The Ethics of Life as It Could Be: Do We Have Moral Obligations to Artificial Life?

The field of Artificial Life studies the nature of the living state by modeling and synthesizing living systems. Such systems, under certain conditions, may come to deserve moral consideration similar to that given to nonhuman vertebrates or even human beings. The fact that these systems are nonhuman and evolve in a potentially radically different substrate should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to their potentially having rights, if they are sufficiently sophisticated in other respects. Nor should the fact that they owe their existence to us be seen as reducing their status as targets of moral concern. On the contrary, creators of Artificial Life may have special obligations to their creations, resembling those of an owner to their pet or a parent to their child. For a field that aims to create artificial life-forms with increasing levels of sophistication, it is crucial to consider the possible ethical implications of our activities, with an eye toward assessing potential moral obligations for which we should be prepared. If Artificial Life is larger than life, then the ethics of artificial beings should be larger than human ethics.

Laboratory animal ethics education improves medical students' awareness of laboratory animal ethics.

OBJECTIVE: In this study, we added laboratory animal ethics education into both didactic sessions and practical sessions the general surgery laboratory course, with the didactic sessions focus on teaching the fundamental principles of laboratory animal ethics, while the practical sessions emphasize the application of these principles in laboratory classes and have assessed the changes in medical students' perception of laboratory animal ethics following medical students exposure to such education. METHODS: One hundred and eighty-nine third-year medical students from Wuhan University's Second Clinical College completed a laboratory animal ethics awareness questionnaire and a laboratory animal ethics written examination before and after laboratory animal ethics education. RESULTS: After receiving laboratory animal ethics education, the percentage of students who supported euthanasia for the execution of animals and humane treatment of laboratory animals were 95.2% and 98.8%, respectively, which did not differ from the 94.9% and 96.4% observed before the education. Moreover, there was a notable increase in the proportion of students who knew about regulations related to laboratory animals (from 39.9% to 57.1%), welfare issues (from 31.9% to 50.0%), and the 3R principle (from 30.4% to 58.9%) post-education, all statistically significant at P < 0.05. Test scores also showed improvement, with students scoring (93.02 ± 11.65) after education compared to (67.83 ± 8.08) before, a statistically significant difference. CONCLUSIONS: This research helps to provide information for the good practices of laboratory animal ethics education. After receiving laboratory animal ethics education, students are better able to treat laboratory animals in a correct animal ethical manner. Laboratory animal ethics education helps improve students' knowledge of laboratory animal ethics. Students' perception towards how the laboratory animal ethics course should be delivered may vary. Still, new courses or better organized courses on laboratory animal ethics education are required in order to provide students an in-depth understanding.

Revisiting two dogmas of conservation science.

Conservation science is a morally motivated field, with implicit and explicit values built into its practice. As such, conservationists must engage with conservation ethics to interrogate underlying values. We examine cutting-edge ecological science and contemporary ethics to revisit two conservation norms that have become dogmatic in the field: ecological collectives, but not individual animals, are valuable and anthropomorphism should be staunchly avoided. Emerging studies demonstrate that individuals and their intraspecific variation can be instrumentally valuable for conservation science, and there is an emerging consensus within environmental philosophy around the moral worth of individuals. Thus, we suggest conservation science should explicitly recognize the value of individuals. We also argue that avoiding anthropomorphism is detrimental to conservation because critical anthropomorphism enables a more nuanced scientific approach-allowing conservationists to ask enlightened questions with creativity and compassion. We provide evidence that both dogmatic norms are scientifically and morally outdated and propose new normative values to push conservation towards more robust science and ethical practice.

Revisión de dos dogmas de las ciencias de la conservación Resumen Las ciencias de la conservación son un campo con motivaciones morales y valores implícitos y explícitos integrados en su práctica. Por lo tanto, los conservacionistas deben trabajar con la ética de la conservación para interrogar los valores subyacentes. Analizamos la ecología de vanguardia y la ética contemporánea para revisar dos normas que se han convertido en dogmas dentro del campo: los colectivos ecológicos, pero no los animales individuales, son valiosos y el antropomorfismo debe evitarse a toda costa. Los estudios emergentes demuestran que los individuos y sus variaciones intraespecíficas pueden tener un valor instrumental para las ciencias de la conservación y que existe un consenso emergente dentro de la filosofía ambiental en torno al valor moral de los individuos. Por lo tanto, sugerimos que las ciencias de la conservación deberían reconocer de forma explícita el valor de los individuos. También discutimos que evitar el antropomorfismo daña a la conservación pues el antropomorfismo crítico permite una estrategia científica más matizada-lo que permite que los conservacionistas hagan preguntas informadas con creatividad y compasión. Proporcionamos evidencias de que ambos dogmas son científica y moralmente obsoletos y proponemos nuevos valores normativos para guiar a la conservación hacia una ciencia más sólida y una práctica más ética.

Using focus groups with dairy cattle veterinarians to explore learning about calf welfare.

Dairy calf welfare is a growing interest within the veterinary field. However, a limited understanding of the conception of calf welfare by dairy cattle veterinarians can hinder efforts to promote welfare improvements on farms. The aim of this study was to explore how focus groups can promote learning about dairy calf welfare issues among cattle veterinarians. Focus groups (n = 5), that collectively had 33 participants representing five Canadian provinces and different geographical regions, were conducted as part of a continuing education workshop for Canadian cattle veterinarians. Two trained individuals undertook exploratory data analyses using applied thematic analysis and adult learning theory to develop a codebook of the data and identify the main themes. There were three main themes about learning that emerged from guided peer-discussion: (i) defining a shared concept of animal welfare from the veterinary perspective to diagnose the problem; (ii) understanding the problems of calf welfare by self-examination and group reflection; and (iii) negotiating the best approach to address the problems through sharing of ideas on improving calf welfare, including strategies for addressing welfare problems. In conclusion, focus groups can facilitate animal welfare learning within the veterinary profession.

Is UK Animal Research Governance Facing a 'New Normal'? Considering the Risks and Benefits of 'Going Online'.

Since a return to in-office working after the extensive disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and associated challenges, many conversations are still being had with regard to what the 'new normal' might look like in professional spaces and networks, and what lessons can be learnt from long periods of remote working. The regulation of animal research practice in the UK is no exception here and, like many other systems, it has been transformed by the increasingly recognised value of streamlining procedures through the use of virtual online spaces. In early October 2022, the author attended an AWERB-UK meeting in Birmingham (convened by the RSPCA, LAVA, LASA and IAT), which focused on the induction, training and Continuing Professional Development (CPD) opportunities for Animal Welfare and Ethical Review Body (AWERB) members. This comment article reflects on this meeting and raises some interesting questions surrounding animal research governance in an evolving online era, specifically the associated ethical and welfare dimensions.

Development of a Screencast-Based Flipped Classroom to Enrich Learning and Reduce Faculty Time Requirements in an Animal Welfare Master's Degree.

A new distance learning Master of Science (MSc) degree in Animal Welfare Science, Ethics and Law was established in 2016 within the Centre for Animal Welfare at the University of Winchester, UK. Our program recruited students worldwide, with enrollments increasing dramatically since its inception in 2016. However, despite rapid growth, our MSc has had only one full-time equivalent faculty member. With further projected sharp increases in student numbers, significant programmatic change was required for the MSc to remain viable. After consultation with our students and program team, we decided to transition to a flipped classroom teaching model. Piloting a screencast-based flipped classroom in one course, our objectives were to provide a more enriched, engaging, and effective student learning experience and to increase student satisfaction while concurrently saving staff time in future years. We aimed to provide a series of enriched screencast videos of short (∼20-minute) durations, with contents clearly signposted. The new teaching model was well received. Within our 2021 program survey, 100% of respondents expressed a wish to see our screencast-based flipped classroom approach continued, and 71%-86% wished to see it implemented in various additional courses. This model has greatly enriched students' learning experiences, increasing student engagement and satisfaction while also freeing staff time to engage in discussion fora and additional live sessions. Learning and achievement outcomes also appear positive. We plan to steadily integrate this model across additional courses, although initial time investment will be significant. Hence, this new model will be implemented over several semesters.

Hybrid theories, psychological plausibility, and the human/animal divide.

A hybrid theory is any moral theory according to which different classes of individuals ought to be treated according to different principles. We argue that some hybrid theories are able to meet standards of psychological plausibility, by which we mean that it's feasible for ordinary human beings to understand and act in accord with them. Insofar as psychological plausibility is a theoretical virtue, then, such hybrid theories deserve more serious consideration. To make the case for this view, we explain what psychological plausibility is and why we might value it, why the human/animal divide appears to be an entrenched feature of human psychology, and why Robert Nozick's hybrid theory doesn't go far enough. Finally, we make the case that a more promising psychologically plausible hybrid theory, with respect to humans and animals, will be (at least) at tribrid theory-that is, positing three domains rather than two.

'Utilitarianism for animals: deontology for people' and the doing/allowing distinction.

It is tempting to think that zebras, goats, lions, and similar animals matter morally, but not in quite the same way people do. This might lead us to adopt a hybrid view of animal ethics such as 'Utilitarianism for Animals; Deontology for People'. One of the core commitments of deontology is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. I explore how this core tenant of deontology applies to non-person, non-human animals and whether hybrid views of animal ethics can accept it. In doing so, I aim to do three things. First, to show that my defence of the DDA can solve a problem surrounding our duties to wild animals, while making only minimal claims about animal moral status. Second, to offer an argument that for many non-person, non-human animals, we should recognise deontological constraints on their treatment, but also see those constraints as importantly different from the constraints against doing harm to persons. Third, to get clearer on how we should understand Utilitarianism for Animals and Nozickian hybrid approaches to animal ethics.

Are the folk utilitarian about animals?

Robert Nozick famously raised the possibility that there is a sense in which both deontology and utilitarianism are true: deontology applies to humans while utilitarianism applies to animals. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in such a hybrid views of ethics. Discussions of this Nozickian Hybrid View, and similar approaches to animal ethics, often assume that such an approach reflects the commonsense view, and best captures common moral intuitions. However, recent psychological work challenges this empirical assumption. We review evidence suggesting that the folk is deontological all the way down-it is just that the moral side constraints that protect animals from harm are much weaker than those that protect humans. In fact, it appears that people even attribute some deontological protections, albeit extremely weak ones, to inanimate objects. We call this view Multi-level Weighted Deontology. While such empirical findings cannot show that the Nozickian Hybrid View is false, or that it is unjustified, they do remove its core intuitive support. That support belongs to Multi-level Weighted Deontology, a view that is also in line with the view that Nozick himself seemed to favour. To complicate things, however, we also review evidence that our intuitions about the moral status of humans are, at least in significant part, shaped by factors relating to mere species membership that seem morally irrelevant. We end by considering the potential debunking upshot of such findings about the sources of common moral intuitions about the moral status of animals.

A critical review of the compassionate conservation debate.

Compassionate conservation holds that compassion should transform conservation. It has prompted heated debate and has been criticized strongly. We reviewed the debate to characterize compassionate conservation and to philosophically analyze critiques that are recurring and that warrant further critical attention. The necessary elements of compassionate conservation relate to the moral value of sentient animals and conservation and to science and conservation practice. Although compassionate conservation has several nontraditional necessary conditions, it also importantly allows a degree of pluralism in values and scientific judgment regarding animals and conservation practice. We identified 52 specific criticisms from 11 articles that directly critique compassionate conservation. We closely examined 33 of these because they recurred regularly or included substantial questions that required further response. Critics criticized compassionate conservation's ethical foundations, scientific credentials, clarity of application, understanding of compassion, its alleged threat to conservation and biodiversity. Some criticisms, we found, are question begging, confused, or overlook conceptual complexity. These criticisms raise questions for critics and proponents, regarding, for example, equal versus differential intrinsic moral value of different sentient animals (including humans), problems of natural and human-caused suffering of wild animals and predation, and the acceptability of specific conservation practices within compassionate conservation. By addressing recurring and faulty critiques of compassionate conservation and identifying issues for compassionate conservation to address, this review provides a clearer basis for crucial ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue about ethics, values, and conservation.

Una Revisión Crítica del Debate sobre la Conservación Compasiva Resumen La conservación compasiva sostiene que la compasión debería transformar la conservación. Esta idea ha impulsado un debate acalorado y ha sido criticada fuertemente. Revisamos el debate para caracterizar la conservación compasiva y para analizar filosóficamente las críticas recurrentes y que ameritan una mayor atención crítica. Los elementos necesarios de la conservación compasiva están relacionados con el valor moral de los animales sensibles y de la conservación y con la ciencia y la práctica de la conservación. Aunque la conservación compasiva tiene varias condiciones no tradicionales necesarias, también permite de manera muy importante un cierto grado de pluralismo en los valores y el juicio científico con respecto a los animales y a la práctica de la conservación. Identificamos 52 críticas específicas en once artículos que criticaban directamente a la conservación compasiva. Analizamos minuciosamente 33 de estas críticas porque aparecieron regularmente o porque incluían preguntas sustanciales que requerían de una respuesta más profunda. Las críticas se centraban en las razones éticas de la conservación compasiva, sus credenciales científicas, la claridad de su aplicación, el entendimiento del concepto compasión y su presunta amenaza para la conservación y la biodiversidad. Notamos que algunas críticas dejan preguntas pendientes, son confusas o ignoran la complejidad conceptual. Estas críticas generan preguntas para los críticos y para los partidarios de la conservación compasiva con respecto al valor moral intrínseco igual o diferencial de distintos animales sensibles (incluyendo a los humanos), problemas relacionados con el sufrimiento natural y causado por humanos y con la depredación que sufren los animales silvestres y la aceptabilidad de prácticas específicas de conservación dentro de la conservación compasiva. Con la identificación de las críticas recurrentes y fallidas que se le hacen a la conservación compasiva y los temas que ésta debe abordar, esta revisión proporciona una base más clara para el importante diálogo interdisciplinario que existe sobre la ética, los valores y la conservación.

The Study That Made Rats Jump for Joy, and Then Killed Them: The Gap between Knowledge and Practice Widens When Scientists Fail to Engage with the Ethical Implications of Their Own Work.

Much contemporary behavioral science stops short of considering the ethical implications of its own findings. This generates a contradiction between methods and discoveries, and hinders translation between updated scientific evidence for animal sentience and corresponding political and legal changes. A recent and particularly illustrative example in rodents is described here.

Frying nemo? Experimental evidence on anthropomorphism, animal ethics, and food choice.

Recently, it has been suggested that a shift towards diets with a lower carbon footprints, especially ones that emphasize the consumption of plants, is necessary to keep global heating below 2 °C. To address demand for animal-based products, we analyze if the effectiveness of anthropomorphic food labeling as a strategy for promoting plant-based diets is contingent on strong animal ethical beliefs. To this end, we conduct a stated choice experiment with Chilean university students (N = 1538). We manipulate the visual display of the main component of the dish attribute of the choice tasks, using anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic icons to frame the choice of meal options. Our results, which are based on a mixed logit model of the choice data and a linear regression analysis of its individual random parameters, suggest that displaying anthropomorphic icons reduces the likelihood of choosing beef or chicken over vegetables. However, the data provides insufficient evidence to claim an influence on the choice of fish over vegetables. The ethical intuitions that anthropomorphic animals evoke are related to a reduction in the consumption of beef and chicken but do not appear to affect preferences for fish. Our findings support the hypothesis that strong ethical concerns reinforce the effect of anthropomorphic nudges on beef consumption. The results for chicken and fish were inconclusive.

Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed.

According to a common view, sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status. In other words, whether a being has intrinsic moral relevance is determined by its capacity for conscious experience. The epistemic objection derives from our profound uncertainty about sentience. According to this objection, we cannot use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in practice because we won't know in the foreseeable future which animals and AI systems are sentient while ethical questions regarding the possession of moral status are urgent. Therefore, we need to formulate an alternative criterion. I argue that the epistemic objection is dissolved once one clearly distinguishes between the question what determines moral status and what criterion should be employed in practice to ascribe moral status. Epistemic concerns are irrelevant to the former question and-I will argue-criteria of moral status have inescapably to be based on sentience, if one concedes that sentience determines moral status. It follows that doubts about our epistemic access to sentience cannot be used to motivate an alternative criterion of moral status. If sentience turns out to be unknowable, then moral status is unknowable. However, I briefly advocate against such strong pessimism.

From here to Utopia: Theories of Change in Nonideal Animal Ethics.

Animal ethics has often been criticized for an overreliance on "ideal" or even "utopian" theorizing. In this article, I recognize this problem, but argue that the "nonideal theory" which critics have offered in response is still insufficient to make animal ethics action-guiding. I argue that in order for animal ethics to be action-guiding, it must consider agent-centered theories of change detailing how an ideally just human-animal coexistence can and should be brought about. I lay out desiderata that such a theory of change should suffice so as to be helpful in guiding action. Specifically, a theory of change should determine (1) who needs to do what in order for ideal justice to be achieved in the long run, (2) who should be expected to refuse compliance and how they should be moved to comply, and (3) why specific intermediate steps are necessary. I show how previous "nonideal" contributions, though helpful in other ways, are insufficiently determinate on these points and I sketch a (still somewhat utopian) theory of change for one specific context. This brings animal ethics a crucial step closer to being action-guiding in the real world.

The differentiation argument: If newborns outrank animals, so do fetuses.

Common-sense morality seems to dictate that newborn babies strictly outrank non-human animals on an ordered list of subjects of moral consideration. This is best described as the view that newborn babies have a higher moral status than any non-human animal. In this article, I will argue that this common-sense claim about the special moral status of newborn babies makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that fetuses, including pre-conscious fetuses, also have a higher moral status than any non-human animal-indeed, as high as newborn babies. While this conclusion does not quite entail that abortion is generally seriously immoral, it does seem to follow that it would be no less difficult to justify (even relatively early) abortion than it would be to justify killing a newborn.

Default Vegetarianism and Veganism.

This paper describes a pair of dietary practices I label default vegetarianism and default veganism. The basic idea is that one adopts a default of adhering to vegetarian and vegan diets, with periodic exceptions. While I do not exhaustively defend either of these dietary practices as morally required, I do suggest that they are more promising than other dietary practices that are normally discussed like strict veganism and vegetarianism. For they may do a better job of striking a balance between normative concerns about contemporary farming practices and competing considerations of life. Additionally, I argue that framing discussions in terms of defaults is useful for various reasons: it helps organize agreements and disagreements, it more accurately reflects the way people conceptualize their dietary practices, and it presents a more dialectically effective view.

Fetal and animal research in Sweden: The construction of viable lives in regulatory policy debates, 1970-1980.

Following demands to regulate biomedicine in the post-war period, Sweden saw several political debates about research ethics in the 1970s. Many of the debates centered on fetal research and animal experiments. At stake were questions of moral permissibility, public transparency, and scientific freedom. However, these debates did not only reveal ethical disagreement-they also contributed to constructing new boundaries between life-forms. Taking a post-Marxist approach to discursive policy analysis, we argue that the meaning of both the "human" and the "animal" in these debates was shaped by a need to manage a legitimacy crisis for medical science. By analyzing Swedish government bills, motions, parliamentary debates, and committee memorials from the 1970s, we map out how fetal and animal research were constituted as policy problems. We place particular emphasis on the problematization of fetal and animal vulnerability. By comparing the debates, we trace out how a particular vision of the ideal life defined the human-animal distinction.

Should We Protect Animals from Hate Speech?

Laws against hate speech protect members of certain human groups. However, they do not offer protection to nonhuman animals. Using racist hate speech as our primary example, we explore the discrepancy between the legal response to hate speech targeting human groups and what might be called anti-animal or speciesist hate speech. We explore two sets of possible defences of this legal discrepancy drawn from the philosophical literature on hate speech-non-consequentialist and harm-based-and find both wanting. We thus conclude that, absent a compelling alternative argument, there is no in-principle reason to support the censure of racist hate speech but not the censure of speciesist hate speech.

Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation.

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.

Reconocimiento de la Calidad de Persona en los Animales dentro de la Conservación Compasiva Resumen La conservación compasiva está basada en la posición ética que parte de que las acciones tomadas para proteger a la biodiversidad deberían estar dirigidas por la compasión por todos los seres sintientes. Los críticos de esta postura argumentan que hay tres razones nucleares por las que el daño a los animales es aceptable dentro de los programas de conservación: el principal motivo de la conservación es la protección de la biodiversidad; la conservación ya es compasiva con los animales; y la conservación debería priorizar la compasión hacia los humanos. Usamos un análisis de argumentos para aclarar los valores y la lógica subyacentes al debate en torno a la conservación compasiva. Encontramos que el rechazo a la conservación compasiva es una expresión de la excepcionalidad humana, la visión de que los humanos están en un nivel categóricamente separado y de mayor moral que todas las demás especies. Por el contrario, los conservacionistas compasivos creen que la conservación debería expandir su comunidad moral al reconocer a todos los seres sintientes como personas. La calidad de persona, en un sentido ético, implica que el individuo merece respeto y no debería ser tratado solamente como un medio para otros fines. Si hablamos desde fundamentos científicos y éticos, existen muy buenas razones para extender la calidad de persona a todos los animales sintientes, particularmente en la conservación. La exclusión moral o la subordinación de los miembros de otras especies justifica la continua manipulación y explotación de los seres vivos, la justa razón por la que necesitamos de la conservación desde el principio. La aceptación de la compasión nos puede ayudar a desmantelar la excepcionalidad humana, a reconocer la calidad de persona no humana y a navegar un espacio moral más expansivo.

Growth and digestive enzyme activities of rohu labeo rohita fed diets containing macrophytes and almond oil-cake.

The impact of plant-based diets on the digestive physiology of rohu Labeo rohita fingerlings (10.66 ±â€¯0.53 g) was evaluated. A diet with all protein supplied by fishmeal was included as a control (F). Four test diets containing 300 g/kg protein were formulated using the following plant ingredients and fishmeal in a 1:1 blend: almond oil-cake Terminalia catappa (FTC), duckweed Lemna minor (FLM), water fern Salvania molesta (FSM) and combination of these three ingredients (FTCLMSM). The final body weight and specific growth rate were significantly higher in rohu fed diet FLM compared to the other treatments. Significantly lower feed conversion ratio in rohu fed diet FLM showed that diet was utilized efficiently in this feeding regime compared to the other diets. The composition of diets also influenced the digestive enzyme activities of the fish. Thus, amylase, trypsin and chymotrypsin activities were significantly higher in rohu fed diet FLM compared to the rohu fed the other diets. Protease activity was significantly higher in rohu fed diets FTC and F and lipase activity was significantly higher in rohu fed diet FTC compared to the rohu fed the other diets. The inclusion of raw duckweed in feed replaced 300 g/kg of dietary fishmeal without affecting growth.