Look before you leap: the role of negative urgency in appraisals of ambiguous and unambiguous scenarios in individuals high in generalized anxiety disorder symptoms.

Negative interpretation bias, the propensity to make threatening interpretations of ambiguous information, is associated with symptoms of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Apart from its relationship with intolerance of uncertainty (IU), little is known about what explains the presence of this cognitive bias in GAD. One factor may be negative urgency (NU), the tendency to take rash action when distressed, which is related to GAD symptoms and to cognitive biases in nonclinical populations. The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between NU and interpretation bias in individuals high in GAD symptoms (N = 111). IU, trait anxiety, and other forms of impulsivity were examined concurrently as competing correlates of interpretation bias. Greater NU and IU were found to be unique correlates of greater threatening interpretations of ambiguous scenarios. Greater NU was also a unique correlate of greater threatening interpretations of negative and positive scenarios. No other forms of impulsivity were uniquely related to interpretation bias. The findings suggest that greater NU may have a role in the tendency for individuals high in GAD symptoms to make threatening interpretations in response to ambiguous scenarios, overtly threatening situations, and situations without indication of threat or danger. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

Intolerance of uncertainty, causal uncertainty, causal importance, self-concept clarity and their relations to generalized anxiety disorder.

Although numerous studies have provided support for the notion that intolerance of uncertainty plays a key role in pathological worry (the hallmark feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)), other uncertainty-related constructs may also have relevance for the understanding of individuals who engage in pathological worry. Three constructs from the social cognition literature, causal uncertainty, causal importance, and self-concept clarity, were examined in the present study to assess the degree to which these explain unique variance in GAD, over and above intolerance of uncertainty. N = 235 participants completed self-report measures of trait worry, GAD symptoms, and uncertainty-relevant constructs. A subgroup was subsequently classified as low in GAD symptoms (n = 69) or high in GAD symptoms (n = 54) based on validated cut scores on measures of trait worry and GAD symptoms. In logistic regressions, only elevated intolerance of uncertainty and lower self-concept clarity emerged as unique correlates of high (vs. low) GAD symptoms. The possible role of self-concept uncertainty in GAD and the utility of integrating social cognition theories and constructs into clinical research on intolerance of uncertainty are discussed.

Maladaptive Core Beliefs and their Relation to Generalized Anxiety Disorder.

Research has demonstrated that individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) hold unhelpful beliefs about worry, uncertainty, and the problem-solving process. Extant writings (e.g., treatment manuals) also suggest that other types of maladaptive beliefs may characterize those with GAD. However, these other beliefs have received limited empirical attention and are not an explicit component of cognitive theories of GAD. The present study examined the extent to which dysfunctional attitudes, early maladaptive schemas, and broad self-focused and other-focused beliefs explain significant variance in GAD symptoms, over and above negative and positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about uncertainty, and negative beliefs about problems. N = 138 participants classified into Probable GAD and Non-GAD groups completed self-report measures. After controlling for trait anxiety and depressive symptoms, only beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about uncertainty, and schemas reflecting unrelenting standards (e.g., "I must meet all my responsibilities all the time"), the need to self-sacrifice (e.g., "I'm the one who takes care of others"), and less positive views of other people and their intentions (e.g., lower endorsement of views such as "other people are fair"), were unique correlates of Probable GAD versus Non-GAD or GAD severity. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.

Mental imagery in generalized anxiety disorder: A comparison with healthy control participants.

Mental imagery plays a prominent role across psychopathology. However, its quality and role in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) have not been examined as extensively as in other disorders. The goal of the present study was to obtain a better understanding of general imagery processes and individual differences in people with GAD. Adults with GAD (N = 31) were compared to a Healthy Control (HC) group (N = 32) across mental imagery domains as per Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes, and Holmes (2013)'s framework: cognitive, general use/experience, and clinical. No differences were found between the GAD and HC groups on cognitive aspects of imagery. Both groups were also similar in their ability to imagine experiences across sensory modalities. No differences were found between groups in their spontaneous use of imagery in everyday situations, or in vividness of sensory-perceptual imagery. For clinical aspects of imagery, between-group differences emerged in the experience of prospective imagery; those with GAD reported greater "pre-experiencing" ("intrusive, prospective, personally-relevant imagery"; Deeprose & Holmes, 2010), rated imagined future negative scenarios as more vivid, more likely, and more personally relevant, and evaluated the experience of these images as more intense than did HCs. Taken together, findings suggest that the presence of intrusive mental imagery distinguishes individuals with GAD from those without psychopathology. Findings could help improve interventions utilizing imagery techniques.