two approaches to predict health-related risky behaviors in a general adult population. We also investigate a potential framing effect in the indirect lottery elicitation approach. We find that risk preferences elicited using the direct approach can better predict health-related risky behavior than those elicited using the indirect approach. Moreover, a seemingly innocuous change to the framing of the lottery question results in significantly different risk preference estimates, and conflicting conclusions about the ability of the indicators to predict risky health behaviors.

Life satisfaction: The role of domain-specific reference points.

In the evaluation of well-being, it is not only important what people have in absolute terms, but also how this compares to reference points in relative terms. We explore the relevance of relative comparisons by testing the effect of people's self-rated position on potential reference points for income and health on their subjective well-being. We used Multiple Discrepancies Theory as a framework to identify seven potentially relevant reference points for income and health. A representative sample (N = 550) of the Netherlands assessed their income and health relative to these reference points. In addition, we elicited monthly household income, health status (EQ-5D-5L), and subjective well-being (SWLS). In line with the literature, we found a negative convex relationship between subjective well-being and age and a positive relationship with being employed, income, and health. For income, subjective well-being was also associated with how current income compared to respondents' needs and progression over time, and for health especially with how current health compared to what they felt they deserved. Our findings suggest that income and health are important for subjective well-being both in absolute and relative terms. We found negative effects on life satisfaction if some of the domain specific reference points were not met.

What is it going to be, TTO or SG? A direct test of the validity of health state valuation.

Standard gamble (SG) typically yields higher health state valuations than time trade-off (TTO), which may be caused by biases affecting both methods. It has been suggested that TTO yields more accurate health state valuations, because TTO is subject to both upward and downward biases that may cancel out. Verifying this claim, however, would require a golden standard to test validity against. In this study, we attempted to provide a first direct test of the validity of health state valuation. A total of 119 students completed five TTO and SG tasks. Afterwards, their health state valuations elicited with TTO and SG were shown to them in an interactive graph. Respondents were asked to indicate which of the methods represented their valuation of a health state best. They could also adjust their valuation. Overall, we found that respondents indicated that TTO valuations better reflected health state valuations, a result that was more pronounced for more severe health states. When offered the opportunity, on average, respondents adjusted health state valuations downwards. These findings may have implications for future work on (bias correction in) health state valuations.

The Corrective Approach: Policy Implications of Recent Developments in QALY Measurement Based on Prospect Theory.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Common health state valuation methodology, such as time tradeoff (TTO) and standard gamble (SG), is typically applied under several descriptively invalid assumptions, for example, related to linear quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) or expected utility (EU) theory. Hence, the current use of results from health state valuation exercises may lead to biased QALY weights, which may in turn affect decisions based on economic evaluations using such weights. Methods have been proposed to correct responses for the biases associated with different health state valuation techniques. In this article we outline the relevance of prospect theory (PT), which has become the dominant descriptive alternative to EU, for health state valuations and economic evaluations. METHODS AND RESULTS: We provide an overview of work in this field, which aims to remove biases from QALY weights. We label this "the corrective approach." By quantifying PT parameters, such as loss aversion, probability weighting, and nonlinear utility, it may be possible to correct TTO and SG responses for biases in an attempt to produce more valid estimates of preferences for health states. Through straightforward examples, this article illustrates the effects of this corrective approach and discusses several unresolved issues that currently limit the relevance of corrected weights for policy. CONCLUSIONS: Suggestions for research addressing these issues are provided. Nonetheless, if validly corrected health state valuations become available, we argue in favor of using these in economic evaluations.

Rabin's paradox for health outcomes.

Many health economic studies assume expected utility maximisation, with typically a concave utility function to capture risk aversion. Given these assumptions, Rabin's paradox (RP) involves preferences over mixed gambles yielding moderate outcomes, where turning down such gambles imply absurd levels of risk aversion. Although RP is considered a classic critique of expected utility, no paper has as of yet fully tested its preferences within individuals. In an experiment we report a direct test of RP in the health domain, which was previously only considered in the economic literature, showing it may have pervasive implications here too. Our paper supports the shift towards alternative, empirically valid models, such as prospect theory, also in the health domain. These alternative models are able to accommodate Rabin's paradox by allowing reference-dependence and loss aversion.

QALYs without bias? Nonparametric correction of time trade-off and standard gamble weights based on prospect theory.

Common health state valuation methodologies, such as standard gamble (SG) and time trade-off (TTO), typically produce different weights for identical health states. We attempt to alleviate these differences by correcting the confounding influences modeled in prospect theory: loss aversion and probability weighting. Furthermore, we correct for nonlinear utility of life duration. In contrast to earlier attempts at correcting TTO and SG weights, we measure and correct all these tenets simultaneously, using newly developed nonparametric methodology. These corrections were applied to three less-than-perfect health states, measured with TTO and SG. We found considerable loss aversion and probability weighting for both gains and losses in life years, and we observe concave utility for gains and convex utility for losses in life years. After correction, the initially significant differences in weights between TTO and SG disappeared for all health states. Our findings suggest new opportunities to account for bias in health state valuations but also the need for further validation of resulting weights.

Peer effects in health valuation: the relation between rating of contemporaries' health and own health.

BACKGROUND: Most health valuation studies assume that individuals' health valuations do not depend on social comparisons. However, there is some evidence that this assumption is not satisfied in practice. This paper tests whether self-rated health by means of a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) is related to how one perceives the health of one's contemporaries, while accounting for one's health as classified by the EQ-5D classification system. METHODS: In a large sample (n = 1500), representative of the general public, we use a VAS to rate respondents' own health and their assessment of their contemporaries' health. In addition, we directly ask them whether they perceive their health to be better, the same, or worse than their contemporaries, and we measure their own health according to the EQ-5D-5 L. RESULTS: We find a positive relationship between own health rating and contemporaries' health rating, after controlling for the respondents' own health as classified according to the EQ-5D. Furthermore, we observe a discrepancy between relative health vis-à-vis age peers as measured by an ordinal comparison and relative health as measured by a VAS. Finally, respondents, especially women, tended to overestimate the health of other people of their age. CONCLUSIONS: We provide evidence that people's own health rating is related to the perception of health of contemporaries. Our results indicate that knowledge about a respondent's perception of others' health is useful in explaining health state valuations.

Ambiguity preferences for health.

In most medical decisions, probabilities are ambiguous and not objectively known. Empirical evidence suggests that people's preferences are affected by ambiguity. Health economic analyses generally ignore ambiguity preferences and assume that they are the same as preferences under risk. We show how health preferences can be measured under ambiguity, and we compare them with health preferences under risk. We assume a general ambiguity model that includes many of the ambiguity models that have been proposed in the literature. For health gains, ambiguity preferences and risk preferences were indeed the same. For health losses, they differed with subjects being more pessimistic in decision under ambiguity. Utility and loss aversion were the same for risk and ambiguity. Our results imply that reducing the clinical ambiguity of health losses has more impact than reducing the ambiguity of health gains, that utilities elicited with known probabilities may not carry over to an ambiguous setting, and that ambiguity aversion may impact value of information analyses if losses are involved. These findings are highly relevant for medical decision making, because most medical interventions involve losses.

Are Health State Valuations from the General Public Biased? A Test of Health State Reference Dependency Using Self-assessed Health and an Efficient Discrete Choice Experiment.

Health state valuations of patients and non-patients are not the same, whereas health state values obtained from general population samples are a weighted average of both. The latter constitutes an often-overlooked source of bias. This study investigates the resulting bias and tests for the impact of reference dependency on health state valuations using an efficient discrete choice experiment administered to a Dutch nationally representative sample of 788 respondents. A Bayesian discrete choice experiment design consisting of eight sets of 24 (matched pairwise) choice tasks was developed, with each set providing full identification of the included parameters. Mixed logit models were used to estimate health state preferences with respondents' own health included as an additional predictor. Our results indicate that respondents with impaired health worse than or equal to the health state levels under evaluation have approximately 30% smaller health state decrements. This confirms that reference dependency can be observed in general population samples and affirms the relevance of prospect theory in health state valuations. At the same time, the limited number of respondents with severe health impairments does not appear to bias social tariffs as obtained from general population samples. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Deriving time discounting correction factors for TTO tariffs.

The Time Trade-off (TTO) method is a popular method for valuing health state utilities and is frequently used in economic evaluations. However, this method produces utilities that are distorted by several biases. One important bias entails the failure to incorporate time discounting. This paper aims to measure time discounting for health outcomes in a sample representative for the general population. In particular, we estimate TTO scores alongside time discounting in order to derive a set of correction factors that can be employed to correct raw TTO scores for the downward bias caused by time discounting. We find substantial positive correction factors, which are increasing with the severity of the health state. Furthermore, higher discounting is found when using more severe health states in the discounting elicitation task. More research is needed to further develop discount rate elicitation procedures and test their validity, especially in general public samples. Moreover, future research should investigate the correction of TTO values for other biases as well, such as loss aversion, and to develop a criterion to test the external validity of TTO scores.

Would you rather be ill now, or later?

The time tradeoff (TTO) method is frequently used to calculate the quality adjustment of the quality adjusted life year and is therefore an important element in the calculation of the benefits of medical interventions. New specifications of TTO, known as 'lead time' TTO and 'lag time' TTO, have been developed to overcome methodological issues of the 'classic' TTO. In the lead time TTO, ill-health is explicitly placed in the future, after a period of good health, whereas in lag time TTO, a health state starts immediately and is followed by a 'lag time' of good health. In this study, we take advantage of these timing properties of lead and lag time TTO. In particular, we use data from a previous study that employed lead and lag time TTO to estimate their implied discounting parameters. We show that individuals prefer being ill later, rather than now, with larger per-period discount rates for longer durations of the health states.

Lead time TTO: leading to better health state valuations?

Preference elicitation tasks for better than dead (BTD) and worse than dead (WTD) health states vary in the conventional time trade-off (TTO) procedure, casting doubt on uniformity of scale. 'Lead time TTO' (LT-TTO) was recently introduced to overcome the problem. We tested different specifications of LT-TTO in comparison with TTO in a within-subject design. We elicited preferences for six health states and employed an intertemporal ranking task as a benchmark to test the validity of the two methods. We also tested constant proportional trade-offs (CPTO), while correcting for discounting, and the effect of extending the lead time if a health state is considered substantially WTD. LT-TTO produced lower values for BTD states and higher values for WTD states. The validity of CPTO varied across tasks, but it was higher for LT-TTO than for TTO. Results indicate that the ratio of lead time to disease time has a greater impact on results than the total duration of the time frame. The intertemporal ranking task could not discriminate between TTO and LT-TTO.

The effect of duration and time preference on the gap between adult and child health state valuations in time trade-off.

Composite time trade-off (cTTO) utilities have been found to be higher when adults value health states for children than for themselves. It is not clear if these differences reflect adults assigning truly higher utilities to the same health state in different perspectives, or if they are caused by other factors, which are not accounted for in the valuation procedure. We test if the difference between children's and adults' cTTO valuations changes if a longer duration than the standard 10 years is used. Personal interviews with a representative sample of 151 adults in the UK were conducted. We employed the cTTO method to estimate utilities of four different health states, where adults considered states both from their own and a 10-year-old child's perspective, for durations of 10 and 20 years. We corrected the cTTO valuations for perspective-specific time preferences in a separate task, again for both perspectives. We replicate the finding that cTTO utilities are higher for the child perspective than for the adult perspective, although the difference is only significant when controlling for other variables in a mixed effects regression. Time preferences are close to 0 on average, and smaller for children than adults. After correcting TTO utilities for time preferences, the effect of perspective is no longer significant. No differences were found for cTTO tasks completed with a 10- or 20-year duration. Our results suggest that the child-adult gap is partially related to differences in time preferences and, hence, that correcting cTTO utilities for these preferences could be useful.

Time and lexicographic preferences in the valuation of EQ-5D-Y with time trade-off methodology.

In the valuation of EQ-5D-Y-3L, adult respondents are asked to complete composite time trade-off (cTTO) tasks for a 10-year-old child. Earlier work has shown that cTTO utilities elicited in such a child perspective are generally higher than when adults take their own perspective. We explore how differences in time preference in child and adult perspectives could explain this effect. Furthermore, as cTTO valuation in a child perspective involves explicit consideration of immediate death for a child, we also consider how cTTO utilities could be affected by decision-makers lexicographically avoiding death in children. We report the results of an experiment in which 219 respondents valued 5 health states in both adult and child perspectives with either a standard cTTO or a lead-time TTO only approach, in which immediate death is less focal. Time preferences were measured in both perspectives. Our results suggest that utilities were lower when lead-time TTO, rather than cTTO, was used. We find large heterogeneity in time preference in both perspectives, with predominantly negative time preference. The influence of time preferences on utilities, however, was small, and correcting for time preferences did not reduce differences between utilities elicited in both perspectives. Surprisingly, we found more evidence for differences in utilities between adult and child perspectives when lead-time TTO was used. Overall, these results suggest that time and lexicographic preferences affect time trade-off valuation in child and adult perspectives, but are not the explanation for differences between these perspectives. We discuss the implications of our findings for EQ-5D-Y-3L valuation.

An experimental investigation of social risk preferences for health.

In this paper, we use the risk apportionment technique of Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) to study higher order risk preferences for others' health as well as ex-ante and ex-post inequality preferences for social risky distributions, and their interaction. In an experiment on a sample of university students acting as impartial spectators, we observe risk aversion towards social health losses and a dislike of ex-ante inequality. In addition, evidence for ex-post inequality seeking is much weaker than evidence for ex-ante inequality aversion. Because ex-ante inequality aversion is unrelated to risk aversion, we conclude that simple forms of utilitarianism are not relevant for individual judgment of social risk over health. Last, our investigation of precautionary distribution, which would occur when one particular group in the society suffers from background health risk, shows substantial polarization of preferences. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11238-023-09928-w.