Neural Reward Representations Enable Utilitarian Welfare Maximization.

From deciding which meal to prepare for our guests to trading off the proenvironmental effects of climate protection measures against their economic costs, we often must consider the consequences of our actions for the well-being of others (welfare). Vexingly, the tastes and views of others can vary widely. To maximize welfare according to the utilitarian philosophical tradition, decision-makers facing conflicting preferences of others should choose the option that maximizes the sum of the subjective value (utility) of the entire group. This notion requires comparing the intensities of preferences across individuals. However, it remains unclear whether such comparisons are possible at all and (if they are possible) how they might be implemented in the brain. Here, we show that female and male participants can both learn the preferences of others by observing their choices and represent these preferences on a common scale to make utilitarian welfare decisions. On the neural level, multivariate support vector regressions revealed that a distributed activity pattern in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a brain region previously associated with reward processing, represented the preference strength of others. Strikingly, also the utilitarian welfare of others was represented in the VMPFC and relied on the same neural code as the estimated preferences of others. Together, our findings reveal that humans can behave as if they maximized utilitarian welfare using a specific utility representation and that the brain enables such choices by repurposing neural machinery processing the reward others receive.

The optimal design of assisted reproductive technologies policies.

This paper studies the optimal fiscal treatment of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in an economy where individuals differ in their reproductive capacity (or fecundity) and in their wage. We find that the optimal ART tax policy varies with the postulated social welfare criterion. Utilitarianism redistributes only between individuals with unequal fecundity and wages but not between parents and childless individuals. To the opposite, ex post egalitarianism (which gives absolute priority to the worst-off in realized terms) redistributes from individuals with children toward those without children, and from individuals with high fecundity toward those with low fecundity, so as to compensate for both the monetary cost of ART and the disutility from involuntary childlessness resulting from unsuccessful ART investments. Under asymmetric information and in order to solve for the incentive problem, utilitarianism recommends to either tax or subsidize ART investments of low-fecundity-low-productivity individuals at the margin, depending on the degree of complementarity between fecundity and ART in the fertility technology. On the opposite, ex post egalitarianism always recommends marginal taxation of ART.

Beyond Trolleyology: The CNI Model of Moral-Dilemma Responses.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT: How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

Choosing between bad and worse: investigating choice in moral dilemmas through the lens of control.

People's preferences for the utilitarian outcome in sacrificial moral dilemmas, where a larger group of individuals are saved at the cost of a few, have been argued to be influenced by various factors. Taking expected utility (EU) theory into consideration, we investigate whether the expected effectiveness of actions elucidate certain inconsistencies in moral judgments. Additionally, we also explore whether participants' role in the dilemma as the executor or a superior who merely makes a decision, which is carried out by a subordinate, influences judgments-a factor generally overlooked by classical EU models. We test these hypotheses using a modified moral dilemma paradigm with a choice between two actions, one highly successful and the other more likely to fail. Both actions are either expected to result in a favorable outcome of saving five individuals by sacrificing one or an unfavorable outcome of sacrificing five to save one. When the efficient action is anticipated to lead to a favorable outcome, in line with EU models, people almost invariably choose the efficient action. However, in conditions where the EUs associated with efficient and inefficient actions are close to each other, people's choice for favored outcome is above chance when they act as agents themselves. We discuss the implications of our results for existing theories of moral judgments.

Exit Duty Generator.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one's autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author's perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo.

Confessions of an Antinatalist Philosopher.

Antinatalism assigns reproduction a negative value. There should be fewer or no births. Those who say that there should be fewer births have been called conditional antinatalists. A better name for their view would be selective pronatalism. Those who say that there should be no births face two challenges. They must define the scope of their no-birth policy. Does it apply only to human or sentient beings or can it also be extended to all organic life, perhaps even to machine consciousness? And whatever the scope, they have to justify the eventual extinction of humankind or other life forms, an inevitable consequence of unconditional antinatalism. Different axiologies and moral theories produce different responses to these challenges. It is argued that a two-value conflict-sensitive negative utilitarianism would produce a kind and reasonable justification for ending at least human and factory-animal reproduction. The conclusion is purely moral and supports only voluntary extinction for humankind.

Vaccine Nationalism Counterintuitively Erodes Public Trust in Leaders.

Global access to resources like vaccines is key for containing the spread of infectious diseases. However, wealthy countries often pursue nationalistic policies, stockpiling doses rather than redistributing them globally. One possible motivation behind vaccine nationalism is a belief among policymakers that citizens will mistrust leaders who prioritize global needs over domestic protection. In seven experiments (total N = 4,215 adults), we demonstrate that such concerns are misplaced: Nationally representative samples across multiple countries with large vaccine surpluses (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States) trusted redistributive leaders more than nationalistic leaders-even the more nationalistic participants. This preference generalized across different diseases and manifested in both self-reported and behavioral measures of trust. Professional civil servants, however, had the opposite intuition and predicted higher trust in nationalistic leaders, and a nonexpert sample also failed to predict higher trust in redistributive leaders. We discuss how policymakers' inaccurate intuitions might originate from overestimating others' self-interest.

Moral characteristics predicting COVID-19 vaccination.

OBJECTIVE: The current study aims to assess, for the first time, whether vaccination is predicted by different behavioral and cognitive aspects of moral decision-making. BACKGROUND: Studies linking moral factors to vaccination have largely examined whether vaccination decisions can be explained by individual differences in the endorsement of various principles and norms central to deontology-based arguments in vaccination ethics. However, these studies have overlooked whether individuals prioritize norms over other considerations when making decisions, such as maximizing consequences (utilitarianism). METHOD: In a sample of 1492 participants, the current study assessed whether vaccination is explained by individual differences in three aspects of moral decision-making (consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and action tendency), while also considering ethics position (idealism, relativism) and moral identity. RESULTS: Supportive vaccination (vaccine uptake accompanied by a positive attitude toward vaccines) was associated with utilitarianism (increased consequence sensitivity) and increased tolerance to risks and harm toward others. Meanwhile, although those in the non-vaccinated group was associated with higher harm sensitivities, they neither supported nor received the COVID vaccines (when vaccines prevent harm from infection). CONCLUSION: Pro-vaccination messages may be made more effective by addressing perceptions of harms associated with vaccines and infections, respectively.

The ethical dilemmas of risky decisions.

Even in a pandemic there seem to be inherent conflicts of interest between the individual and societal consequences of remedial actions and strategies. Actions taken in the sole interests of patients, as required by the Hippocratic oath, can have broadly inconvenient economic implications for the State. ("Average" benefits for a population can impose individual inconveniences for the vulnerable.). Understandably these decisions are not normally made explicitly and transparently by governments. This leads to seemingly illogical and inhumane strategies which are not understood and hence mistrusted and often ignored by the public. Vaccination sentiments on social media are often an unwanted symptom of this dilemma. This article outlines and discusses a number of examples of such situations with a focus on ethical aspects. It concludes that each case must be considered individually as to the issues that need to be weighed in these difficult decisions; and that there are no clear and universally acceptable ethical solutions. What can be learned from the COVID-19 crisis is that short term utilitarianism has consequences that in the eyes of the population are unacceptable. This lesson seems equally valid for cost benefit evaluations regarding other risks, such as from hazardous industries, flood defenses, and air transport. Decisionmakers and politicians can learn that persuasion only goes so far. In the end the people appear to prioritize in terms of deontology.

Moral philosophy has much more to offer.

Moral philosophy is a rich tradition that contains many alternative approaches to determining what is right and wrong. A limited account that only considers (hedonistic) utilitarianism and deontology cannot do justice to moral philosophy. It is necessary to also consider the many other general-purpose moral theories that have been proposed, as well as the approaches developed in various branches of applied ethics, such as healthcare ethics, the ethics of technology, and the ethics of risk.

The Moral Pitfalls of Cultivated meat: Complementing Utilitarian Perspective with eco-republican Justice Approach.

The context of accelerated climate change, environmental pollution, ecosystems depletion, loss of biodiversity and growing undernutrition has led human societies to a crossroads where food systems require transformation. New agricultural practices are being advocated in order to achieve food security and face environmental challenges. Cultivated meat has recently been considered one of the most desired alternatives by animal rights advocates because it promises to ensure nutrition for all people while dramatically reducing ecological impacts and animal suffering. It is therefore presented as one of the fairest means of food production for the coming decades, according to utilitarian arguments. However, food security, environmental concerns and animal welfarism guided by a short-term utilitarianism could have techno-optimism bias and could result in some forms of oppression such as anthropocentrism. I argue that there are still deep-rooted moral issues in food systems that are not addressed primarily by lab-grown meat, mainly derived from a loss of sovereignty. Food practices developed in high-tech labs with artificial interventionism constrain the ability of living entities (that are used as food) to flourish on their own terms. This paper aims to explore how sovereignty entitlements for humans and nonhumans are often overlooked by advocates of cultivated meat and the moral challenges it may pose. Accordingly, a more than utilitarian approach framed by ecological and republican justice is proposed here to shed light on some pitfalls of food chains based on cellular agriculture.

The Oxford Utilitarianism Scale: Psychometric properties of a French adaptation (OUS-Fr).

It is well established that one's sense of morality may be readily influenced by one's culture, education, and life situation. Very few psychometric tools are currently available to measure facets of human morality in different cultures. Therefore, the purpose of the present study was to develop a French adaptation of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS-Fr) and formally evaluate its validity. The OUS-Fr was developed through a process of back-translation and administered to a sample of 552 participants. Results from exploratory factor analyses revealed a bidimensional structure with satisfactory loadings that was then also supported in the confirmatory factor analysis check. The OUS-Fr scale demonstrated good psychometric properties, with acceptable internal consistency and coherent results in the convergent validity analyses. These findings contribute to morality measurement literature by providing evidence for the reliability and validity of the French adaptation of the OUS. The OUS-Fr can be viewed as a valuable tool for researchers and practitioners for assessing utilitarian tendencies within the French-speaking population, which could pave the way for cross-cultural understandings that are important for fully understanding the intricacies of human morality.

Online Moral Conformity: how powerful is a Group of Strangers when influencing an Individual's Moral Judgments during a video meeting?

People make moral decisions every day. When making such decisions, they may be influenced by their companions (a so-called moral conformity effect). Increasingly, people make decisions in online environments, like video meetings. In the current preregistered experiment, we studied the moral conformity effect in an online context. We applied an Asch conformity paradigm by asking participants (N = 120) to reply to sacrificial moral dilemmas through the online video communication tool Zoom either when sitting in a "virtual" room with strangers (confederates instructed on how to answer; experimental condition) or when sitting alone (control condition). We found that people displayed a moral conformity effect on half the dilemmas included in our study as well as in the aggregate. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-023-04765-0.

'Utilitarianism for animals: deontology for people' and the doing/allowing distinction.

It is tempting to think that zebras, goats, lions, and similar animals matter morally, but not in quite the same way people do. This might lead us to adopt a hybrid view of animal ethics such as 'Utilitarianism for Animals; Deontology for People'. One of the core commitments of deontology is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. I explore how this core tenant of deontology applies to non-person, non-human animals and whether hybrid views of animal ethics can accept it. In doing so, I aim to do three things. First, to show that my defence of the DDA can solve a problem surrounding our duties to wild animals, while making only minimal claims about animal moral status. Second, to offer an argument that for many non-person, non-human animals, we should recognise deontological constraints on their treatment, but also see those constraints as importantly different from the constraints against doing harm to persons. Third, to get clearer on how we should understand Utilitarianism for Animals and Nozickian hybrid approaches to animal ethics.

On the uneasy alliance between moral bioenhancement and utilitarianism.

Moral bioenhancement (MBE) is often associated with a consequentialist, especially utilitarian, framework, owing to its capacity to prevent great harm and motivate acts in accordance with basic moral principles such us universal impartial altruism or benevolence. However, it remains unclear whether we could de facto justify MBE on utilitarian grounds. This article examines whether there is a plausible utilitarian case for MBE and what the obstacles for justifying MBE on utilitarian grounds could be. More specifically, it explores the relationship between MBE and basic utilitarian principles, as well as its effects on utilitarian moral judgment. It seems that MBE could modify moral agents in ways that would accord with the main utilitarian demands and facilitate the adoption and realization of utilitarian prescriptions. Although MBE would, in principle, create preconditions for achieving utilitarian ends, I argue that there are certain limits to this claim. I identify and elaborate several ways in which MBE could undermine utilitarian moral judgment.

Racism without racists and consequentialist life-maximizing approaches to triaging.

Consequentialist life-maximizing approaches to triaging prescribe that everyone ought to have an equal chance of living a typical lifespan, through the saving more life-years (or saving most lives) principle, which emphasizes the youngest-first principle and in some cases a lottery approach, often at the expense of the old and the sick. Although this approach has already been criticized by several bioethicists, this article provides a different kind of criticism to the life-cycle viewpoint, one that has not yet been explored at length; namely, we contend that the life-maximizing approach entails a form of racism without racists in its attitude towards Black people. More specifically, we contend that by neglecting the idea that current societies are not post-racial, it privileges White individuals and disadvantages Black people in the triaging process, curtails equal opportunities for Black people, reinforces white normativity, and neglects African culture. We end the article by pointing towards an Afro-communitarian relational triaging approach that does not face the same difficulties as consequentialist life-maximizing approaches do.

Trolleys, triage and Covid-19: the role of psychological realism in sacrificial dilemmas.

At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, frontline medical professionals at intensive care units around the world faced gruesome decisions about how to ration life-saving medical resources. These events provided a unique lens through which to understand how the public reasons about real-world dilemmas involving trade-offs between human lives. In three studies (total N = 2298), we examined people's moral attitudes toward the triage of acute coronavirus patients, and found elevated support for utilitarian triage policies. These utilitarian tendencies did not stem from period change in moral attitudes relative to pre-pandemic levels-but rather, from the heightened realism of triage dilemmas. Participants favoured utilitarian resolutions of critical care dilemmas when compared to structurally analogous, non-medical dilemmas-and such support was rooted in prosocial dispositions, including empathy and impartial beneficence. Finally, despite abundant evidence of political polarisation surrounding Covid-19, moral views about critical care triage differed modestly, if at all, between liberals and conservatives. Taken together, our findings highlight people's robust support for utilitarian measures in the face of a global public health threat, and illustrate how the dominant methods in moral psychology (e.g. trolley cases) may deliver insights that do not generalise to real-world moral dilemmas.

The good, the bad, and the utilitarian: attitudes towards genetic testing and implications for disability.

The present study focused on the link between the attitudes towards genetic testing and views on selective reproduction choices following genetic testing. First, we explored the potential demographical (age, gender, number of children, relationship status) and personal factors (perceived morality, religiosity, parenting intentions, instrumental harm) underlying these attitudes using a specific moral psychology approach, i.e., the two-dimension model of utilitarianism (i.e., instrumental harm and impartial beneficence). Next, we investigated participants' hypothetical reproduction choices depending on the future child's potential future condition, assessed through genetic screening. Our sample consisted of 1627 Romanian adults aged 17 to 70 (M = 24.46). Results indicated that one's perceived morality was the strongest predictor of positive attitudes towards genetic testing, and instrumental harm was the strongest predictor of negative attitudes. Also, more religious individuals with more children had more moral concerns related to genetic testing. Participants considered Down syndrome as the condition that parents (others than themselves) should most take into account when deciding to have children (35%), followed by progressive muscular dystrophy (29.1%) and major depressive disorder (29%). When expressing their choices for their future children (i.e., pregnancy termination decisions), participants' knowledge about potential deafness in their children generated the most frequent (37.7%) definitive termination decisions (i.e., "definitely yes" answers), followed by schizophrenia (35.8%), and major depressive disorder (35.2%). Finally, we discuss our results concerning their practical implications for disability and prenatal screening ethical controversies.

Moral judgment, decision times and emotional salience of a new developed set of sacrificial manual driving dilemmas.

The growing interest in the subject of moral judgment in driver and autonomous vehicle behavior highlights the importance of investigating the suitability of sacrificial dilemmas as experimental tools in the context of traffic psychology. To this aim a set of validated sacrificial trolley problems and a new set of trolley-like driving dilemmas were compared through an online survey experiment, providing normative values for rates of participants' choices; decision times; evaluation of emotional valence and arousal experienced during the decision process; and ratings of the moral acceptability. Results showed that while both sets of dilemmas led to a more frequent selection of utilitarian outcomes, the driving-type dilemmas seemed to enhance faster decisions mainly based on the utilitarian moral code. No further differences were observed between the two sets, confirming the reliability of the moral dilemma tool in the investigation of moral driving behaviors. We suggest that as moral judgments and behaviors become more lifelike, the individual's moral inclination emerge more automatically and effectively. This new driving-type dilemma set may help researchers who work in traffic psychology and moral decision-making to approach the complex task of developing realistic moral scenarios more easily in the context of autonomous and nonautonomous transportation.

Respect for persons and the allocation of lifesaving healthcare resources.

Many ethicists argue that we should respect persons when we distribute resources. Yet it is unclear what this means in practice. For some, the idea of respect for persons is synonymous with the idea of respect for autonomy. Yet a principle of respect for autonomy provides limited guidance for how we should distribute scarce medical interventions. In this article, however, I sketch an alternative conception of respect for persons-one that is based on an ethic of mutual accountability. I draw in particular upon Stephen Darwall's writings on respect and the second-person standpoint. I consider the implications of this conception of respect for the distribution of scarce, lifesaving healthcare resources. A second-personal account of respect rules out aggregative approaches to distribution, and instead requires that we give individual consideration to the claims that persons in need make on the resources in our control. The principles that we use to govern our allocation of resources, furthermore, should be principles that are acceptable to all reasonable agents. Building on this insight, the final section of this paper considers how a principle of need can be used as a means to make decisions about the allocation of lifesaving resources.