RESUMEN
Cognitive studies on Parkinson's disease (PD) reveal abnormal semantic processing. Most research, however, fails to indicate which conceptual properties are most affected and capture patients' neurocognitive profiles. Here, we asked persons with PD, healthy controls, and individuals with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD, as a disease control group) to read concepts (e.g., 'sun') and list their features (e.g., hot). Responses were analyzed in terms of ten word properties (including concreteness, imageability, and semantic variability), used for group-level comparisons, subject-level classification, and brain-behavior correlations. PD (but not bvFTD) patients produced more concrete and imageable words than controls, both patterns being associated with overall cognitive status. PD and bvFTD patients showed reduced semantic variability, an anomaly which predicted semantic inhibition outcomes. Word-property patterns robustly classified PD (but not bvFTD) patients and correlated with disease-specific hypoconnectivity along the sensorimotor and salience networks. Fine-grained semantic assessments, then, can reveal distinct neurocognitive signatures of PD.
RESUMEN
La capacidad para entender palabras abstractas se relaciona con la inteligencia y procesos de orden superior. Sin embargo, un creciente número de investigaciones sugiere que las palabras abstractas, aun cuando tienen bajos niveles de concreción e imaginabilidad, son procesadas de una manera diferente. Este artículo proporciona evidencia experimental, donde el procesamiento de palabras abstractas-epistémicas (v.g. imaginación, certeza) es diferente al procesamiento de palabras abstractas-metafísicas (v.g. libertad, criterio). Se llevó a cabo un experimento en el que 16 niños y adolescentes con Trastorno del Espectro Autista (ASD) y un grupo pareado con Desarrollo Típico (DT) completaron nueve sentencias incompletas graduadas por dificultad. Los sujetos con TEA fueron menos precisos y lentos con palabras epistémicas-abstractas, y lentos con palabras abstractas-metafísicas que los sujetos con DT. Los resultados se discuten en términos de los procesos cognitivos y sociales para detectar y entender los estados mentales, una habilidad llamada teoría de la mente (ToM).
The ability to understand abstract words is related to intelligence and higher order processes. However, a growing corpus of research suggests that abstracts words, while having lower level of concreteness and imaginability, are processed in different manners. This article provides experimental evidence that the processing of epistemic-abstract words (eg. Imagination, certainty) is different from the processing of metaphysical-abstract words (eg. Freedom, criteria). We carried out an experiment in which 16 children and adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and a typically developing matched group (TD) completed nine sentences graded by difficulty. Subjects with ASD were less accurate and slower with abstract-epistemic words; and slower with abstract-metaphysical words, than subjects with TD. The findings are discussed in terms of the social and cognitive processes to detect and understand the mental states, an ability named theory of mind (ToM).
Asunto(s)
Humanos , Masculino , Adolescente , Femenino , Niño , Comprensión , Semántica , Trastorno del Espectro Autista/fisiopatología , Trastorno del Espectro Autista/psicología , Proyectos Piloto , Solución de Problemas , Teoría de la Mente , Tiempo de ReacciónRESUMEN
La capacidad o mecanismo tácito de atribuir estados mentales a los otros y a uno mismo, con el objeto de anticipar, comprender y predecir la conducta, es conocida como Teoría de la Mente (ToM). Parte de la discusión se centra en comprender si este razonamiento es un proceso independiente o subordinado a los procesos ejecutivos de control consciente. En esta investigación se analiza el efecto de las funciones ejecutivas de control consciente en tareas de razonamiento con ToM, en niños con y sin discapacidad intelectual. La muestra la constituyen 30 niños con discapacidad intelectual y 20 niños sin discapacidad intelectual. Se hipotetizó que la habilidad para responderlas preguntas de control, una operacionalización de las funciones ejecutivas de control consciente, se asocia más a las tareas de segundo orden que a las de primer orden, ya que estas requieren mayor carga representacional. Los resultados obtenidos, sugieren que los procesos de control consciente no sólo se asocian a las tareas que requieren una mayor carga representacional, sino a todas las tareas que requieren razonar con estados mentales, sean ellos de primer o segundo orden.
The ability to attribute mental states to others and oneself, to anticipate, understand and predict behavior is known as Theory of Mind (ToM). Part of the current discussion focuses on understanding whether this reasoning is a separate process or subordinate to the executive process of conscious control. We analyze the effect of executive functions of conscious control on reasoning tasks with ToM, in children with and without intellectual disabilities. The sample included 30 children with intellectual disabilities and 20 children without intellectual disabilities. We hypothesize that the ability to answer the questions of control, an operational definition of the executive functions of conscious control, is most often associated with the tasks of second order to first order, because the second order task requiring increased representational capability. The results suggest that the processes of conscious control are not only associated with tasks requiring a higher representational, but to all the tasks that require reasoning with mental states, be they first or second order.