Investigating the validity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale - The effect of task-related difficulty on subjective rating.

The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is often used to probe conscious experience, but the assumptions behind the scale and its validity are rarely tested. Using a continuous colour estimation task to assess perceptual quality, we focus on how well PAS follows perceptual quality and how the presence of the estimation task affects PAS ratings. We varied the number and presentation time of stimuli in a simultaneous presentation and target position in a sequential presentation. In all experiments, PAS rating closely followed colour precision. However, it was affected by task-induced response bias, even when the possible task difficulty was judged, without performing the task itself. Still, this bias was only observed on the absolute rating level rather than the scale's ability to capture changes in perceptual quality. Reported studies shed light on factors influencing scales outside of the scale formulation and construction.

Comparing theories of consciousness: Object position, not probe modality, reliably influences experience and accuracy in object recognition tasks.

People often claim seeing images completely despite performing poorly. This highlights an issue with conscious representations. We introduce an experimental manipulation aiming to disentangle two prevalent positions: Rich views posit that people virtually represent the external world with unlimited capacity; Sparse views state that representations are reconstructed from expectations and information. In two experiments using the object recognition task, we tested two probe types: Images, which should aid reconstruction more, and Words, which should aid it less. From a sparse view, one should expect that Images lead to greater accuracy and reported experience. We found no reliable differences in accuracy and reported experience across probe types; however, we observed that the object positions influenced both accuracy and reported experience, which is surprising from a Rich view as it seemingly requires assumptions of different access across the visual field. Both theoretical positions thus currently need further development to explain our results.

Early visual processing allows for selective behavior, shifts of attention, and conscious visual experience in spite of masking.

Object-substitution masking (OSM) occurs when a briefly displayed target in a search array is surrounded by a mask, which remains onscreen after the target has disappeared. It has been suggested that OSM results from a specific interference with reentrant visual processing, while the initial feedforward processing is left intact. Here, we tested the prediction that the fastest saccadic responses towards a masked target, supposedly triggered before the onset of reentrant processing, are not impaired by OSM. Indeed, saccades faster than 350ms "escaped" the influence of the mask. Notably, participants' judgements of subjective awareness indicated that stimulus processing during this early stage is not entirely devoid of conscious awareness. Furthermore, the N2pc event-related potential component indicated shifts of spatial attention towards the masked targets on trials with correct fast saccades, suggesting that both target detection and spatial attention can be based on the computations accomplished during the initial feedforward sweep.

A window of subliminal perception.

Under labels such as unconscious processing and subliminal perception, identification of stimuli falling below the subjective threshold (whether truly unconscious or not) has been found remarkably accurate in some experiments while completely at chance in others. Here, we first identify that an apparent window of subliminal perception arises in humans under specific stimulus conditions using different experimental paradigms and analysis methods. We then show that the standard signal detection theory (SDT) model is unable to account for this window and extend it until it is. We finally compare a range of models on empirical data. The models performing best are notable for their absence of hierarchical levels, indicating that the window could be a base property of any phenomenally conscious system. The models explain previously incompatible findings in the literature, and they allow for estimations of peaks in subthreshold perception across the spectrum of stimulus saliency, which may be used in further studies of subliminal perception.

Comparing theories of consciousness: why it matters and how to do it.

The theoretical landscape of scientific studies of consciousness has flourished. Today, even multiple versions of the same theory are sometimes available. To advance the field, these theories should be directly compared to determine which are better at predicting and explaining empirical data. Systematic inquiries of this sort are seen in many subfields in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, e.g. in working memory. Nonetheless, when we surveyed publications on consciousness research, we found that most focused on a single theory. When 'comparisons' happened, they were often verbal and non-systematic. This fact in itself could be a contributing reason for the lack of convergence between theories in consciousness research. In this paper, we focus on how to compare theories of consciousness to ensure that the comparisons are meaningful, e.g. whether their predictions are parallel or contrasting. We evaluate how theories are typically compared in consciousness research and related subdisciplines in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and we provide an example of our approach. We then examine the different reasons why direct comparisons between theories are rarely seen. One possible explanation is the unique nature of the consciousness phenomenon. We conclude that the field should embrace this uniqueness, and we set out the features that a theory of consciousness should account for.

No validity without a theory-a critical look at subjective measures of consciousness.

Michel (The mismeasure of consciousness: a problem of coordination for the perceptual awareness scale. Philos Sci 2019;86:1239-49) claims that the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) faces the problem of coordination (also known as validity). We argue that his claim holds only under certain theoretical assumptions which need to be made explicit as these are likely not in line with the PAS proponents' standpoint. We also call for terminological clarity, an example being the usage of 'levels' of consciousness. Precise terminology combined with an explicit reference to the chosen theoretical perspective is necessary conditions for making progress in consciousness research and the development of consciousness theories.

Weak experiences sufficient for creating illusory figures that influence perception of actual lines.

The question of whether conscious experience is best viewed as graded or dichotomous has received much scientific attention in recent years as the answer is relevant not only to models of consciousness, but also to the examination of neural markers of consciousness in patients and infants. Although some studies have found evidence of graded perception, it is unclear whether such perception is simply composed of individual stimulus features perceived in an all-or-none manner. Here, we examined whether the Kanizsa triangle (an illusory figure that is supposedly only perceived when all its parts are visible) has an impact on line length discrimination across four degrees of subjective visibility. We found that the presence of the Kanizsa triangle biases line length judgments (a phenomenon called the Ponzo illusion) when participants reported any experience (even a weak glimpse) of the stimulus. The results support the view that consciousness is a graded phenomenon. The strength of this support depends on the assumption that all parts of the illusory figure must be perceived for the illusion to work but this assumption is not resolved in the present literature. Currently, evidence can be found both for and against this notion.

Improved estimates for the role of grey matter volume and GABA in bistable perception.

Across a century or more, ambiguous stimuli have been studied scientifically because they provide a method for studying the internal mechanisms of the brain while ensuring an unchanging external stimulus. In recent years, several studies have reported correlations between perceptual dynamics during bistable perception and particular brain characteristics such as the grey matter volume of areas in the superior parietal lobule (SPL) and the relative GABA concentration in the occipital lobe. Here, we attempt to replicate previous results using similar paradigms to those used in the studies first reporting the correlations. Using the original findings as priors for Bayesian analyses, we found strong support for the correlation between structure-from-motion percept duration and anterior SPL grey matter volume. Correlations between percept duration and other parietal areas as well as occipital GABA, however, were not directly replicated or appeared less strong than previous studies suggested. Inspection of the posterior distributions (current "best guess" based on new data given old data as prior) revealed that several original findings may reflect true relationships although no direct evidence was found in support of them in the current sample. Additionally, we found that multiple regression models based on grey matter volume at 2-3 parietal locations (but not including GABA) were the best predictors of percept duration, explaining approximately 35% of the inter-individual variance. Taken together, our results provide new estimates of correlation strengths, generally increasing confidence in the role of the aSPL while decreasing confidence in some of the other relationships.