Cryptochrome proteins regulate the circadian intracellular behavior and localization of PER2 in mouse suprachiasmatic nucleus neurons.

The ∼20,000 cells of the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN), the master circadian clock of the mammalian brain, coordinate subordinate cellular clocks across the organism, driving adaptive daily rhythms of physiology and behavior. The canonical model for SCN timekeeping pivots around transcriptional/translational feedback loops (TTFL) whereby PERIOD (PER) and CRYPTOCHROME (CRY) clock proteins associate and translocate to the nucleus to inhibit their own expression. The fundamental individual and interactive behaviors of PER and CRY in the SCN cellular environment and the mechanisms that regulate them are poorly understood. We therefore used confocal imaging to explore the behavior of endogenous PER2 in the SCN of PER2::Venus reporter mice, transduced with viral vectors expressing various forms of CRY1 and CRY2. In contrast to nuclear localization in wild-type SCN, in the absence of CRY proteins, PER2 was predominantly cytoplasmic and more mobile, as measured by fluorescence recovery after photobleaching. Virally expressed CRY1 or CRY2 relocalized PER2 to the nucleus, initiated SCN circadian rhythms, and determined their period. We used translational switching to control CRY1 cellular abundance and found that low levels of CRY1 resulted in minimal relocalization of PER2, but yet, remarkably, were sufficient to initiate and maintain circadian rhythmicity. Importantly, the C-terminal tail was necessary for CRY1 to localize PER2 to the nucleus and to initiate SCN rhythms. In CRY1-null SCN, CRY1Δtail opposed PER2 nuclear localization and correspondingly shortened SCN period. Through manipulation of CRY proteins, we have obtained insights into the spatiotemporal behaviors of PER and CRY sitting at the heart of the TTFL molecular mechanism.

Adversarial alignment enables competing models to engage in cooperative theory building toward cumulative science.

Crises in science concern not only methods, statistics, and results but also, theory development. Beyond the indispensable refinement of tools and procedures, resolving crises would also benefit from a deeper understanding of the concepts and processes guiding research. Usually, theories compete, and some lose, incentivizing destruction of seemingly opposing views. This does not necessarily contribute to accumulating insights, and it may incur collateral damage (e.g., impairing cognitive processes and collegial relations). To develop a more constructive model, we built on adversarial collaboration, which integrates incompatible results into agreed-on new empirical research to test competing hypotheses [D. Kahneman, Am. Psychol. 58, 723-730 (2003)]. Applying theory and evidence from the behavioral sciences, we address the group dynamic complexities of adversarial interactions between scientists. We illustrate the added value of considering these in an "adversarial alignment" that addressed competing conceptual frameworks from five different theories of social evaluation. Negotiating a joint framework required two preconditions and several guidelines. First, we reframed our interactions from competitive rivalry to cooperative pursuit of a joint goal, and second, we assumed scientific competence and good intentions, enabling cooperation toward that goal. Then, we applied five rules for successful multiparty negotiations: 1) leveling the playing field, 2) capitalizing on curiosity, 3) producing measurable progress, 4) working toward mutual gain, and 5) being aware of the downside alternative. Together, these guidelines can encourage others to create conditions that allow for theoretical alignments and develop cumulative science.

The differential similarity of positive and negative information - an affect-induced processing outcome?

People judge positive information to be more alike than negative information. This good-bad asymmetry in similarity was argued to constitute a true property of the information ecology (Alves, H., Koch, A., & Unkelbach, C. (2017). Why good is more alike than bad: Processing implications. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21, 69-79). Alternatively, the asymmetry may constitute a processing outcome itself, namely an influence of phasic affect on information processing. Because no research has yet tested whether phasic affect influences perceived similarity among stimuli, we conducted 5 Experiments that also tested whether phasic affect can account for the higher judged similarity among positive compared to negative stimuli. In three experiments, we affectively charged pictures of different Pokemon by pairing them with monetary gains and losses (Exp. 1a, 1b) as well as positive and negative trait words (Exp. 2); yet, the evaluative charge did not differentially influence perceived similarity among the Pokemon. Experiment 3 replicated the basic similarity asymmetry among positive and negative words, and found that it was unaffected by externally induced phasic affect. Experiment 4 showed that phasic affect had no influence on perceived similarity of non-evaluative words either. We conclude that albeit a weak influence of phasic affect on perceived similarity of stimuli cannot be ruled out entirely, it can most likely not account for the typically medium to large sized asymmetry in similarity among positive and negative stimuli.

A Cognitive-Ecological Explanation of Intergroup Biases.

People often hold negative attitudes toward out-groups and minority groups. We argue that such intergroup biases may result from an interaction of basic cognitive processes and the structure of the information ecology. This cognitive-ecological model assumes that groups such as minorities and out-groups are often novel to a perceiver. At the level of cognition, novel groups are primarily associated with their unique attributes, that is, attributes that differentiate them from other groups. In the information ecology, however, unique attributes are likely to be negative. Thus, novel groups, and by proxy minorities and out-groups, tend to be associated with negative attributes, leading to an evaluative disadvantage. We demonstrated this disadvantage in three experiments in which participants successively formed impressions about two fictional groups associated with the same number of positive and negative attributes. Participants preferred the first group over the novel group as long as the groups' unique attributes were negative.

A density explanation of valence asymmetries in recognition memory.

The density hypothesis states that positive information is more similar than negative information, resulting in higher density of positive information in mental representations. The present research applies the density hypothesis to recognition memory to explain apparent valence asymmetries in recognition memory, namely, a recognition advantage for negative information. Previous research explained this negativity advantage on the basis of valence-induced affect. We predicted that positive information's higher density impairs recognition performance. Two old-new word recognition experiments tested whether differential density between positive and negative stimuli creates a negativity advantage in recognition memory, over and above valence-induced affect. In Experiment 1, participants better discriminated negative word stimuli (i.e., less false alarms) and showed a response bias towards positive words. Regression analyses showed the asymmetry to be function of density and not of valence. Experiment 2 varied stimulus density orthogonal to valence. Again, discriminability and response bias were a function of density and not of valence. We conclude that the higher density of positive information causes an apparent valence asymmetry in recognition memory.

Perceived Power Polarizes Moral Evaluations.

We show an interactive effect of perceiver-target similarity in ideological beliefs and target power on impressions of target morality. Consistent with prior research, perceivers rated targets with dissimilar ideologies as less moral than targets with similar ideologies, but this difference in ratings was magnified for powerful targets relative to less powerful targets. We argue that these results emerged because perceivers expected similar-ideology, powerful (vs. powerless) targets to help the self more, and expected dissimilar-ideology, powerful (vs. powerless) targets to hurt the self more. We establish this effect when people evaluate politicians (Study 1), groups, and individuals (Studies 2a-2b); demonstrate its predictive power over other kinds of interpersonal similarity; and show that it affects morality judgments uniquely when compared with other consequential dimensions of social evaluation. Finally, we manipulated power experimentally and showed the interaction when the difference between high- and low-power manipulations was controlled over just $1 (Studies 3-4).

Unconstrained Descriptions of Facebook Profile Pictures Support High-Dimensional Models of Impression Formation.

Dominant models of impression formation focus on two fundamental dimensions: a horizontal dimension of warmth/communion/trustworthiness and a vertical dimension of competence/agency/dominance. However, these models have typically been studied using theory-driven methods and stimuli of restricted complexity. We used a data-driven approach and naturalistic stimuli to explore the latent dimensions underlying >300,000 unconstrained linguistic descriptions of 1,000 Facebook profile pictures from 2,188 participants. Via traditional (Exploratory Factor Analysis) and modern (natural language dictionaries, semantic sentence embeddings) approaches, we observed impressions to form with regard to the horizontal and vertical dimensions and their respective facets of sociability/morality and ability/assertiveness, plus the key demographic variables of gender, age, and race. However, we also observed impressions to form along numerous further dimensions, including adventurousness, conservatism, fitness, non-conformity, and stylishness. These results serve to emphasize the importance of high-dimensional models of impression formation and help to clarify the content dimensions underlying unconstrained descriptions of individuals.

Differentiation in social perception: Why later-encountered individuals are described more negatively.

According to the cognitive-ecological model of social perception, biases toward individuals can arise as by-products of cognitive principles that interact with the information ecology. The present work tested whether negatively biased person descriptions occur as by-products of cognitive differentiation. Later-encountered persons are described by their distinct attributes that differentiate them from earlier-encountered persons. Because distinct attributes tend to be negative, serial person descriptions should become increasingly negative. We found our predictions confirmed in six studies. In Study 1, descriptions of representatively sampled persons became increasingly distinct and negative with increasing serial positions of the target person. Study 2 eliminated this pattern of results by instructing perceivers to assimilate rather than differentiate a series of targets. Study 3 generalized the pattern from one-word descriptions of still photos of targets to multisentence descriptions of videos of targets. In line with the cognitive-ecological model, Studies 4-5b found that the relation between serial position and negativity was amplified among targets with similar positive attributes, zero among targets with distinct positive or negative attributes, and reversed among similar negative targets. Study 6 returned to representatively sampled targets and generalized the serial position-negativity effect from descriptions of the targets to overall evaluations of them. In sum, the present research provides strong evidence for the explanatory power of the cognitive-ecological model of social perception. We discuss theoretical and practical implications. It may pay off to appear early in an evaluation sequence. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Reminders undermine impressions of genuine gratitude.

While reminders can help by encouraging prosocial behaviors, we propose that they can also hurt. Across 10 studies, most of which focus on reminders to express gratitude, we find that reminders interfere with impressions of genuine prosociality. Whether people are reminded subtly (Studies 1a and 6-8) or blatantly (Studies 2-5) to express gratitude, the reminder is perceived to put social pressure on the potential thanker, making reminded thankers seem less genuine and less likable than spontaneous thankers. This is true from the perspective of both a third-party observer (Studies 1a and 2-7) and the receiver of thanks (Study 4), regardless of whether the judgments are about hypothetical (Studies 1a, 2-3, and 6-7) or real behavior (Studies 4-5). We find that this phenomenon can have material consequences: Receivers of gratitude expressions allocated a larger proportion of bonus money to a spontaneous thanker compared to a reminded thanker (Study 5). We also find that to overcome the decrement in their perceived genuineness, reminded thankers must engage in costly signaling by thanking more elaborately (Study 7), and reminded thankers spontaneously do this (Study 8). Overall, while reminding people to engage in prosocial actions may encourage laudable behavior (Study 6), our findings suggest that doing so may also undermine the actor's perceived genuineness, leading to material consequences and raising the bar for what is required to signal sincerity. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Relational versus structural goals prioritize different social information.

People gather information about others along a few fundamental dimensions; their current goals determine which dimensions they most need to know. As proponents of competing social-evaluation models, we sought to study the dimensions that perceivers spontaneously prioritize when gathering information about unknown social groups. Because priorities depend on functions, having relational goals (e.g., deciding whether and how to interact with a group) versus structural goals (e.g., getting an overview of society) should moderate dimensional priorities. Various candidate dimensions could differentiate perceivers' impressions of social groups. For example, the Stereotype Content model argues that people evaluate others in terms of their Warmth (i.e., their Sociability and Morality) and Competence (i.e., their Ability and Assertiveness). Alternatively, the Agency-Beliefs-Communion (ABC) model proposes conservative-progressive Beliefs. Five studies (N = 2,268) found that participants consistently prioritized learning about targets' Warmth. However, goal moderated priority: When participants had a relational goal, such as an unknown group increasing in their neighborhood, they showed more interest in targets' Sociability, a facet of Warmth. When participants had a structural goal, such as an unknown group increasing in their nation, they showed more interest in the groups' Beliefs, as well as increased interest in Competence-related facets. Diverse methods reveal interest in all dimensions, reconciling discrepancies among social-evaluation models by identifying how relational versus structural goals differentiate priorities of the fundamental dimensions proposed by current models. Results have implications for fundamental dimensions of social cognition, more generally. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Quantification of protein abundance and interaction defines a mechanism for operation of the circadian clock.

The mammalian circadian clock exerts control of daily gene expression through cycles of DNA binding. Here, we develop a quantitative model of how a finite pool of BMAL1 protein can regulate thousands of target sites over daily time scales. We used quantitative imaging to track dynamic changes in endogenous labelled proteins across peripheral tissues and the SCN. We determine the contribution of multiple rhythmic processes coordinating BMAL1 DNA binding, including cycling molecular abundance, binding affinities, and repression. We find nuclear BMAL1 concentration determines corresponding CLOCK through heterodimerisation and define a DNA residence time of this complex. Repression of CLOCK:BMAL1 is achieved through rhythmic changes to BMAL1:CRY1 association and high-affinity interactions between PER2:CRY1 which mediates CLOCK:BMAL1 displacement from DNA. Finally, stochastic modelling reveals a dual role for PER:CRY complexes in which increasing concentrations of PER2:CRY1 promotes removal of BMAL1:CLOCK from genes consequently enhancing ability to move to new target sites.

Fluency and positivity as possible causes of the truth effect.

Statements' rated truth increases when people encounter them repeatedly. Processing fluency is a central variable to explain this truth effect. However, people experience processing fluency positively, and these positive experiences might cause the truth effect. Three studies investigated positivity and fluency influences on the truth effect. Study 1 found correlations between elicited positive feelings and rated truth. Study 2 replicated the repetition-based truth effect, but positivity did not influence the effect. Study 3 conveyed positive and negative correlations between positivity and truth in a learning phase. We again replicated the truth effect, but positivity only influenced judgments for easy statements in the learning phase. Thus, across three studies, we found positivity effects on rated truth, but not on the repetition-based truth effect: We conclude that positivity does not explain the standard truth effect, but the role of positive experiences for truth judgments deserves further investigation.

Identifying the dimensions of secrets to reduce their harms.

How does the content of secrets relate to their harms? We identified a data-driven model (across five empirical steps), which suggested that secrets are generally seen to differ in how immoral, relational, and profession/goal-oriented they are (Study 1). The more a secret was consensually perceived to be immoral, relational, and profession/goal-oriented, the more that secret was reported to evoke feelings of shame, social connectedness, and insight into the secret, respectively. These three experiences independently predicted the extent to which the secret was judged as harmful to well-being (Studies 2a-c and 3). Reciprocally, reminding participants of the ways in which a secret does not need to be harmful (i.e., across the three dimensions of secrets) bolstered participants' feelings of well-being and efficacy with regard to coping with that secret (Study 4). A final study that examined secrets from romantic partners replicated the effect on perceived coping efficacy, which in turn predicted daily indicators of relationship quality (Study 5). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Explaining Negativity Dominance without Processing Bias.

In a recent study, Shin and Niv explain both negativity and positivity biases in social evaluations as a function of the diversity and low frequency of events. We discuss why negative information is indeed more diverse and less frequent, and highlight the implications beyond social evaluations.

Navigating the social world: Toward an integrated framework for evaluating self, individuals, and groups.

Social evaluation occurs at personal, interpersonal, group, and intergroup levels, with competing theories and evidence. Five models engage in adversarial collaboration, to identify common conceptual ground, ongoing controversies, and continuing agendas: Dual Perspective Model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007); Behavioral Regulation Model (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007); Dimensional Compensation Model (Yzerbyt et al., 2005); Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002); and Agency-Beliefs-Communion Model (Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016). Each has distinctive focus, theoretical roots, premises, and evidence. Controversies dispute dimensions: number, organization, definition, and labeling; their relative priority; and their relationship. Our first integration suggests 2 fundamental dimensions: Vertical (agency, competence, "getting ahead") and Horizontal (communion, warmth, "getting along"), with respective facets of ability and assertiveness (Vertical) and friendliness and morality (Horizontal). Depending on context, a third dimension is conservative versus progressive Beliefs. Second, different criteria for priority favor different dimensions: processing speed and subjective weight (Horizontal); pragmatic diagnosticity (Vertical); moderators include number and type of target, target-perceiver relationship, context. Finally, the relation between dimensions has similar operational moderators. As an integrative framework, the dimensions' dynamics also depend on perceiver goals (comprehension, efficiency, harmony, compatibility), each balancing top-down and bottom-up processes, for epistemic or hedonic functions. One emerging insight is that the nature and number of targets each of these models typically examines alters perceivers' evaluative goal and how bottom-up information or top-down inferences interact. This framework benefits theoretical parsimony and new research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The ABC of society: Perceived similarity in agency/socioeconomic success and conservative-progressive beliefs increases intergroup cooperation.

The dimensions that explain which societal groups cooperate more with which other groups remain unclear. We predicted that perceived similarity in agency/socioeconomic success and conservative-progressive beliefs increases cooperation across groups. Self-identified members (N = 583) of 30 society-representative U.S. groups (gays, Muslims, Blacks, upper class, women, Democrats, conservatives etc.) played an incentivized one-time continuous prisoner's dilemma game with one self-identified member of each of these groups. Players knew nothing of each other except one group membership. Consistent with the ABC (agency-beliefs-communion) model of spontaneous stereotypes, perceived self-group similarity in agency and beliefs independently increased expected and actual cooperation across groups, controlling for shared group membership. Similarity in conservative-progressive beliefs had a stronger effect on cooperation than similarity in agency, and this effect of similarity in beliefs was stronger for individuals with extreme (progressive or conservative) compared to moderate beliefs.

How Orthogonal Are the Big Two of Social Perception? On the Curvilinear Relation Between Agency and Communion.

Humans make sense of their social environment by forming impressions of others that allow predicting others' actions. In this process of social perception, two types of information carry pivotal importance: other entities' communion (i.e., warmth and trustworthiness) and agency (i.e., status and power). Although commonly thought of as orthogonal dimensions, we propose that these Big Two of social perception are curvilinearly related. Specifically, as we delineate from four different theoretical explanations, impressions of communion should peak at average agency, while entities too high or too low on agency should be perceived as low on communion. We show this pattern for social groups across one novel and five previously published data sets, including a meta-analysis of the most comprehensive data collection in the group perception literature, consisting of 36 samples from more than 20 countries. Addressing the generalizability of this curvilinear relation, we then report recent and unpublished experiments establishing the effect for the perception of individuals and animals. On the basis of the proposed curvilinear relation, we revisit the primacy of processing communion (rather than agency) information. Finally, we discuss the possibility of a more general curvilinear relation between communion and dimensions other than agency.

The "common good" phenomenon: Why similarities are positive and differences are negative.

Positive attributes are more prevalent than negative attributes in the social environment. From this basic assumption, 2 implications that have been overlooked thus far: Positive compared with negative attributes are more likely to be shared by individuals, and people's shared attributes (similarities) are more positive than their unshared attributes (differences). Consequently, similarity-based comparisons should lead to more positive evaluations than difference-based comparisons. We formalized our probabilistic reasoning in a model and tested its predictions in a simulation and 8 experiments (N = 1,181). When participants generated traits about 2 target persons, positive compared with negative traits were more likely to be shared by the targets (Experiment 1a) and by other participants' targets (Experiment 1b). Conversely, searching for targets' shared traits resulted in more positive traits than searching for unshared traits (Experiments 2, 4a, and 4b). In addition, positive traits were more accessible than negative traits among shared traits but not among unshared traits (Experiment 3). Finally, shared traits were only more positive when positive traits were indeed prevalent (Experiments 5 and 6). The current framework has a number of implications for comparison processes and provides a new interpretation of well-known evaluative asymmetries such as intergroup bias and self-superiority effects. (PsycINFO Database Record

Why Good Is More Alike Than Bad: Processing Implications.

Humans process positive information and negative information differently. These valence asymmetries in processing are often summarized under the observation that 'bad is stronger than good', meaning that negative information has stronger psychological impact (e.g., in feedback, learning, or social interactions). This stronger impact is usually attributed to people's affective or motivational reactions to evaluative information. We present an alternative interpretation of valence asymmetries based on the observation that positive information is more similar than negative information. We explain this higher similarity based on the non-extremity of positive attributes, discuss how it accounts for observable valence asymmetries in cognitive processing, and show how it predicts hitherto undiscovered phenomena.

A general valence asymmetry in similarity: Good is more alike than bad.

The density hypothesis (Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008) claims a general higher similarity of positive information to other positive information compared with the similarity of negative information to other negative information. This similarity asymmetry might explain valence asymmetries on all levels of cognitive processing. The available empirical evidence for this general valence asymmetry in similarity suffers from a lack of direct tests, low representativeness, and possible confounding variables (e.g., differential valence intensity, frequency, familiarity, or concreteness of positive and negative stimuli). To address these problems, Study 1 first validated the spatial arrangement method (SpAM) as a similarity measure. Using SpAM, Studies 2-6 found the proposed valence asymmetry in large, representative samples of self- and other-generated words (Studies 2a/2b), for words of consensual and idiosyncratic valence (Study 3), for words from 1 and many independent information sources (Study 4), for real-life experiences (Study 5), and for large data sets of verbal (i.e., ∼14,000 words reported by Warriner, Kuperman, & Brysbaert, 2013) and visual information (i.e., ∼1,000 pictures reported in the IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005; Study 6). Together, these data support a general valence asymmetry in similarity, namely that good is more alike than bad. (PsycINFO Database Record