Causally estimating the effect of YouTube's recommender system using counterfactual bots.

In recent years, critics of online platforms have raised concerns about the ability of recommendation algorithms to amplify problematic content, with potentially radicalizing consequences. However, attempts to evaluate the effect of recommenders have suffered from a lack of appropriate counterfactuals-what a user would have viewed in the absence of algorithmic recommendations-and hence cannot disentangle the effects of the algorithm from a user's intentions. Here we propose a method that we call "counterfactual bots" to causally estimate the role of algorithmic recommendations on the consumption of highly partisan content on YouTube. By comparing bots that replicate real users' consumption patterns with "counterfactual" bots that follow rule-based trajectories, we show that, on average, relying exclusively on the YouTube recommender results in less partisan consumption, where the effect is most pronounced for heavy partisan consumers. Following a similar method, we also show that if partisan consumers switch to moderate content, YouTube's sidebar recommender "forgets" their partisan preference within roughly 30 videos regardless of their prior history, while homepage recommendations shift more gradually toward moderate content. Overall, our findings indicate that, at least since the algorithm changes that YouTube implemented in 2019, individual consumption patterns mostly reflect individual preferences, where algorithmic recommendations play, if anything, a moderating role.

Cultural threat perceptions predict violent extremism via need for cognitive closure.

Understanding the psychological processes that drive violent extremism is a pressing global issue. Across six studies, we demonstrate that perceived cultural threats lead to violent extremism because they increase people's need for cognitive closure (NFC). In general population samples (from Denmark, Afghanistan, Pakistan, France, and an international sample) and a sample of former Mujahideen in Afghanistan, single-level and multilevel mediation analyses revealed that NFC mediated the association between perceived cultural threats and violent extremist outcomes. Further, in comparisons between the sample of former Afghan Mujahideen and the general population sample from Afghanistan following the known-group paradigm, the former Mujahideen scored significantly higher on cultural threat, NFC, and violent extremist outcomes. Moreover, the proposed model successfully differentiated former Afghan Mujahideen participants from the general Afghan participants. Next, two preregistered experiments provided causal support for the model. Experimentally manipulating the predictor (cultural threat) in Pakistan led to higher scores on the mediator (NFC) and dependent variables (violent extremist outcomes). Finally, an experiment conducted in France demonstrated the causal effect of the mediator (NFC) on violent extremist outcomes. Two internal meta-analyses using state-of-the-art methods (i.e., meta-analytic structural equation modeling and pooled indirect effects analyses) further demonstrated the robustness of our results across the different extremist outcomes, designs, populations, and settings. Cultural threat perceptions seem to drive violent extremism by eliciting a need for cognitive closure.

Hate crime supporters are found across age, gender, and income groups and are susceptible to violent political appeals.

Hate crime is a pervasive problem across societies. Though perpetrators represent a small share of the population, their actions continue in part because they enjoy community support. But we know very little about this wider community of support; existing surveys do not measure whether citizens approve of hate crime. Focusing on Germany, where antiminority violence is entrenched, this paper uses original surveys to provide systematic evidence on the nature and impacts of hate crime support. Employing direct and indirect measures, I find that significant shares of the population support antirefugee hate crime and that the profile of supporters is broad, going much beyond common perpetrator types. I next use a candidate choice experiment to show that this support has disturbing political consequences: among radical right voters, hate crime supporters prefer candidates who endorse using gun violence against refugees. I conclude that a significant number of citizens empower potential perpetrators from the bottom-up and further legitimize hate crime from the top-down by championing violence-promoting political elites.

Trusted authorities can change minds and shift norms during conflict.

The reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups is a pressing policy challenge. Governments and policymakers often have to change minds among reticent populations and shift perceived community norms in order to pave the way for peaceful reintegration. How can they do so on a mass scale? Previous research shows that messages from trusted authorities can be effective in creating attitude change and shifting perceptions of social norms. In this study, we test whether messages from religious leaders-trusted authorities in many communities worldwide-can change minds and shift norms around an issue related to conflict resolution: the reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups. Our study takes place in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the birthplace of the violent extremist group Boko Haram. Participants were randomly assigned to listen to either a placebo radio message or to a treatment message from a religious leader emphasizing the importance of forgiveness, announcing the leader's forgiveness of repentant fighters, and calling on followers to forgive. Participants were then asked about their attitudes, intended behaviors, and perceptions of social norms surrounding the reintegration of an ex-Boko Haram fighter. The religious leader message significantly increased support for reintegration and willingness to interact with the ex-fighter in social, political, and economic life (8 to 10 percentage points). It also shifted people's beliefs that others in their community were more supportive of reintegration (6 to 10 percentage points). Our findings suggest that trusted authorities such as religious leaders can be effective messengers for promoting peace.

Autism spectrum disorder, extremism and risk assessment.

BACKGROUND: To date, there is no evidence supporting the existence of an association between Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and extremism in the general population. However, there is increasing recognition that several features of ASD may provide the context of vulnerability to engage in extremist behaviour. AIMS: This paper sets out the case for a dedicated clinical approach to better integrate clinical risk appraisal processes with an assessment of ASD individuals' vulnerabilities within the Criminal Justice System. METHODS AND RESULTS: In this paper the Framework for the Assessment of Risk & Protection in Offenders on the Autistic Spectrum (FARAS): A Guide for Risk Assessors Working with Offenders on the Autistic Spectrum is explored. In developing the FARAS, Al-Attar proposed seven facets of ASD that 'may have different functional links with push and pull factors to terrorism' (p. 928), which include circumscribed interests; rich vivid fantasy and impaired social imagination; need for order, rules, rituals, routine and predictability; obsessionality, repetition and collecting; social interaction and communication difficulties; cognitive styles and Sensory processing. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: We describe the FARAS within the context of the most widely used clinical risk appraisal 'aide memoire' instruments integral to the Structured Professional Judgement of risk process, namely the HCR20v3.

The personality of violent Jihadists: Examining violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims.

OBJECTIVE: Although violent extremism is often attributed to clinical (dysfunctional) dispositions, it is also possible that violent Jihadists might be clinically "normal" but bear certain personality signatures. This alternative view has yet to be tested. METHOD: In six studies, employing hard-to-reach Muslim samples, including one study of former Mujahideen, we investigated the relationship between basic personality traits and violent extremism. We further used a known group paradigm to validate the personality signatures of violent extremism, comparing a sample of former Mujahideen with another sample from Afghanistan. RESULTS: These studies and an internal meta-analysis revealed that Lower Openness to Experience, lower Emotionality, and lower Altruism were associated with more violent intentions to support Muslims. Higher Altruism was associated with higher levels of nonviolent intention to support Muslims. Supporting the validity of the nonviolent intention measure, similar associations were found in Study 3 with overt behavioral support of Muslims (donations). More important, compared to the nonMujahideen, the Mujahideen sample scored lower on average on, for instance, Openness, indicating that these results go beyond self-reported, findings. CONCLUSION: We demonstrated that personality predicts violent and nonviolent defense of Muslims among four general populations of Muslims living in the West and in Asia (including the Middle East), and a sample of Mujahideen in Afghanistan.

Violence risk assessment of Sovereign Citizens: An exploratory examination of the HCR-20 Version 3 and the TRAP-18.

Sovereign Citizens comprise an understudied right-wing extremist movement in the United States who have grown in notoriety in recent years due to several high-profile instances of violence. Despite this, little empirical research has been conducted on Sovereign Citizens, including research on assessing their risk for violence. In this study, we sought to replicate and extend a prior study on Sovereign Citizen violence. Using open-source data, we added several new cases to a pre-existing dataset of violent and non-violent Sovereign Citizen incidents, yielding a total sample of 107 cases, 69 of which were scored using the HCR-20V3 , and 83 of which were scored using the TRAP-18. Our findings indicated that higher scores on both instruments were significantly associated with greater odds of cases being violent. We also observed that several risk factors occurred with significantly more frequency among violent cases than non-violent ones. Implications for future research and professional practice are discussed.

[Experiences of dangerous situations in psychiatry and psychotherapy involving patients with extremist attitudes]. / Erfahrungen mit Gefährdungssituationen in Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie bei Patienten mit extremistischer Einstellung.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Dangerous situations in connection with the treatment of persons with suspected extremist attitudes have become increasingly relevant. A survey of physicians and psychotherapists is intended to provide information about concrete dangerous situations among these patients. MATERIALS AND METHODS: By means of an anonymous online survey, which comprised 16 main questions and up to 95 additional questions, a total of 364 health professionals were asked about the general situation and about patients, as well as relatives with suspected extremist attitudes. RESULTS: In all, 17.5% of the participants were physicians, 72.1% psychotherapists. 47.7% work exclusively in a hospital, 34.2% in a private practice. A total of 57.7% of the participants have already treated patients with suspected extremist attitudes (46.7% treated relatives); 27.6% were confronted with situations of self-endangerment (30.1% in the case of relatives), 49.5% with situations of danger to others (18.3% in the case of relatives), in which they often did not feel safe. Altogether, 20.3% of the professionals informed security authorities, and not quite half found this contact to be comparatively unhelpful/not at all helpful (45.5% among relatives). The majority of the participants had no contact to other agencies, such as specialized counselling centres for deradicalization. Physicians experienced the situations of endangerment more often than non-medical psychotherapists. A comparison between professionals from hospitals and private practices shows no significant differences. DISCUSSION: The study was able to show that extremism and the associated dangerous situations are an important topic in the treatment of patients and that physicians and non-medical psychotherapists should be well prepared. Networking with extremism prevention agencies and good cooperation with security authorities would be important and desirable for the future.

Fighting Violent Extremism With Narrative Intervention: Evidence From a Field Experiment in West Africa.

Violent extremism is one of the major challenges of our time. A cluster-randomized controlled trial with two arms (treatment vs. control) conducted in 132 villages in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso (N = 2,904 participants) examined whether a narrative intervention in the format of a radio drama can shift behavioral intentions, beliefs, and attitudes in contexts of violent extremism. Individuals in intervention villages participated in weekly listening sessions to the radio drama (6 months' content) over 12 weeks. Compared with the control condition, the narrative intervention reduced justification of violence, increased behavioral intentions to collaborate with the police, and increased prioritization of addressing violent extremism. The intervention did not influence beliefs about or attitudes toward the police (e.g., trust, fairness) or beliefs about police-community collaboration. Content analysis of the narrative intervention and participants' reception and discussion of the intervention provide insights on the processes driving the intervention's influence.

A systematic literature review on preventing violent extremism.

INTRODUCTION: In recent years, violent extremism (VE) attacks have escalated worldwide. More schools and students are being attacked. Examining and addressing VE core causes through preventing VE (PVE) strategies can help avoid future atrocities. Due to the tremendous proliferation of research geared toward PVE, an extensive but disorganized knowledge review has accumulated in recent years. The review aims to discover several common themes and strategies across different disciplines and suggests resilience approaches might be the effective framework for PVE worldwide. METHODS: This study followed the guidelines provided by PRISMA. A systematic literature review on 81 articles was conducted in January 2022, with a screening approach starting from the title, abstract and finally, full articles. RESULTS: Seventeen studies were identified with a total sample of 2415 vulnerable young adults, age range: 16-29, male: 68.65% and female 31.35% mainly influenced VE pursuits through internet, TV and social media. In addition, the study identified that for PVE, individual actions would include ineffective approaches compared to a group approach starting from family to educational institutions. CONCLUSIONS: The effective PVE will be ensured by developing strategies for resilient individuals and dialoguing from the social-ecological perspective for taking practical actions in reducing VE activities.

"This is a political movement, friend": Why "incels" support violence.

How do members of extremist groups think about violence conducted by individual members on the group's behalf? We examine the link between extremism-motivated violence and extremist groups through a case study of misogynist incels, a primarily online community of men who lament their lack of sexual success with women. To learn how misogynist incels talk about mass violence committed by members of their group, we conduct a qualitative content analysis of 3,658 comments relating to the 2018 Toronto van attack, in which self-declared incel Alek Minassian drove a van into pedestrians, killing 10 and injuring 16. We find overwhelming support among self-proclaimed incels for the attack and violence more generally. Incels viewed mass violence as instrumental, serving the following four main purposes: garnering increased attention, exacting revenge, reinforcing masculinity, and generating political change. Our findings indicate the need to examine misogynist incels as a potential terrorist group and male supremacism as a basis for terrorism.

Ideological Extremism Among Syrian Refugees Is Negatively Related to Intentions to Migrate to the West.

The conflict in Syria created a dire humanitarian situation, as nations around the world struggled with how best to deal with the more than 6.6 million Syrian refugees who fled their homes to escape aggression. Resistance to granting refugee status to individuals often originates in the belief that the influx of refugees endangers national security because of the presumably extremist religious and political beliefs that refugees hold. The present research surveyed Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq (N = 1,000). The results revealed that the majority of surveyed refugees did not intend to migrate to the West and would rather return to their home country. More importantly, refugees most interested in moving to Western countries were the least likely to subscribe to Islamist extremism or to harbor negative sentiment toward the West. Theoretical and practical implications for addressing the current refugee crisis are discussed.

Asking People to Explain Complex Policies Does Not Increase Political Moderation: Three Preregistered Failures to Closely Replicate Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, and Sloman's (2013) Findings.

Fernbach et al. (2013) found that political extremism and partisan in-group favoritism can be reduced by asking people to provide mechanistic explanations for complex policies, thus making their lack of procedural-policy knowledge salient. Given the practical importance of these findings, we conducted two preregistered close replications of Fernbach et al.'s Experiment 2 (Replication 1a: N = 306; Replication 1b: N = 405) and preregistered close and conceptual replications of Fernbach et al.'s Experiment 3 (Replication 2: N = 343). None of the key effects were statistically significant, and only one survived a small-telescopes analysis. Although participants reported less policy understanding after providing mechanistic policy explanations, policy-position extremity and in-group favoritism were unaffected. That said, well-established findings that providing justifications for prior beliefs strengthens those beliefs, and well-established findings of in-group favoritism, were replicated. These findings suggest that providing mechanistic explanations increases people's recognition of their ignorance but is unlikely to increase their political moderation, at least under these conditions.

Extremism and common mental illness: cross-sectional community survey of White British and Pakistani men and women living in England.

BACKGROUND: Mental illnesses may explain vulnerability to develop extremist beliefs that can lead to violent protest and terrorism. Yet there is little evidence. AIMS: To investigate the relationship between mental illnesses and extremist beliefs. METHOD: Population survey of 618 White British and Pakistani people in England. Extremism was assessed by an established measure of sympathies for violent protest and terrorism (SVPT). Respondents with any positive scores (showing sympathies) were compared with those with all negative scores. We calculated associations between extremist sympathies and ICD-10 diagnoses of depression and dysthymia, and symptoms of anxiety, personality difficulties, autism and post-traumatic stress. Also considered were demographics, life events, social assets, political engagement and criminal convictions. RESULTS: SVPT were more common in those with major depression with dysthymia (risk ratio 4.07, 95% CI 1.37-12.05, P = 0.01), symptoms of anxiety (risk ratio 1.09, 95% CI 1.03-1.15, P = 0.002) or post-traumatic stress (risk ratio 1.03, 95% CI 1.01-1.05, P = 0.003). At greater risk of SVPT were: young adults (<21 versus ≥21: risk ratio 3.05, 95% CI 1.31-7.06, P = 0.01), White British people (versus Pakistani people: risk ratio 2.24, 95% CI 1.25-4.02, P = 0.007) and those with criminal convictions (risk ratio 2.23, 95% CI 1.01-4.95, P = 0.048). No associations were found with life events, social assets and political engagement. CONCLUSION: Depression, dysthymia and symptoms of anxiety and post-traumatic stress are associated with extremist sympathies.

Assessing risks of violent extremism in depressive disorders: Developing and validating a new measure of Sympathies for Violent Protest and Terrorism.

OBJECTIVE: Clinicians are tasked with assessing the relationship between violence and mental illness. Yet, there is now a legal expectation in some countries that public services, including health professionals, assess risk of violent extremism - with few available measures. We previously developed a new measure of Sympathies for Radicalisation, using items that measure Sympathies for Violent Protest and Terrorism. In this paper, we present the detailed psychometric properties of a reduced item measure of Sympathies for Violent Protest and Terrorism. We use data from two studies to test replication and then validity against outcomes of self-reported violence and convictions in the entire sample and in those with depressive symptoms. METHODS: Data from two cross-sectional neighbourhood surveys, consisting of Pakistani and Bangladeshi adults (survey 1, n = 608) and White British and Pakistani adults (survey 2, n = 618), were used to undertake confirmatory factor analysis of Sympathies for Radicalisation and produce a short measure of Sympathies for Violent Protest and Terrorism. Survey 2 data were used to test the Sympathies for Violent Protest and Terrorism's convergent validity to classify presence/absence of violence and convictions in the whole sample and for subgroups by depressive disorder. RESULTS: The seven-item measure's structure was a consistent measure of extremist attitudes across the two surveys. A threshold score of zero to classify violence was optimal (specificity = 89.7%; area under the curve = 0.75), but sensitivity to a risk of violence was poor (34.5%). The short version Sympathies for Radicalisation was a better classifier of violence in respondents with depression, dysthymia or both (area under the curve = 0.78) than respondents with neither (area under the curve = 0.69; ß = 0.62, 95% confidence interval = [-0.67, 1.92]; standard error = 0.66). CONCLUSION: The seven-item measure of Sympathies for Violent Protest and Terrorism is an accessible and valid measure for clinical assessments and helpfully identifies low risk of violence. It enables clinicians to conduct detailed assessments of people endorsing one or more of the items, although further research is needed.

The moral compass and life skills in navigating radicalization processes: Examining the interplay among life skills, moral disengagement, and extremism.

The present study investigated the interplay among deficient life skills, moral disengagement, and extremist attitude across two national contexts. Using a sample of young students in high school or college (N = 686), the present study found significant indirect effects between deficient life skills (agency and structure) and various aspects of an extremist mindset through moral disengagement. These findings suggest that these two psychological concepts of life skills and moral disengagement are relevant for understanding and countering violent radicalization processes; that is to say that morality can direct the life skills toward either violent extremism or nonviolent, legal civil participation. Furthermore, the development and empowerment of life skills could enhance individual resilience to morally disengaging narratives and radicalized ideologies.

Group-Based Relative Deprivation Explains Endorsement of Extremism Among Western-Born Muslims.

Although jihadist threats are regarded as foreign, most Islamist terror attacks in Europe and the United States have been orchestrated by Muslims born and raised in Western societies. In the present research, we explored a link between perceived deprivation of Western Muslims and endorsement of extremism. We suggest that Western-born Muslims are particularly vulnerable to the impact of perceived relative deprivation because comparisons with majority groups' peers are more salient for them than for individuals born elsewhere. Thus, we hypothesized that Western-born, compared with foreign-born, Muslims would score higher on four predictors of extremism (e.g., violent intentions), and group-based deprivation would explain these differences. Studies 1 to 6 ( Ns = 59, 232, 259, 243, 104, and 366, respectively) confirmed that Western-born Muslims scored higher on all examined predictors of extremism. Mediation and meta-analysis showed that group-based relative deprivation accounted for these differences. Study 7 ( N = 60) showed that these findings are not generalizable to non-Muslims.

Evidence for indirect loss of significance effects on violent extremism: The potential mediating role of anomia.

Psychological research suggests that violent extremism (e.g., terrorism) stems partly from existential motives, such as individuals' need to achieve significance in life after experiencing failure, ostracism, or humiliation (Significance Quest Theory; SQT). Parallel investigations from sociology and criminology established similar findings by linking anomia-a syndrome including feelings of meaninglessness, powerlessness, isolation, self-estrangement, and normlessness-with violent behavior. In line with SQT, this contribution tested if anomia could mediate Loss of Significance effects on violent extremism. Accordingly, three studies conducted in France highlight indirect effects of exposure to discrimination on legitimation of political violence (Study 1, cross-sectional, minority population sample, N = 110), violent behavioral intentions (Study 2, experimental, undergraduate sample, N = 249), and support for ISIS fighters (Study 3, experimental, undergraduate sample, N = 221) through anomia. A subsequent study shows this indirect effect to be robust when controlled for Social Dominance Orientation and Political Extremism (Study 4, cross-sectional, undergraduate sample, N = 279). A final investigation re-analyzing data collected in Turkey highlights a reverse effect when the independent variable tapped into social inclusion (rather than exclusion; Study 5, cross-sectional, undergraduate sample, N = 321). This indirect effect was also robust to Political Extremism and Intolerance as control variables. These results support the usefulness of considering anomia as a proximal predictor of violent extremism in a SQT perspective.

Terrorist threat, dehumanization, and right-wing authoritarianism as predictors of discrimination.

This study analyzed the relationship between terrorist threat and discrimination, operationalized by support for retributive justice against Islamic groups suspect of terrorist crimes. Two experimental studies were performed. Study 1 (N = 215) showed that the terrorist threat against the ingroup raises the support for the retributive procedures through the dehumanization of the outgroup. Study 2 (N = 304) analyzed how the mediating role of dehumanization in the relationship between terrorist threat and support for retributive justice is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). In addition, the study aimed to verify if the dehumanization of outgroup and RWA could explain the relationship between terrorist threat and discrimination of Muslim immigrants. The results indicated that adherence to RWA favors dehumanization of the outgroup and, consecutively, the discrimination, operationalized as support for the use of retributive justice. The adherence to RWA has been identified as the mechanism that explains the discrimination against Muslim immigrants.

Producing 'internal suspect bodies': divisive effects of UK counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities in Leeds and Bradford.

Research on UK government counter-terrorism measures has claimed that Muslims are treated as a 'suspect community'. However, there is limited research exploring the divisive effects that membership of a 'suspect community' has on relations within Muslim communities. Drawing from interviews with British Muslims living in Leeds or Bradford, I address this gap by explicating how co-option of Muslim community members to counter extremism fractures relations within Muslim communities. I reveal how community members internalize fears of state targeting which precipitates internal disciplinary measures. I contribute the category of 'internal suspect body' which is materialized through two intersecting conditions within preventative counter-terrorism: the suspected extremist for Muslims to look out for and suspected informer who might report fellow Muslims. I argue that the suspect community operates through a network of relations by which terrors of counter-terrorism are reproduced within Muslim communities with divisive effects.