On Interpretation and Appreciation. A European Human Rights Perspective on Dobbs.

In June 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned Roe v. Wade. The European Court of Human Rights is also expected to decide on several abortion cases. In this paper, the interpretative approaches of both courts are compared. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decided on an originalist approach to the Constitution, the highest European court has always regarded the European Convention on Human Rights as a living instrument. As a result, domestic laws regulating the interruption of pregnancy are seen by the Strasbourg court as interferences with a fundamental right, the right to respect for private life. Although member states of the Council of Europe enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the circumstances in which abortion will be permitted, its highest court put forward the state's positive obligation to secure pregnant women's right to effective respect for their physical and psychological integrity in several landmark judgments. In this way, it ensures the existence of effective mechanisms in countries with a poor record of implementing the right to a lawful abortion. Albeit at a minimum, the Strasbourg court offers protection, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court no longer does.

A New Philosophy for the Margin of Appreciation and European Consensus.

The article advances an anti-foundationalist account of the key doctrines of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the margin of appreciation (MoA) and European consensus (EuC). The first part of the article argues that anti-foundationalism, which understands the existence of human rights as ultimately dependent on social practices and their justification as based on a plurality of values, is a credible conception of human rights grounds. The second part contends that anti-foundationalism offers the best explanation of the MoA and EuC, without making the ECtHR's practice less normatively appealing. These arguments challenge the dominant critiques of the MoA and EuC, which often assume, but rarely explicitly defend, a foundationalist understanding of human rights. While the ECtHR's use of the MoA and EuC can be inadequate, this is not because it is mistaken about the grounds of human rights.

Will the UK Supreme Court allow assisted dying?

MPs overwhelmingly voted against passing the Assisted Dying Bill into law in September 2015. The Bill was defeated by a majority of 212, despite the heartfelt pleas of many MPs to pass it into law. The size of the defeat means that it is unlikely that Parliament will consider a similar law for many years. Yet many considered the Bill their last opportunity to make assisted dying lawful. There is, however, one further possible way assisted dying could become lawful in the UK--and that would be where the Supreme Court allowed it. In this article, the author reviews the Supreme Court's decision in R (on the application of Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2014] and considers how likely it is that the Supreme Court will now sanction assisted dying following Parliament's refusal to enact an assisted dying law.

A discussion on the proposed assisted dying law.

Having failed in their attempt to persuade the United Kingdom Supreme Court to allow health professionals to participate in assisting patients to end their lives, the hopes of campaigners now lie with Parliament passing Lord Falconer's private members' Assisted Dying Bill. This article reviews the Supreme Court's decision in R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] and considers how likely it is that Parliament will enact an assisted dying law.

Access to medical-assisted reproduction and pgd in Italian law: a deadly blow to an illiberal statute? commentary to the European Court on Human Rights's decision Costa and Pavan v Italy (ECtHR, 28 August 2012, App. 54270/2010).

This article provides an account of the European Court on Human Rights' Second Section decision in the case Costa and Pavan v Italy. The judgment found that the Italian Statute on Assisted Reproduction (Law 40/2004), and particularly its prohibition to use in vitro fertilisation and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to prevent the birth of children affected by genetically transmissible conditions, breached Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In fact, the statute in question permits only infertile people to access medically assisted reproduction techniques and forbids PGD and embryo selection. The Court regarded that the rationale of these prohibitions-identified by the Italian Government with the need to prevent eugenic practices as well as to protect the health of the unborn and of the woman-was at odds with the fact that Italian law allows pre-natal screening and therapeutic abortions in case foetal abnormalities are diagnosed. In order to clarify the decision's significance, the paper goes on to analyse the rationale of Law 40/2004 in the Italian legal and political context. Emphasis is placed on the fact that this statute is extremely controversial at domestic level, because many of its provisions-including those considered by the Strasbourg Court-are inherently contradictory and contrast with the settled constitutional principles on abortion, as many domestic authorities highlighted. In this context, should the commented decision be confirmed by the Grand Chamber, it may provide a basis to bring consistency back to the Italian regulation of assisted reproduction. Finally, the paper considers the appeal lodged by the Italian Government to the Grand Chamber, and in particular the contention that the European Court had failed to respect Italy's margin of appreciation. In this regard, it is argued that, under Law 40/2004, individuals face illogical and discriminatory restrictions to their right to private and family life and that therefore, even if an outright violation of Article 8 ECHR could not be found, there appears to be at least a breach of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.

Freedom of Commercial Expression and Public Health Protection at the European Court of Human Rights.

This contribution considers the case law of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and focuses on the extent to which the Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can regulate the tobacco, alcohol, and food industries in a manner compatible with their ECHR obligations. After briefly presenting the two key cases dealing specifically with tobacco advertising, this contribution considers the main factors that the ECtHR takes into account when balancing competing concerns, and in particular freedom of commercial expression and public health protection. It concludes that none of these factors is absolute, as the Court considers the strength of each one of them on the facts of each case. Nevertheless, it is clear from its case law that States have a wide margin of appreciation to regulate marketing practices that are inimical to public health and the prevention of non-communicable diseases more specifically, to the extent that even extensive advertising restrictions can be compatible with Article 10 of the ECHR.

The Case for Same-Sex Marriage Before the European Court of Human Rights.

For proponents of same-sex marriage, this essay sets forward a critical analysis of relevant arguments before the European Court of Human Rights. The privacy aspect of Article 8 European Convention of Human Rights will never be a successful argument with reference to marriage, which involves a public status. The equality argument (Article 14) is useful in addressing this issue with its close connections with citizenship, symbolic value, and proven record internationally. Difficulties remain with the equality argument; its conditional status, the width of the margin of appreciation allocated, and the need for an equality comparator. The equality argument needs reinforcement by use alongside a developing family law argument under Article 8 and a dynamically interpreted Article 12 (right to marry) argument. Ultimately, the success of any argument depends on convincingly influencing the European Court to consider that sufficient consensus has developed among Member States of the Council of Europe.