Control in context: The theta rhythm provides evidence for reactive control but no evidence for proactive control.

A prime goal of psychological science is to understand how humans can flexibly adapt to rapidly changing contexts. The foundation of this cognitive flexibility rests on contextual adjustments of cognitive control, which can be tested using the list-wide proportion congruency effect (LWPC). Blocks with mostly incongruent (MI) trials show smaller conflict interference effects compared to blocks with mostly congruent (MC) trials. A critical debate is how proactive and reactive control processes drive contextual adjustments. In this preregistered study (N = 30), we address this conundrum, by using the theta rhythm as a key neural marker for cognitive control. In a confound-minimized Stroop paradigm with short alternating MC and MI blocks, we tested reaction times, error rates, and participants' individualized theta activity (2-7 Hz) in the scalp-recorded electroencephalogram. An LWPC effect was found for both, reaction times and error rates. Importantly, the results provided clear evidence for reactive control processes in the theta rhythm: Theta power was higher in rare incongruent compared with congruent trials in MC blocks, but there was no such modulation in MI blocks. However, regarding proactive control, there were no differences in sustained theta power between MC and MI blocks. A complementary analysis of the alpha activity (8-14 Hz) also revealed no evidence for sustained attentional resources in MI blocks. These findings suggest that contextual adjustments rely mainly on reactive control processes in the theta rhythm. Proactive control, in the present study, may be limited to a flexible attentional shift but does not seem to require sustained theta activity.

The role of objective and subjective effort costs in voluntary task choice.

Human beings tend to avoid effort, if a less effortful option is equally rewarding. However, and in sharp contrast to this claim, we repeatedly found that (a subset of) participants deliberately choose the more difficult of two tasks in a voluntary task switching (VTS) paradigm even though avoidance of the difficult task was allowed (Jurczyk et al., Motivation Science 5:295-313, 2019). In this study, we investigate to what extent the deliberate switch to the difficult task is determined by the actual objective or the subjective effort costs for the difficult task. In two experiments, participants (N = 100, each) first went through several blocks of voluntary task choices between an easy and a difficult task. After that, they worked through an effort discounting paradigm, EDT, (Westbrook et al., PLoS One 8(7):e68210, 2013) that required participants to make a series of iterative choices between re-doing a difficult task block for a fixed amount or an easy task block for a variable (lower) amount of money until the individual indifference point was reached. In Experiment 1, the EDT comprised the same tasks from the VTS, in Experiment 2, EDT used another set of easy vs. difficult tasks. Results showed that the voluntary switch to the difficult task was mostly predicted by the objective performance costs and only marginally be the subjective effort cost. The switch to the difficult task may thus be less irrational than originally thought and at its avoidance at least partially driven by economic considerations.

How Sequentially Changing Reward Prospect Modulates Meta-control: Increasing Reward Prospect Promotes Cognitive Flexibility.

Meta-control is necessary to regulate the balance between cognitive stability and flexibility. Evidence from (voluntary) task switching studies suggests performance-contingent reward as one modulating factor. Depending on the immediate reward history, reward prospect seems to promote either cognitive stability or flexibility: Increasing reward prospect reduced switch costs and increased the voluntary switch rate, suggesting increased cognitive flexibility. In contrast, remaining high reward prospect increased switch costs and reduced the voluntary switch rate, suggesting increased cognitive stability. Recently we suggested that increasing reward prospect serves as a meta-control signal toward cognitive flexibility by lowering the updating threshold in working memory. However, in task switching paradigms with two tasks only, this could alternatively be explained by facilitated switching to the other of two tasks. To address this issue, a series of task switching experiments with uncued task switching between three univalent tasks was conducted. Results showed a reduction in reaction time (RT) switch costs to a nonsignificant difference and a high voluntary switch rate when reward prospect increased, whereas repetition RTs were faster, switch RTs slower, and voluntary switch rate was reduced when reward prospect remained high. That is, increasing reward prospect put participants in a state of equal readiness to respond to any target stimulus-be it a task repetition or a switch to one of the other two tasks. The study thus provides further evidence for the assumption that increasing reward prospect serves as a meta-control signal to increase cognitive flexibility, presumably by lowering the updating threshold in working memory.

Investigating anticipatory processes during sequentially changing reward prospect: An ERP study.

Performance-contingent reward prospect modulates the stability-flexibility balance in voluntary task switching. High reward prospect typically increases stability, indicated by a low voluntary switch rate (VSR). But this effect depends on the immediate reward history: Only when a high reward repeats (reward remains high), stability is increased. In contrast, when reward increases (high reward following low reward) cognitive flexibility is promoted, indicated by a relatively high VSR. To investigate the underlying mechanisms of changing reward expectations during voluntary task choice, we conducted two experiments and measured reward cue-locked event-related potentials (P2, P3b, CNV). The experiments yielded consistent findings: The P2 was stronger in response to high vs. low reward reflecting an early attentional boost by high reward anticipation. The P3b was highest in increase, intermediate in remain-high, and lowest in low reward trials suggesting responsiveness to working memory updating and motivational arousal. Finally, the CNV increased over time and was sensitive to both reward magnitude and sequence with the lowest amplitude in reward remain-low trials suggesting that preparatory control only increases when worth the effort. Taken together, early attentional processes (P2) were boosted by mere reward magnitude, while later processes (P3b, CNV) were sensitive to both reward magnitude and its sequence.

Enhancing task-demands disrupts learning but enhances transfer gains in short-term task-switching training.

Content variability was previously suggested to promote stronger learning effects in cognitive training whereas less variability incurred transfer costs (Sabah et al. Psychological Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1006-7 , 2018). Here, we expanded these findings by additionally examining the role of learners' control in short-term task-switching training by comparing voluntary task-switching to a yoked control forced task-switching condition. To this end, four training conditions were compared: (1) forced fixed content, (2) voluntary fixed content, (3) forced varied content, and (3) voluntary varied content. To further enhance task demands, bivalent stimuli were used during training. Participants completed baseline assessment commencing with task-switching and verbal fluency blocks, followed by seven training blocks and last by task-switching (near transfer) and verbal fluency (far transfer) blocks, respectively. For the baseline and transfer task-switching blocks, we used the exact same baseline and first transfer block from Sabah et al. (Psychological Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1006-7 , 2018), employing univalent stimuli and alternating-runs task sequence. Our results pointed again to the contribution of content variability to task-switching performance. No indications for far transfer were observed. Allowing for learners' control was not found to produce additional transfer gains beyond content variability. A between-study comparison suggests that enhanced task demands, by means of bivalency, promoted higher transfer gains in the current study when compared to Sabah et al. (Psychological Research, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1006-7 , 2018). Taken together, the current results provide further evidence to the beneficial impact of variability on training outcomes. The lack of modulatory effect for learners' control is discussed in relation to possible methodological limitations.

The volatile nature of positive affect effects: opposite effects of positive affect and time on task on proactive control.

There is growing evidence suggesting that positive affect promotes cognitive flexibility at the cost of increased distractibility and decreased proactive control. Regarding the latter effect, some studies revealed inconsistent or even diverging findings casting doubt on the reliability of this observation. Recently, it has been shown that motivation can counteract positive affect effects. Here, the authors provide evidence for another factor that opposes positive affect effects, namely time on and experience with a task. To this end, the well proven AX-continuous performance task (AX-CPT) was used. Three groups of participants received three blocks of the AX-CPT with a positive affect manipulation (positive group) or neutral affect manipulation (neutral group) or alternating affect blocks (mixed group: pos-neut-pos). Results confirmed the positive affect effect associated with decreased proactive control in the positive and mixed group as compared to the neutral group. Most importantly, all groups showed an increase in proactive control with increasing time on task supporting our prediction that time on task is another factor opposing the positive affect effect. The results thus reveal the sensitivity of the positive affect effect to strategic influences developed with increasing experience with the given task. Implications for future research on the interplay of mild positive affect and cognitive control will be discussed.

When less is more: costs and benefits of varied vs. fixed content and structure in short-term task switching training.

Training variability has been brought forward as one possible moderator for wider scale transfer effects in cognitive training. However, little is known about which aspects of task variability are important for optimizing training outcomes. This study systematically examined the impact of variability in the different task components on outcome measures, here manipulating content (whether the task stimuli remained fixed or changed between blocks) and the deeper structural task configuration (task sequence: whether the task sequence was fixed or random). Short-term task switching training was implemented with one of four training variability conditions: fixed content\fixed structure; fixed content\ random structure; varied content\fixed structure and varied content\varied structure. The experiment consisted of a baseline block, seven training blocks (learning phase), followed by two transfer blocks, one with fixed and one with random task structure, respectively. In the learning phase, more rapid training gains were observed in the fixed content as compared to varied content. Interestingly, training with fixed content resulted in a trend for costs when transferred to a novel task switching context. In contrast, moderate transfer gains were noted in the varied content condition, manifested specifically on switch trials. These results suggest that task (content) variability is one of the means to improve positive transfer and avoid negative transfer. Additionally, and in agreement with the wide literature on training, this finding suggests that conditions that prevent training gains are in fact beneficial for learning generalization.

The dynamic balance between cognitive flexibility and stability: the influence of local changes in reward expectation and global task context on voluntary switch rate.

Current theories describe cognitive control as a dynamic balance between two antagonistic control functions, namely cognitive stability and flexibility. Recent evidence suggests that this balance between these control modes is modulated by changing reward prospects on the one side and contextual parameters on the other. In the present study, we aim to investigate how both factors interact. In a between-subjects design, we manipulated the context by the ratio of free- to forced-choice trials (80:20, 50:50, 20:80) in a hybrid task-switching paradigm, combining forced- and free-choice task switching. In addition, two reward magnitudes changed randomly from trial to trial. Results showed an overall increase in voluntary switch rate (VSR) with increasing forced-choice frequency, demonstrating a robust context effect. Moreover, the trial-by-trial reward manipulation interacted with this global context effect: with a stability bias (80% free:20% forced), only an increase in reward expectation increased VSR, whereas with a more flexible global bias (in the 50:50 or 20:80 conditions) VSR increased when reward expectation changed and reduced when reward expectation remained high. Taken together, results suggest that the cognitive system is able to adapt to global context parameters and to respond to rapid changes in reward expectation at the same time.

Conflict and disfluency as aversive signals: context-specific processing adjustments are modulated by affective location associations.

Context-specific processing adjustments are one signature feature of flexible human action control. However, up to now the precise mechanisms underlying these adjustments are not fully understood. Here it is argued that aversive signals produced by conflict- or disfluency-experience originally motivate such context-specific processing adjustments. We tested whether the efficiency of the aversive conflict signal for control adaptation depends on the affective nature of the context it is presented in. In two experiments, high vs. low proportions of aversive signals (Experiment 1: conflict trials; Experiment 2: disfluent trials) were presented either above or below the screen center. This location manipulation was motivated by existing evidence that verticality is generally associated with affective valence with up being positive and down being negative. From there it was hypothesized that the aversive signals would lose their trigger function for processing adjustments when presented at the lower (i.e., more negative) location. This should then result in a reduced context-specific proportion effect when the high proportion of aversive signals was presented at the lower location. Results fully confirmed the predictions. In both experiments, the location-specific proportion effects were only present when the high proportion of aversive signals occurred at the more positive location above but were reduced (Experiment 1) or even eliminated (Experiment 2) when the high proportion occurred at the more negative location below. This interaction of processing adjustments with affective background contexts can thus be taken as further hint for an affective origin of control adaptations.

The role of affective evaluation in conflict adaptation: An LRP study.

Conflict between incompatible response tendencies is typically followed by control adjustments aimed at diminishing subsequent conflicts, a phenomenon often called conflict adaptation. Dreisbach and Fischer (2015, 2016) recently proposed that it is not the conflict per se but the aversive quality of a conflict that originally motivates this kind of sequential control adjustment. With the present study we tested the causal role of aversive signals in conflict adaptation in a more direct way. To this end, after each trial of a vertical Simon task participants rated whether they experienced the last trial as rather pleasant or unpleasant. Conflict adaptation was measured via lateralized readiness potentials as a measure of early motor-related activation that were computed on the basis of event-related brain potentials. Results showed the typical suppression of automatic response activation following trials rated as unpleasant, whereas suppression was relaxed following trials rated as pleasant. That is, sequential control adaptation was not based on previous conflict but on the subjective affective experience. This is taken as evidence that negative affect even in the absence of actual conflict triggers subsequent control adjustments.

Let it go: the flexible engagement and disengagement of monitoring processes in a non-focal prospective memory task.

Remembering to perform a delayed intention is referred to as prospective memory (PM). In two studies, participants performed an Eriksen flanker task with an embedded PM task (they had to remember to press F1 if a pre-specified cue appeared). In study 1, participants performed a flanker task with either a concurrent PM task or a delayed PM task (instructed to carry out the intention in a later different task). In the delayed PM condition, the PM cues appeared unexpectedly early and we examined whether attention would be captured by the PM cue even though they were not relevant. Results revealed ongoing task costs solely in the concurrent PM condition but no significant task costs in the delayed PM condition showing that attention was not captured by the PM cue when it appeared in an irrelevant context. In study 2, we compared a concurrent PM condition (exactly as in Study 1) to a PM forget condition in which participants were told at a certain point during the flanker task that they no longer had to perform the PM task. Analyses revealed that participants were able to switch off attending to PM cues when instructed to forget the PM task. Results from both studies demonstrate the flexibility of monitoring as evidenced by the presence versus absence of costs in the ongoing flanker task implying that selective attention, like a lens, can be adjusted to attend or ignore, depending on intention relevance.

Individual Differences in the Context-Dependent Recruitment of Cognitive Control: Evidence From Action Versus State Orientation.

The ability to flexibly adapt to deviations from optimal performance is an important aspect of self-control. In the present study, the authors present first evidence that the personality trait action versus state orientation (Kuhl, 2000) modulates the ability of adaptive control adjustments in response to experienced conflicts. Sixty-two German individuals with extreme scores on the action-state dimension performed a response interference task, that is, 31 extreme action-oriented individuals (30 females; Mage = 20.35 years) and 31 extreme state-oriented individuals (20 females; Mage = 23.23 years), respectively. Action-oriented individuals displayed a stronger conflict adaptation effect as evidenced by a stronger reduction of interference on trials following conflict. These results were further corroborated by a correlational analysis including a sample of 105 participants: the higher the score on the action-state dimension, the lower the interference effect following conflict (i.e., stronger conflict adaptation). The results provide evidence that even low-level, bottom-up-driven processes of self-control such as conflict adaptation are systematically moderated by individual differences in control modes and provide insights into the cognitive mechanisms underlying action versus state orientation.

The differential influences of positive affect, random reward, and performance-contingent reward on cognitive control.

Growing evidence suggests that positive affect and reward have differential effects on cognitive control. So far, however, these effects have never been studied together. Here, the authors present one behavioral study investigating the influences of positive affect and reward (contingent and noncontingent) on proactive control. A modified version of the AX-continuous performance task, which has repeatedly been shown to be sensitive to reward and affect manipulations, was used. In a first phase, two experimental groups received either neutral or positive affective pictures before every trial. In a second phase, the two halves of a given affect group additionally received, respectively, performance-contingent or random rewards. The results replicated the typical affect effect, in terms of reduced proactive control under positive as compared to neutral affect. Also, the typical reward effects associated with increased proactive control were replicated. Most interestingly, performance-contingent reward counteracted the positive affect effect, whereas random reward mirrored that effect. In sum, this study provides first evidence that performance-contingent reward, on the one hand, and positive affect and performance-noncontingent reward, on the other hand, have oppositional effects on cognitive control: Only performance-contingent reward showed a motivational effect in terms of a strategy shift toward increased proactive control, whereas positive affect alone and performance-noncontingent reward reduced proactive control. Moreover, the integrative design of this study revealed the vulnerability of positive affect effects to motivational manipulations. The results are discussed with respect to current neuroscientific theories of the effects of dopamine on affect, reward, and cognitive control.

Don't do it again! Directed forgetting of habits.

Most daily routines are determined by habits. However, the experienced ease and automaticity of habit formation and execution come at a cost when habits that are no longer appropriate must be overcome. So far, proactive and reactive control strategies that prevent inappropriate habit execution either by preparation or "on the fly" have been identified. Here, we present evidence for a third, retroactive control strategy. In two experiments using the list method of directed forgetting, the accessibility of newly learned and practiced stimulus-response rules was significantly reduced when participants were cued to forget the rules rather than to remember them. The results thus show that directed forgetting, so far observed and investigated only for episodic memory traces, can also be applied to habits. The findings further emphasize the adaptive value of forgetting and can be taken as evidence of a retroactive strategy of habit control.

Socially triggered negative affect impairs performance in simple cognitive tasks.

The aim of this research was to investigate the influence of a social-evaluative context on simple cognitive tasks. While another person present in the room evaluated photographs of beautiful women or landscapes by beauty/attractiveness, female participants had to perform a combination of digit-categorization and spatial-compatibility task. There, before every trial, one of the women or landscape pictures was presented. Results showed selective performance impairments: the numerical distance effects increased on trials that followed women pictures but only, if another person concurrently evaluated these women pictures. In a second experiment, using the affective priming paradigm, the authors show that female pictures have a more negative connotation when they are concurrently evaluated by another person (social-evaluative context) than when they are not evaluated (neutral context). Together, these results suggest that the social-evaluative context triggers mild negative affective reactions to women pictures which then impair performance in an unrelated task.

Flexibility by association? No evidence for an influence of cue-transition associations on voluntary task switching.

Some situations require cognitive flexibility, whereas others call for cognitive stability. Recent theories posit lower-level associative learning processes as the basis of contextual control. The present study incorporates six experiments to investigate whether cognitive flexibility can be triggered by task-irrelevant color cues in the task-switching paradigm. In the first learning phase, the cue colors were repeatedly paired with certain task transitions (repetition, switch) without explicit instruction. In the following test phase, voluntary trials were intermixed (where participants can freely choose the task) to measure the voluntary switch rate (VSR) in response to the color cues. For Experiment 2a, cue size and duration were increased, and the learning phase was extended. Additionally, in Experiment 2b, the second half of the test phase consisted of 100% free choices. Experiment 3 contained catch trials to ensure cue processing. In Experiment 4, two tasks of unequal difficulty were used. Experiments 1-4 provided evidence for the null hypothesis indicating no effect of the transition association on the VSR (all BF10 < 0.265). The control Experiment 5 ruled out that the null effect was due to the insensitivity of the paradigm. Therefore, flexibility by association appears to be harder to achieve than recent accounts suggest. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Dynamic adjustments of cognitive control: oscillatory correlates of the conflict adaptation effect.

It is a prominent idea that cognitive control mediates conflict adaptation, in that response conflict in a previous trial triggers control adjustments that reduce conflict in a current trial. In the present EEG study, we investigated the dynamics of cognitive control in a response-priming task by examining the effects of previous trial conflict on intertrial and current trial oscillatory brain activities, both on the electrode and the source level. Behavioral results showed conflict adaptation effects for RTs and response accuracy. Physiological results showed sustained intertrial effects in left parietal theta power, originating in the left inferior parietal cortex, and midcentral beta power, originating in the left and right (pre)motor cortex. Moreover, physiological analysis revealed a current trial conflict adaptation effect in midfrontal theta power, originating in the ACC. Correlational analyses showed that intertrial effects predicted conflict-induced midfrontal theta power in currently incongruent trials. In addition, conflict adaptation effects in midfrontal theta power and RTs were positively related. Together, these findings point to a dynamic cognitive control system that, as a function of previous trial type, up- and down-regulates attention and preparatory motor activities in anticipation of the next trial.

Conflicts as aversive signals: conflict priming increases negative judgments for neutral stimuli.

Botvinick, Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 7:356-366 (2007) recently suggested that competing theories of the monitoring function of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for cognitive control might converge on the detection of aversive signals in general, implying that response conflicts, a known trigger of ACC activation, are aversive, too. Recent evidence showing conflict priming (i.e., faster responses to negative targets after conflict primes) directly supports this notion but remains inconclusive with regard to possible confounds with processing fluency. To this end, two experiments were conducted to offer more compelling evidence for the negative valence of conflicts. Participants were primed by (conflict and nonconflict) Stroop stimuli and subsequently had to judge the valence of neutral German words (Experiment 1a) or Chinese pictographs (Experiment 1b). Results showed that conflict, as compared with nonconflict, primes led to more negative judgments of subsequently presented neutral target stimuli. The findings will be discussed in the light of existing theories of action control highlighting the role of aversive signals for sequential processing adjustments.

Temporal predictability facilitates action, not perception.

Expectancy for upcoming action requirements is a fundamental prerequisite for human control of action. In the research reported here, we investigated which part of cognitive processing benefits from temporal predictability. In a binary forced-choice paradigm, visual targets were preceded by different intervals. In one condition, targets could be predicted by the length of the intervals. In other conditions, response goals or response effectors could be predicted by the length of the intervals. Behavioral advantages were observed when response effectors were temporally predictable, whereas temporal predictability of response goals and target stimuli was not sufficient. The findings thus show that temporal expectancy in speeded choice-reaction tasks facilitates late, effector-specific motor processing. These findings are of importance not only for our basic understanding of action control but also for any human-machine interaction that involves system delays.