Look Again: Pedagogical Demonstration Facilitates Children's Use of Counterevidence.

In learning about the world children must not only make inferences based on minimal evidence, but must deal with conflicting evidence and question those initial inferences when they appear to be wrong. Four experiments (N = 144) found that young children were significantly more likely to revise their initial inferences when conflicting evidence was explicitly demonstrated for them. Four- and five-year-old children saw deterministic evidence about which objects had causal powers, and then saw counterevidence conflicting with that initial pattern. Critically, the conflicting evidence was either demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically, or produced in an intentional but nonpedagogical manner. Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for them did children revise their initial hypothesis and use a subtle clue to infer the correct rule.

Young Children See a Single Action and Infer a Social Norm.

Human social life depends heavily on social norms that prescribe and proscribe specific actions. Typically, young children learn social norms from adult instruction. In the work reported here, we showed that this is not the whole story: Three-year-old children are promiscuous normativists. In other words, they spontaneously inferred the presence of social norms even when an adult had done nothing to indicate such a norm in either language or behavior. And children of this age even went so far as to enforce these self-inferred norms when third parties "broke" them. These results suggest that children do not just passively acquire social norms from adult behavior and instruction; rather, they have a natural and proactive tendency to go from "is" to "ought." That is, children go from observed actions to prescribed actions and do not perceive them simply as guidelines for their own behavior but rather as objective normative rules applying to everyone equally.

Two- and 3-year-olds integrate linguistic and pedagogical cues in guiding inductive generalization and exploration.

Young children can in principle make generic inferences (e.g., "doffels are magnetic") on the basis of their own individual experience. Recent evidence, however, shows that by 4 years of age children make strong generic inferences on the basis of a single pedagogical demonstration with an individual (e.g., an adult demonstrates for the child that a single "doffel" is magnetic). In the current experiments, we extended this to look at younger children, investigating how the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are integrated with other aspects of inductive inference during early development. We found that both 2- and 3-year-olds used pedagogical cues to guide such generic inferences, but only so long as the "doffel" was linguistically labeled. In a follow-up study, 3-year-olds, but not 2-year-olds, continued to make this generic inference even if the word "doffel" was uttered incidentally and non-referentially in a context preceding the pedagogical demonstration, thereby simply marking the opportunity to learn about a culturally important category. By 3 years of age, then, young children show a remarkable ability to flexibly combine different sources of culturally relevant information (e.g., linguistic labeling, pedagogy) to make the kinds of generic inferences so central in human cultural learning.

The opportunity to collaborate increases preschoolers' motivation for challenging tasks.

Collaborating on challenging endeavors is a foundation of human society. Recent research suggests that young children are not only motivated to cooperate with others-for instance, to help others accomplish their goals-but may also be motivated to collaborate with others-to pursue shared goals. However, a primary reason why collaboration is so important is because opportunities to collaborate can bring people together to work hard to overcome challenges. Two studies (N=70) tested whether the collaborative nature of an activity itself can cause preschoolers to enjoy challenging tasks more and to persist longer on them. To isolate the psychological feeling of collaboration, we tested this hypothesis by manipulating purely psychological cues of collaboration; in all cases, children worked while physically alone. Both studies found that such cues substantially increased preschoolers' motivation on a challenging puzzle, including their persistence on and liking for the puzzle, relative to two non-collaborative control conditions. We suggest that an early emerging drive to engage in shared collaborative activities leads children to find collaborative activities to be intrinsically motivating. This may represent an important basis of motivation as children embark on formal schooling.

Preschoolers use intentional and pedagogical cues to guide inductive inferences and exploration.

Children are judicious social learners. They may be particularly sensitive to communicative actions done pedagogically for their benefit, as such actions may mark important, generalizable information. Three experiments (N = 224) found striking differences in preschoolers' inductive generalization and exploration of a novel functional property, depending on whether identical evidence for the property was produced accidentally, intentionally, or pedagogically and communicatively. Results also revealed that although 4-year-olds reserved strong generalizations for a property that is pedagogically demonstrated, 3-year-olds made such inferences when it was produced either intentionally or pedagogically. These findings suggest that by age 4 children assess whether evidence is produced for their benefit in gauging generalizability, giving them a powerful tool for acquiring important kind-relevant, generic knowledge.

Claims of wrongdoing by outgroup members heighten children's ingroup biases.

Little is known about how group bias may impact children's acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. Most children view cheating as unfair. However, in competitive situations, when ambiguity surrounds the potential intention to cheat, group affiliation may lead children to support claims of cheating based solely on the team affiliation of the claimant, even when those claims are not clearly substantiated. Therefore, it may be particularly important to consider the role ingroup bias may play in children's accusations of cheating in a competitive intergroup context. The current study investigated 4-10 year old children's (N = 137, MAge = 6.71 years, SDAge = 1.49; 47 % female) evaluations of ambiguous acts and unverified claims about those acts in a competitive, intergroup context. Results showed that children initially viewed an ambiguous act similarly, regardless of team affiliation, but demonstrated increasing ingroup biases after claims of wrongdoing were introduced. Implications for how unsubstantiated claims may impact intergroup interactions more broadly will be discussed.

Young children use pedagogical cues to modulate the strength of normative inferences.

Young children understand pedagogical demonstrations as conveying generic, kind-relevant information. But, in some contexts, they also see almost any confident, intentional action on a novel artefact as normative and thus generic, regardless of whether this action was pedagogically demonstrated for them. Thus, although pedagogy may not be necessary for inferences to the generic, it may nevertheless be sufficient to produce inductive inferences on which the child relies more strongly. This study addresses this tension by bridging the literature on normative reasoning with that on social learning and inductive inference. Three-year-old children learned about a novel artefact from either a pedagogical or non-pedagogical demonstration, and then, a series of new actors acted on that artefact in novel ways. Although children protested normatively in both conditions (e.g., 'No, not like that'), they persisted longer in enforcing the learned norms in the face of repeated non-conformity by the new actors. This finding suggests that not all generic, normative inferences are created equal, but rather they depend - at least for their strength - on the nature of the acquisition process.

Preschoolers use pedagogical cues to guide radical reorganization of category knowledge.

In constructing a conceptual understanding of the world, children must actively evaluate what information is idiosyncratic or superficial, and what represents essential, defining information about kinds and categories. Preschoolers observed identical evidence about a novel object's function (magnetism) produced in subtly different manners: accidentally, intentionally, or demonstrated communicatively and pedagogically. Only when evidence was explicitly demonstrated for their benefit did children reliably go beyond salient perceptual features (color or shape), to infer function to be a defining property on which to base judgments about category membership. Children did not show this pattern when reasoning about a novel perceptual property, suggesting that a pedagogical communicative context may be especially important for children's learning about artifact functions. Observing functional evidence in a pedagogical context helps children construct fundamentally different conceptions of novel categories as defined not by superficial appearances but by deeper, functional properties.