What makes euthanasia justifiable? The role of symptoms' characteristics and interindividual differences.

The consideration of laypeople's views of conditions under which euthanasia is justifiable is important for policy decisions. In an online survey of US respondents, we examined how patient's symptoms influence justifiability of euthanasia. Euthanasia was judged more justifiable for conditions associated with physical suffering and negative impact on other people. The weight given to physical suffering and negative impact on others in evaluation of justifiability of euthanasia also differed based on personal characteristics. The results suggest that public discourse about medical assistance in dying should take into account differences in its perceived justifiability for patients with different conditions.

If It's Difficult to Pronounce, It Might Not Be Risky: The Effect of Fluency on Judgment of Risk Does Not Generalize to New Stimuli.

Processing fluency is used as a basis for various types of judgment. For example, previous research has shown that people judge food additives with names that are more difficult to pronounce (i.e., that are disfluent) to be more harmful. We explored the possibility that the association between disfluency and perceived harmfulness might be in the opposite direction for some categories of stimuli. Although we found some support for this hypothesis, an improved analysis and further studies indicated that the effect was strongly dependent on the stimuli used. We then used stimulus sampling and showed that the original association between fluency and perceived safety was not replicable with the newly constructed stimuli. We found the association between fluency and perceived safety using the newly constructed stimuli in a final study, but only when pronounceability was confounded with word length. The results cast doubt on generalizability of the association between pronounceability and perceived safety and underscore the importance of treating stimulus as a random factor.

The process of replication target selection in psychology: what to consider?

Increased execution of replication studies contributes to the effort to restore credibility of empirical research. However, a second generation of problems arises: the number of potential replication targets is at a serious mismatch with available resources. Given limited resources, replication target selection should be well-justified, systematic and transparently communicated. At present the discussion on what to consider when selecting a replication target is limited to theoretical discussion, self-reported justifications and a few formalized suggestions. In this Registered Report, we proposed a study involving the scientific community to create a list of considerations for consultation when selecting a replication target in psychology. We employed a modified Delphi approach. First, we constructed a preliminary list of considerations. Second, we surveyed psychologists who previously selected a replication target with regards to their considerations. Third, we incorporated the results into the preliminary list of considerations and sent the updated list to a group of individuals knowledgeable about concerns regarding replication target selection. Over the course of several rounds, we established consensus regarding what to consider when selecting a replication target. The resulting checklist can be used for transparently communicating the rationale for selecting studies for replication.

Sacrificing Oneself or Another: The Difference Between Prescriptive and Normative Judgments in Moral Evaluation.

When asked whether to sacrifice oneself or another person to save others, one might think that people would consider sacrificing themselves rather than someone else as the right and appropriate course of action-thus showing an other-serving bias. So far however, most studies found instances of a self-serving bias-people say they would rather sacrifice others. In three experiments using trolley-like dilemmas, we tested whether an other-serving bias might appear as a function of judgment type. That is, participants were asked to make a prescriptive judgment (whether the described action should or should not be done) or a normative judgment (whether the action is right or wrong). We found that participants exhibited an other-serving bias only when asked whether self- or other-sacrifice is wrong. That is, when the judgment was normative and in a negative frame (in contrast to the positive frame asking whether the sacrifice is right). Otherwise, participants tended to exhibit a self-serving bias; that is, they approved sacrificing others more. The results underscore the importance of question wording and suggest that some effects on moral judgment might depend on the type of judgment.

Predictors of Bribe-Taking: The Role of Bribe Size and Personality.

Laboratory studies allow studying the predictors of bribe-taking in a controlled setting. However, presently used laboratory tasks often lack any connection to norm violation or invite participants to role-play. A new experimental task for studying the decision to take a bribe was designed in this study to overcome these problems by embedding the opportunity for bribe-taking in an unrelated task that participants perform. Using this new experimental task, we found that refraining from harming a third party by taking a bribe was associated with lower offered bribes and higher scores of the participants on the honesty-humility scale from the HEXACO personality inventory. A trial-level analysis showed that response times were longer for trials with bribes and even longer for trials in which bribes were accepted. These results suggest that taking a bribe may require overcoming automatic honest response and support the validity of the honesty-humility scale in predicting moral behavior.

Is the Emotional Dog Blind to Its Choices?

Previous choice blindness studies showed that people sometimes fail to notice when their choice is changed. Subsequently, they are willing to provide reasons for the manipulated choice which is the opposite of the one they made just seconds ago. In the present study, participants first made binary judgments about the wrongness of described behaviors and then were shown an opposite answer during a second reading of some of the descriptions. Half of the participants saw the answer during the second presentation of the description and the other half saw it only after the presentation. Based on Haidt's Social intuitionist model, we hypothesized that participants in the latter group would be less likely to reconcile their intuition with the presented answer and thus they would be more likely to reject it. However, we found no difference between the groups.