People accept breaks in the causal chain between crime and punishment.

Crime and punishment are usually connected. An agent intentionally causes harm, other people find out, and they punish the agent in response. We investigated whether people care about the integrity of this causal chain. Across seven experiments, participants (total N = 1,709) rated the acceptability of punishing agents for one crime when the agents had committed a different crime. Overall, participants generally approved of such wayward punishment. They endorsed it more strongly than punishing totally innocent agents, though they often approved of punishing agents for their correct crimes more strongly. Participants sometimes supported wayward punishment when wrongdoers were punished for a different kind of crime than the one committed, and they supported several different kinds of wayward punishments. Together the findings show that people often tolerate breaks in the causal chain between crime and punishment.

Probability and intentional action.

How does probability affect attributions of intentionality? In five experiments (total N = 1410), we provide evidence for a probability raising account holding that people are more likely to see the outcome of an agent's action as intentional if the agent does something to increase the odds of that outcome. Experiment 1 found that high probability without probability raising does not suffice for strong attributions of intentionality. Participants were more likely to conclude a girl intentionally obtained a desired gumball from a single gumball machine when it offered favorable odds for getting that kind of gumball compared with when it offered poor odds, but their attributions of intentionality were lukewarm. Experiments 2 and 3 then found stronger attributions of intentionality when the girl raised her probability of success by choosing to use machines offering favorable odds over machines offering poor odds. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined whether these effects of probability raising might reduce to consideration of agents' beliefs and expectations. We found that although these mental states do matter, probability raising matters too-people attribute intentional actions to agents who increase their odds of success, rather than to agents who merely become convinced that success is likely. We discuss the implications of these findings for claims that control and skill contribute to attributions of intentional action.

Can compression take place in working memory without a central contribution of long-term memory?

Information is easier to remember when it is recognized as structured. One explanation for this benefit is that people represent structured information in a compressed form, thus reducing memory load. However, the contribution of long-term memory and working memory to compression are not yet disentangled. Previous work has mostly produced evidence that long-term memory is the main source of compression. In the present work, we reveal two signatures of compression in working memory using a large-scale naturalistic data set from a science museum. Analyzing data from more than 32,000 memory trials, in which people attempted to recall briefly displayed sequences of colors, we examined how the estimated compressibility of each sequence predicted memory performance. Besides finding that compressibility predicted memory performance, we found that greater compressibility of early subsections of sequences predicted better memory for later subsections, and that mis-recalled sequences were simpler than the originals. These findings suggest that (1) more compressibility reduces memory load, leaving space for additional information; (2) memory errors are not random and instead reflect compression gone awry. Together, these findings suggest that compression can take place in working memory. This may enable efficient storage on the spot without direct contributions from long-term memory. However, we also discuss ways long-term memory could explain our findings.

Ownership and willingness to compete for resources.

Boyer proposes that ownership intuitions depend on tracking cues predictive of agents' motivations to compete for resources. However, the account may mis-predict people's intuitions about ownership, and it may also be too cognitively costly to be feasible. Even so, alternative accounts could benefit by taking inspiration from how the account handles thorny issues in the psychology of ownership.

The second-order problem of other minds.

The target article proposes that people perceive social robots as depictions rather than as genuine social agents. We suggest that people might instead view social robots as social agents, albeit agents with more restricted capacities and moral rights than humans. We discuss why social robots, unlike other kinds of depictions, present a special challenge for testing the depiction hypothesis.

Easy or difficult? Children's understanding of how supply and demand affect goal completion.

Three experiments examined children's understanding of how supply and demand affect the difficulty of completing goals. Participants were 368 predominantly White Canadians (52% female, 48% male) tested in 2017-2022. In Experiment 1, 3-year-olds recognized that obtaining resources is easier where supply exceeds demand than where demand exceeds supply. However, in Experiment 2, 3-year-olds were insensitive to supply and demand when comparing situations where demand exceeded supply to a greater or lesser degree. Finally, Experiment 3 revealed a developmental lag in 3- to 7-year-olds' understanding of how supply and demand affects goal completion: Children succeeded when contrasting a surplus and a shortage of supply relative to demand at 4;2. But they only succeeded when contrasting degrees of greater supply than demand at 5;10.

Causal knowledge and children's possibility judgments.

Children often say that strange and improbable events, like eating pickle-flavored ice cream, are impossible. Two experiments explored whether these beliefs are explained by limits in children's causal knowledge. Participants were 423 predominantly White Canadian 4- to 7-year-olds (44% female) tested in 2020-2021. Providing children with causal information about ordinary events did not lead them to affirm that improbable events are possible, and they more often affirmed improbable events after merely learning that a similar event had occurred. However, children were most likely to affirm events if they learned how similar events happened (OR = 2.16). The findings suggest that knowledge of causal circumstances may only impact children's beliefs about the possibility after they are able to draw connections between potential events and known events.

A Similarity Heuristic in Children's Possibility Judgments.

Children often judge that strange and improbable events are impossible, but the mechanisms behind their reasoning remain unclear. This article (N = 250) provides evidence that young children use a similarity heuristic that compares potential events to similar known events to determine whether events are possible. Experiment 1 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds who hear about improbable events go on to judge that similar improbable events can happen. Experiment 2 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds more often affirm that improbable events can happen if told about related improbable events than if told about unrelated ones. Finally, Experiment 3 shows that 5- to 6-year-olds affirm the possibility of improbable events related to known events, but deny that related impossible events can happen.

Toddlers and Preschoolers Understand That Some Preferences Are More Subjective Than Others.

Four experiments examined Canadian 2- to 3-year-old children's (N = 224; 104 girls, 120 boys) thoughts about shared preferences. Children saw sets of items, and identified theirs and another person's preferences. Children expected that food preferences would be more likely to be shared than color preferences, regardless of whether the items were similar or different in appeal (Experiments 1-3). A final study replicated these findings while also exploring children's expectations about activity and animal preferences. Across all studies, children expected shared preferences at surprisingly low rates (never higher than chance). Overall, these findings suggest that young children understand that some preferences are more subjective than others, and that these expectations are driven by beliefs about domains of preferences.

Actual knowledge.

This response argues that when you represent others as knowing something, you represent their mind as being related to the actual world. This feature of knowledge explains the limits of knowledge attribution, how knowledge differs from belief, and why knowledge underwrites learning from others. We hope this vision for how knowledge works spurs a new era in theory of mind research.

Young Children Use Probability to Infer Happiness and the Quality of Outcomes.

Happiness with an outcome often depends on whether better or worse outcomes were initially more likely. In five experiments, we found that young children (N = 620, Experiments 1-4) and adults (N = 254, Experiment 5) used probability to infer emotions and assess outcome quality. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 6-year-olds (but not 4-year-olds) inferred that an agent would be less happy with an outcome if a better outcome were initially more likely. In Experiment 3, 4- to 6-year-olds used probability to assess quality. These findings suggest a developmental lag between 4-year-olds' assessments of quality and happiness. We replicated this lag in Experiment 4. In Experiment 5, adults used probability to assess both quality and happiness. We suggest that children and adults may use probability to establish a standard against which actual outcomes are compared. Doing so might allow them to make probability-based inferences of happiness without drawing on counterfactual reasoning.

Children's Beliefs About Possibility Differ Across Dreams, Stories, and Reality.

Are children's judgments about what can happen in dreams and stories constrained by their beliefs about reality? This question was explored across three experiments, in which four hundred and sixty-nine 4- to 7-year-olds judged whether improbable and impossible events could occur in a dream, a story, or reality. In Experiment 1, children judged events more possible in dreams than in reality. In Experiment 2, children also judged events more possible in dreams than in stories. Both experiments also suggested that children's beliefs about reality constrain their judgments about dreams and stories. Finally, in Experiment 3 children were asked about impossible events more typical of dreams and stories. In contrast with the other experiments, children now affirmed the events could happen in these worlds.

Working memory develops at a similar rate across diverse stimuli.

Children's working memory improves with age. We examined whether the rate of improvement varies across different classes of stimuli or is instead constant across classes of stimuli. We tested between these two possibilities by having participants (N = 99) from four age groups (7 years, 9 years, 11 years, and adults) complete simple span tasks using items from six stimulus classes. Participants' span improved with age and varied across the different stimulus classes. Crucially, age-related improvements were mostly similar across the different stimulus classes. These findings suggest that age-related improvements in working memory result from an increase in capacity and not from gains in the ability to form chunks or from growing familiarity with certain classes of stimuli. Moreover, the findings build on previous studies on adults showing that working memory performance varies across different stimulus classes by revealing that these differences occur in young children and remain stable across development.

Knowledge before belief.

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations of beliefs, which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations of knowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind - one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it.

Give and take: Ownership affects how 2- and 3-year-olds allocate resources.

In three experiments, we investigated whether 2- and 3-year-olds (N = 240) consider ownership when taking resources for themselves and allocating resources to another agent. When selecting resources for themselves, children generally avoided taking resources that belonged to another agent and instead favored their own resources (Experiments 1 and 2). However, they did not avoid taking the agent's resources when the only other resources available were described as not belonging to the agent (Experiment 3). Children also selected fewer of the agent's resources when taking for themselves than when giving to the agent (Experiments 2 and 3). In giving to the agent, children were more likely to select the agent's resources than resources not belonging to the agent (Experiment 3). These findings show that ownership affects how 2- and 3-year-olds allocate resources. The findings also provide new evidence that 2-year-olds may respect others' ownership rights, at least to a limited degree, although we also consider an alternative explanation for the findings.

Future-oriented objects.

Hoerl & McCormack suggest that saving tools does not require temporal reasoning. However, we identify a class of objects that are only possessed (i.e., saved) in anticipation of future needs. We propose that investigating these future-oriented objects may help identify temporal reasoning in populations where this ability is uncertain.

Preschoolers are sensitive to accent distance.

Can children tell how different a speaker's accent is from their own? In Experiment 1 (N = 84), four- and five-year-olds heard speakers with different accents and indicated where they thought each speaker lived relative to a reference point on a map that represented their current location. Five-year-olds generally placed speakers with stronger accents (as judged by adults) at more distant locations than speakers with weaker accents. In contrast, four-year-olds did not show differences in where they placed speakers with different accents. In Experiment 2 (N = 56), the same sentences were low-pass filtered so that only prosodic information remained. This time, children judged which of five possible aliens had produced each utterance, given a reference speaker. Children of both ages showed differences in which alien they chose based on accent, and generally rated speakers with foreign accents as more different from their native accent than speakers with regional accents. Together, the findings show that preschoolers perceive accent distance, that children may be sensitive to the distinction between foreign and regional accents, and that preschoolers likely use prosody to differentiate among accents.

Fitting the Message to the Listener: Children Selectively Mention General and Specific Facts.

In three experiments, two hundred and ninety-seven 4- to 6-year-olds were asked to describe objects to a listener, and their answers were coded for the presence of general and specific facts. In Experiments 1 and 2, the listener's knowledge of the kinds of objects was manipulated. This affected references to specific facts at all ages, but only affected references to general facts in children aged 5 and older. In Experiment 3, children's goal in communicating was either pedagogical or not. Pedagogy influenced references to general information from age 4, but not references to specific information. These findings are informative about how children vary general and specific information in conversation, and suggest that listeners' knowledge and children's pedagogical goals influenced children's responses via different mechanisms.

Accent, Language, and Race: 4-6-Year-Old Children's Inferences Differ by Speaker Cue.

Three experiments examined 4- to 6-year-olds' use of potential cues to geographic background. In Experiment 1 (N = 72), 4- to 5-year-olds used a speaker's foreign accent to infer that they currently live far away, but 6-year-olds did not. In Experiment 2 (N = 72), children at all ages used accent to infer where a speaker was born. In both experiments, race played some role in children's geographic inferences. Finally, in Experiment 3 (N = 48), 6-year-olds used language to infer both where a speaker was born and where they currently live. These findings reveal critical differences across development in the ways that speaker characteristics are used as inferential cues to a speaker's geographic location and history.

Using versus liking: Young children use ownership to predict actions but not to infer preferences.

Three experiments show that young children (N = 384) use ownership to predict actions but not to infer preferences. In Experiment 1, 3- to 6-year-olds considered ownership when predicting actions but did not expect it to trump preferences. In Experiment 2, 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, used ownership to predict actions, and 5-year-olds grasped that an agent would use his or her own property despite preferring someone else's. This experiment also showed that relating an agent to an object interfered with 3- and 4-year-olds' judgments that a more attractive object is preferred. Finally, Experiment 3 found that 3- and 4-year-olds do not believe that owning an object increases regard for it. These findings are informative about the kinds of information children use to predict actions and the inferences they make from ownership. The findings also reveal specificity in how children use ownership to make judgments about others, and suggest that children more closely relate ownership to people's actions than to their desires.