Pavlovian impatience: The anticipation of immediate rewards increases approach behaviour.

People often exhibit intertemporal impatience by choosing immediate small over delayed larger rewards, which has been implicated across maladaptive behaviours and mental health symptoms. In this preregistered study, we tested the role of an intertemporal Pavlovian bias as possible psychological mechanism driving the temptation posed by immediate rewards. Concretely, we hypothesized that the anticipation of immediate rewards (compared with preference-matched delayed rewards) enhances goal-directed approach behaviour but interferes with goal-directed inhibition. Such a mechanism could contribute to the difficulty to inhibit ourselves in the face of immediate rewards (e.g., a drug), at the cost of long-term (e.g., health) goals. A sample of 184 participants completed a newly developed reinforcement learning go/no-go task with four trial types: Go to win immediate reward; Go to win delayed reward; No-go to win immediate reward; and No-go to win delayed reward trials. Go responding was increased in trials in which an immediate reward was available compared with trials in which a preference-matched delayed reward was available. Computational models showed that on average, this behavioural pattern was best captured by a cue-response bias reflecting a stronger elicitation of go responses upon presentation of an immediate (versus delayed) reward cue. The results of this study support the role of an intertemporal Pavlovian bias as a psychological mechanism contributing to impatient intertemporal choice.

Age differences in intertemporal choice among children, adolescents, and adults.

When choosing between sooner-smaller and later-larger rewards (i.e., intertemporal choices), adults typically prefer later-larger rewards more often than children. Intertemporal choice preferences have been implicated in various impulsivity-related psychopathologies, making it important to understand the underlying mechanisms not only in terms of how reward magnitude and delay affect choice but also in terms of how these mechanisms develop across age. We administered an intertemporal choice paradigm to 60 children (8-11 years), 79 adolescents (14-16 years), and 60 young adults (18-23 years). The paradigm systematically varied amounts and delays of the available rewards, allowing us to identify mechanisms underlying age-related differences in patience. Compared with young adults, both children and adolescents made fewer later-larger choices. In terms of underlying mechanisms, variation in delays, absolute reward magnitudes, and relative amount differences affected choice in each age group, indicating that children showed sensitivity to the same choice-relevant factors as young adults. Sensitivity to both absolute reward magnitude and relative amount differences showed a further monotonic age-related increase, whereas no change in delay sensitivity occurred. Lastly, adolescents and young adults weakly displayed a present bias (i.e., overvaluing immediate vs. future rewards; nonsignificant and trend, respectively), whereas children showed a nonsignificant but opposite pattern, possibly indicating that specifically dealing with future rewards changed with age. These findings shed light on the underlying mechanisms that contribute to the development of patience. By decomposing overt choices, our results suggest that the age-related increase in patience may be driven specifically by stronger sensitivity to amount differences with age.

Time ambiguity during intertemporal decision-making is aversive, impacting choice and neural value coding.

We are often presented with choices that differ in their more immediate versus future consequences. Interestingly, in everyday-life, ambiguity about the exact timing of such consequences frequently occurs, yet it remains unknown whether and how time-ambiguity influences decisions and their underlying neural correlates. We developed a novel intertemporal fMRI choice task in which participants make choices between sooner-smaller (SS) versus later-larger (LL) monetary rewards with systematically varying levels of time-ambiguity. Across trials, delay information of the SS, the LL, or both rewards was either exact (e.g., in 5 weeks), of low ambiguity (4 week range: e.g., in 3-7 weeks), or of high ambiguity (8 week range: e.g., in 1-9 weeks). Choice behavior showed that the majority of participants preferred options with exact delays over those with ambiguous delays, indicating time-ambiguity aversion. Consistent with these results, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex showed decreased activation during ambiguous versus exact trials. In contrast, intraparietal sulcus activation increased during ambiguous versus exact trials. Furthermore, exploratory analyses suggest that more time-ambiguity averse participants show more insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation during subjective value (SV)-coding of ambiguous versus exact trials. Lastly, the best-fitting computational choice models indicate that ambiguity impacts the SV of options via time perception or via an additive ambiguity-related penalty term. Together, these results provide the first behavioral and neural signatures of time-ambiguity, pointing towards a unique profile that is distinct from impatience. Since time-ambiguity is ubiquitous in real-life, it likely contributes to shortsighted decisions above and beyond delay-discounting.

The relation between infant freezing and the development of internalizing symptoms in adolescence: A prospective longitudinal study.

Given the long-lasting detrimental effects of internalizing symptoms, there is great need for detecting early risk markers. One promising marker is freezing behavior. Whereas initial freezing reactions are essential for coping with threat, prolonged freezing has been associated with internalizing psychopathology. However, it remains unknown whether early life alterations in freezing reactions predict changes in internalizing symptoms during adolescent development. In a longitudinal study (N = 116), we tested prospectively whether observed freezing in infancy predicted the development of internalizing symptoms from childhood through late adolescence (until age 17). Both longer and absent infant freezing behavior during a standard challenge (robot-confrontation task) were associated with internalizing symptoms in adolescence. Specifically, absent infant freezing predicted a relative increase in internalizing symptoms consistently across development from relatively low symptom levels in childhood to relatively high levels in late adolescence. Longer infant freezing also predicted a relative increase in internalizing symptoms, but only up until early adolescence. This latter effect was moderated by peer stress and was followed by a later decrease in internalizing symptoms. The findings suggest that early deviations in defensive freezing responses signal risk for internalizing symptoms and may constitute important markers in future stress vulnerability and resilience studies.

Dissecting "Peer Presence" and "Decisions" to Deepen Understanding of Peer Influence on Adolescent Risky Choice.

This study evaluated the aspects of complex decisions influenced by peers, and components of peer involvement influential to adolescents' risky decisions. Participants (N = 140) aged 13-25 completed the Columbia Card Task (CCT), a risky choice task, isolating deliberation-reliant and affect-reliant decisions while alone, while a friend monitors choices, and while a friend is merely present. There is no condition in which a nonfriend peer is present. Results demonstrated the risk-increasing peer effect occurred in the youngest participants in the cold CCT and middle-late adolescents in the hot CCT, whereas other ages and contexts showed a risk-decreasing peer effect. Mere presence was not sufficient to influence risky behavior. These boundaries in age, decision, and peer involvement constrain prevailing models of adolescent peer influence.

Neural mechanisms of individual differences in temporal discounting of monetary and primary rewards in adolescents.

Adolescents are generally characterized as impulsive. However, impulsivity is a multi-dimensional construct that involves multiple component processes. Which of these components contribute to adolescent impulsivity is currently unclear. This study focused on the neural mechanisms underlying individual differences in distinct components of temporal discounting (TD), i.e., the preference for smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Participants were 58 adolescents (12-16 years-old) who performed an fMRI TD task with both monetary and snack rewards. Using mixed-effects modeling, we determined participants' average impatience, and further decomposed TD choices into: 1) amount sensitivity (unique contribution of the magnitude of the immediate reward); and 2) delay sensitivity (unique contribution of delay duration). Adolescents' average impatience was positively correlated with frontoparietal and ventral striatal activity during delayed reward choices, and with ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity during immediate reward choices. Adolescents' amount sensitivity was positively associated with ventral striatal and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex activity during immediate reward choices. Delay sensitivity was positively correlated with inferior parietal cortex activity during delayed reward choices. As expected, snacks were discounted more steeply than money, and TD of both reward types was associated with overlapping activation in the inferior parietal cortex. Exploring whether testosterone or estradiol were associated with TD and its neural correlates revealed no significant associations. These findings indicate that distinct components contribute uniquely to TD choice and that individual differences in amount sensitivity are uniquely associated with activation of reward valuation areas, while individual differences in delay sensitivity are uniquely associated with activation of cognitive control areas.

Neural correlates of expected risks and returns in risky choice across development.

Adolescence is often described as a period of increased risk taking relative to both childhood and adulthood. This inflection in risky choice behavior has been attributed to a neurobiological imbalance between earlier developing motivational systems and later developing top-down control regions. Yet few studies have decomposed risky choice to investigate the underlying mechanisms or tracked their differential developmental trajectory. The current study uses a risk-return decomposition to more precisely assess the development of processes underlying risky choice and to link them more directly to specific neural mechanisms. This decomposition specifies the influence of changing risks (outcome variability) and changing returns (expected value) on the choices of children, adolescents, and adults in a dynamic risky choice task, the Columbia Card Task. Behaviorally, risk aversion increased across age groups, with adults uniformly risk averse and adolescents showing substantial individual differences in risk sensitivity, ranging from risk seeking to risk averse. Neurally, we observed an adolescent peak in risk-related activation in the anterior insula and dorsal medial PFC. Return sensitivity, on the other hand, increased monotonically across age groups and was associated with increased activation in the ventral medial PFC and posterior cingulate cortex with age. Our results implicate adolescence as a developmental phase of increased neural risk sensitivity. Importantly, this work shows that using a behaviorally validated decision-making framework allows a precise operationalization of key constructs underlying risky choice that inform the interpretation of results.

Dopamine Modulation of Intertemporal Decision-making: Evidence from Parkinson Disease.

Choosing between smaller prompt rewards and larger later rewards is a common choice problem, and studies widely agree that frontostriatal circuits heavily innervated by dopamine are centrally involved. Understanding how dopamine modulates intertemporal choice has important implications for neurobiological models and for understanding the mechanisms underlying maladaptive decision-making. However, the specific role of dopamine in intertemporal decisions is not well understood. Dopamine may play a role in multiple aspects of intertemporal choices--the valuation of choice outcomes and sensitivity to reward delays. To assess the role of dopamine in intertemporal decisions, we tested Parkinson disease patients who suffer from dopamine depletion in the striatum, in either high (on medication, PDON) or low (off medication, PDOFF) dopaminergic states. Compared with both PDOFF and healthy controls, PDON made more farsighted choices and reduced their valuations less as a function of increasing time to reward. Furthermore, reduced discounting in the high dopaminergic state was robust across multiple measures, providing new evidence for dopamine's role in making decisions about the future.

Neural Mechanisms Underlying Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies in Risky Choice.

Individuals may differ systematically in their applied decision strategies, which has critical implications for decision neuroscience but is yet scarcely studied. Our study's main focus was therefore to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying compensatory versus noncompensatory strategies in risky choice. Here, we compared people using a compensatory expected value maximization with people using a simplified noncompensatory loss-minimizing choice strategy. To this end, we used a two-choice paradigm including a set of "simple" items (e.g., simple condition), in which one option was superior on all attributes, and a set of "conflict" items, in which one option was superior on one attribute but inferior on other attributes. A binomial mixture analysis of the decisions elicited by these items differentiated between decision-makers using either a compensatory or a noncompensatory strategy. Behavioral differences were particularly pronounced in the conflict condition, and these were paralleled by neural results. That is, we expected compensatory decision-makers to use an integrated value comparison during choice in the conflict condition. Accordingly, the compensatory group tracked the difference in expected value between choice options reflected in neural activation in the parietal cortex. Furthermore, we expected noncompensatory, compared with compensatory, decision-makers to experience increased conflict when attributes provided conflicting information. Accordingly, the noncompensatory group showed greater dorsomedial PFC activation only in the conflict condition. These pronounced behavioral and neural differences indicate the need for decision neuroscience to account for individual differences in risky choice strategies and to broaden its scope to noncompensatory risky choice strategies.

Temporal focus, temporal distance, and mind-wandering valence: Results from an experience sampling and an experimental study.

When mind-wandering, people may think about events that happened in the past, or events that may happen in the future. Using experience sampling, we first aimed to replicate the finding that future-oriented thoughts show a greater positivity bias than past-oriented thoughts. Furthermore, we investigated whether there is a relation between the temporal distance of past- and future-oriented thoughts and the frequency of positive thoughts, a factor that has received little attention in previous work. Second, we experimentally investigated the relation between temporal focus, temporal distance, and thought valence. Both studies showed that future-oriented thoughts were more positive compared to past-oriented thoughts. Regarding temporal distance, thoughts about the distant past and future were more positive than thoughts about the near past and future in the experiment. However, the experience sampling study did not provide clear insight into this relation. Potential theoretical and methodological explanations for these findings are discussed.

The neurocomputational link between defensive cardiac states and approach-avoidance arbitration under threat.

Avoidance, a hallmark of anxiety-related psychopathology, often comes at a cost; avoiding threat may forgo the possibility of a reward. Theories predict that optimal approach-avoidance arbitration depends on threat-induced psychophysiological states, like freezing-related bradycardia. Here we used model-based fMRI analyses to investigate whether and how bradycardia states are linked to the neurocomputational underpinnings of approach-avoidance arbitration under varying reward and threat magnitudes. We show that bradycardia states are associated with increased threat-induced avoidance and more pronounced reward-threat value comparison (i.e., a stronger tendency to approach vs. avoid when expected reward outweighs threat). An amygdala-striatal-prefrontal circuit supports approach-avoidance arbitration under threat, with specific involvement of the amygdala and dorsal anterior cingulate (dACC) in integrating reward-threat value and bradycardia states. These findings highlight the role of human freezing states in value-based decision making, relevant for optimal threat coping. They point to a specific role for amygdala/dACC in state-value integration under threat.

Emotion regulation and risk taking: predicting risky choice in deliberative decision making.

Only very recently has research demonstrated that experimentally induced emotion regulation strategies (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression) affect risky choice (e.g., Heilman et al., 2010). However, it is unknown whether this effect also operates via habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice involving deliberative decision making. We investigated the role of habitual use of emotion regulation strategies in risky choice using the "cold" deliberative version of the Columbia Card Task (CCT; Figner et al., 2009). Fifty-three participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) and--one month later--the CCT and the PANAS. Greater habitual cognitive reappraisal use was related to increased risk taking, accompanied by decreased sensitivity to changes in probability and loss amount. Greater habitual expressive suppression use was related to decreased risk taking. The results show that habitual use of reappraisal and suppression strategies predict risk taking when decisions involve predominantly cognitive-deliberative processes.

Increased capacity to delay reward in anorexia nervosa.

Individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) are often characterized as possessing excessive self-control and are unusual in their ability to reduce or avoid the consumption of palatable foods. This behavior promotes potentially life-threatening weight loss and suggests disturbances in reward processing. We studied whether individuals with AN showed evidence of increased self-control by examining the tendency to delay receipt of a monetary, non-food related, reward. Underweight AN (n = 36) and healthy controls (HC, n = 28) completed a monetary intertemporal choice task measuring delay discounting factor. Individuals with AN reduced the value of a monetary reward over time significantly less than HC (F[1,61] = 5.03; p = 0.029). Secondary analyses indicated that the restricting subtype of AN, in particular, showed significantly less discounting than HC (F[1,46] = 8.3; p = 0.006). These findings indicate that some individuals with AN show less temporal discounting than HC, suggestive of enhanced self-control that is not limited to food consumption. This is in contrast to other psychiatric disorders, for example, substance abuse, which are characterized by greater discounting. Though preliminary, these findings suggest that excessive self-control may contribute to pathological processes and individuals with AN may have neuropsychological characteristics that enhance their ability to delay reward and thereby may help to maintain persistent food restriction.

Confidence in evaluations and value-based decisions reflects variation in experienced values.

Evaluations and value-based decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of confidence about whether or not the evaluation or decision is accurate. We argue that this feeling of confidence reflects the variation of an underlying value distribution and that this value distribution represents previously experienced values related to an object. Two preregistered experiments in which the variation of such value distributions was systematically varied provide causal evidence in favor of this hypothesis. A third preregistered experiment showed that, for natural food items with uncontrolled prior experiences, confidence in evaluations is again related to the variation of individuals' self-reported value distributions. Similarly, for choices between items, the variation of experienced values related to a choice pair influenced confidence in the perceived correctness of the choice. These findings converge with other domains of decision making showing that confidence tracks the variation of the underlying probability distribution of the evidence that a decision is based on, which in the case of value-based decisions, is informed by a value distribution reflecting priorly experienced values. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

A Censored Mixture Model for Modeling Risk Taking.

Risk behavior has substantial consequences for health, well-being, and general behavior. The association between real-world risk behavior and risk behavior on experimental tasks is well documented, but their modeling is challenging for several reasons. First, many experimental risk tasks may end prematurely leading to censored observations. Second, certain outcome values can be more attractive than others. Third, a priori unknown groups of participants can react differently to certain risk-levels. Here, we propose the censored mixture model which models risk taking while dealing with censoring, attractiveness to certain outcomes, and unobserved individual risk preferences, next to experimental conditions.

Correction: Protocol of the Healthy Brain Study: An accessible resource for understanding the human brain and how it dynamically and individually operates in its bio-social context.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0260952.].

Defensive freezing and its relation to approach-avoidance decision-making under threat.

Successful responding to acutely threatening situations requires adequate approach-avoidance decisions. However, it is unclear how threat-induced states-like freezing-related bradycardia-impact the weighing of the potential outcomes of such value-based decisions. Insight into the underlying computations is essential, not only to improve our models of decision-making but also to improve interventions for maladaptive decisions, for instance in anxiety patients and first-responders who frequently have to make decisions under acute threat. Forty-two participants made passive and active approach-avoidance decisions under threat-of-shock when confronted with mixed outcome-prospects (i.e., varying money and shock amounts). Choice behavior was best predicted by a model including individual action-tendencies and bradycardia, beyond the subjective value of the outcome. Moreover, threat-related bradycardia (high-vs-low threat) interacted with subjective value, depending on the action-context (passive-vs-active). Specifically, in action-contexts incongruent with participants' intrinsic action-tendencies, stronger bradycardia related to diminished effects of subjective value on choice across participants. These findings illustrate the relevance of testing approach-avoidance decisions in relatively ecologically valid conditions of acute and primarily reinforced threat. These mechanistic insights into approach-avoidance conflict-resolution may inspire biofeedback-related techniques to optimize decision-making under threat. Critically, the findings demonstrate the relevance of incorporating internal psychophysiological states and external action-contexts into models of approach-avoidance decision-making.

The role of psychopathic traits, social anxiety and cortisol in social approach avoidance tendencies.

Social anxiety and psychopathy have conceptually been linked to nearly opposite emotional, behavioral and endocrinological endophenotypes, representing social fearfulness and fearlessness, respectively. Although such a dimensional view has theoretical and practical implications, no study has directly compared social anxiety and psychopathy in terms of emotional experiences, relevant hormones (i.e. cortisol, testosterone) and behavioral tendencies (i.e. social approach-avoidance). Therefore, the present study examined 1) whether self-reported social anxiety and psychopathic traits are indeed anticorrelated, and 2) whether social anxiety, psychopathic traits, cortisol, testosterone and their interplay are differentially linked to social approach-avoidance tendencies. In a well-powered study, a sample of 196 healthy female participants, we assessed self-reported emotional and behavioral tendencies of social fear (i.e. social anxiety and social avoidance) and psychopathic traits (i.e. Factor I [interpersonal-affective deficit] and Factor II [impulsive behavior]). Furthermore, hormone levels were assessed, and approach-avoidance tendencies towards emotional (angry, happy) facial expressions were measured by means of a joystick reaction time task. Results confirmed that self-reported emotional tendencies of social anxiety and psychopathy Factor I (interpersonal-affective deficit) correlated negatively, but self-reported behavioral tendencies (social avoidance and psychopathy Factor II [impulsive behavior]) correlated positively. Furthermore, Structural Equation Modelling demonstrated that participants with higher social anxiety and higher cortisol levels showed an avoidance tendency towards happy faces, while participants with higher psychopathic traits showed an approach tendency towards angry faces. In sum, the notion that social anxiety and psychopathic traits are opposing ends of one dimension was supported only in terms of self-reported emotional experiences, but a comparable relationship with regard to behavioral and endocrinological aspects is debatable. The current findings stress the necessity to study emotional, endocrinological and behavioral factors in unison in order to better understand the shared and distinctive mechanisms of social anxiety and psychopathic traits.

Human defensive freezing: Associations with hair cortisol and trait anxiety.

The anticipation of threat facilitates innate defensive behaviours including freezing reactions. Freezing in humans is characterised by reductions in body sway and heart rate. Limited evidence suggests that individual differences in freezing reactions are associated with predictors of anxiety-related psychopathology including trait anxiety and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis activity. However, previous human studies focused on acutely circulating cortisol levels, leaving the link between freezing and more stable, individual trait markers of HPA axis activity unclear. We investigated whether individual differences in anticipatory freezing reactions are predicted by accumulated hair cortisol concentrations (HCC) and trait anxiety, in a well-powered mixed sample of police recruits at the start of the police training, and age, sex and education matched controls (total N = 419, mean age = 24, Nwomen = 106, Npolice recruits = 337). Freezing-related reactions were assessed with posturographic and heart rate measurements during an active shooting task under threat of shock. The anticipation of threat of shock elicited the expected reductions in body sway and heart rate, indicative of human freezing. Individual differences in threat-related reductions in body sway, but not heart rate, were related to lower HCC and higher trait anxiety. The observed links between postural freezing and predictors of anxiety-related psychopathology suggest the potential value of defensive freezing as a somatic marker for individual differences in stress-vulnerability and resilience. DATA AVAILABILITY: The datasets analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding authors upon reasonable request.

Individual differences in costly fearful avoidance and the relation to psychophysiology.

Excessive avoidance behaviour is a cardinal symptom of anxiety disorders. Avoidance is not only associated with the benefits of avoiding threats, but also with the costs of missing out on rewards upon exploration. Psychological and psychophysiological mechanisms contributing to these costly avoidance decisions in prospect of mixed outcomes remain unclear. We developed a novel Fearful Avoidance Task (FAT) that resembles characteristics of real-life approach-avoidance conflicts, enabling to disentangle reward and threat effects. Using the FAT, we investigated individual differences in avoidance behaviour and anticipatory psychophysiological states (i.e. startle reflex and skin conductance) in a relatively large sample of 343 (78 females) participants. Avoidance under acute threat of shock depends on a trade-off between perceived reward and threat. Both increased startle and skin conductance in the absence of threat of shock emerged as predictors of increased avoidance (potentially indicative of fear generalization). Increased avoidance was also associated with female sex and trait anxiety, dependent on reward and threat levels. Our findings highlight distinct possible predictors of heightened avoidance and add to mechanistic understanding of how individual propensity for costly avoidance may emerge. Distinct avoidance typologies based on differential reward and threat sensitivities may have different mechanistic origins and thereby could benefit from different treatment strategies.