Punctuated equilibrium at 50: Anything there for evolutionary anthropology? Yes; definitely.

The theory of punctuated equilibrium (PE) was developed a little over 50 years ago to explain long-term, large-scale appearance and disappearance of species in the fossil record. A theory designed specifically for that purpose cannot be expected, out of the box, to be directly applicable to biocultural evolution, but in revised form, PE offers a promising approach to incorporating not only a wealth of recent empirical research on genetic, linguistic, and technological evolution but also large databases that document human biological and cultural diversity across time and space. Here we isolate the fundamental components of PE and propose which pieces, when reassembled or renamed, can be highly useful in evolutionary anthropology, especially as humanity faces abrupt ecological challenges on an increasingly larger scale.

Sociobiology on Screen. The Controversy Through the Lens of Sociobiology: Doing What Comes Naturally.

When the sociobiology debate erupted in 1975, there were almost too many contributions to the heated exchanges between sociobiologists and their critics to count. In the fall of 1976, a Canadian educational film entitled Sociobiology: Doing What Comes Naturally sparked further controversy due to its graphic visuals and outrageous narration. While critics claimed the film was a promotional tool to further the sociobiological agenda in educational settings, sociobiologists quickly distanced themselves from the film and, in turn, accused the critics of consciously misrepresenting sociobiology by organizing showings of the film. Using audio, video, archival, and published sources, this paper explores the complicated history of Sociobiology: Doing What Comes Naturally and demonstrates how the public debate about the film reflects the positions, polemics, and polarization of the sociobiology debate as a whole.

Evolution Is Linear: Debunking Life's Little Joke.

Linear depictions of the evolutionary process are ubiquitous in popular culture, but linear evolutionary imagery is strongly rejected by scientists who argue that evolution branches. This point is frequently illustrated by saying that we didn't evolve from monkeys, but that we are related to them as collateral relatives. Yet, we did evolve from monkeys, but our monkey ancestors are extinct, not extant. Influential voices, such as the late Stephen Jay Gould, have misled audiences for decades by falsely portraying the linear and branching aspects of evolution to be in conflict, and by failing to distinguish between the legitimate linearity of evolutionary descent, and the branching relationships among collateral relatives that result when lineages of ancestors diverge. The purpose of this article is to correct the widespread misplaced rejection of linear evolutionary imagery, and to re-emphasize the basic truth that the evolutionary process is fundamentally linear.

The Unfinished Synthesis?: Paleontology and Evolutionary Biology in the 20th Century.

In the received view of the history of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, paleontology was given a prominent role in evolutionary biology thanks to the significant influence of paleontologist George Gaylord Simpson on both the institutional and conceptual development of the Synthesis. Simpson's 1944 Tempo and Mode in Evolution is considered a classic of Synthesis-era biology, and Simpson often remarked on the influence of other major Synthesis figures - such as Ernst Mayr and Theodosius Dobzhansky - on his developing thought. Why, then, did paleontologists of the 1970s and 1980s - Stephen Jay Gould, Niles Eldredge, David M. Raup, Steven Stanley, and others - so frequently complain that paleontology remained marginalized within evolutionary biology? This essay considers three linked questions: first, were paleontologists genuinely welcomed into the Synthetic project during its initial stages? Second, was the initial promise of the role for paleontology realized during the decades between 1950 and 1980, when the Synthesis supposedly "hardened" to an "orthodoxy"? And third, did the period of organized dissent and opposition to this orthodoxy by paleontologists during the 1970s and 1980s bring about a long-delayed completion to the Modern Synthesis, or rather does it highlight the wider failure of any such unified Darwinian evolutionary consensus?

The Fate of the Method of 'Paradigms' in Paleobiology.

An earlier article described the mid-twentieth century origins of the method of "paradigms" in paleobiology, as a way of making testable hypotheses about the functional morphology of extinct organisms. The present article describes the use of "paradigms" through the 1970s and, briefly, to the end of the century. After I had proposed the paradigm method to help interpret the ecological history of brachiopods, my students developed it in relation to that and other invertebrate phyla, notably in Euan Clarkson's analysis of vision in trilobites. David Raup's computer-aided "theoretical morphology" was then combined with my functional or adaptive emphasis, in Adolf Seilacher's tripartite "constructional morphology." Stephen Jay Gould, who had strongly endorsed the method, later switched to criticizing the "adaptationist program" he claimed it embodied. Although the explicit use of paradigms in paleobiology had declined by the end of the century, the method was tacitly subsumed into functional morphology as "biomechanics."

Stephen Jay Gould's Analysis of the Army Beta Test in The Mismeasure of Man: Distortions and Misconceptions Regarding a Pioneering Mental Test.

In The Mismeasure of Man, Stephen Jay Gould argued that the preconceived beliefs and biases of scientists influence their methods and conclusions. To show the potential consequences of this, Gould used examples from the early days of psychometrics and allied fields, arguing that inappropriate assumptions and an elitist desire to rank individuals and/or groups produced incorrect results. In this article, we investigate a section of The Mismeasure of Man in which Gould evaluated the Army Beta intelligence test for illiterate American draftees in World War I. We evaluated Gould's arguments that the Army Beta (a) had inappropriate content, (b) had unsuitable administration conditions, (c) suffered from short time limits, and (d) could not have measured intelligence. By consulting the historical record and conducting a pre-registered replication of Gould's administration of the test to a sample of college students, we show that Gould mischaracterized the Army Beta in a number of ways. Instead, the Army Beta was a well-designed test by the standards of the time, and all evidence indicates that it measured intelligence a century ago and can, to some extent, do so today.

Gould on species, metaphysics and macroevolution: A critical appraisal.

Stephen Jay Gould's views on the ontology of species were an important plank of his revisionist program in evolutionary theory. In this paper I cast a critical eye over those views. I focus on three central aspects of Gould's views on species: the relation between the Darwinian and the metaphysical notions of individuality, the relation between the ontology of species and macroevolution, and the issue of contextualism and conventionalism about the metaphysics of species.

Before hierarchy: the rise and fall of Stephen Jay Gould's first macroevolutionary synthesis.

Few of Stephen Jay Gould's accomplishments in evolutionary biology have received more attention than his hierarchical theory of evolution, which postulates a causal discontinuity between micro- and macroevolutionary events. But Gould's hierarchical theory was his second attempt to supply a theoretical framework for macroevolutionary studies-and one he did not inaugurate until the mid-1970s. In this paper, I examine Gould's first attempt: a proposed fusion of theoretical morphology, multivariate biometry and the experimental study of adaptation in fossils. This early "macroevolutionary synthesis" was predicated on the notion that parallelism and convergence dominate the history of higher taxa, and moreover, that they can be explained in terms of adaptation leading to mechanical improvement. In this paper, I explore the origins and contents of Gould's first macroevolutionary synthesis, as well as the reasons for its downfall. In addition, I consider how various developments during the mid-1970s led Gould to identify hierarchy and constraint as the leading themes of macroevolutionary studies-and adaptation as a macroevolutionary red herring.

"Replaying Life's Tape": Simulations, metaphors, and historicity in Stephen Jay Gould's view of life.

In a famous thought experiment, Stephen Jay Gould asked whether, if one could somehow rewind the history of life back to its initial starting point, the same results would obtain when the "tape" was run forward again. This hypothetical experiment is generally understood as a metaphor supporting Gould's philosophy of evolutionary contingency, which he developed and promoted from the late 1980s until his death in 2002. However, there was a very literal, non-metaphorical inspiration for Gould's thought experiment: since the early 1970s, Gould, along with a group of other paleontologists, was actively engaged in attempts to model and reconstruct the history of life using computer simulations and database analysis. These simulation projects not only demonstrate the impact that computers had on data analysis in paleontology, but also shed light on the close relationship between models and empirical data in data-oriented science. In a sense, I will argue, the models developed by paleontologists through simulation and quantitative analysis of the empirical fossil record in the 1970s and beyond were literal attempts to "replay life's tape" by reconstructing the history of life as data.

Counterfactuals and history: Contingency and convergence in histories of science and life.

This article examines a series of recent histories of science that have attempted to consider how science may have developed in slightly altered historical realities. These works have, moreover, been influenced by debates in evolutionary science about the opposing forces of contingency and convergence in regard to Stephen Jay Gould's notion of "replaying life's tape." The article argues that while the historians under analysis seem to embrace contingency in order to present their counterfactual narratives, for the sake of historical plausibility they are forced to accept a fairly weak role for contingency in shaping the development of science. It is therefore argued that Simon Conway Morris's theory of evolutionary convergence comes closer to describing the restrained counterfactual worlds imagined by these historians of science than does contingency.

What are narratives good for?

Narratives may be easy to come by, but not everything is worth narrating. What merits a narrative? Here, I follow the lead of narratologists and literary theorists, and focus on one particular proposal concerning the elements of a story that make it narrative-worthy. These elements correspond to features of the natural world addressed by the historical sciences, where narratives figure so prominently. What matters is contingency. Narratives are especially good for representing contingency and accounting for contingent outcomes. This will be squared with a common view that narratives leave no room for chance. On the contrary, I will argue, tracing one path through a maze of alternative possibilities, and alluding to those possibilities along the way, is what a narrative does particularly well.

Convergent evolution as natural experiment: the tape of life reconsidered.

Stephen Jay Gould argued that replaying the 'tape of life' would result in radically different evolutionary outcomes. Recently, biologists and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the theoretical importance of convergent evolution-the independent origination of similar biological forms and functions-which many interpret as evidence against Gould's thesis. In this paper, we examine the evidentiary relevance of convergent evolution for the radical contingency debate. We show that under the right conditions, episodes of convergent evolution can constitute valid natural experiments that support inferences regarding the deep counterfactual stability of macroevolutionary outcomes. However, we argue that proponents of convergence have problematically lumped causally heterogeneous phenomena into a single evidentiary basket, in effect treating all convergent events as if they are of equivalent theoretical import. As a result, the 'critique from convergent evolution' fails to engage with key claims of the radical contingency thesis. To remedy this, we develop ways to break down the heterogeneous set of convergent events based on the nature of the generalizations they support. Adopting this more nuanced approach to convergent evolution allows us to differentiate iterated evolutionary outcomes that are probably common among alternative evolutionary histories and subject to law-like generalizations, from those that do little to undermine and may even support, the Gouldian view of life.

Paleontology at the "high table"? Popularization and disciplinary status in recent paleontology.

This paper examines the way in which paleontologists used "popular books" to call for a broader "expanded synthesis" of evolutionary biology. Beginning in the 1970s, a group of influential paleontologists, including Stephen Jay Gould, Niles Eldredge, David Raup, Steven Stanley, and others, aggressively promoted a new theoretical, evolutionary approach to the fossil record as an important revision of the existing synthetic view of Darwinism. This work had a transformative effect within the discipline of paleontology. However, by the 1980s, paleontologists began making their case to a wider audience, both within evolutionary biology, and to the general public. Many of their books-for example, Eldredge's provocatively-titled Unfinished Synthesis-explicitly argued that the received synthetic view of Darwinian evolution was incomplete, and that paleontological contributions such as punctuated equilibria, the hierarchical model of macroevolution, and the study of mass extinction dynamics offered a substantial corrective to evolutionary theory. This paper argues that books-far from being "mere popularizations" of scientific ideas-played an important role in disciplinary debates surrounding evolutionary theory during the 1980s, and in particular that paleontologists like Gould and Eldredge self-consciously adopted the book format because of the importance of that genre in the history of evolutionary biology.

Claiming Darwin: Stephen Jay Gould in contests over evolutionary orthodoxy and public perception, 1977-2002.

This article analyzes the impact of the resurgence of American creationism in the early 1980s on debates within post-synthesis evolutionary biology. During this period, many evolutionists criticized Harvard biologist Stephen Jay Gould for publicizing his revisions to traditional Darwinian theory and opening evolution to criticism by creationists. Gould's theory of punctuated equilibrium was a significant source of contention in these disputes. Both he and his critics, including Richard Dawkins, claimed to be carrying the mantle of Darwinian evolution. By the end of the 1990s, the debate over which evolutionary thinkers were the rightful heirs to Darwin's evolutionary theory was also a conversation over whether Darwinism could be defended against creationists in the broader cultural context. Gould and others' claims to Darwin shaped the contours of a political, religious and scientific controversy.

Gould talking past Dawkins on the unit of selection issue.

My general aim is to clarify the foundational difference between Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins concerning what biological entities are the units of selection in the process of evolution by natural selection. First, I recapitulate Gould's central objection to Dawkins's view that genes are the exclusive units of selection. According to Gould, it is absurd for Dawkins to think that genes are the exclusive units of selection when, after all, genes are not the exclusive interactors: those agents directly engaged with, directly impacted by, environmental pressures. Second, I argue that Gould's objection still goes through even when we take into consideration Sterelny and Kitcher's defense of gene selectionism in their admirable paper "The Return of the Gene." Third, I propose a strategy for defending Dawkins that I believe obviates Gould's objection. Drawing upon Elisabeth Lloyd's careful taxonomy of the various understandings of the unit of selection at play in the philosophy of biology literature, my proposal involves realizing that Dawkins endorses a different understanding of the unit of selection than Gould holds him to, an understanding that does not require genes to be the exclusive interactors.