Memory for abstract control states does not decay with increasing retrieval delays.

Recent studies have suggested that abstract control states (i.e., internal attentional states independent from concrete stimuli and responses) can be stored in episodic memory and retrieved subsequently. However, the duration of such a control state memory remains unclear. Previous research has found a quick and complete decay for stimulus-response bindings after 2000-5000 ms. Here, we tested a possible decay of control state bindings with retrieval delays of 2000, 3000, or 5000 ms. Five preregistered experiments used a confound-minimized prime-target task to measure the congruency sequence effect (CSE) separately for trials in which a nominally irrelevant context feature changed or repeated across trials. Analyses of the individual experiments did not result in conclusive evidence. A mega-analysis integrating the data of all experiments (Ntotal = 326) replicated evidence for binding and retrieval of control states, in that larger CSEs were found for context repetition trials. Importantly, Bayesian analysis indicated that this effect was not modulated by the length of retrieval delay. While this finding suggests that bindings of abstract control states can be relatively robust, we also discuss possible limitations of the present research.

On the interplay of curiosity, confidence, and importance in knowing information.

Curiosity appears to be the driving force for humans to find new information, but despite its general relevance, only a few studies investigated the underlying mechanisms of curiosity. Kang et al. (Psychol Sci 20(8):963-973, 2009) and Dubey and Griffiths (Psychol Rev 127(3):455-476, 2020) reported a relation between curiosity and confidence such that curiosity follows an inverted U-shaped function of confidence, with the highest curiosity on moderate confidence levels of knowing information. Given that replications of findings on curiosity are rare, this study sought to replicate these previous findings in two experiments, with the same stimulus material (Experiment 1) and new stimulus material using COVID-19-related information (Experiment 2). Based on theoretical predictions by Dubey and Griffiths (2020), we extended previous findings assessing the effect of the importance of information for the participant on the relationship between curiosity and confidence. Our findings replicated previous results in both experiments with the highest curiosity regarding information about which participants were moderately confident in knowing. Our extended analyses suggest that if information can be considered as important, then people are most curious about information when having very low-to-moderate confidence in knowing this information. However, if information is rated as rather not important, then curiosity is highest for information with moderate confidence in knowing the information. Together, these results emphasize the modulatory effect of perceived importance on the interplay between curiosity and confidence in knowing information.

Task performance errors and rewards affect voluntary task choices.

Humans are remarkably flexible in adapting their behavior to current demands. It has been suggested that the decision which of multiple tasks to perform is based on a variety of factors pertaining to the rewards associated with each task as well as task performance (e.g., error rates associated with each task and/or error commission on the previous trial). However, further empirical investigation is needed to examine whether task performance still influences task choices if task choices are rewarded but task performance is not. Accordingly, we exposed participants to a novel reward-varying voluntary task switching paradigm where the reward for the performed task gradually decreased while the reward associated for the alternative task was unchanged. Importantly, we rewarded participants' task choices before participants performed the task to investigate the effect of rewards independent from task performance. We examined the effect of (i) reward, (ii) error rates associated with each of the two tasks, and (iii) error commission in the previous trial on voluntary task choices. As expected, we found that participants' task selection was influenced by reward differences between task choices. In addition, error rates associated with a task also influenced task selection, with participants requiring larger reward differences to switch to a task associated with relatively higher error rates, compared to switching to a task with relatively lower error rates. However, errors in n - 1 did not influence participants' probability to switch to the alternative task. These findings contribute to an ongoing discussion on the influence of task performance on task selection.

Similar proactive effect monitoring in free and forced choice action modes.

When our actions yield predictable consequences in the environment, our eyes often already saccade towards the locations we expect these consequences to appear at. Such spontaneous anticipatory saccades occur based on bi-directional associations between action and effect formed by prior experience. That is, our eye movements are guided by expectations derived from prior learning history. Anticipatory saccades presumably reflect a proactive effect monitoring process that prepares a later comparison of expected and actual effect. Here, we examined whether anticipatory saccades emerged under forced choice conditions when only actions but not target stimuli were predictive of future effects and whether action mode (forced choice vs. free choice, i.e., stimulus-based vs. stimulus-independent choice) affected proactive effect monitoring. Participants produced predictable visual effects on the left/right side via forced choice and free choice left/right key presses. Action and visual effect were spatially compatible in one half of the experiment and spatially incompatible in the other half. Irrespective of whether effects were predicted by target stimuli in addition to participants' actions, in both action modes, we observed anticipatory saccades towards the location of future effects. Importantly, neither the frequency, nor latency or amplitude of these anticipatory saccades significantly differed between forced choice and free choice action modes. Overall, our findings suggest that proactive effect monitoring of future action consequences, as reflected in anticipatory saccades, is comparable between forced choice and free choice action modes.

Assessing the influence of cognitive response conflict on balance control: an event-related approach using response-aligned force-plate time series data.

Process interference or sharing of attentional resources between cognitive tasks and balance control during upright standing has been well documented. Attentional costs increase with greater balancing demands of a balance activity, for example in standing compared to sitting. The traditional approach for analyzing balance control using posturography with a force plate integrates across relative long trial periods of up to several minutes, which blends any balance adjustments and cognitive operations within this period. In the present study, we pursued an event-related approach to assess if single cognitive operations resolving response selection conflict in the Simon task interfere with concurrent balance control in quiet standing. In addition to traditional outcome measures (response latency, error proportions) in the cognitive Simon task, we investigated the effect of spatial congruency on measures of sway control. We expected that conflict resolution in incongruent trials would alter short-term progression of sway control. Our results demonstrated the expected congruency effect on performance in the cognitive Simon task and the mediolateral variability of balance control within 150 ms before the onset of the manual response was reduced to a greater degree in incongruent compared to congruent trials. In addition, mediolateral variability before and after the manual response was generally reduced compared to variability following target presentation, where no effect of congruency was observed. Assuming that response conflict in incongruent conditions requires suppression of the incorrect response tendencies, our results may imply that mechanisms of cognitive conflict resolution may also carry over to intermittent balance control mechanisms in a direction-specific manner.

A random-object-kinematogram plugin for web-based research: implementing oriented objects enables varying coherence levels and stimulus congruency levels.

One of the recent major advances in cognitive psychology research has been the option of web-based in addition to lab-based experimental research. This option fosters experimental research by increasing the pace and size of collecting data sets. Importantly, web-based research profits heavily from integrating tasks that are frequently applied in cognitive psychology into open access software. For instance, an open access random-dot kinematogram (RDK) plugin has recently been integrated into the jsPsych software for web-based research. This plugin allows researchers to implement experimental tasks with varying coherence levels (with that varying task difficulty) of moving dots or varying signal to noise ratios of colored dots. Here, we introduce the random-object kinematogram (ROK) plugin for the jsPsych software which, among other new features, enables researchers to include oriented objects (e.g., triangles or arrows) instead of dots as stimuli. This permits experiments with feature congruency (e.g., upwards-moving triangles pointing upwards) or incongruency (e.g., upwards-moving triangles pointing downwards), allowing to induce gradual degrees of stimulus interference, in addition to gradual degrees of task difficulty. We elaborate on possible set-ups with this plugin in two experiments examining participants' RTs and error rates on different combinations of coherence and congruency levels. Results showed increased RTs and error rates on trials with lower coherence percentages, and on trials with lower congruency levels. We discuss other new features of the ROK plugin and conclude that the possibility of gradually varying the coherence level and congruency level independently from each other offers novel possibilities when conducting web-based experiments.

Limitations of cognitive control on emotional distraction - Congruency in the Color Stroop task does not modulate the Emotional Stroop effect.

Emotional information receives prioritized processing over concurrent cognitive processes. This can lead to distraction if emotional information has to be ignored. In the cognitive domain, mechanisms have been described that allow control of (cognitive) distractions. However, whether similar cognitive control mechanisms also can attenuate emotional distraction is an active area of research. This study asked whether cognitive control (triggered in the Color Stroop task) attenuates emotional distraction in the Emotional Stroop task. Theoretical accounts of cognitive control, and the Emotional Stroop task alike, predict such an interaction for tasks that employ the same relevant (e.g., color-naming) and irrelevant (e.g., word-reading) dimension. In an alternating-runs design with Color and Emotional Stroop tasks changing from trial to trial, we analyzed the impact of proactive and reactive cognitive control on Emotional Stroop effects. Four experiments manipulated predictability of congruency and emotional stimuli. Overall, results showed congruency effects in Color Stroop tasks and Emotional Stroop effects. Moreover, we found a spillover of congruency effects and emotional distraction to the other task, indicating that processes specific to one task impacted to the other task. However, Bayesian analyses and a mini-meta-analysis across experiments weigh against the predicted interaction between cognitive control and emotional distraction. The results point out limitations of cognitive control to block off emotional distraction, questioning views that assume a close interaction between cognitive control and emotional processing.

Investigating time-based expectancy beyond binary timing scenarios: evidence from a paradigm employing three predictive pre-target intervals.

When the duration of a pre-target interval probabilistically predicts the identity of the target, participants typically form time-based expectancies: they respond faster to frequent interval-target combinations than to infrequent ones. Yet, previous research investigating the cognitive time-processing mechanisms underlying time-based expectancy assessed time-based expectancy always in situations with a binary set of intervals (i.e. short vs. long). Here we aim to test whether time-based expectancy transfers to more complex settings with three different predictive time intervals (short, medium, long) in which each predicts one of three different target stimuli with 80% probability. In three experiments we varied how the medium interval was computed (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, or in between both). Our results showed that participants were able to learn the time-event contingencies for the short and the long as well as for the medium interval, and were, thus able to flexibly redirect their target expectancy two times during the course of a trial. The evidence concerning the impact of the manipulation of the medium intervals' absolute duration on time-based expectancy was, however, mixed, as time-based expectancy for the medium interval could only be observed in one of three reported experiments. In sum, the findings of the present study suggest a previously unknown cognitive flexibility underlying time-based expectancy and offer important theoretical implications, challenging future research on the timing mechanisms involved in time-based expectancy.

Time-based task expectancy: perceptual task indicator expectancy or expectancy of post-perceptual task components?

The temporal predictability of upcoming events plays a crucial role in the adjustment of anticipatory cognitive control in multitasking. Previous research has demonstrated that task switching performance improved if tasks were validly predictable by a pre-target interval. Hence, far, the underlying cognitive processes of time-based task expectancy in task switching have not been clearly defined. The present study investigated whether the effect of time-based expectancy is due to expectancy of post-perceptual task components or rather due to facilitation of perceptual visual processing of the coloured task indicator. Participants performed two numeric judgment tasks (parity vs. magnitude), which were each indicated by two different colours. Each task was either more or less frequently preceded by one of two intervals (500 ms or 1500 ms). Tasks were indicated either by colours that were each more frequently (or in Exp. 1 also less frequently) paired with the interval or by colours that were equally frequent for each interval. Participants only responded faster when colour and task were predictable by time (expected colour), not when the task alone was predictable (neutral colour). Hence, our results speak in favour of perceptual time-based task indicator expectancy being the underlying cognitive mechanism of time-based expectancy in the task switching paradigm.

Investigating limits of task prioritization in dual-tasking: evidence from the prioritized processing and the psychological refractory period paradigms.

Dual-tasking often requires prioritizing one task over the other. For example, in the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm, participants are instructed to initially respond to Task 1 (T1) and only then to Task 2 (T2). Furthermore, in the prioritized processing paradigm (PP), participants are instructed to perform T2 only if T1 was a no-go trial-requiring even more prioritization. The present study investigated the limits of task prioritization. Two experiments compared performance in the PRP paradigm and the PP paradigm. To manipulate task prioritization, tasks were rewarded differently (e.g., high reward for T1, low reward for T2, and vice versa). We hypothesized (a) that performance will improve for the highly rewarded task (Experiments 1 and 2) and (b) that there are stronger reward effects for T1 in the PRP than in the PP paradigm (Experiment 2). Results showed an influence of reward on task prioritization: For T1, high reward (compared to low reward) caused a speed-up of responses that did not differ between the two paradigms. However, for T2, reward influenced response speed selectively in the PP paradigm, but not in the PRP paradigm. Based on paradigm-specific response demands, we propose that the coordination of two motor responses plays a crucial role in prioritizing tasks and might limit the flexibility of the allocation of preparatory capacity.

Humans derive task expectancies from sub-second and supra-second interval durations.

Recent studies in the field of task switching have shown that humans can base expectancies for tasks on temporal cues. When tasks are predictable based on the duration of the preceding pre-target interval, humans implicitly adapt to this predictability, indicated by better performance in trials with validly compared to invalidly predicted tasks. Yet, it is not clear which internal timing mechanisms are involved. Previous research has suggested that intervals from the sub- and supra-second range are processed by distinct cognitive timing systems. As earlier studies on temporally predictable task switching have used predictive intervals stemming from both ranges, it was not yet clear if the time-based expectancy effect was driven by just one of the two internal timing systems. The present study used clearly sub-second intervals (10 ms and 500 ms) in Experiment 1, while clearly supra-second intervals (1500 ms and 3000 ms) were used in Experiment 2. Substantial adaptation effects were observed in both experiments, showing that sub- as well as supra-second timing systems are involved in time-based expectancies for tasks. The present findings offer important implications for our theoretical understanding of the internal timing mechanisms involved in time-based task expectancy.

Learning in the absence of overt practice: a novel (previously unseen) stimulus can trigger retrieval of an unpracticed response.

Skilled performance is traditionally thought to develop via overt practice. Recent research has demonstrated that merely instructed stimulus-response (S-R) bindings can influence later performance and readily transfer across response modalities. In the present study, we extended this to include instructed category-response (C-R) associations. That is, we investigated whether merely instructed C-R bindings can trigger an unpracticed response (in a different modality) on perception of a novel (previously unseen) stimulus. In a learning-test design, participants had to classify stimuli by comparing them to perceptual category templates (Experiment 1) or semantic category descriptions (Experiment 2) presented prior to each block. During learning blocks, participants had to respond manually, respond vocally, or listen passively to the correct response being spoken. A manual response was always required at test. In test blocks, the categories could either be novel or repeated from the learning block, whereas half of the stimuli were always novel and half were always repeated from the learning block. Because stimulus and category repetitions were manipulated orthogonally, it was possible to directly compare the relative contribution of S-R and C-R associations to performance. In Experiment 1, test performance was enhanced by repeating the C-R bindings independently of the stimulus. In Experiment 2, there was also evidence of an S-R repetition benefit independent of the classification. Critically, instructed associations formed in one response modality were robust to changes in the required response, even when no overt response was required during training, indicating the need to update the traditional view of associative learning.

Execution-based and verbal code-based stimulus-response associations: proportion manipulations reveal conflict adaptation processes in item-specific priming.

Stimulus-response (S-R) associations consist of two independent components: Stimulus-classification (S-C) and stimulus-action (S-A) associations. Here, we examined whether these S-C and S-A associations were modulated by cognitive control operations. In two item-specific priming experiments, we systematically manipulated the proportion of trials in which item-specific S-C and/or S-A mappings repeated or switched between the single encoding (prime) and single retrieval (probe) instance of each stimulus (i.e., each stimulus appeared only twice). Thus, we assessed the influence of a list-level proportion switch manipulation on the strength of item-specific S-C and S-A associations. Participants responded slower and committed more errors when item-specific S-C or S-A mappings switched rather than repeated between prime and probe (i.e., S-C/S-A switch effects). S-C switch effects were larger when S-C repetitions rather than switches were frequent on the list-level. Similarly, S-A switch effects were modulated by S-A switch proportion. Most importantly, our findings rule out contingency learning and temporal learning as explanations of the observed results and point towards a conflict adaptation mechanism that selectively adapts the encoding and/or retrieval for each S-R component. Finally, we outline how cognitive control over S-R associations operates in the context of item-specific priming.

Cognitive control of emotional distraction - valence-specific or general?

Emotional information captures attention due to privileged processing. Consequently, performance in cognitive tasks declines (i.e. emotional distraction, ED). Therefore, shielding current goals from ED is essential for adaptive goal-directed- behaviour. It has been shown that ED is reduced when participants recruit cognitive control before or after the presentation of an emotional negative distractor. Following up on this, we asked first, whether cognitive control of ED is negative-valence-specific or valence-general. A valence-general-account predicts that control shields against distracting influence of emotion, irrespective of the specific valence. In contrast, a negative-valence-specific-account predicts that control interacts with the valence and ED is reduced for negative stimuli only. Second, we asked whether this effect of ED differs between control modes operating on different time scales (i.e. proactively or reactively). To test this, we manipulated emotional distractor valence (positive/high-arousal; negative/high-arousal; neutral/low-arousal) and assessed how control interacts with ED. Results showed that ED was reduced for negative and positive valent stimuli when control was triggered before (i.e. proactive control, nExp1 = 141, between-subject-design) and after (reactive control, nExp2 = 37, within-subject-design) the emotional stimuli. Accordingly, control blocks off high-arousing emotional distractors from interfering with goal-directed-actions, irrespective of their valence (i.e. valence-general-account) and for both, proactive and reactive control modes.

Flexible coupling of covert spatial attention and motor planning based on learned spatial contingencies.

The present study tested whether the coupling of covert attentional shifts and motor planning of pointing movements can be modulated by learning. Participants performed two tasks. As a primary movement task, they executed a pointing movement to a movement target (MT) location. As a secondary visual attention task, they identified a discrimination target (DT) that was presented shortly before initiation of the pointing movement. These DTs either occurred at the same or at different locations with the MT. A common finding in such and similar settings is the enhanced visual target identification when locations of MT and DT coincide. However, it is not known which factors govern the flexibility of spatial attention-action coupling. Here, we tested the influence of previously learned spatial contingencies between MT and DT on the coupling of covert attention and motor planning. These contingencies were manipulated in three groups (always same locations, always opposite locations, non-contingent locations) in a training session. Results indicated that in a subsequent test phase, previously learned contingencies enhanced visual identification accordingly, even when targets for the movement task and the visual task were presented at opposite sides. These results corroborate previous findings of a rather flexible interaction of attention and motor planning, and demonstrate how one can learn to control attention by means of motor planning.

Transfer of time-based task expectancy across different timing environments.

Recent research on time-based expectancy has shown that humans base their expectancies for responses on representations of temporal relations (e.g., shorter vs. longer duration), rather than on representations of absolute durations (e.g., 500 vs. 1000 ms). In the present study, we investigated whether this holds also true for time-based expectancy of tasks instead of responses. Using a combination of the time-event correlation paradigm and the standard task-switching paradigm, participants learned to associate two different time intervals with two different tasks in a learning phase. In a test phase, the two intervals were either globally prolonged (Experiment 1), or shortened (Experiment 2), and they were no longer predictive for the upcoming task. In both experiments, performance in the test phase was better when expectancy had been defined in relative terms and worse when expectancy had been defined in absolute terms. We conclude that time-based task expectancy employs a relative, rather than an absolute, representation of time. Humans seem to be able to flexibly transfer their time-based task expectancies between different global timing regimes. This finding is of importance not only for our basic understanding of cognitive mechanisms underlying time-based task expectancy. For human-machine applications, these results mean that adaptation to predictive delay structures in interfaces survives globally speeding up or slowing down of delays due to different transmission rates.

Exploring the repetition bias in voluntary task switching.

In the voluntary task-switching paradigm, participants are required to randomly select tasks. We reasoned that the consistent finding of a repetition bias (i.e., participants repeat tasks more often than expected by chance) reflects reasonable adaptive task selection behavior to balance the goal of random task selection with the goals to minimize the time and effort for task performance. We conducted two experiments in which participants were provided with variable amount of preview for the non-chosen task stimuli (i.e., potential switch stimuli). We assumed that switch stimuli would initiate some pre-processing resulting in improved performance in switch trials. Results showed that reduced switch costs due to extra-preview in advance of each trial were accompanied by more task switches. This finding is in line with the characteristics of rational adaptive behavior. However, participants were not biased to switch tasks more often than chance despite large switch benefits. We suggest that participants might avoid effortful additional control processes that modulate the effects of preview on task performance and task choice.

Intentional binding of two effects.

An action that produced an effect is perceived later in time compared to an action that did not produce an effect. Likewise, the effect of an action is perceived earlier in time compared to a stimulus that was not produced by an action. Despite numerous studies on this phenomenon-referred to as Intentional Binding effect (IB)-the underlying mechanisms are still not fully understood. Typically, IB is investigated in settings where the action produces just one single effect, whereas in everyday action contexts, it rather causes a sequence of effects before leading to the desired outcome. Therefore, we investigated IB of two consecutive effects. We observed substantially more IB of a first effect tone compared to a second tone. This pattern was observed for second tones that were temporally predictable (Exp. 1) or not (Exp. 2 and 3). Interestingly, the second tone yielded stronger IB when it was less delayed (Exp. 4). Thus, also an event occurring later in an unfolding action-effect sequence can be bound to its causing action, but it might be less bound to the action than a first effect. Instead of the fact that it is the second of two consecutive effects, this, however, rather seems to be influenced by the longer delay of a second and, therefore, later occurring effect.

Task intentions and their implementation into actions: cognitive control from adolescence to middle adulthood.

Cognitive control processes involved in human multitasking arise, mature, and decline across age. This study investigated how age modulates cognitive control at two different levels: the level of task intentions and the level of the implementation of intentions into the corresponding actions. We were particularly interested in specifying maturation of voluntary task choice (intentions) and task-switching execution (their implementations) between adolescence and middle adulthood. Seventy-four participants were assigned to one of the four age groups (adolescents, 12-17 years; emerging adults, 18-22 years; young adults, 23-27 years; middle-aged adults, 28-56 years). Participants chose between two simple cognitive tasks at the beginning of each trial before pressing a spacebar to indicate that the task choice was made. Next, a stimulus was presented in one of the three adjacent boxes, with participants identifying either the location or the shape of the stimulus, depending on their task choice. This voluntary task-switching paradigm allowed us to investigate the intentional component (task choice) separately from its implementation (task execution). Although all participants showed a tendency to repeat tasks more often than switching between them, this repetition bias was significantly stronger in adolescents than in any adult group. Furthermore, participants generally responded slower after task switches than after task repetitions. This switch cost was similar across tasks in the two younger groups but larger for the shape than the location task in the two older groups. Together, our results demonstrate that both task intentions and their implementation into actions differ across age in quite specific ways.

Defining stimulus representation in stimulus-response associations formed on the basis of task execution and verbal codes.

Responding to stimuli leads to the formation of stimulus-response (S-R) associations that allow stimuli to subsequently automatically trigger associated responses. A recent study has shown that S-R associations are established not only by active task execution, but also by the simultaneous presentation of stimuli and verbal codes denoting responses in the absence of own action [Pfeuffer et al. (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 43:328-347, 2017)]. Here, we used an item-specific priming paradigm to investigate whether the stimulus part of S-R associations formed based on task execution and verbal codes is represented in abstract or specific format by examining whether S-R associations are retrieved for perceptually different forms of the same stimulus or not. Between the prime and probe instance of a stimulus, its format switched from image to word or vice versa. We found that, irrespective of whether stimuli were primed by task execution or verbal coding, performance was impaired when S-R mappings switched rather than repeated between the prime and probe instance of a stimulus. The finding that prime S-R mappings affected probe performance even when stimulus format switched indicates that stimuli were represented in abstract form in S-R association based on both task execution and verbal coding. Furthermore, we found no performance benefits for stimuli primed and probed in the same format rather than different formats, suggesting that stimuli were not additionally represented in specific format. Overall, our findings demonstrate the adaptability of automatized behaviors and indicate that abstract stimulus representations allow S-R associations to generalize across perceptually different stimulus formats.