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We argue that Quilty-Dunn et al.'s commitment to representational pluralism undermines their case for the language-of-thought hypothesis as the evidence they present is consistent with the operation of the other representational formats that they are willing to accept.
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Ciencia Cognitiva , Lenguaje , HumanosRESUMEN
Phillips and colleagues claim that the capacity to ascribe knowledge is a "basic" capacity, but most studies reporting linguistic data reviewed by Phillips et al. were conducted in English with American participants - one of more than 6,500 languages currently spoken. We highlight the importance of cross-cultural and cross-linguistic research when one is theorizing about fundamental human representational capacities.
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Comparación Transcultural , Conocimiento , Humanos , Lenguaje , Lingüística , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
We argue that the exercise of agency is compatible with the presence of what Doris calls "defeaters." In order to undermine reflectivist theories of agency and support his valuational alternative, Doris must not simply show that defeaters exist but rather establish that some agentive behaviors do express a person's values without involving reflection.
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Stanford argues that cooperators achieve and maintain correlated interaction through the objectification of moral norms. We first challenge the moral/non-moral distinction that frames Stanford's discussion. We then argue that to the extent that norms are objectified (and we hold that they are at most objectified in a very thin sense), it is not for the sake of achieving correlated interaction.
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Helados , Nacionalsocialismo , Humanos , Relaciones Interpersonales , Principios MoralesRESUMEN
Anderson (2014) proposes a bottom-up approach to cognitive ontology revision: Neuroscientists should revise their taxonomies of cognitive constructs on the basis of brain activation patterns across many tasks. We argue that such bottom-up proposal is bound to commit a mistake of reification: It treats the abstract mathematical entities uncovered by dimension reduction techniques as if they were real psychological entities.
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Encéfalo , Cognición , Humanos , Modelos TeóricosRESUMEN
Recent evidence shows that psychological essentialism is neither a universal nor stable feature of human cognition. The extent to which people report essentialist intuitions varies enormously across cultures and education levels, and is also influenced by subtle, normatively irrelevant contextual manipulations. These results challenge the notion that the human mind is "fitted" with a built-in inherence heuristic that produces essentialist intuitions.
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Cognición , Formación de Concepto , Aprendizaje , Lógica , HumanosRESUMEN
Baumard and colleagues put forward a new hypothesis about the nature and evolution of fairness. In this commentary, we discuss the relation between morality and their views about fairness.
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Conducta de Elección , Matrimonio , Principios Morales , Parejas Sexuales , Femenino , Humanos , MasculinoRESUMEN
The concept of representation is commonly treated as indispensable to research on brains, behavior, and cognition. Nevertheless, systematic evidence about the ways the concept is applied remains scarce. We present the results of an experiment aimed at elucidating what researchers mean by "representation." Participants were an international group of psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers (N = 736). Applying elicitation methodology, participants responded to a survey with experimental scenarios aimed at invoking applications of "representation" and five other ways of describing how the brain responds to stimuli. While we find little disciplinary variation in the application of "representation" and other expressions (e.g., "about" and "carry information"), the results suggest that researchers exhibit uncertainty about what sorts of brain activity involve representations or not; they also prefer non-representational, causal characterizations of the brain's response to stimuli. Potential consequences of these findings are explored, such as reforming or eliminating the concept of representation from use.
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The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal = 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions-the "discovery" and "transformation" scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed.
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Cognición , Intuición , Humanos , JuicioRESUMEN
In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.
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Estado de Conciencia , HumanosRESUMEN
In this review, I provide a pessimistic assessment of the indirect measurement of attitudes by highlighting the persisting anomalies in the science of implicit attitudes, focusing on their validity, reliability, predictive power, and causal efficiency, and I draw some conclusions concerning the validity of the implicit bias construct. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making.
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Actitud , Sesgo Implícito , Humanos , Reproducibilidad de los ResultadosRESUMEN
Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts. Doing without Concepts (Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts.
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Cognición , Formación de Concepto , Ciencia Cognitiva , Humanos , Modelos Psicológicos , Teoría PsicológicaRESUMEN
In this commentary, I argue that to properly assess the significance of the cross-cultural findings reviewed by Henrich et al., one needs to understand better the causes of the variation in performance in experimental tasks across cultures.
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Conducta , Cognición , Comparación Transcultural , Solución de Problemas , Humanos , Grupos de Población , InvestigaciónRESUMEN
Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that people judge morally lucky and morally unlucky agents differently, an assumption that stands at the heart of the Puzzle of Moral Luck. We examine whether the asymmetry is found for reflective intuitions regarding wrongness, blame, permissibility, and punishment judgments, whether people's concrete, case-based judgments align with their explicit, abstract principles regarding moral luck, and what psychological mechanisms might drive the effect. Our experiments produce three findings: First, in within-subjects experiments favorable to reflective deliberation, the vast majority of people judge a lucky and an unlucky agent as equally blameworthy, and their actions as equally wrong and permissible. The philosophical Puzzle of Moral Luck, and the challenge to the very possibility of systematic ethics it is frequently taken to engender, thus simply do not arise. Second, punishment judgments are significantly more outcome-dependent than wrongness, blame, and permissibility judgments. While this constitutes evidence in favor of current Dual Process Theories of moral judgment, the latter need to be qualified: punishment and blame judgments do not seem to be driven by the same process, as is commonly argued in the literature. Third, in between-subjects experiments, outcome has an effect on all four types of moral judgments. This effect is mediated by negligence ascriptions and can ultimately be explained as due to differing probability ascriptions across cases.
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Juicio , Principios Morales , Percepción Social , Adolescente , Adulto , Anciano , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Teoría Psicológica , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one's actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one's actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.
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A central tenet of contemporary moral psychology is that people typically reject active forms of utilitarian sacrifice. Yet, evidence for secularization and declining empathic concern in recent decades suggests the possibility of systematic change in this attitude. In the present study, we employ hypothetical dilemmas to investigate whether judgments of utilitarian sacrifice are becoming more permissive over time. In a cross-sectional design, age negatively predicted utilitarian moral judgment (Study 1). To examine whether this pattern reflected processes of maturation, we asked a panel to re-evaluate several moral dilemmas after an eight-year interval but observed no overall change (Study 2). In contrast, a more recent age-matched sample revealed greater endorsement of utilitarian sacrifice in a time-lag design (Study 3). Taken together, these results suggest that today's younger cohorts increasingly endorse a utilitarian resolution of sacrificial moral dilemmas.
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Envejecimiento/psicología , Teoría Ética , Juicio , Principios Morales , Adulto , Estudios Transversales , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.
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Investigación Empírica , Imaginación , Teoría Psicológica , Simbolismo , HumanosRESUMEN
The operationalization of scientific notions is instrumental in enabling experimental evidence to bear on scientific propositions. Conceptual change should thus translate into operationalization change. This article describes some important experimental works in the psychology of concepts since the beginning of the twentieth century. It is argued that since the early days of this field, psychologists' theoretical understanding of concepts has been modified several times. However, in all cases but one, these theoretical changes did not translate into changes in the operationalization of the notion of concept learning.