Physician Turnover in the United States.

BACKGROUND: Medical groups, health systems, and professional associations are concerned about potential increases in physician turnover, which may affect patient access and quality of care. OBJECTIVE: To examine whether turnover has changed over time and whether it is higher for certain types of physicians or practice settings. DESIGN: The authors developed a novel method using 100% of traditional Medicare billing to create national estimates of turnover. Standardized turnover rates were compared by physician, practice, and patient characteristics. SETTING: Traditional Medicare, 2010 to 2020. PARTICIPANTS: Physicians billing traditional Medicare. MEASUREMENTS: Indicators of physician turnover-physicians who stopped practicing and those who moved from one practice to another-and their sum. RESULTS: The annual rate of turnover increased from 5.3% to 7.2% between 2010 and 2014, was stable through 2017, and increased modestly in 2018 to 7.6%. Most of the increase from 2010 to 2014 came from physicians who stopped practicing increasing from 1.6% to 3.1%; physicians moving increased modestly from 3.7% to 4.2%. Modest but statistically significant (P < 0.001) differences existed across rurality, physician sex, specialty, and patient characteristics. In the second and third quarters of 2020, quarterly turnover was slightly lower than in the corresponding quarters of 2019. LIMITATION: Measurement was based on traditional Medicare claims. CONCLUSION: Over the past decade, physician turnover rates have had periods of increase and stability. These early data, covering the first 3 quarters of 2020, give no indication yet of the COVID-19 pandemic increasing turnover, although continued tracking of turnover is warranted. This novel method will enable future monitoring and further investigations into turnover. PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: The Physicians Foundation Center for the Study of Physician Practice and Leadership.

Association Between Individual Primary Care Physician Merit-based Incentive Payment System Score and Measures of Process and Patient Outcomes.

Importance: The Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) influences reimbursement for hundreds of thousands of US physicians, but little is known about whether program performance accurately captures the quality of care they provide. Objective: To examine whether primary care physicians' MIPS scores are associated with performance on process and outcome measures. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cross-sectional study of 80 246 US primary care physicians participating in the MIPS program in 2019. Exposures: MIPS score. Main Outcomes and Measures: The association between physician MIPS scores and performance on 5 unadjusted process measures, 6 adjusted outcome measures, and a composite outcome measure. Results: The study population included 3.4 million patients attributed to 80 246 primary care physicians, including 4773 physicians with low MIPS scores (≤30), 6151 physicians with medium MIPS scores (>30-75), and 69 322 physicians with high MIPS scores (>75). Compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly worse mean performance on 3 of 5 process measures: diabetic eye examinations (56.1% vs 63.2%; difference, -7.1 percentage points [95% CI, -8.0 to -6.2]; P < .001), diabetic HbA1c screening (84.6% vs 89.4%; difference, -4.8 percentage points [95% CI, -5.4 to -4.2]; P < .001), and mammography screening (58.2% vs 70.4%; difference, -12.2 percentage points [95% CI, -13.1 to -11.4]; P < .001) but significantly better mean performance on rates of influenza vaccination (78.0% vs 76.8%; difference, 1.2 percentage points [95% CI, 0.0 to 2.5]; P = .045] and tobacco screening (95.0% vs 94.1%; difference, 0.9 percentage points [95% CI, 0.3 to 1.5]; P = .001). MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with risk-adjusted patient outcomes: compared with physicians with high MIPS scores, physicians with low MIPS scores had significantly better mean performance on 1 outcome (307.6 vs 316.4 emergency department visits per 1000 patients; difference, -8.9 [95% CI, -13.7 to -4.1]; P < .001), worse performance on 1 outcome (255.4 vs 225.2 all-cause hospitalizations per 1000 patients; difference, 30.2 [95% CI, 24.8 to 35.7]; P < .001), and did not have significantly different performance on 4 ambulatory care-sensitive admission outcomes. Nineteen percent of physicians with low MIPS scores had composite outcomes performance in the top quintile, while 21% of physicians with high MIPS scores had outcomes in the bottom quintile. Physicians with low MIPS scores but superior outcomes cared for more medically complex and socially vulnerable patients, compared with physicians with low MIPS scores and poor outcomes. Conclusions and Relevance: Among US primary care physicians in 2019, MIPS scores were inconsistently associated with performance on process and outcome measures. These findings suggest that the MIPS program may be ineffective at measuring and incentivizing quality improvement among US physicians.

Physician Practice Leaders' Perceptions of Medicare's Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS).

BACKGROUND: Medicare's Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major value-based purchasing program. Little is known about how physician practice leaders view the program and its benefits and challenges. OBJECTIVE: To understand practice leaders' perceptions of MIPS. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: Interviews were conducted from December 12, 2019, to June 23, 2020, with leaders of 30 physician practices of various sizes and specialties across the USA. Practices were randomly selected using the Medical Group Management Association's membership database. Practices included small primary care and general surgery practices (1-9 physicians); medium primary care and general surgery practices (10-25 physicians); and large multispecialty practices (50 or more physicians). Participants were asked about their perceptions of MIPS measures; the program's effect on patient care; administrative burden; and rationale for participation. MAIN MEASURES: Major themes related to practice participation in MIPS. KEY RESULTS: Interviews were conducted with 30 practices representing all US census regions. Six major themes emerged: (1) MIPS is understood as a continuation of previous value-based payment programs and a precursor to future programs; (2) measures are more relevant to primary care practices than other specialties; (3) leaders are conflicted on whether the program improves patient care; (4) MIPS creates a substantial administrative burden, exacerbated by annual programmatic changes; (5) incentives are small relative to the effort needed to participate; and (6) external support for participation can be helpful. Many participants indicated that their practice only participated in MIPS to avoid financial penalties; some reported that physicians cared for fewer patients due to the program's administrative burden. CONCLUSIONS: Practice leaders reported several challenges related to MIPS, including irrelevant measures, administrative burden, frequent programmatic changes, and small incentives. They held mixed views on whether the program improves patient care. These findings may be useful to policymakers hoping to improve MIPS.

Association Between Patient Social Risk and Physician Performance Scores in the First Year of the Merit-based Incentive Payment System.

Importance: The US Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based payment program aimed at improving quality and reducing costs. Little is known about how physicians' performance varies by social risk of their patients. Objective: To determine the relationship between patient social risk and physicians' scores in the first year of MIPS. Design, Setting, and Participants: Cross-sectional study of physicians participating in MIPS in 2017. Exposures: Physicians in the highest quintile of proportion of dually eligible patients served; physicians in the 3 middle quintiles; and physicians in the lowest quintile. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcome was the 2017 composite MIPS score (range, 0-100; higher scores indicate better performance). Payment rates were adjusted -4% to 4% based on scores. Results: The final sample included 284 544 physicians (76.1% men, 60.1% with ≥20 years in practice, 11.9% in rural location, 26.8% hospital-based, and 24.6% in primary care). The mean composite MIPS score was 73.3. Physicians in the highest risk quintile cared for 52.0% of dually eligible patients; those in the 3 middle risk quintiles, 21.8%; and those in the lowest risk quintile, 6.6%. After adjusting for medical complexity, the mean MIPS score for physicians in the highest risk quintile (64.7) was lower relative to scores for physicians in the middle 3 (75.4) and lowest (75.9) risk quintiles (difference for highest vs middle 3, -10.7 [95% CI, -11.0 to -10.4]; highest vs lowest, -11.2 [95% CI, -11.6 to -10.8]; P < .001). This relationship was found across specialties except psychiatry. Compared with physicians in the lowest risk quintile, physicians in the highest risk quintile were more likely to work in rural areas (12.7% vs 6.4%; difference, 6.3 percentage points [95% CI, 6.0 to 6.7]; P < .001) but less likely to care for more than 1000 Medicare beneficiaries (9.4% vs 17.8%; difference, -8.3 percentage points [95% CI, -8.7 to -8.0]; P < .001) or to have more than 20 years in practice (56.7% vs 70.6%; difference, -13.9 percentage points [95% CI, -14.4 to -13.3]; P < .001). For physicians in the highest risk quintile, several characteristics were associated with higher MIPS scores, including practicing in a larger group (mean score, 82.4 for more than 50 physicians vs 46.1 for 1-5 physicians; difference, 36.2 [95% CI, 35.3 to 37.2]; P < .001) and reporting through an alternative payment model (mean score, 79.5 for alternative payment model vs 59.9 for reporting as individual; difference, 19.7 [95% CI, 18.9 to 20.4]; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: In this cross-sectional analysis of physicians who participated in the first year of the Medicare MIPS program, physicians with the highest proportion of patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid had significantly lower MIPS scores compared with other physicians. Further research is needed to understand the reasons underlying the differences in physician MIPS scores by levels of patient social risk.

Real-time Feedback in Pay-for-Performance: Does More Information Lead to Improvement?

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been used expansively to improve quality of care delivered by physicians. However, to what extent P4P works through the provision of information versus financial incentives is poorly understood. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether an increase in information feedback without changes to financial incentives resulted in improved physician performance within an existing P4P program. INTERVENTION/EXPOSURE: Implementation of a new registry enabling real-time feedback to physicians on quality measure performance. DESIGN: Observational, predictive piecewise model at the physician-measure level to examine whether registry introduction associated with performance changes. We used detailed physician quality measure data 3 years prior to registry implementation (2010-2012) and 2 years after implementation (2014-2015). We also linked physician-level data including age, gender, and board certification; group-level data including registry click rates; and patient panel data including chronic conditions. PARTICIPANTS: Four hundred thirty-four physicians continuously affiliated with Advocate from 2010 to 2015. MAIN MEASURES: Physician performance on ten quality metrics. KEY RESULTS: We found no consistent pattern of improvement associated with the availability of real-time information across ten measures. Relative to predicted performance without the registry, average performance increased for two measures (childhood immunization status-rotavirus (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-medical attention for nephropathy (p = 0.024)) and decreased for three measures (childhood immunization status-influenza (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-HbA1c testing (p < 0.001) and poor HbA1c control (p < 0.001)). Results were consistent for subgroup analysis on those most able to improve, i.e., physicians in the bottom tertile of performance prior to registry introduction. Physicians who improved most were in groups that accessed the registry more than those who improved least (8.0 vs 10.0 times per week, p = 0.010). CONCLUSIONS: More frequent provision of information, provided in real-time, was insufficient to improve physician performance in an existing P4P program with high baseline performance. Results suggest that electronic registries may not themselves drive performance improvement. Future work should consider testing information feedback enhancements with financial incentives.

Role of supply chain intermediaries in steering hospital product choice: Group Purchasing Organizations and biosimilars.

Over 95% of hospitals in the United States use pooling alliances, known as Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs), to purchase medications, devices, and supplies. While GPOs create savings for hospitals through lowered prices and reduced administrative burden, critics allege that these supply chain intermediaries reduce competition, particularly if GPOs concentrate purchasing from larger, dominant manufacturers. Using a mixed-methods design, we studied whether GPOs influence hospital purchasing behavior and explored the contracting mechanisms used by GPOs. Focusing on 4 high-cost biologic molecules that face competition from generic-like biosimilars between 2015 and 2019, we found that biosimilar uptake was 16%-23% higher among Traditional Medicare patients in hospitals associated with 2 of the 3 top GPOs as compared with smaller GPOs. The increase in biosimilar use was driven by single biosimilar brands that varied by GPO. Based on qualitative interviews, these 2 GPOs used more aggressive contracting strategies to steer member hospitals to specific biosimilar brands. To date, the use of GPOs and these aggressive contracting strategies appear to have increased biosimilar use, suggesting savings for payers and patients. However, single-source GPO contracting could inhibit competition or create shortages in the long term. Transparency on GPO practices and pricing strategies is needed for further GPO evaluations.

Meeting The Needs Of Socially Vulnerable Patients: Views Of ACO Leaders On Moving From Intent To Action.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has placed growing emphasis on social drivers of health, but little is known about how accountable care organizations (ACOs) aim to meet the needs of vulnerable patients. During September-December 2022, we interviewed leaders of forty-nine ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Participants were asked about strategies to identify socially vulnerable patients, programs that addressed their needs, and Medicare reforms that could support their efforts. Seven themes emerged: ACOs were in the early stages of collecting social needs data; leaders were frustrated by an incomplete ability to act on such data; ACOs tended to stratify patients by medical, rather than social, risk; some ACOs have introduced pilot programs to address challenges, including social isolation and drug costs; programs were often payer agnostic; rural ACOs faced unique challenges; and Medicare reforms related to reimbursement, logistical support, quality metrics, and patient benefits could support ACO efforts. These findings suggest that the MSSP alone has not been sufficient to promote consistent investment in social needs provision at most ACOs. Policy makers may want to consider more direct support and incentives for health care organizations, or greater investment in non-health care sectors, to help socially vulnerable patients.

Accountable Care Organization Leader Perspectives on the Medicare Shared Savings Program: A Qualitative Study.

Importance: The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) includes more than 400 accountable care organizations (ACOs) and is among the largest and longest running value-based payment efforts in the US. However, given recent program reforms and other changes in the health care system, the experiences and perspectives of ACO leaders remain incompletely characterized. Objective: To understand the priorities, strategies, and challenges of ACO leaders in MSSP. Design, Setting, and Participants: In this qualitative study, interviews were conducted with leaders of 49 ACOs of differing sizes, leadership structures, and geographies from MSSP between September 29 and December 29, 2022. Participants were asked about their clinical and care management efforts; how they engaged frontline clinicians; the process by which they distributed shared savings and added or removed practices; and other factors that they believed influenced their success or failure in the program. Main Outcomes and Measures: Leader perspectives on major themes related to ACO initiatives, performance improvement, and the recruitment, engagement, and retention of clinicians. Results: Of the 49 ACOs interviewed, 34 were hospital-associated ACOs (69%), 35 were medium or large (>10 000 attributed beneficiaries) (71%), and 17 were rural (35%). The ACOs had a mean (SD) tenure of 8.1 (2.1) years in MSSP. Five major themes emerged: (1) ACO leaders reported a focus on annual wellness visits, coding practices, and care transitions; (2) leaders used both relationship-based and metrics-based strategies to promote clinician engagement; (3) ACOs generally distributed half or more of shared savings to participating practices; (4) ACO recruitment and retention efforts were increasingly influenced by market competition; and (5) some hospital-associated ACOs faced misaligned incentives. Conclusions and Relevance: In this study, the ACO leaders reported varied approaches to promoting clinician alignment with ACO goals, an emphasis on increasing annual wellness visits, and new pressures related to growth of other care models. Policymakers hoping to modify or expand the program may wish to incorporate these perspectives into future reforms.

The Role Of Financial Incentives In Biosimilar Uptake In Medicare: Evidence From The 340B Program.

Biosimilar drugs-lower-cost alternatives to expensive biologic drugs-have the potential to slow the growth of US drug spending. However, rates of biosimilar uptake have varied across hospital outpatient providers. We investigated whether the 340B Drug Pricing Program, which offers eligible hospitals substantial discounts on drug purchases, inhibits biosimilar uptake. Almost one-third of US hospitals participate in the 340B program. Using a regression discontinuity design and two high-volume biologics with biosimilar competitors, filgrastim and infliximab, we estimated that 340B program eligibility was associated with a 22.9-percentage-point reduction in biosimilar adoption. In addition, 340B program eligibility was associated with 13.3 more biologic administrations annually per hospital and $17,919 more biologic revenue per hospital. Our findings suggest that the program inhibited biosimilar uptake, possibly as a result of financial incentives making reference drugs more profitable than biosimilar medications.

After-hours care and its coordination with primary care in the U.S.

BACKGROUND: Despite expectations that medical homes provide "24 × 7 coverage" there is little to guide primary care practices in developing sustainable models for accessible and coordinated after-hours care. OBJECTIVE: To identify and describe models of after-hours care in the U.S. that are delivered in primary care sites or coordinated with a patient's usual primary care provider. DESIGN: Qualitative analysis of data from in-depth telephone interviews. SETTING: Primary care practices in 16 states and the organizations they partner with to provide after-hours coverage. PARTICIPANTS: Forty-four primary care physicians, practice managers, nurses and health plan representatives from 28 organizations. APPROACH: Analyses examined after-hours care models, facilitators, barriers and lessons learned. RESULTS: Based on 28 organizations interviewed, five broad models of after-hours care were identified, ranging in the extent to which they provide continuity and patient access. Key themes included: 1) The feasibility of a model varies for many reasons, including patient preferences and needs, the local health care market supply, and financial compensation; 2) A shared electronic health record and systematic notification procedures were extremely helpful in maintaining information continuity between providers; and 3) after-hours care is best implemented as part of a larger practice approach to access and continuity. CONCLUSION: After-hours care coordinated with a patient's usual primary care provider is facilitated by consideration of patient demand, provider capacity, a shared electronic health record, systematic notification procedures and a broader practice approach to improving primary care access and continuity. Payer support is important to increasing patients' access to after-hours care.

Association of Physician Management Companies and Private Equity Investment With Commercial Health Care Prices Paid to Anesthesia Practitioners.

IMPORTANCE: Physician management companies (PMCs), often backed by private equity (PE), are increasingly providing staffing and management services to health care facilities, yet little is known of their influence on prices. OBJECTIVE: To study changes in prices paid to practitioners (anesthesiologists and certified registered nurse anesthetists) before and after an outpatient facility contracted with a PMC. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This retrospective cohort study used difference-in-differences methods to compare price changes before and after a facility contracted with a PMC with facilities that did not and to compare differences between PMCs with and without PE investment. Commercial claims data (2012-2017) from 3 large national insurers in the Health Care Cost Institute database were combined with a novel data set of PMC facility contracts to identify prices paid to anesthesia practitioners in hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers. The cohort included 2992 facilities that never contracted with a PMC and 672 facilities that contracted with a PMC between 2012 and 2017, collectively representing 2 255 933 anesthesia claims. EXPOSURES: Temporal variation in facility-level exposure to PMC contracts for anesthesia services. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Main outcomes were (1) allowed amounts and the unit price (allowed amounts standardized per unit of service) paid to anesthesia practitioners; and (2) the probability that a practitioner was out of network. RESULTS: From before to after the PMC contract period, allowed amounts increased by 16.5% (+$116.39; 95% CI, $76.11 to $156.67; P < .001), and the unit price increased by 18.7% (+$18.79; 95% CI, $12.73 to $24.84; P < .001) in PMC facilities relative to non-PMC facilities. Results did not show evidence that anesthesia practitioners were moved out of network (+2.25; 95% CI, -2.56 to 7.06; P < .36). In subsample analyses, PMCs without PE investment increased allowed amounts by 12.9% (+$89.88; 95% CI, $42.07 to $137.69; P < .001), while PE-backed PMCs (representing half of the PMCs in the sample) increased allowed amounts by 26.0% ($187.06; 95% CI, $133.59 to $240.52; P < .001). Similar price increases were observed for unit prices. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: In this cohort study, prices paid to anesthesia practitioners increased after hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers contracted with a PMC and were substantially higher if the PMC received PE investment. This research provides insights into the role of corporate ownership in health care relevant to policy makers, payers, practitioners, and patients.

Physician prices and low-value services: evidence from general internal medicine.

OBJECTIVES: To assess the cross-sectional relationship between prices paid to physicians by commercial insurers and the provision of low-value services. STUDY DESIGN: Observational study design using Health Care Cost Institute claims representing 3 large national commercial insurers. METHODS: The main outcome was count of 19 potential low-value services in 2014. The secondary outcome was total spending on the low-value services. Independent variables of interest were price quintiles based on each physician's mean geographically adjusted price of a mid-level office visit, the most commonly billed service by general internal medicine (GIM) physicians. We estimated the association between physician price quintile and provision of low-value services via negative binomial or generalized linear models with adjustments for measure, region, and patient and physician characteristics. RESULTS: This study included 750,452 commercially insured patients attributed to 28,951 GIM physicians. In 2014, the mean geographically adjusted price for physicians in the highest price quintile was $122.6 vs $54.7 for physicians in the lowest quintile ($67.9 difference; 95% CI, $67.5-$68.3). Relative to patients attributed to the lowest-priced physicians, those attributed to the highest-priced physicians received 3.6, or 22.9%, fewer low-value services per 100 patients (95% CI, 2.7-4.7 services per 100 patients). Spending on low-value services attributed to the highest-priced physicians was 10.9% higher ($520 difference per 100 patients; 95% CI, $167-$872). CONCLUSIONS: Commercially insured patients of high-priced physicians received fewer low-value services, although spending on low-value services was higher. More research is needed to understand why high-priced providers deliver fewer low-value services and whether physician prices are correlated with other measures of quality.

Telemedicine catches on: changes in the utilization of telemedicine services during the COVID-19 pandemic.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the degree of telemedicine expansion overall and across patient subpopulations and diagnoses. We hypothesized that telemedicine visits would increase substantially due to the need for continuity of care despite the disruptive effects of COVID-19. STUDY DESIGN: A retrospective study of health insurance claims for telemedicine visits from January 1, 2018, through March 10, 2020 (prepandemic period), and March 11, 2020, through October 31, 2020 (pandemic period). METHODS: We analyzed claims from 1,589,777 telemedicine visits that were submitted to Independence Blue Cross (Independence) from telemedicine-only providers and providers who traditionally deliver care in person. The primary exposure was the combination of individual behavior changes, state stay-at-home orders, and the Independence expansion of billing policies for telemedicine. The comparison population consisted of telemedicine visits in the prepandemic period. RESULTS: Telemedicine increased rapidly from a mean (SD) of 773 (155) weekly visits in prepandemic 2020 to 45,632 (19,937) weekly visits in the pandemic period. During the pandemic period, a greater proportion of telemedicine users were older, had Medicare Advantage insurance plans, had existing chronic conditions, or resided in predominantly non-Hispanic Black or African American Census tracts compared with during the prepandemic period. A significant increase in telemedicine claims containing a mental health-related diagnosis was observed. CONCLUSIONS: Telemedicine expanded rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic across a broad range of clinical conditions and demographics. Although levels declined later in 2020, telemedicine utilization remained markedly higher than 2019 and 2018 levels. Trends suggest that telemedicine will likely play a key role in postpandemic care delivery.

Changes in Medicare Part B Spending for Biologic Drugs After Biosimilar Entry Into the Market.

This cross-sectional study describes changes in annual Medicare Part B spending for biologic drugs after biosimilar entry, focusing on the first 4 products to experience biosimilar competition: filgrastim, infliximab, epoetin alpha, and pegfilgrastim.

Physician, Practice, and Patient Characteristics Associated With Biosimilar Use in Medicare Recipients.

Importance: Biosimilars, or highly similar versions of complex biologic drugs, have the potential to slow drug spending growth; however, biosimilar uptake in the United States has been slow. Little is known about barriers to biosimilar uptake following drug launch. Objective: To examine the patient, physician, and practice characteristics associated with biosimilar use in the Medicare population. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study used regression analysis to estimate the association between biosimilar use and various characteristics. Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries who received a filgrastim product or an infliximab product between the launch of a class's first biosimilar (quarter 3 2015 for filgrastim-sndz and quarter 4 2016 for infliximab-dyyb) and December 2018. Data analysis was conducted from March to November 2020. Exposures: Patient demographic characteristics and product clinical indications; physician demographic characteristics, specialty, and volume of filgrastim or infliximab biologic administration; hospital size, ownership, 340B status, academic medical center status, and system affiliation; physician office size and multispecialty status. Main Outcomes and Measures: Administration of a filgrastim or infliximab biosimilar. Results: The final filgrastim sample included 25 870 patients (11 857 [45.8%] men; 14 224 [55.0%] aged 65-74 years; 22 617 [87.4%] White individuals) who had 259 178 administrations (79 017 [30.5%] biosimilar administrations), and the final infliximab sample included 14 786 patients (4765 [32.2%] men; 8773 [59.3%] aged 65-74 years; 13 467 [91.1%] White individuals) who had 174 973 administrations (9012 [5.2%] biosimilar administrations). In adjusted analyses, no patient demographic characteristics and 2 of 9 clinical indications (22.2%) were associated with biosimilar use (filgrastim, neutropenia: adjusted difference, -2.0 [95% CI, -3.9 to -0.2] percentage points; P = .03; infliximab, Crohn disease: adjusted difference, -1.8 [95% CI, -2.9 to -0.8] percentage points; P = .001). Several physician characteristics were associated with biosimilar administrations, including high filgrastim or infliximab prescribing volume (high vs low volume, filgrastim: adjusted difference, 3.6 [95% CI, 1.5 to 5.8] percentage points; P = .001; infliximab: adjusted difference, 1.2 [95% CI, 0.3 to 2.2] percentage points; P = .007) and specialty (eg, hematologist-oncologists vs primary care, filgrastim: adjusted difference, -3.0 [95% CI, -5.4 to -0.5] percentage points; P = .02). Numerous practice characteristics were associated with biosimilar use, including practice setting (outpatient hospital department vs office practice, filgrastim: adjusted difference, -16.1 [95% CI, -18.1 to -14.1] percentage points; P < .001; infliximab: adjusted difference, 3.0 [95% CI, 2.2 to 3.7] percentage points; P < .001) and hospital outpatient department ownership status (for-profit vs not-for-profit, filgrastim: adjusted difference, -17.4 [95% CI, -21.6 to -13.3] percentage points; P < .001; infliximab: adjusted difference, 10.8 [95% CI, 6.7 to 14.9] percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: In this study, practice setting and hospital ownership status had the largest associations with biosimilar usage, suggesting practices play a role in steering physicians toward certain medications. However, the types of practices with high biosimilar use differed by drug class. Further research is needed to understand the reasons for these differences across drug classes.

Private Equity In Dermatology: Effect On Price, Utilization, And Spending.

Private equity firms have increasingly acquired physician practices, and particularly dermatology practices. Analyzing commercial claims from the Health Care Cost Institute (2012-17), we used a difference-in-differences design within an event study framework to estimate the prevalence of private equity acquisitions and their impact on dermatologist prices, spending, utilization, and volume of patients. By 2017 one in eleven dermatologists practiced in a private equity-owned practice, and private equity-owned practices employed four advanced practitioners for every ten dermatologists compared with three for non-private equity practices. Private equity firms targeted their acquisitions at larger practices that saw more commercially insured patients compared with practices that were never acquired by private equity firms. The volume of patients per private equity dermatologist ranged from 4.7 percent to 17.0 percent higher than the volume per non-private equity dermatologist up to nine quarters after acquisition. At 1.5 years after acquisition, prices paid to private equity dermatologists for routine medical visits were 3-5 percent higher than those paid to non-private equity dermatologists. There was no significant consistent impact on dermatology spending or use of biopsies, lesion destruction, or Mohs surgery. Policy makers and dermatology practice leaders may want to track the rapidly evolving phenomenon of private equity acquisitions.

Association of Surprise-Billing Legislation with Prices Paid to In-Network and Out-of-Network Anesthesiologists in California, Florida, and New York: An Economic Analysis.

Importance: Several states have passed surprise-billing legislation to protect patients from unanticipated out-of-network medical bills, yet little is known about how state laws influence out-of-network prices and whether spillovers exist to in-network prices. Objective: To identify any changes in prices paid to out-of-network anesthesiologists at in-network facilities and to in-network anesthesiologists before and after states passed surprise-billing legislation. Design, Setting, and Participants: This retrospective economic analysis used difference-in-differences methods to compare price changes before and after the passage of legislation in California, Florida, and New York, which passed comprehensive surprise-billing legislation between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2017, to 45 states that did not. Commercial claims data from the Health Care Cost Institute were used to identify prices paid to anesthesiologists in hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers. The final analytic sample comprised 2 713 913 anesthesia claims across the 3 treated states and the 45 control states. Exposures: Temporal and state-level variation in exposure to surprise-billing legislation. Main Outcomes and Measures: The unit price (allowed amounts standardized per unit of service) paid to out-of-network anesthesiologists at in-network facilities and to in-network anesthesiologists. Results: This retrospective economic analysis of 2 713 913 anesthesia claims found that after surprise-billing laws were passed in 3 states, the unit price paid to out-of-network anesthesiologists at in-network facilities decreased significantly in 2 of them: California, -$12.71 (95% CI, -$25.70 to -$0.27; P = .05) and Florida, -$35.67 (95% CI, -$46.27 to -$25.07; P < .001). In New York, a decline in the overall out-of-network price was not statistically significant (-$7.91; 95% CI, -$17.48 to -$1.68; P = .10); however, by the fourth quarter of 2017, the decline was -$41.28 (95% CI, -$70.24 to -$12.33; P = .01). In-network prices decreased in California by -$10.68 (95% CI, -$12.70 to -$8.66; P < .001); in Florida, -$3.18 (95% CI, -$5.17 to -$1.19; P = .002); and in New York, -$8.05 (95% CI, -$11.46 to -$4.64; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: This retrospective study found that prices paid to in-network and out-of-network anesthesiologists in hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers decreased after the introduction of surprise-billing legislation, providing early insights into how prices may change under the federal No Surprises Act and in states that have recently passed their own legislation.

Time and Financial Costs for Physician Practices to Participate in the Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System: A Qualitative Study.

Importance: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based purchasing program, influencing payment for more than 1 million clinicians annually. There is a growing concern that MIPS increases administrative burden, and little is known about what it costs physician practices to participate in the program. Objective: To examine the costs for independent physician practices to participate in MIPS in 2019. Design Setting and Participants: This qualitative study identified and interviewed leaders of physician practices participating in the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) MIPS program, including those in MIPS alternative payment models. Time required and financial costs were calculated from responses to in-depth, semistructured interviews conducted from December 12, 2019, to June 23, 2020. Physician practices were categorized by size (small, 1-9 physicians; medium, 10-25; and large, ≥50), specialty (primary care, general surgery, or multispecialty), and US census region. Participants were asked about 2019 costs related to clinician and staff time, information technology, and external vendors. Time was converted to financial costs using the Medical Group Management Association's Provider Compensation and the Management and Staff Compensation databases. Main Outcomes and Measures: Annual time spent by staff on MIPS-related activities and mean per-physician costs to physician practices in 2019. Results: Leaders of 30 physician practices (9 [30.0%] small primary care, 6 [20.0%] small general surgery, 4 [13.3%] medium primary care, 4 [13.3%] medium general surgery, and 7 [23.3%] large multispecialty) represented all US census regions, and 14 of the 30 (46.7%) practices participated in a MIPS alternative payment model in 2019. The mean per-physician cost to practices of participating in MIPS was $12 811 (interquartile range [IQR], $2861-$17 715). Physicians, clinical staff, and administrative staff together spent 201.7 (IQR, 50.9-295.2) hours annually per physician on MIPS-related activities. Medical assistants and nursing staff together spent a mean of 99.2 (IQR, 0-163.3) hours per physician each year; frontline physicians spent 53.6 (IQR, 0.6-55.8) hours; executive administrators spent 28.6 (IQR, 3.1-26.7) hours; other clinicians and staff spent a combined 20.3 (IQR, 0-36.8) hours. Physician time accounted for the greatest proportion of overall MIPS-related costs (54%; $6909; IQR, $94-$9905). Conclusions and Relevance: In this qualitative study, physician practice leaders reported significant time and financial costs of participating in the MIPS program. Attention to reducing the burden of MIPS may be warranted.