Human infants are aroused and concerned by moral transgressions.

Humans reason and care about ethical issues, such as avoiding unnecessary harm. But what enables us to develop a moral capacity? This question dates back at least to ancient Greece and typically results in the traditional opposition between sentimentalism (the view that morality is mainly driven by socioaffective processes) and rationalism [the view that morality is mainly driven by (socio)cognitive processes or reason]. Here, we used multiple methods (eye-tracking and observations of expressive behaviors) to assess the role of both cognitive and socioaffective processes in infants' developing morality. We capitalized on the distinction between moral (e.g., harmful) and conventional (e.g., harmless) transgressions to investigate whether 18-mo-old infants understand actions as distinctively moral as opposed to merely disobedient or unexpected. All infants watched the same social scene, but based on prior verbal interactions, an actor's tearing apart of a picture (an act not intrinsically harmful) with a tool constituted either a conventional (wrong tool), a moral (producing harm), or no violation (correct tool). Infants' anticipatory looks differentiated between conventional and no violation conditions, suggesting that they processed the verbal interactions and built corresponding expectations. Importantly, infants showed a larger increase in pupil size (physiological arousal), and more expressions indicating empathic concern, in response to a moral than to a conventional violation. Thus, infants differentiated between harmful and harmless transgressions based solely on prior verbal interactions. Together, these convergent findings suggest that human infants' moral development is fostered by both sociocognitive (inferring harm) and socioaffective processes (empathic concern for others' welfare).

Schadenfreude or empathy? Children's emotional responses to the physical pain and pleasure of prosocial and antisocial others.

Adults' emotional reactions to the pain and pleasure of others are influenced by the moral character of those individuals. However, it remains unclear whether children's emotional responses also show such selectivity. To investigate this, we compared 4- to 8-year-old children's emotional responses to the physical pain and pleasure of prosocial versus antisocial puppets. In Study 1, children reported unhappiness after witnessing the pain of the prosocial and antisocial puppets but reported less unhappiness after witnessing the pain of the antisocial puppet. In Study 2, children reported happiness after witnessing the pleasure of both puppets but reported being less happy for the antisocial puppet. These results suggest that children are less likely to empathize with antisocial individuals. Meanwhile, children did not display Schadenfreude (pleasure at others' pain) or Gluckschmerz (displeasure at others' pleasure) toward antisocial individuals in our studies. Moreover, the selectivity of children's emotional responses disappeared after we manipulated the physical competence rather than the moral character of the puppets in Study 3. Our findings help to reveal the moral selectivity of emotional responses to others' pleasure and pain during early childhood.

What motivates early lies? Deception in 2½- to 5-year-olds.

What motivates young children to produce early lies? A total of 217 2½- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 44.5 months, SD = 8.45; 54% girls; 61.7% White) from the southeastern United States were tested using a modified third-party transgression paradigm to examine the motivation behind their deception. Children were assigned to one of three conditions-baseline, self-motivated, or other-motivated condition-and their propensity to lie was captured through both verbal and nonverbal measures. Results show that children's early lies are primarily driven by a self-serving motivation. However, the motivation to lie diversifies by 4 years of age, when children begin to lie for both self-serving and other-serving motivations.

Infant-parent attachment and lie-telling in young children: The Generation R Study.

Insecure-attached adults are more likely to lie. However, it is unknown whether infant-parent attachment quality relates to lie-telling in early childhood. As in adults, lie-telling in early childhood might be related to attachment insecurity. However, a competing hypothesis might be plausible; lie-telling might be related to attachment security given that lie-telling in early childhood is considered an advancement in social-cognitive development. The current study is the first to investigate the link between insecure/secure and disorganized/non-disorganized attachment and lie-telling behavior in early childhood. Because lie-telling is studied in the context of cheating behavior, the association between cheating and attachment is additionally explored. A total of 560 Dutch children (287 girls) from a longitudinal cohort study (Generation R) were included in the analyses. Attachment quality with primary caregiver (secure/insecure and disorganized/non-disorganized attachment) was assessed at 14 months of age in the Strange Situation Procedure, and cheating and lie-telling were observed in games administered at 4 years of age. The results demonstrated no relationship of attachment (in)security and (dis)organization with cheating and lie-telling. Results are interpreted in light of evidence that lie-telling in early childhood is part of normative development. Limitations are discussed, including the time lag between assessments, the fact that lie-telling was measured toward a researcher instead of a caregiver, and the conceptualization of attachment in infancy versus adulthood. Attachment quality does not affect early normative lie-telling, but how and when it may affect later lying in children remains to be explored.

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness.

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.

Self-control and cooperation in childhood as antecedents of less moral disengagement in adolescence.

Moral disengagement is a social cognition people use to engage in wrongdoings even when they know it is wrong. However, little is known about the antecedents that predict moral disengagement. The current study focuses on the development of self-control and cooperation during middle childhood as two antecedents of moral disengagement among 1,103 children (50% female; 77% White, 12% Black, 6% Hispanic, and 5% other). Children's self-control at age 8 and growth in self-control from age 8 to 11 were positively linked to adolescents seeing themselves as having self-control at age 15, which then predicted less moral disengagement at age 18. Children's cooperation at age 8 also was positively linked to adolescents' self-views of cooperation at age 15, which in turn, was associated with less moral disengagement at age 18. These findings demonstrate the potential of self-control and cooperation as intrapersonal and interpersonal strengths during middle childhood for mitigating moral disengagement 10 years later.

Children's moral reasoning about self- versus other-benefiting public health measures.

The COVID-19 pandemic has introduced novel public health measures such as masking and social distancing. In adults, framing these behaviors as benefiting others versus the self has been shown to affect people's perceptions of public health measures and willingness to comply. Here we asked whether self- versus other-oriented frames of novel public health measures influence children's endorsement and moral reasoning. Children aged 5 to 10 years viewed hypothetical dilemmas of aliens in which we manipulated the frame (other-oriented or self-oriented) of the prevention behavior and the severity (high or low) of the potential harm. Across two studies (Study 1: N = 48; Study 2: N = 61), results showed that across ages framing the behaviors as other-oriented, but not self-oriented, yielded more positive ratings of individuals who followed the public health measures and more negative ratings of those who did not. Across both frames, children generally endorsed these public health measures when the severity was high. Children used more moralizing concepts in other-oriented frames and were more critical of intentional transgressions over accidental transgressions, demonstrating further evidence that other-oriented frames induce moral reasoning. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these framing effects for sociomoral reasoning and action.

"But the poor needed it more": Children's judgments on procedural justice to allocate resources between two candidates equal in merit, different in need.

The current study investigated children's judgments on procedural justice and its outcomes when the candidates were equal in merit but different in need. A total of 88 children (41 girls and 47 boys) aged 7 to 11 years were individually interviewed (Mage = 8 years 9 months, SD = 14.065 months). Results showed that, regardless of age, children tended to give educational resources to the resource-poor candidates. However, children's welfare consideration of the resource-poor candidates increased with age. Children also made differentiated judgments based on the resource type and treated educational materials as more necessary than educational experiences. Children's age and socioeconomic status (SES) were associated with this differentiation. Younger and high-SES children were more likely to view the outcome of procedural justice (i.e., drawing a stick) for allocating an educational experience (i.e., summer camp) as fair when the result favored the resource-rich candidate. Overall, findings revealed that children do not use a unitary form of fairness in the procedural justice context. The shift from strict equality to welfare concerns continues to develop over middle childhood.

A cross-cultural comparison of the relation between children's moral standards of honesty and their lie-telling behavior.

This study examined the relation between children's moral standards of honesty and their lie-telling behavior and the role that culture plays in this relation. In the study, 6- to 12-year-old Chinese and Northern American (Canadian and American) children underwent a behavioral paradigm where they had the opportunity to tell a lie about their performance to gain a benefit. The children then read vignettes where a character told lies to conceal a transgression committed to satisfy either a need or a desire and evaluated those lies. Northern American children were less likely to lie with age, but Chinese children did not demonstrate this trend. Lie-telling rates were higher for Chinese children than for Northern American children, but children were overall unlikely to tell a lie about their performance. Chinese children evaluated the lies in the vignettes more negatively than Northern American children. Children's moral standards of honesty were related to their lie-telling behavior, and the relation between children's moral standards and behavior did not differ by age in either culture. Overall, results suggest that culture influences how children make moral evaluations and decisions related to lie-telling and support the notion that children's moral standards and behavior are related. These findings suggest that socialization plays a central role in children's moral decision making related to honesty through helping children to develop moral standards related to honesty.

Subverting parental overreach: Children endorse defiance and deception as legitimate modes of moral resistance and social opposition.

This research examined how children evaluate the legitimacy of various sorts of rules as well as children's reasoning about the legitimacy of covertly defying and lying to parents to resist those rules. We asked U.S. 6-, 8-, and 11-year-olds (N = 118) to assess seven hypothetical situations depicting comparably aged children engaged in defiance and deception to circumvent parents' prohibitions. The nature of parents' justifications for the prohibitions varied in terms of social-cognitive domain (moral, personal, prudential, pragmatic, or conventional). Evaluations and justifications for the legitimacy of parents' prohibitions and children's defiance and deception were examined, as were general evaluations of deception and parental authority. Across situations, increased age was associated with decreased acceptance of proscriptions and, in several situations, increased acceptance of defiance and deception. Children responded significantly differently to prohibitions by domain of norm. With age, children increasingly justified defiance and deception for reasons of personal autonomy. They also increasingly endorsed defiance and deception as moral obligations required to resist immoral norms. This research shows that children value parental authority, but not at the expense of their personal autonomy, and they value honesty but sometimes subordinate it to competing moral concerns.

The logic of universalization guides moral judgment.

To explain why an action is wrong, we sometimes say, "What if everybody did that?" In other words, even if a single person's behavior is harmless, that behavior may be wrong if it would be harmful once universalized. We formalize the process of universalization in a computational model, test its quantitative predictions in studies of human moral judgment, and distinguish it from alternative models. We show that adults spontaneously make moral judgments consistent with the logic of universalization, and report comparable patterns of judgment in children. We conclude that, alongside other well-characterized mechanisms of moral judgment, such as outcome-based and rule-based thinking, the logic of universalizing holds an important place in our moral minds.

Student and Teacher Views on Cheating in High School: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Decisions.

Why do so many adolescents cheat despite judging that cheating is wrong? Two studies tested a new model of cheating in high school. In Study 1, 85 high schoolers in the Western U.S. reported their perceptions, evaluations, and motivations surrounding their own and hypothetical cheating. In Study 2, 83 teachers reported their views about cheating; we also analyzed course syllabi. About half of the adolescents reported unintentional cheating, and many judged their own cheating-but not hypothetical cheating-as acceptable. Decisions to cheat were responses to competing pressures, low value placed on the assignment, and other considerations. Study 2 revealed teacher-student disagreements about cheating, and minimal content about academic integrity in syllabi. The findings supported the proposed model of adolescent cheating.

Dual process in parent-adolescent moral socialization: The moderating role of maternal warmth and involvement.

INTRODUCTION: It has been argued that moral identity can be conceptualized as implicit and automatic or explicit and controlled dualities of cognitive information processing. In this study, we examined whether socialization in the moral domain may also exhibit a dual process. We further tested whether parenting that is warm and involved may play a moderating role in moral socialization. We assessed relations between mothers' implicit and explicit moral identity, warmth and involvement, and the prosocial behavior and moral values of their adolescent children. METHODS: Participants were 105 mother-adolescent dyads from Canada, with adolescents between 12 and 15 years of age and 47% girls. Mothers' implicit moral identity was measured using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), adolescents' prosocial behavior was measured using a donation task, and the remaining mother and adolescent measures were self-reported. Data were cross-sectional. RESULTS: We found that mothers' implicit moral identity was associated with adolescents' greater generosity during the prosocial behavior task, but only when mothers were warm and involved. Mothers' explicit moral identity was associated with adolescents' more prosocial values. CONCLUSIONS: Moral socialization may occur through dual processes, and as an automatic process may only take place when mothers are also high in warmth and involvement, setting the conditions for adolescents' understanding and acceptance of the moral values being taught and ultimately their automatic morally relevant behaviors. Adolescents' explicit moral values, on the other hand, may be aligned with more controlled, reflective socialization processes.

How the COVID-19 pandemic affects the moral reasoning of pediatric residents and the general population.

BACKGROUND: Kohlberg's theory of moral development asserts that people progress through different stages of moral reasoning as their cognitive abilities and social interactions mature. Individuals at the lowest stage of moral reasoning (preconventional stage) judge moral issues based on self-interest, those with a medium stage (conventional stage) judge them based on compliance with rules and norms, and those at the highest stage (postconventional stage) judge moral issues based on universal principles and shared ideals. Upon attaining adulthood, it can be considered that there is stability in the stage of individuals' moral development; however, the effect of a global population crisis such as the one experienced in March 2020, when the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 pandemic, is unknown. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the changes in the moral reasoning of pediatric residents before and after one year of the COVID-19 pandemic and compare them with a general population group. METHODS: This is a naturalistic quasi-experimental study conducted with two groups, one comprised 47 pediatric residents of a tertiary hospital converted into a COVID hospital during the pandemic and another group comprised 47 beneficiaries of a family clinic who were not health workers. The defining issues test (DIT) was applied to the 94 participants during March 2020, before the pandemic initiated in Mexico, and later during March 2021. To assess intragroup changes, the McNemar-Bowker and Wilcoxon tests were used. RESULTS: Pediatric residents showed higher baseline stages of moral reasoning: 53% in the postconventional group compared to the general population group (7%). In the preconventional group, 23% were residents and 64% belonged to the general population. In the second measurement, one year after the start of the pandemic, the group of residents had a significant decrease of 13 points in the P index, unlike the general population group in which a decrease of 3 points was observed. This decrease however, did not equalize baseline stages. Pediatric residents remained 10 points higher than the general population group. Moral reasoning stages were associated with age and educational stage. CONCLUSIONS: After a year of the COVID-19 pandemic, we found a decrease in the stage of moral reasoning development in pediatric residents of a hospital converted for the care of patients with COVID-19, while it remained stable in the general population group. Physicians showed higher stages of moral reasoning at baseline than the general population.

Piagetian's principles on moral development and its influence on the oral hygiene practices of Indian children: An embedded mixed-method approach.

BACKGROUND: Moral principles in children can influence their oral hygiene practices and can be beneficial in providing better oral health care. AIM: To assess the consistency of Piaget's moral development principles in Indian children aged 7 to 11 years and evaluate its influence on their oral hygiene practices. DESIGN: The first phase of the embedded mixed-method approach included telephone interviews of 50 children on eight situations of moral development as suggested by Jean Piaget. Children were categorised into heteronomous and autonomous moralities based on the content analysis. The second phase of the study included a semi-structured qualitative interview on knowledge and practice behaviour of children on oral hygiene maintenance. RESULTS: There was no significant difference in the overall moral development of children aged 7 to 9 years and 9 to 11 years (p = .57). Only 4.8% of girls had heteronomous morality, and a significant difference was noted between boys and girls (p = .014). There was a significant difference in the oral hygiene practices observed between heteronomous morality and autonomous morality children. CONCLUSION: Children were autonomous in their morality at 7 to 9 years of age. Children with autonomous morality performed better oral hygiene practices than children with heteronomous morality.

Empathy and ethical sensitivity among intensive and critical care nurses: A path analysis.

BACKGROUND: Intensive and critical care nurses need to demonstrate ethical sensitivity especially in recognizing and dealing with ethical dilemmas particularly as they often care for patients living with life-threatening conditions. Theories suggest that there is a convergence between nurses' empathy and ethical sensitivity. Evidence in the literature indicates that nurses' emotional, demographic, and work characteristics are associated with their level of empathy and ethical sensitivity. AIM: To investigate the relationship between nurses' empathy and ethical sensitivity, considering their emotional states (depression, anxiety, and stress), demographic and work characteristics, and test an empirical model describing potential predictors of empathy (as a mediator) and ethical sensitivity using path analysis. RESEARCH DESIGN: Using a cross-sectional design, the philosophical theory of care ethics and empathy was extended and adopted as a conceptual framework for this study and tested by path analysis. PARTICIPANTS AND RESEARCH CONTEXT: Data were collected from 347 intensive care nurses recruited by ten educational-medical hospitals in Iran using a questionnaire between February and March 2021. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: The study was reviewed by the Ethical Advisory Board in Iran and conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki. FINDINGS: Study participants demonstrated a mild level of stress, anxiety, and depression, alongside a relatively high level of empathy and ethical sensitivity. Nurses with good socioeconomic status had higher empathetic behavior with patients than those with weak status. Nurses aged over 40 who had received ethics training and had higher work experience were associated with higher ethical sensitivity compared to nurses under 20 years of age. Empathy directly affected ethical sensitivity; however, anxiety had an indirect effect on ethical sensitivity through empathy. Among demographic factors, age had a positive direct effect on ethical sensitivity. CONCLUSIONS: Less anxiety and a high level of empathy contribute to higher levels of ethical sensitivity among intensive and critical care nurses.

From distress to detachment: exploring how providing care for stigmatized patients influences the moral development of medical trainees.

In acute hospital settings, medical trainees are often confronted with moral challenges and negative emotions when caring for complex and structurally vulnerable patients. These challenges may influence the long term moral development of medical trainees and have significant implications for future clinical practice. Despite the importance of moral development to medical education, the topic is still relatively under-explored. To gain a deeper understanding of moral development in trainees, we conducted a qualitative exploration of how caring for a stigmatized population influences their moral development. Data were collected from 48 medical trainees, including observational field notes, supplemental interviews, and medical documentation from inpatient units of two urban teaching hospitals in a Canadian context. Utilizing a practice-based approach which draws on constructivist grounded theory, we conducted constant comparative coding and analysis. We found that caring for stigmatized populations appeared to trigger frustration in medical trainees, which often perpetuated feelings of futility as well as avoidance behaviours. Additionally, hospital policies, the physical learning environment, variability in supervisory practices, and perceptions of judgment and mistrust all negatively influenced moral development and contributed to apathy and moral detachment which has implications for the future. Recognizing the dynamic and uncertain nature of care for stigmatized patients, and addressing the influence of structural and material factors provide an opportunity to support moral experiences within clinical training, and to improve inequities.

Disagreement, justification, and equitable moral judgments: A brief training study.

Although theorists agree that social interactions play a major role in moral development, previous research has not experimentally assessed how specific features of social interactions affect children's moral judgments and reasoning. The current study assessed two features: disagreement and justification. In a brief training phase, children aged 4-5.5 years (N = 129) discussed simple moral scenarios about issues of fairness (how to allocate things between individuals) with a puppet who, in a between-participants factorial design, either agreed or disagreed with the children's ideas and either asked or did not ask the children to justify their ideas. Children then responded to another set of moral scenarios in a test phase that was the same for all children. Children in the "agree and do not justify" baseline condition showed an inflexible equality bias (preferring only equal allocations regardless of context), but children who had experiences of disagreement or experiences of being asked to justify themselves shifted toward making equitable decisions based on common ground norms and values. Furthermore, false belief competence was related to children's decisions and justifications. These findings support the classic Piagetian hypothesis that social interactions are a catalyst of cognitive disequilibrium and moral development.

Children's cost-benefit assessment of lies across three cultures.

We examined 4- to 11-year-old children's evaluation of six types of lies arranged along a cost-benefit assessment scale factoring both the lie teller and the lie recipient. Children were from three distinct cultural environments: rural Samoa (n = 99), urban China (n = 49), and urban United States (n = 109). Following the simple script of six different stories involving a lie teller and a lie recipient, children were asked to evaluate the character who lied and whether it deserved reward or punishment using a child-friendly Likert scale. From the age when children produce both antisocial and prosocial lies, our results show that their evaluation of lies rests on a cost-benefit analysis of both the lie teller and the lie recipient. Such analysis varies depending on age, type of lie, and the child's cultural environment. In general, Samoan children tended to rate lies more negatively, and they were less differential in their evaluation of the different types of lies compared with both Chinese and U.S. children. We interpret these results as reflecting the differences across cultures in explicit moral teaching and children's relative experience in resource allocation.

Preschoolers learn new moral and conventional norms from direct experiences.

By observing others, children can learn about different types of norms, including moral norms rooted in concerns for welfare and rights, and social conventions based on directives from authority figures or social consensus. Two experiments examined how preschoolers and adults constructed and applied knowledge about novel moral and conventional norms from their direct social experiences. Participants watched a video of a novel prohibited action that caused pain to a victim (moral conditions) or a sound from a box (conventional conditions). Next, they saw a transgressor puppet, who had either watched the video alongside participants or not, engage in the prohibited action. Preschoolers and adults rapidly constructed distinct moral and conventional evaluations about the novel actions. These distinctions were evident across several response modalities that have often been studied separately, including judgments, reasoning, and actions. However, children did not reliably track the puppet's knowledge of the novel norms. These studies provide experimental support for the idea that children and adults construct distinct moral and conventional norms from social experiences, which in turn guide judgments, reasoning, and behavior.