Public health response to imported case of poliomyelitis, Australia, 2007.

Australia, along with 36 other countries in the Western Pacific Region, was declared free of poliomyelitis by the World Health Organization in October 2000. Yet, the persistence of wild poliovirus in the 4 remaining polio-endemic countries-Afghanistan, India, Nigeria, and Pakistan-poses a risk for its importation into all countries declared polio free. We describe the public health response and outcomes resulting from the importation of a wild poliovirus infection in Melbourne, Australia, in July 2007. This response, based on an assessment of the risk for transmission, included offering vaccination with inactivated polio vaccine to the contacts and placing the index patient in isolation and the household contacts in quarantine until consecutive fecal specimens were negative for poliovirus by culture. The experience gained from the polio importation event in Australia may assist other polio-free countries to prepare for, and respond to, a similar event. No secondary clinical cases resulted from this importation.

A lower than expected adult Victorian community attack rate for pandemic (H1N1) 2009.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the community seropositivity of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in order to estimate immunity and the community attack rate. METHODS: Selected clusters of participants (n=706) in the 'Victorian Health Monitor' (VHM), from whom blood samples were taken between August and October 2009, were tested opportunistically for antibodies to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus. A titre of > or = 1:40 was chosen as the cut-off for recording seropositivity. The proportion (95% CI) of seropositive participants, aged 18 to <65 years of age, were computed for groups of census collection districts (CDs) across metropolitan Melbourne. RESULTS: The observed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 seropositivity rates for all CDs tested in metropolitan Melbourne was 16.0% (95% CI:12.9-19.1%); in northern Melbourne subset was 14.4% (95% CI:12.4-16.3%); and in eastern subset was 16.2% (95% CI:9.7-22.6%). The pre-pandemic (H1N1) 2009 positivity rate was estimated at 6%. CONCLUSION: Given this study's estimate of 16.0% seropositivity in adults in metropolitan Melbourne, and given the WHO laboratory's estimate of 6% pre-pandemic positivity, the estimated adult community attack rate was 10% for metropolitan Melbourne. IMPLICATIONS: This community attack rate is lower than anticipated and suggests that levels of immunity to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 might be lower than anticipated. Although limited by a low response rate of 34%, this study suggests low adult seropositivity, which may be useful for public health professionals when encouraging the community to get vaccinated.

The epidemiology of invasive group A streptococcal disease in Victoria, Australia.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the incidence and severity of invasive group A streptococcal infection in Victoria, Australia. DESIGN: Prospective active surveillance study. SETTING: Public and private laboratories, hospitals and general practitioners throughout Victoria. PATIENTS: People in Victoria diagnosed with group A streptococcal disease notified to the surveillance system between 1 March 2002 and 31 August 2004. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: Confirmed invasive group A streptococcal disease. RESULTS: We identified 333 confirmed cases: an average annual incidence rate of 2.7 (95% CI, 2.3-3.2) per 100,000 population per year. Rates were highest in people aged 65 years and older and those younger than 5 years. The case-fatality rate was 7.8%. Streptococcal toxic shock syndrome occurred in 48 patients (14.4%), with a case-fatality rate of 23%. Thirty cases of necrotising fasciitis were reported; five (17%) of these patients died. Type 1 (23%) was the most frequently identified emm sequence type in all age groups. All tested isolates were susceptible to penicillin and clindamycin. Two isolates (4%) were resistant to erythromycin. CONCLUSION: The incidence of invasive group A streptococcal disease in temperate Australia is greater than previously appreciated and warrants greater public health attention, including its designation as a notifiable disease.

Infection control and pandemic influenza.

If an influenza pandemic occurs, the spread of the virus should be reduced for as long as possible while an effective vaccine is produced. Influenza spreads mainly by large respiratory droplets (> 5 microm) depositing onto the mucosal surfaces of the eye, mouth or respiratory tract. Hands are another major means for spread, and are frequently contaminated by droplets. The most effective way to reduce the spread of the virus is with good infection control practices and social distancing. Infection control practices include the use of personal protective equipment (PPE), hand hygiene, and respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette. Infected people should be isolated and spatial separation observed in common areas where infected people may be present. Any practices that create aerosols (eg, nebulisation) should be avoided, unless performed with appropriate precautions, especially with all people in the room wearing appropriate PPE. Now is the time to re-examine all our current practices so that we are better prepared, well practised and have good infection control practices in place for all transmissible respiratory infections.

An outbreak of Legionnaires' disease at the Melbourne Aquarium, April 2000: investigation and case-control studies.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the source and risk factors associated with Australia's largest outbreak of Legionnaires' disease. DESIGN AND SETTING: Epidemiological and environmental investigation of cases of Legionnaires' disease associated with visits to the Melbourne Aquarium; two case-control studies to confirm the outbreak source and to investigate risk factors for infection, respectively. PARTICIPANTS: Patients with confirmed Legionnaires' disease who visited the Melbourne Aquarium between 11 and 27 April 2000 were compared (i) with control participants from the community, and (ii) with control participants selected from other visitors to the Aquarium during this period. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Risk factors for acquiring Legionnaires' disease. RESULTS: There were 125 confirmed cases of Legionnaires' disease caused by Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 associated with the Aquarium; 76% of patients were hospitalised, and four (3.2%) died. The Aquarium cooling towers were contaminated with this organism. Visiting the Aquarium was significantly associated with disease (odds ratio [OR], 207; 95% CI, 73-630). The case-control study indicated that current smoking was a dose-dependent risk (multivariable OR for currently smoking > 70 cigarettes/week, 13.5; 95% CI, 5-36), but chronic illness and duration of exposure at the site were not significant risks. CONCLUSIONS: This study showed an association between poorly disinfected cooling towers at the Aquarium and Legionnaires' disease in visitors, and confirmed current smoking as a critical risk factor. The rapid response, publicity, and widespread urinary antigen testing may have resulted in detection of milder cases and contributed to the relatively low apparent morbidity and mortality rates. The urinary antigen test allows rapid identification of cases and may be changing the severity of illness recognised as Legionnaires' disease and altering who is considered at risk.