Could it? Should it? Cognitive reflection facilitates children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility.

Children can be unduly skeptical of events that violate their expectations, claiming that these events neither could happen nor should happen even if the events violate no physical or social laws. Here, we explored whether children's reasoning about possibility and permissibility-modal cognition-is aided by cognitive reflection, or the disposition to privilege analysis over intuition. A total of 99 children aged 4 to 11 years judged the possibility and permissibility of several hypothetical events, and their judgments were compared with their scores on a developmental version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-D). Children's CRT-D scores predicted their ability to differentiate possible events from impossible ones and their ability to differentiate impermissible events from permissible ones as well as their ability to differentiate possibility from permissibility in general. Such differentiations were predicted by children's CRT-D scores independent of age and executive function. These findings suggest that mature modal cognition may require the ability to reflect on, and override, the intuition that unexpected events cannot happen.

The familiar appeal of imaginary worlds.

Imaginary worlds may satisfy our need to explore, but it's an open question what we are searching for. Research on imagination suggests that if we are searching for something extraordinary - something that violates our intuitions about real-world causality - then we seek it in small doses and in contexts that ultimately confirm our intuitions. Imaginary worlds allow for true novelty, but we may actually prefer ideas that are novel on their surface but familiar at their core.

Whitewashing Nature: Sanitized Depictions of Biology in Children's Books and Parent-Child Conversation.

The biological world includes many negatively valenced activities, like predation, parasitism, and disease. Do children's books cover these activities? And how do parents discuss them with their children? In a content analysis of children's nature books (Study 1), we found that negatively valenced concepts were rarely depicted across genres and reading levels. When parents encountered negative information in books (Studies 2-3), they did not omit it but rather elaborated on it, adding their own comments and questions, and their children (ages 3-11) were more likely to remember the negative information but less likely to generalize that information beyond the animal in the book. These findings suggest that early input relevant to biological competition may hamper children's developing understanding of ecology and evolution.

Children's Cognitive Reflection Predicts Conceptual Understanding in Science and Mathematics.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a widely used measure of adults' propensity to engage in reflective analytic thought. The CRT is strongly predictive of many diverse psychological factors but unsuitable for use with developmental samples. Here, we examined a children's CRT, the CRT-Developmental (CRT-D), and investigated its predictive utility in the domains of science and mathematics. School-age children (N = 152) completed the CRT-D, measures of executive functioning, measures of rational thinking, and measures of vitalist-biology and mathematical-equivalence concepts. CRT-D performance predicted conceptual understanding in both domains after we adjusted for children's age, executive functioning, and rational thinking. These findings suggest that cognitive reflection supports conceptual knowledge in early science and mathematics and, moreover, demonstrate the theoretical and practical importance of children's cognitive reflection. The CRT-D will allow researchers to investigate the development, malleability, and consequences of children's cognitive reflection.

A field guide for teaching evolution in the social sciences.

The theory of evolution by natural selection has begun to revolutionize our understanding of perception, cognition, language, social behavior, and cultural practices. Despite the centrality of evolutionary theory to the social sciences, many students, teachers, and even scientists struggle to understand how natural selection works. Our goal is to provide a field guide for social scientists on teaching evolution, based on research in cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, and education. We synthesize what is known about the psychological obstacles to understanding evolution, methods for assessing evolution understanding, and pedagogical strategies for improving evolution understanding. We review what is known about teaching evolution about nonhuman species and then explore implications of these findings for the teaching of evolution about humans. By leveraging our knowledge of how to teach evolution in general, we hope to motivate and equip social scientists to begin teaching evolution in the context of their own field.

Differentiating "could" from "should": Developmental changes in modal cognition.

Young children have difficulty in distinguishing events that violate physical laws (impossible events) from those that violate mere physical regularities (improbable events). They judge both as "impossible." Young children also have difficulty in distinguishing events that violate moral laws (immoral events) from events that violate mere social regularities (unconventional events). They judge both as "wrong." In this set of studies, we explored the possibility that both difficulties arise from a more general deficit in modal cognition, or the way in which children represent and reason about possibilities. Participants (80 children aged 3-10years and 101 adults) were shown impossible, improbable, unconventional, and immoral events and were asked to judge whether the events could occur in real life and whether they would be okay to do. Preschool-aged children not only had difficulty distinguishing law-violating events from regularity-violating events but also had difficulty distinguishing the two modal questions themselves, judging physically abnormal events (e.g., floating in the air) as immoral and judging socially abnormal events (e.g., lying to a parent) as impossible. These findings were replicated in a second study where participants (74 children and 78 adults) judged whether the events under consideration would require magic (a specific consequence of impossibility) or would require punishment (a specific consequence of impermissibility). Our findings imply that young children's modal representations clearly distinguish abnormal events from ordinary events but do not clearly distinguish different types of abnormal events from each other. That is, the distinction between whether an event could occur and whether an event should occur must be learned.

Children's susceptibility to online misinformation.

Children have a reputation for credulity that is undeserved; even preschoolers have proven adept at identifying implausible claims and unreliable informants. Still, the strategies children use to identify and reject dubious information are often superficial, which leaves them vulnerable to accepting such information if conveyed through seemingly authoritative channels or formatted in seemingly authentic ways. Indeed, children of all ages have difficulty differentiating legitimate websites and news stories from illegitimate ones, as they are misled by the inclusion of outwardly professional features such as graphs, statistics, and journalistic layout. Children may not be inherently credulous, but their skepticism toward dubious information is often shallow enough to be overridden by the deceptive trappings of online misinformation.

Improbable but possible: Training children to accept the possibility of unusual events.

Young children tend to deny the possibility of events that violate their expectations, including events that are merely improbable, like making onion-flavored ice cream or owning a crocodile as a pet. Could this tendency be countered by teaching children more valid strategies for judging possibility? We explored this question by training children aged 4-12 (n = 128) to consider either the similarity between the target event and unusual events that have actually occurred or causal mechanisms that might bring the target event about. Both trainings increased children's acceptance of improbable events but only for the types of events addressed during training. Older children were more likely to accept improbable events, as were children who scored higher on a measure of cognitive reflection, but neither age nor cognitive reflection moderated the effects of training. These findings indicate that children can use both similarity and causality to assess possibility, but the use of this information is highly circumscribed, further demonstrating how robustly children conflate improbability with impossibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Tempering the tension between science and intuition.

Scientific ideas can be difficult to access if they contradict earlier-developed intuitive theories; counterintuitive scientific statements like "bubbles have weight" are verified more slowly and less accurately than closely-matched intuitive statements like "bricks have weight" (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). Here, we investigate how context and instruction influences this conflict. In Study 1, college undergraduates (n = 100) verified scientific statements interspersed with images intended to prime either a scientific interpretation of the statements or an intuitive one. Participants primed with scientific images verified counterintuitive statements more accurately, but no more quickly, than those primed with intuitive images. In Study 2, college undergraduates (n = 138) received instruction that affirmed the scientific aspects of the target domain and refuted common misconceptions. Instruction increased the accuracy of participants' responses to counterintuitive statements but not the speed of their responses. Collectively, these findings indicate that scientific interpretations of a domain can be prioritized over intuitive ones but the conflict between science and intuition cannot be eliminated altogether.

Stay away, Santa: Children's beliefs about the impact of COVID-19 on real and fictional beings.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced children to reckon with the causal relations underlying disease transmission. What are children's theories of how COVID-19 is transmitted? And how do they understand the relation between COVID-19 susceptibility and the need for disease-mitigating behavior? We asked these questions in the context of children's beliefs about supernatural beings, like Santa and the Tooth Fairy. Because these beings cannot be observed, children's beliefs about the impact of COVID-19 on them must be based on their underlying theories of disease transmission and prevention rather than on experience. In the summer of 2020, N = 218 U.S. children between the ages of 3 and 10 years (M = 81.2 months) were asked to rate supernatural beings' susceptibility to COVID-19, and the extent to which these beings should engage in disease-mitigating behaviors, such as social distancing and mask wearing. Many children believed supernatural beings were susceptible to COVID-19. However, children rated the need for supernatural beings to engage in disease-mitigating behaviors as higher than the beings' disease susceptibility, indicating a disconnect between their conceptions of the causal relations between disease-mitigating behavior and disease prevention. Children's belief that a particular supernatural being could be impacted by COVID-19 was best predicted by the number of human-like properties they attributed to it, regardless of the child's age. Together, these findings suggest that although young children fail to appreciate specific pathways of disease transmission, they nonetheless understand disease as a bodily affliction, even for beings whose bodies have never been observed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Development of a Classification System for Live Surgical Feedback.

Importance: Live feedback in the operating room is essential in surgical training. Despite the role this feedback plays in developing surgical skills, an accepted methodology to characterize the salient features of feedback has not been defined. Objective: To quantify the intraoperative feedback provided to trainees during live surgical cases and propose a standardized deconstruction for feedback. Design, Setting, and Participants: In this qualitative study using a mixed methods analysis, surgeons at a single academic tertiary care hospital were audio and video recorded in the operating room from April to October 2022. Urological residents, fellows, and faculty attending surgeons involved in robotic teaching cases during which trainees had active control of the robotic console for at least some portion of a surgery were eligible to voluntarily participate. Feedback was time stamped and transcribed verbatim. An iterative coding process was performed using recordings and transcript data until recurring themes emerged. Exposure: Feedback in audiovisual recorded surgery. Main Outcomes and Measures: The primary outcomes were the reliability and generalizability of a feedback classification system in characterizing surgical feedback. Secondary outcomes included assessing the utility of our system. Results: In 29 surgical procedures that were recorded and analyzed, 4 attending surgeons, 6 minimally invasive surgery fellows, and 5 residents (postgraduate years, 3-5) were involved. For the reliability of the system, 3 trained raters achieved moderate to substantial interrater reliability in coding cases using 5 types of triggers, 6 types of feedback, and 9 types of responses (prevalence-adjusted and bias-adjusted κ range: a 0.56 [95% CI, 0.45-0.68] minimum for triggers to a 0.99 [95% CI, 0.97-1.00] maximum for feedback and responses). For the generalizability of the system, 6 types of surgical procedures and 3711 instances of feedback were analyzed and coded with types of triggers, feedback, and responses. Significant differences in triggers, feedback, and responses reflected surgeon experience level and surgical task being performed. For example, as a response, attending surgeons took over for safety concerns more often for fellows than residents (prevalence rate ratio [RR], 3.97 [95% CI, 3.12-4.82]; P = .002), and suturing involved more errors that triggered feedback than dissection (RR, 1.65 [95% CI, 1.03-3.33]; P = .007). For the utility of the system, different combinations of trainer feedback had associations with rates of different trainee responses. For example, technical feedback with a visual component was associated with an increased rate of trainee behavioral change or verbal acknowledgment responses (RR, 1.11 [95% CI, 1.03-1.20]; P = .02). Conclusions and Relevance: These findings suggest that identifying different types of triggers, feedback, and responses may be a feasible and reliable method for classifying surgical feedback across several robotic procedures. Outcomes suggest that a system that can be generalized across surgical specialties and for trainees of different experience levels may help galvanize novel surgical education strategies.

Using Real-time Feedback To Improve Surgical Performance on a Robotic Tissue Dissection Task.

Background: There is no standard for the feedback that an attending surgeon provides to a training surgeon, which may lead to variable outcomes in teaching cases. Objective: To create and administer standardized feedback to medical students in an attempt to improve performance and learning. Design setting and participants: A cohort of 45 medical students was recruited from a single medical school. Participants were randomly assigned to two groups. Both completed two rounds of a robotic surgical dissection task on a da Vinci Xi surgical system. The first round was the baseline assessment. In the second round, one group received feedback and the other served as the control (no feedback). Outcome measurements and statistical analysis: Video from each round was retrospectively reviewed by four blinded raters and given a total error tally (primary outcome) and a technical skills score (Global Evaluative Assessment of Robotic Surgery [GEARS]). Generalized linear models were used for statistical modeling. According to their initial performance, each participant was categorized as either an innate performer or an underperformer, depending on whether their error tally was above or below the median. Results and limitations: In round 2, the intervention group had a larger decrease in error rate than the control group, with a risk ratio (RR) of 1.51 (95% confidence interval [CI] 1.07-2.14; p = 0.02). The intervention group also had a greater increase in GEARS score in comparison to the control group, with a mean group difference of 2.15 (95% CI 0.81-3.49; p < 0.01). The interaction effect between innate performers versus underperformers and the intervention was statistically significant for the error rates, at F(1,38) = 5.16 (p = 0.03). Specifically, the intervention had a statistically significant effect on the error rate for underperformers (RR 2.23, 95% CI 1.37-3.62; p < 0.01) but not for innate performers (RR 1.03, 95% CI 0.63-1.68; p = 0.91). Conclusions: Real-time feedback improved performance globally compared to the control. The benefit of real-time feedback was stronger for underperformers than for trainees with innate skill. Patient summary: We found that real-time feedback during a training task using a surgical robot improved the performance of trainees when the task was repeated. This feedback approach could help in training doctors in robotic surgery.

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Belief in beings without physical bodies is prevalent in present and past religions, from all-powerful gods to demonic spirits to guardian angels to immortal souls. Many scholars have explained this prevalence by a quirk in how we conceptualize persons, intuitively representing their minds as separable from their bodies. Infants have both a folk psychology (for representing the mental states of intentional agents) and a folk physics (for representing the properties of objects) but are said to apply only folk psychology to persons. The two modes of construal become integrated with development, but their functional specialization and initial independence purportedly make it natural for people of all ages to entertain beliefs in disembodied minds. We critically evaluate this thesis. We integrate studies of both children and adults on representations of intentional agents, both natural and supernatural, beliefs about the afterlife and souls, mind transfer, body duplication, and body transplantation. We show that representations of minds and bodies are integrated from the start, that conceptions of religious beings as disembodied are not evident in early ages but develop slowly, and that early-acquired conceptions of religious beings as embodied are not revised by theological conceptions of such beings as disembodied. We argue that belief in disembodied beings requires cultural learning-a learned dualism. We conclude by suggesting that disembodied beings may be prevalent not because we are developmentally predisposed to entertain them but because they are counterintuitive and thus have a social transmission advantage. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Piloerection is not a reliable physiological correlate of awe.

In scientific and popular literature, piloerection (e.g. goosebumps) is often claimed to accompany the experience of awe, though this correlation has not been tested empirically. Using two pre-registered and independently collected samples (N = 210), we examined the objective physiological occurrence of piloerection in response to awe-inducing stimuli. Stimuli were selected to satisfy three descriptors of awe, including perceptual vastness, virtual reality, and expectancy-violating events. The stimuli reliably elicited self-reported awe to a great extent, in line with previous research. However, awe-inducing stimuli were not associated with the objective occurrence of piloerection. While participants self-reported high levels of goosebumps and "the chills," there was no physical evidence of this response. These results suggest that piloerection is not reliably connected to the experience of awe-at least using stimuli known to elicit awe in an experimental setting.

The Development of Cognitive Reflection in China.

Cognitive reflection is the tendency to override an intuitive response so as to engage in the reflection necessary to derive a correct response. Here, we examine the emergence of cognitive reflection in a culture that values nonanalytic thinking styles, Chinese culture. We administered a child-friendly version of the cognitive reflection test, the CRT-D, to 130 adults and 111 school-age children in China and compared performance on the CRT-D to several measures of rational thinking (belief bias syllogisms, base rate sensitivity, denominator neglect, and other-side thinking) and normative thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition). The CRT-D was a significant predictor of rational thinking and normative thinking dispositions in both children and adults, as previously found in American samples. Adults' performance on the CRT-D correlated with their performance on the original CRT, and children's performance on the CRT-D predicted rational thinking and normative thinking dispositions even after adjusting for age. These results demonstrate that cognitive reflection, rational thinking, and normative thinking dispositions converge even in a culture that emphasizes holistic, nonanalytic reasoning.

Competing Explanations of Competing Explanations: Accounting for Conflict Between Scientific and Folk Explanations.

People who hold scientific explanations for natural phenomena also hold folk explanations, and the two types of explanations compete under some circumstances. Here, we explore the question of why folk explanations persist in the face of a well-understood scientific alternative, a phenomenon known as explanatory coexistence. We consider two accounts: an associative account, where coexistence is driven by low-level associations between co-occurring ideas in experience or discourse, and a theory-based account, where coexistence reflects high-level competition between distinct sets of causal expectations. We present data that assess the relative contributions of these two accounts to the cognitive conflict elicited by counterintuitive scientific ideas. Participants (134 college undergraduates) verified scientific statements like "air has weight" and "bacteria have DNA" as quickly as possible, and we examined the speed and accuracy of their verifications in relation to measures of associative information (lexical co-occurrence of the statements' subjects and predicates) and theory-based expectations (ratings of whether the statements' subjects possess theory-relevant attributes). Both measures explained a significant amount of variance in participants' responses, but the theory-based measures explained three to five times more. These data suggest that the cognitive conflict elicited by counterintuitive scientific ideas typically arises from competing theories and that such ideas might be made more intuitive by strengthening scientific theories or weakening folk theories.

How Children's Cognitive Reflection Shapes Their Science Understanding.

Learning science requires contending with intuitions that are incompatible with scientific principles, such as the intuition that animals are alive but plants are not or the intuition that solids are composed of matter but gases are not. Here, we explore the tension between science and intuition in elementary school-aged children and whether that tension is moderated by children's tendency to reflect on their intuitions. Our participants were children between the ages of 5 and 12 years (n = 142). They were administered a statement-verification task, in which they judged statements about life and matter as true or false, as well as a children's Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-D), in which they answered "brain teasers" designed to elicit an intuitive, yet inaccurate, response that could be corrected upon further reflection. Participants also received a tutorial on the scientific properties of life or matter, sandwiched between two blocks of the statement-verification task. We found that performance on the statement-verification task, which pitted scientific conceptions against intuitive conceptions (e.g., "cactuses are alive"), was predicted by performance on the CRT-D, independent of age. Children with higher levels of cognitive reflection verified scientific statements more accurately before the tutorial, and they made greater gains in accuracy following the tutorial. These results indicate that children experience conflict between scientific and intuitive conceptions of a domain in the earliest stages of acquiring scientific knowledge but can learn to resolve that conflict in favor of scientific conceptions, particularly if they are predisposed toward cognitive reflection.

Distant lands make for distant possibilities: Children view improbable events as more possible in far-away locations.

Young children often deny that improbable events are possible. We examined whether children aged 5-7 (N = 300) might have more success in recognizing that these events are possible if they considered whether the events could happen in a distant country. Children heard about improbable and impossible events (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 2) and about ordinary events (Experiment 2) and either judged whether the events could happen in a distant country or locally (Experiments 1A and 2) or with their location unspecified (Experiment 1B). Children were more likely to judge that extraordinary events could happen in a distant country than when the same events were described locally or with location unspecified; also, older children were more likely to deny these events could happen when they were local compared with when their location was unspecified. We also found some evidence that manipulating distance affects judgments more strongly for improbable events than for impossible one. Together, the findings show that children's assessments of whether hypothetical events are possible are affected by the geographic context of the events. The findings are consistent with accounts holding that children normally assess whether hypothetical events are possible by drawing on their knowledge of the ordinary world but further suggest that children modify this approach when considering events in distant lands. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Variation in the anthropomorphization of supernatural beings and its implications for cognitive theories of religion.

The cognitive study of religion has been highly influenced by P. Boyer's (2001, 2003) claim that supernatural beings are conceptualized as persons with counterintuitive properties. The present study tests the generality of this claim by exploring how different supernatural beings are conceptualized by the same individual and how different individuals conceptualize the same supernatural beings. In Experiment 1, college undergraduates decided whether three types of human properties (psychological, biological, physical) could or could not be attributed to two types of supernatural beings (religious, fictional). On average, participants attributed more human properties to fictional beings, like fairies and vampires, than to religious beings, like God and Satan, and they attributed more psychological properties than nonpsychological properties to both. In Experiment 2, 5-year-old children and their parents made both open-ended and closed-ended property attributions. Although both groups of participants attributed a majority of human properties to the fictional beings, children attributed a majority of human properties to the religious beings as well. Taken together, these findings suggest that anthropomorphic theories of supernatural-being concepts, though fully predictive of children's concepts, are only partially predictive of adults' concepts.

The relation between essentialist beliefs and evolutionary reasoning.

Historians of science have pointed to essentialist beliefs about species as major impediments to the discovery of natural selection. The present study investigated whether such beliefs are impediments to learning this concept as well. Participants (43 children aged 4-9 and 34 adults) were asked to judge the variability of various behavioral and anatomical properties across different members of the same species. Adults who accepted within-species variation-both actual and potential-were significantly more likely to demonstrate a selection-based understanding of evolution than adults who denied within-species variation. The latter demonstrated an alternative, incorrect understanding of evolution and produced response patterns that were both quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those produced by preschool-aged children. Overall, it is argued that psychological essentialism, although a useful bias for drawing species-wide inductions, leads individuals to devalue within-species variation and, consequently, to fail to understand natural selection.