Pilgrims sailing the Titanic: plausibility effects on memory for misinformation.

People rely on information they read even when it is inaccurate (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, Journal of Memory and Language 49:519-536, 2003), but how ubiquitous is this phenomenon? In two experiments, we investigated whether this tendency to encode and rely on inaccuracies from text might be influenced by the plausibility of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we presented stories containing inaccurate plausible statements (e.g., "The Pilgrims' ship was the Godspeed"), inaccurate implausible statements (e.g., . . . the Titanic), or accurate statements (e.g., . . . the Mayflower). On a subsequent test of general knowledge, participants relied significantly less on implausible than on plausible inaccuracies from the texts but continued to rely on accurate information. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results with the addition of a think-aloud procedure to elicit information about readers' noticing and evaluative processes for plausible and implausible misinformation. Participants indicated more skepticism and less acceptance of implausible than of plausible inaccuracies. In contrast, they often failed to notice, completely ignored, and at times even explicitly accepted the misinformation provided by plausible lures. These results offer insight into the conditions under which reliance on inaccurate information occurs and suggest potential mechanisms that may underlie reported misinformation effects.

Anticipating who will say what: the influence of speaker-specific memory associations on reference resolution.

Some accounts of common ground assume that successful communication requires detailed consideration of others' knowledge. In two studies, we provide evidence for an alternative account that views common ground as being mediated in part through domain-general memory mechanisms. On each trial, participants heard prerecorded instructions from one of two speakers indicating which of two displayed pictures to select. During an initial association phase, each speaker repeatedly referred to different sets of pictures. In Experiment 1, we contrasted a "between-speaker mapping" condition, in which each speaker referred to only one picture from critical item pairs (e.g., the cat drinking milk vs. the cat sitting up), and a "within-speaker mapping" condition, in which each speaker referred to both pictures within each pair, although item categories differed across speakers. On subsequent test trials, we recorded participants' eye fixations to critical displays that included both items from a category pair. Prior to the linguistic point of disambiguation, participants in the between-speaker mapping condition were more likely to fixate on the picture previously described by the current speaker, suggesting that knowledge associated with the speaker was prompting expectations for which picture would be the intended target. In Experiment 2, we used two prerecorded speakers of the same gender to strengthen the claim that the relevant implicit memory associations are speaker-specific. These results demonstrate how domain-general memory associations can be an important constraint upon language use.

Yielding to desire: the durability of affective preferences.

People's expectations about the future are guided not just by the contingencies of situations but also by what they hope or wish will happen next. These preferences can inform predictions that run counter to what should or must occur based on the logic of unfolding events. Effects of this type have been regularly identified in studies of judgment and decision making, with individuals' choices often reflecting emotional rather than rational influences. Encouraging individuals to rely less on their emotional considerations has proven a challenge as affective responses are generated quickly and are seemingly informative for decisions. In 6 experiments we examined whether individuals could be encouraged to rely less on their affective preferences when making judgments about future events. Participants read stories in which contexts informed the likelihood of events in ways that might run counter to their preferential investments in particular outcomes. While being less than relevant given the logic of events, participants' affective considerations remained influential despite time allotted for predictive reflection. In contrast, instructional warnings helped attenuate the influence of affective considerations, even under conditions previously shown to encourage preferential biases. The findings are discussed with respect to factors that mediate preference effects, and highlight challenges for overcoming people's reliance on affective contributors to everyday judgments and comprehension.