Consciousness in non-REM-parasomnia episodes.

Sleepwalking and related parasomnias are thought to result from incomplete awakenings out of non-rapid eye movement (non-REM) sleep. Non-REM parasomnia behaviours have been described as unconscious and automatic, or related to vivid, dream-like conscious experiences. Similarly, some observations have suggested that patients are unresponsive during episodes, while others that they can interact with their surroundings. To better grasp and characterise the full spectrum of consciousness and environmental (dis)connection associated with behavioural episodes, 35 adult patients with non-REM sleep parasomnias were interviewed in-depth about their experiences. The level of consciousness during parasomnia episodes was reported to be variable both within and between individuals, ranging from minimal or absent consciousness and largely automatic behaviours (frequently/always present in 36% of patients) to preserved conscious experiences characterised by delusional thinking to varying degrees of specificity (65%), often about impending danger, variably formed, uni- or multisensory hallucinations (53%), impaired insight (77%), negative emotions (75%), and variable, but often pronounced, amnesia (30%). Patients described their experiences as a dream scene during which they felt awake ("awake dreaming"). The surroundings were either realistically perceived, misinterpreted (in the form of perceptual illusions or misidentifications of people), or entirely hallucinated as a function of the prevailing delusion. These observations suggest that the level of consciousness, amnesia and sensory disconnection during non-REM parasomnia episodes is variable and graded. In their full-fledged expression, non-REM parasomnia experiences feature several core features of dreams. They therefore represent a valuable model for the study of consciousness, sleep-related sensory disconnection and dreaming.

Neuroanatomical and neurocognitive correlates of delusion in Alzheimer's disease and mild cognitive impairment.

BACKGROUND: Neuropsychiatric symptoms and delusions are highly prevalent among people with dementia. However, multiple roots of neurobiological bases and shared neural basis of delusion and cognitive function remain to be characterized. By utilizing a fine-grained multivariable approach, we investigated distinct neuroanatomical correlates of delusion symptoms across a large population of dementing illnesses. METHODS: In this study, 750 older adults with mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease completed brain structural imaging and neuropsychological assessment. We utilized principal component analysis followed by varimax rotation to identify the distinct multivariate correlates of cortical thinning patterns. Five of the cognitive domains were assessed whether the general cognitive abilities mediate the association between cortical thickness and delusion. RESULTS: The result showed that distributed thickness patterns of temporal and ventral insular cortex (component 2), inferior and lateral prefrontal cortex (component 1), and somatosensory-visual cortex (component 5) showed negative correlations with delusions. Subsequent mediation analysis showed that component 1 and 2, which comprises inferior frontal, anterior insula, and superior temporal regional thickness accounted for delusion largely through lower cognitive functions. Specifically, executive control function assessed with the Trail Making Test mediated the relationship between two cortical thickness patterns and delusions. DISCUSSION: Our findings suggest that multiple distinct subsets of brain regions underlie the delusions among older adults with cognitive impairment. Moreover, a neural loss may affect the occurrence of delusion in dementia largely due to impaired general cognitive abilities.

Koro: a socially-transmitted delusional belief.

INTRODUCTION: Koro is a delusion whereby a man believes his penis is shrinking into his abdomen and this may result in his death. This socially-transmitted non-neuropsychological delusional belief occurs (in epidemic form) in South-East and South Asia. We investigated whether the two-factor theory of delusion could be applied to epidemic Koro. METHODS: We scrutinised the literature on epidemic Koro to isolate features relevant to the two questions that must be answered to provide a two-factor account: What could initially prompt the Koro delusional hypothesis? Why is this hypothesis adopted as a belief? RESULTS: We concluded that the Koro hypothesis is usually prompted by the surprising observation of actual penis shrinkage-but only if the man has access to background beliefs about Koro. Whether the hypothesis is then adopted as a belief will depend on individual factors such as prior belief in the Koro concept or limited formal education and sociocultural factors such as deference to culture, to media, or to rumours spread by word of mouth. Social transmission can influence how the first factor works and how the second factor works. CONCLUSION: The two-factor theory of delusion can be applied to a socially-transmitted delusion that occurs in epidemic form.

Making Sense of Spiritual, Metaphysical, and Eschatological Elements in Delusions: A Qualitative Study Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.

BACKGROUND: Spiritual, metaphysical, or eschatological elements in delusions (SMEDs) are frequent and often subjectively regarded as profound transformational experiences, similar to mystical experiences. This study aimed (1) to explore how SMEDs are experienced and in which aspects they are similar to mystical experiences and (2) to investigate how individuals make sense of SMED. METHODS: Seven participants were interviewed, and their expressions were analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis. RESULTS: We found that SMEDs were similar to mystical experiences with regard to alterations in perception of space, time, and unity. Furthermore, SMEDs were accompanied by a sense of enlightenment that however remained ineffable. SMEDs were interpreted from different viewpoints, i.e., as a source of ontological insight, as a mental health issue, as an inspiration for a new orientation in the world, and, for some participants, as an example of the limits of knowledge. Making sense of SMED appeared to follow a lively internal dialogue in which various, sometimes contradictory positions were reflected upon. Participants usually struggled to align the ostensible ontological significance of SMED to the dominating illness explanation. CONCLUSION: SMEDs have similarities to mystical experiences, but integrating SMED into one's own life is challenging. We propose a philosophical, non-pathological interpretation of SMED derived from a novel perspective on mystical experience which may also have some therapeutic utility.

Associations of conservatism and jumping to conclusions biases with aberrant salience and default mode network.

AIM: While conservatism bias refers to the human need for more evidence for decision-making than rational thinking expects, the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias refers to the need for less evidence among individuals with schizophrenia/delusion compared to healthy people. Although the hippocampus-midbrain-striatal aberrant salience system and the salience, default mode (DMN), and frontoparietal networks ("triple networks") are implicated in delusion/schizophrenia pathophysiology, the associations between conservatism/JTC and these systems/networks are unclear. METHODS: Thirty-seven patients with schizophrenia and 33 healthy controls performed the beads task, with large and small numbers of bead draws to decision (DTD) indicating conservatism and JTC, respectively. We performed independent component analysis (ICA) of resting functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. For systems/networks above, we investigated interactions between diagnosis and DTD, and main effects of DTD. We similarly applied ICA to structural and diffusion MRI to explore the associations between DTD and gray/white matter. RESULTS: We identified a significant main effect of DTD with functional connectivity between the striatum and DMN, which was negatively correlated with delusion severity in patients, indicating that the greater the anti-correlation between these networks, the stronger the JTC and delusion. We further observed the main effects of DTD on a gray matter network resembling the DMN, and a white matter network connecting the functional and gray matter networks (all P < 0.05, family-wise error [FWE] correction). Function and gray/white matter showed no significant interactions. CONCLUSION: Our results support the novel association of conservatism and JTC biases with aberrant salience and default brain mode.

[The nurse and psychotic disorders in neurocognitive diseases]. / L'infirmière face aux troubles psychotiques au cours de maladies neurocognitives.

Psychotic disorders, such as delusions and hallucinations, cause stress for individuals, their caregivers and healthcare professionals. Attitudes, perceived as behavioral tendencies, in the presence of these symptoms, can either alleviate or exacerbate them. How should we position ourselves in the presence of these disorders? What are the most effective attitudes for calming day-to-day situations?

Delusions of love and passion in the behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia.

Erotomania (de Clérambault's syndrome) refers to the delusional belief that another person, usually socially unreachable, is in love with the holder of the delusion. The occurrence of erotomania in Frontotemporal Dementia has rarely been reported. We present the unique case of a 59-year-old woman with a strong family history of early-onset dementia in whom erotomania was the initial manifestation that led to a diagnosis of definite Behavioral Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia with a pathogenic missense mutation in the MAPT gene. Based on this case, we propose a hypothetical model for developing erotomania in patients with FTD.

"A ghost doesn't need insulin," Cotard's delusion leading to diabetic ketoacidosis and a body-mass index of 15: a case presentation.

BACKGROUND: Cotard's Syndrome (CS) is a rare clinical entity where patients can report nihilistic, delusional beliefs that they are already dead. Curiously, while weight loss, dehydration, and metabolic derangements have been described as discussed above, a review of the literature revealed neither a single case of a severely underweight patient nor a serious metabolic complication such as Diabetic Ketoacidosis. Further, a search on PubMed revealed no articles discussing the co-occurrence of Cotard's Delusion and eating disorders or comorbid metabolic illnesses such as diabetes mellitus. In order to better examine the association between Cotard's Delusion and comorbid eating disorders and metabolic illness, we will present and discuss a case where Cotard's delusion led to a severe metabolic outcome of DKA and a BMI of 15. CASE PRESENTATION: Mr. B is a 19 year old transgender man admitted to the hospital due to diabetic ketoacidosis secondary to Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus. Mr. B had a history of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. The primary pediatric team discovered that Mr. B had not been using his insulin appropriately and was severely underweight, and they believed this could be due to his underlying mental illness. The psychiatric consultation/liaison service found that Mr. B was suffering from Cotard's delusion leading him to be noncompliant with his insulin due to a belief that he was already dead. Cotard's delusion had in this case led to a severe metabolic outcome of DKA and a BMI of 15. CONCLUSIONS: This case provides clinical insight into the interactions of eating disorders and Cotard's delusion as well as the potential medical complications when Cotard's delusion is co-morbid with medical conditions such as Diabetes Mellitus. We recommend that clinicians routinely screen patients for Cotard's delusion and assess whether the presence of which could exacerbate any underlying medical illness. This includes clinicians taking special care in assessing patient's caloric and fluid intake as well as their adherence to medications both psychiatric and medical. Further research could be conducted to explore the potential overlap of Cotard's delusion and eating disorder phenomenology.

Strange-face-in-the-mirror illusions: specific effects on derealization, depersonalization, and dissociative identity.

Anomalous strange-face illusions (SFIs) are produced when mirror gazing under a low level of face illumination. In contrast to past studies in which an observer's task was to pay attention to the reflected face and to perceive potential facial changes, the present research used a mirror gazing task (MGT) that instructed participants to fixate their gaze on a 4-mm hole in a glass mirror. The participants' eye-blink rates were thus measured without priming any facial changes. Twenty-one healthy young individuals participated in the MGT and a control panel-fixation task (staring at a hole in a gray non-reflective panel). The Revised Strange-Face Questionnaire (SFQ-R) indexed derealization (deformations of facial features; FD), depersonalization (bodily face detachment; BD), and dissociative identity (new or unknown identities; DI) scales. Mirror-fixation increased FD, BD, and DI scores compared to panel-fixation. In mirror-fixation, FD scores revealed fading specific to facial features, distinct from "classical" Troxler- and Brewster-fading. In mirror-fixation, eye-blink rates correlated negatively with FD scores. Panel-fixation produced low BD scores, and, in a few participants, face pareidolias as detected on FD scores. Females were more prone to early derealization and males to compartmentalization of a dissociative identity. SFQ-R may be a valuable instrument for measuring face-specific dissociation (FD, BD, DI) produced by MGT. Use of MGT and panel-fixation task for differential diagnoses between schizophrenia and dissociative identity disorder is discussed.

MISATTRIBUTION OF EMOTIONAL OVER-AROUSAL TO NEUTRAL FACES IN ACUTE PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA PSYCHOSIS.

INTRODUCTION: Misattribution of motivational salience to non-salient (neutral) stimuli could be viewed as a hallmark of psychosis in schizophrenia. Studies have recently revealed increased subjective experience of emotional arousal (EA) to neutral social stimuli in paranoid schizophrenia psychosis, suggesting a misattribution of emotional salience to them. We examined this phenomenon directly by quantifying the level of EA subjectively attributed to low-arousal, neutral-valenced faces. SUBJECTS AND METHODS: A task for EA attribution to neutral (in the context of affective) facial expressions was applied to 44 actively psychotic paranoid schizophrenia inpatients and 44 well-matched healthy controls. RESULTS: Psychotic patients, compared with healthy controls, rated the neutral faces as more aroused (t (86) = 3.15, p =.001) thus misattributing emotional salience to them. DISCUSSION: This finding supports the hypothesis that over-assignment of EA to neutral faces could be viewed as a subclinical affective mechanism of the clinically manifested experience of delusional perception. CONCLUSION: The study provides the first direct empirical evidence for misattribution of emotional salience in terms of over-attribution of EA to neutral faces during acute paranoid schizophrenia psychosis.

[Talking about delusion, what delusion?] / Parler du délire, quel délire ?

When we talk about the clinic of delusional symptoms, we are first and foremost affirming that delusions exist. Professionals working in psychiatry know that delusions can be listened to, that they give meaning to suffering and are part of the history of the subject. Taking the time to reflect on this type of symptom allows us to invest in the clinical field specific to psychiatry, and only makes sense if the clinical approach is based on work referring to the patient's individual history. Maintaining and developing these attitudes to care is essential to the survival of psychiatry as a discipline. Focusing on the clinic of delusion is neither a luxury nor a waste of time.

[Radical imagination and the poetic approach to delusion]. / Imaginaire radical et abord poétique du délire.

A poetic look at delusional disorders. Drawing on Castoriadis' considerations of the radical imaginary, we can show that contemporary objectivist nosography is not sufficient to grasp the full complexity of this disorder. Two of Baudelaire's poems, L'Albatros and Elevation, seem to illustrate what poetry can say about human imaginary productions.

[For a rehabilitation of the delusional faculty]. / Pour une réhabilitation de la faculté délirante.

From ordinary beliefs to delusions, we're all susceptible to misguidance. In search of meaning, we tell ourselves stories that resonate with our feelings, and we unconsciously adhere to them. These subjective truths become pathological when the circumstances and terrain lend themselves to it. The causes are manifold and go beyond the realms of psychiatry and medicine. In rehabilitation, we explain the delusional faculty as a failed narrative attempt by the subject in response to uncertainty and confusion. This combats stigmatization while promoting critical thinking as a protective factor.

[Les demoiselles de Rochefort, or a clinical illustration of madness in pairs]. / Les demoiselles de Rochefort, ou une illustration clinique de folie à deux.

Although folie à deux is a confidential entity that has disappeared from psychiatric textbooks and is disguised in current international classifications of mental disorders, which tend to obscure the fundamental notion of the dyad, recent case reports highlight the topicality of the disorder. The richness of the clinical encounter with twin sisters, presenting a common delusion of parasitic infestation, may prompt us to question the disorder differently, guided in particular by ancient writings and the analytic compass.

Thinking style and psychosis proneness do not predict false insights.

The FIAT paradigm (Grimmer et al., 2021) is a novel method of eliciting 'Aha' moments for incorrect solutions to anagrams in the laboratory, i.e. false insights. There exist many documented reports of psychotic symptoms accompanying strong feelings of 'Aha!' (Feyaerts, Henriksen, Vanheule, Myin-Germeys, & Sass, 2021; Mishara, 2010; Tulver, Kaup, Laukkonen, & Aru, 2021), suggesting that the newly developed FIAT could reveal whether people who have more false insights are more prone to psychosis and delusional belief. To test this possibility, we recruited 200 participants to take an adapted version of the FIAT and complete measures of thinking style and psychosis proneness. We found no association between experimentally induced false insights and measures of Schizotypy, Need for Cognition, Jumping to Conclusions, Aberrant Salience, Faith in Intuition, or the Cognitive Reflection Task. We conclude that experiencing false insights might not be constrained to any particular type of person, but rather, may arise for anyone under the right circumstances.

Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation.

INTRODUCTION: Cotard delusion-the delusional belief "I am dead"-is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard. Ramachandran and Blakeslee proposed that the idea "I am dead" comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if "I am dead" were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. METHODS: We scrutinised the literature on people who expressed the delusional belief "I am dead", looking for data on whether such patients are reported as entirely lacking in emotional responsivity. RESULTS: In numerous cases, patients with Cotard delusion are described as experiencing emotions including anxiety, fear, guilt, distress, euphoria and worry. CONCLUSIONS: We conclude that complete absence of emotional responsivity cannot be what prompts the delusional idea that one is dead. We propose that, in at least some cases, the idea "I am dead" comes to mind in response to symptoms of depersonalisation or derealisation, often present in cases of Cotard delusion, and give examples of Cotard patients with abnormalities in various neural areas that could be responsible for the presence of such symptoms.

What is Capgras delusion?

INTRODUCTION: Capgras delusion is sometimes defined as believing that close relatives have been replaced by strangers. But such replacement beliefs also occur in response to encountering an acquaintance, or the voice of a familiar person, or a pet, or some personal possession. All five scenarios involve believing something familiar has been replaced by something unfamiliar. METHODS: We evaluate the proposal that these five kinds of delusional belief should count as subtypes of the same delusion. RESULTS: Personally familiar stimuli activate the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) much more strongly than unfamiliar stimuli. In Capgras delusion, this difference is absent, prompting the delusional idea that a familiar person is actually a stranger. We suggest this absence of an effect of familiarity on SNS response will occur in all five scenarios and will prompt the idea that the familiar has been replaced by the unfamiliar. CONCLUSIONS: We propose that: (a) all five scenarios be referred to as subtypes of Capgras delusion; (b) in all five, ideas about replacement are prompted by weakness of SNS responses to familiar stimuli; (c) this is insufficient to generate delusion. For a delusional idea to become a belief, a second factor (impaired hypothesis evaluation) must also be present.

Unusual experiences and their association with metacognition: investigating ASMR and Tulpamancy.

BACKGROUND: Unusual experiences in Tulpamancer and Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR) communities are generally positive and sought after, unlike hallucinations and delusions in clinical populations. Metacognition, the ability to reflect on self-referential experiences, may aid sense-making around unusual experiences, reducing distress. This study investigated group differences in hallucination-proneness, delusion-proneness, and metacognition in these communities compared to controls, and whether metacognition predicted unusual experiences. METHODS: 243 participants reporting ASMR, Tulpamancy, or neither, with no history of psychosis, took part in an online observational study. Participants completed the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, Metacognitions Questionnaire-30, and Brief Core Schema Scales to capture metacognition. A Tulpamancer+ (reporting ASMR) group was identified and included in analyses. ANCOVAs highlighted group differences in hallucination-proneness, with Tulpamancer+ scoring higher, and metacognitive beliefs, with Tulpamancers reporting lower metacognitive belief endorsement. There were no group differences in delusion-proneness, self-reflection, or self-schemas. Stepwise regression demonstrated metacognition does influence unusual experiences in the non-clinical population, and this influence varies across groups. CONCLUSIONS: In non-clinical populations, unusual sensory experiences are not associated with increased metacognitive beliefs, but having multiple unusual experiences is associated with higher hallucination-proneness. Results suggest improving metacognition in clinical groups may help reduce distress related to unusual sensory experiences.

Neuropathological studies of serotonergic and noradrenergic systems in Lewy body disease patients with delusion or depression.

AIM: The association between psychiatric symptoms in Lewy body disease (LBD) and the noradrenergic and serotonergic systems is still controversial. This study investigated the quantitative relationships of depression and delusion with these systems. METHODS: We studied 24 postmortem tissues from individuals with a pathological diagnosis of LBD with sufficient clinical history. The numbers of neurons and Lewy bodies (LBs) in the locus coeruleus (LC) and dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) were counted, and the density of neurons in the DRN was analyzed. In addition, the densities of tryptophan hydroxylase-positive neurites and norepinephrine transporter-positive neurites in the amygdala and dorsal prefrontal cortex were measured. Finally, we divided the cases into two groups: with or without depressive mood, and with or without delusion. Quantitative histological data were compared between the groups. RESULTS: The group with depressive mood had a significantly smaller number of neurons in the LC compared with the group without depressive mood. The group with delusion had a significantly larger number of LBs in the DRN compared with the group without delusion. The density of norepinephrine transporter-positive neurites in the dorsal prefrontal cortex was significantly correlated with the number of neurons in the LC. CONCLUSIONS: The accumulation of LBs in the DRN of individuals with LBD was associated with delusion, whereas a decrease in the number of neurons in the LC was associated with depressive mood. These neurodegenerative changes involved the serotonergic and noradrenergic systems and may be associated with the formation of delusion and depression, respectively, in LBD.

Clinicodemographic and Psychosocial Factors Related to Presentation or Severity of Delusions of Theft among Females with Amnestic Mild Cognitive Impairment and Alzheimer's Disease.

Objectives: We examined the clinicodemographic and psychosocial factors that relate to the presentation and severity of delusions of theft among female patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (a-MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD).Methods: We enrolled a total of 177 female patients with a-MCI or AD, of whom 40 presented with delusions of theft. We compared the differences in clinicodemographic and psychosocial factors of the 40 patients (delusions of theft group) with 50 age- and Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE)-matched controls without delusions (control group). Furthermore, we identified the factors associated with the presentation of delusions of theft using a general linear model (GLM). The severity of delusions of theft was calculated using the Neuropsychiatric Inventory Questionnaire, and correlations between the clinicodemographic and psychosocial factors were examined.Results: Between the two groups, the delusions of theft group had lower scores on the Physical Self-Maintenance Scale and instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) and higher scores on the Japanese version of the Zarit Caregiver Burden Interview (ZBI-J) than the control group. GLM analysis revealed that the IADL score was related to the presentation of delusions of theft. The severity of delusions of theft correlated with the MMSE and the ZBI-J scores in the delusions of theft group.Conclusions: The two groups had several differences regarding clinicodemographic and psychosocial factors. Furthermore, lower IADL scores were related to symptom presentation. Symptom severity correlated with cognitive functioning and caregiver burden.Clinical Implications: In the determination of treatment or care, differences in these factors should be considered.