RESUMO
The ability to respond to public health emergencies involving infectious diseases as well as our ability to adequately prepare for as yet unknown or unrecognized emerging infectious diseases requires suitable facilities within which scientific investigations can take place. To ensure the safe conduct of such investigations so that laboratory workers and the general public are protected from potential consequences of accidental or intentional release of high consequence pathogens, special containment facilities have been designed and constructed. Evaluation of the adequacy of containment for these types of investigations requires a risk assessment (RA) as part of the overall construction project for these types of laboratories. A discussion of the RA process along with considerations that impact the design of such studies and the overall results is presented.
Assuntos
Contenção de Riscos Biológicos , Laboratórios/normas , Defesa Civil/métodos , Doenças Transmissíveis Emergentes/diagnóstico , Doenças Transmissíveis Emergentes/tratamento farmacológico , Doenças Transmissíveis Emergentes/prevenção & controle , Pesquisa sobre Serviços de Saúde , Humanos , Saúde Ocupacional , Medição de RiscoRESUMO
On August 22-23, 2013, agencies within the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) sponsored the Filovirus Medical Countermeasures (MCMs) Workshop as an extension of the activities of the Filovirus Animal Non-clinical Group (FANG). The FANG is a federally-recognized multi-Agency group established in 2011 to coordinate and facilitate U.S. government (USG) efforts to develop filovirus MCMs. The workshop brought together government, academic and industry experts to consider the needs for filovirus MCMs and evaluate the status of the product development pipeline. This report summarizes speaker presentations and highlights progress and challenges remaining in the field.