Similar or dissimilar? Influence of similarity between distraction tasks and target tasks on unconscious thought.

Distraction tasks are known to affect the unconscious-thought (UT) effect. However, the relationship between two task types, namely distraction and target tasks, and their effect on UT effect have not been examined in previous studies. In this study, we assessed whether simultaneously performing dissimilar distraction and target tasks are beneficial to information processing by UT. In Experiment 1, the target task was an Alternate Use Task (speech task). For the similar-task test, the UT group was assigned the speech 1-back task (speech task) as the distraction task; for the dissimilar-task test, the UT group was assigned the spatial 1-back task (spatial task) as the distraction task. The results of the experiment revealed that under dissimilar tasks, the UT group not only provided more answers but also provided answers that were more novel. For Experiment 2, the target task was changed to Creative Mental Synthesis Task (spatial task) to replicate the results of Experiment 1. The results demonstrated that the dissimilarity between the distraction and target tasks facilitates the UT.

Unconscious versus conscious thought in creative science problem finding: Unconscious thought showed no advantage!

Unconscious thought theory (UTT) suggests that creativity benefits more from unconscious thought than conscious thought. However, previous studies have only focused on creative problem solving. This study aims to explore the effect of unconscious thought and conscious thought in creative science problem finding (CSPF). The ability of CSPF was measured by fluency, flexibility and originality. Participants accomplished the CSPF task after 3 min of distraction, during which unconscious thought was supposed to take place, or after 3 min of conscious thought. Results showed that unconscious thought had no advantage over conscious thought on CSPF. For the CSPF task with open instructions, conscious thought was comparable to unconscious thought in fluency, flexibility and originality. What's more, for the CSPF task with closed instructions, unconscious thought was even overtaken by conscious thought in fluency, flexibility and originality. These findings extend the unconscious thought theory and provide practical guidance on how to propose a creative science problem.

The tendency of unconscious thought toward global processing style.

This study explored whether unconscious thought has a tendency to process information globally. In three experiments, a Navon task was used to activate global or local processing styles. Findings showed that in the unconscious-thought groups, those performing the local Navon task presented a poorer decision-making performance when compared to those performing the global Navon task (Experiment 1); participants reported that their judgments were made based on partial attributes (Experiment 2), and evaluated a target individual mainly based on information consistent with stereotypes (Experiment 3). These results showed that when presented with distracter tasks, conscious thought activates local processing, which impairs its ability to process information globally. However, this impairment would not happen if global processing were activated instead. This study provides support to the idea that unconscious thought has a tendency to process information globally.

Information presentation format moderates the unconscious-thought effect: The role of recollection.

The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision-making. In two experiments using the unconscious-thought paradigm, we investigated the effect of presentation format of decision information (i) on memory for decision-relevant information and (ii) on the quality of decisions made after distraction, conscious deliberation or immediately. We used the process-dissociation procedure to measure recollection and familiarity. The two studies showed that presenting information blocked per criterion led participants to recollect more decision-relevant details compared to a presentation by option. Moreover, a Bayesian meta-analysis of the two studies provided strong evidence that conscious deliberation resulted in better decisions when the information was presented blocked per criterion and substantial evidence that distraction improved decision quality when the information was presented blocked per option. Finally, Study 2 revealed that the recollection of decision-relevant details mediated the effect of presentation format on decision quality in the deliberation condition. This suggests that recollection contributes to conscious deliberation efficacy.

Cognitive style modulates conscious but not unconscious thought: Comparing the deliberation-without-attention effect in analytics and wholists.

Unconscious thought theory (UTT) suggests that conscious thinking is less effective in complex decision-making than unconscious thinking. However, little research has taken individual differences (e.g., cognitive style) into account. Using an adapted UTT paradigm, the present study compared the performances of individuals with a wholist or an analytic cognitive style in both conscious and unconscious thought conditions. After viewing information regarding four hypothetical phones, participants in the conscious thought condition deliberated for three minutes before rating the phones, while participants in the unconscious thought condition were distracted with a 2-back task for three minutes before rating. The results showed that wholists were equally good at differentiating good and bad phones after conscious or unconscious thought, whereas analytics performed well only when thinking unconsciously. The modulation effect of cognitive style appeared only in conscious thought. Implications for UTT and the understanding of cognitive style are discussed.

Thinking in Black and White: Conscious thought increases racially biased judgments through biased face memory.

It is a common research finding that conscious thought helps people to avoid racial discrimination. These three experiments, however, illustrate that conscious thought may increase biased face memory, which leads to increased judgment bias (i.e., preferring White to Black individuals). In Experiments 1 and 2, university students formed impressions of Black and White housemate candidates. They judged the candidates either immediately (immediate decision condition), thought about their judgments for a few minutes (conscious thought condition), or performed an unrelated task for a few minutes (unconscious thought condition). Conscious thinkers and immediate decision-makers showed a stronger face memory bias than unconscious thinkers, and this mediated increased judgment bias, although not all results were significant. Experiment 3 used a new, different paradigm and showed that a Black male was remembered as darker after a period of conscious thought than after a period of unconscious thought. Implications for racial prejudice are discussed.

Can unconscious thought detect relational similarities?

One of the core principles of unconscious thought theory is the bottom-up-versus-top-down principle. However, previous studies on bottom-up-versus-top-down processes focused mainly on surface similarities, and there is a lack of studies based on relational similarity. Therefore, the present study intended to examine whether unconscious thought is capable of detecting relational similarities. In two experiments, the participants were presented with three stories. One of the test stories shared surface similarity with the base story, while the other shared relational similarity with it. The results indicated that the unconscious thought group was more likely to select the story with relational similarity, while the conscious thought and immediate decision groups were more likely to select the story with surface similarity. These findings suggest that unconscious thought can detect relational similarities, thus supporting the bottom-up-versus-top-down principle.

Bias or equality? Unconscious thought equally integrates temporally scattered information.

In previous experiments on unconscious thought, information was presented to participants in one continuous session; however, in daily life, information is delivered in a temporally partitioned way. We examined whether unconscious thought could equally integrate temporally scattered information when making overall evaluations. When presenting participants with information in two temporally partitioned sessions, participants' overall evaluation was based on neither the information in the first session (Experiment 1) nor that in the second session (Experiment 2); instead, information in both sessions were equally integrated to reach a final judgment. Conscious thought, however, overemphasized information in the second session. Experiments 3 and 4 further ruled out possible influencing factors including differences in the distributions of positive/negative attributes in the first and second sessions and on-line judgment. These findings suggested that unconscious thought can integrate information from a wider range of periods during an evaluation, while conscious thought cannot.

Gist memory in the unconscious-thought effect.

The unconscious-thought effect (UTE) occurs when people are better able to make complex decisions after a period of distraction rather than immediately or after a period of conscious deliberation. This finding has often been interpreted as evidence of unconscious thinking. In two experiments, we provided the first evidence that the UTE is accompanied by enhanced memory for the gist of decision-relevant attributes and demonstrated that the cognitive demands of a distraction task moderate its effect on decision making and gist memory. It was only following a low-demand distraction task that participants chose the best alternative more often and displayed enhanced gist memory for decision-relevant attributes. These findings suggest that the UTE occurs only if cognitive resources are available and that it is accompanied by enhanced organization of information in memory, as shown by the increase in gist memory.

Making Appropriate New Choices Through Unconscious Thought Based on New Goals.

This research examines whether appropriate choices can be made based on a new goal through unconscious thought. The experimental materials are four mobile phones, one suitable for older adults and the other for younger people. The results of Experiment 1 show that when the goal was changed from judging whether a mobile phone is suitable for older adults to judging whether it is suitable for younger people, the scores of the participants in the unconscious thought group-that mobile phones are objectively suitable for older adults-were significantly higher than those for the group which thought that mobile phones are objectively suitable for young people. In Experiment 2, the immediate decision-making group was added, which ruled out the possibility that the participants had already made a choice during the information presentation process. The results of this study show that unconscious thought can make appropriate new choices based on new goals.

A Fresh Look at the Unconscious Thought Effect: Using Mind-Wandering Measures to Investigate Thought Processes in Decision Problems With High Information Load.

Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis, 2004) states that thinking about a complex problem unconsciously can result in better solutions than conscious deliberation. We take a fresh look at the cognitive processes underlying "unconscious" thought by analyzing data of 822 participants who worked on a complex apartment-evaluation task in three experiments. This task's information-presentation and evaluation parts were separated by different kinds of filler-interval activities, which corresponded to standard conscious-thought and unconscious-thought manipulations. Employing experience-sampling methods, we obtained thought reports during and after filler-interval engagement. Evidence concerning the existence of the Unconscious Thought Effect was mixed, with such an effect being present in the first two experiments only. In these experiments, we further found less problem deliberation to be associated with better performance on the apartment task. Interestingly, this benefit disappeared when we probed participants' thoughts during the filler interval. We suggested that explicit thought awareness diminishes the Unconscious Thought Effect.

Performance and Material-Dependent Holistic Representation of Unconscious Thought: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study.

Psychological research has demonstrated that humans can think unconsciously. Unconscious thought (UT) refers to cognitive or affective decision-related processes that occur beyond conscious awareness. UT processes are considered more effective in complex decision-making than conscious thought (CT). In addition, holistic representation plays a key role in UT and consists of a multimodal, value-related cognitive process. While the neural correlates of UT have recently been investigated, the holistic representation hypothesis of UT has not been confirmed. Therefore, in the present study, we aimed to further evaluate this hypothesis by utilizing two UT tasks (person and consumer-product evaluations) in conjunction with an improved functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experimental protocol. Participants evaluated four alternatives with 12 attributes each. In the UT condition, once the decision information had been presented, the participants completed a 1-back task for 120 s and evaluated each alternative, as well as an independent 1-back task in the absence of any decision information. We then performed regression analysis of the UT performance in both tasks. Our results revealed a positive correlation between performance in the UT task and the use of the anterior part of the precuneus/paracentral lobule in the person evaluation task and between performance and the posterior part of the precuneus, postcentral gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, and superior parietal lobule in the consumer-product evaluation task. The involvement of the precuneus area in both tasks was indicative of a multimodal, value-related process and is consistent with the features of holistic representation, supporting a central role for holistic representation in UT. Furthermore, the involvement of different precuneus subregions in the two UT tasks may reflect the task dependency of the key representation critical for advantageous UT.

Do Not Think Carefully? Re-examining the Effect of Unconscious Thought on Deception Detection.

Several recent studies have examined the effect of unconscious thinking on deception detection with the hypothesis that unconscious thought increases the ability to discriminate between truth and deception, but these studies yielded conflicting results. The present study aimed to re-examine the effect of unconscious thinking and extend it by adopting both verbal and non-verbal/paraverbal stimuli. We hypothesized that unconscious thought leads to a higher accuracy rate than immediate decision and conscious thought when judging non-verbal/paraverbal stimuli, but not when judging verbal stimuli. In Study 1, we compared unconscious thought with immediate decision by using both video and audio stimuli. In Study 2, we compared unconscious thought with conscious thought by using both video and text stimuli. The results showed that when detecting deception vs. truth, (1) unconscious thought was not better than immediate decision on deception detection in both audio and video conditions (Study 1), and (2) unconscious thought was not better than conscious thought in both video and text conditions (Study 2). The Bayes factor of both studies also showed substantial evidence for null hypothesis (H0) relative to alternative hypothesis (H1). The implications and limitations of the present study are discussed.

Similar Effects for Resting State and Unconscious Thought: Both Solve Multi-attribute Choices Better Than Conscious Thought.

When people have headaches, they put their work aside and do other things. When they return, their decisions may be better, resulting in more satisfaction than if they had contemplated their choices consciously. Researchers have proposed the "deliberation-without-attention" hypothesis to discover whether it is always advantageous to engage in conscious deliberation before making a choice. Unconscious thinking can optimize people's behavioral decision-making in a complex environment and improve their satisfaction with their choices. As previous studies have not used a resting state (RS), another kind of unconscious thinking, this paper adds the RS to unconscious thinking during distracting tasks, unconscious and conscious joint thinking, and conscious thinking conditions, to study the unconscious thought effect and decision-making performance in four different thinking modes. We performed three experiments involving a choice of jobs, using two ways of presenting information, to check the unconscious effect and compare the decision-making performance of different thinking patterns. The results show that RS and unconscious thinking have similar effects, while people's decision-making performance differs in different thinking modes.

Not Merely Experiential: Unconscious Thought Can Be Rational.

Individuals often form more reasonable judgments from complex information after a period of distraction vs. deliberation. This phenomenon has been attributed to sophisticated unconscious thought during the distraction period that integrates and organizes the information (Unconscious Thought Theory; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Yet, other research suggests that experiential processes are strengthened during the distraction (relative to deliberation) period, accounting for the judgment and decision benefit. We tested between these possibilities, hypothesizing that unconscious thought is distinct from experiential processes, and independently contributes to judgments and decisions during a distraction period. Using an established paradigm, Experiment 1 (N = 319) randomly induced participants into an experiential or rational mindset, after which participants received complex information describing three roommates to then consider consciously (i.e., deliberation) or unconsciously (i.e., distraction). Results revealed superior roommate judgments (but not choices) following distraction vs. deliberation, consistent with Unconscious Thought Theory. Mindset did not have an influence on roommate judgments. However, planned tests revealed a significant advantage of distraction only within the rational-mindset condition, which is contrary to the idea that experiential processing alone facilitates complex decision-making during periods of distraction. In a second experiment (N = 136), we tested whether effects of unconscious thought manifest for a complex analytical reasoning task for which experiential processing would offer no advantage. As predicted, participants in an unconscious thought condition outperformed participants in a control condition, suggesting that unconscious thought can be analytical. In sum, the current results support the existence of unconscious thinking processes that are distinct from experiential processes, and can be rational. Thus, the experiential vs. rational nature of a process might not cleanly delineate conscious and unconscious thought.

Can Medical Diagnosis Benefit from "Unconscious Thought"?

The unconscious thought theory argues that making complex decisions after a period of distraction can lead to better decision quality than deciding either immediately or after conscious deliberation. Two studies have tested this unconscious thought effect (UTE) in clinical diagnosis with conflicting results. The studies used different methodologies and had methodological weaknesses. We attempted to replicate the UTE in medical diagnosis by providing favorable conditions for the effect while maintaining ecological validity. Family physicians (N= 116) diagnosed 3 complex cases in 1 of 3 thinking modes: immediate, unconscious (UT), and conscious (CT). Cases were divided into short sentences, which were presented briefly and sequentially on computer. After each case presentation, the immediate response group gave a diagnosis, the UT group performed a 2-back distraction task for 3 min before giving a diagnosis, and the CT group could take as long as necessary before giving a diagnosis. We found no differences in diagnostic accuracy between groups (P= 0.95). The CT group took a median of 7 s to diagnose, which suggests that physicians were able to diagnose "online," as information was being presented. The lack of a difference between the immediate and UT groups suggests that the distraction had no additional effect on performance. To assess the decisiveness of the evidence of this null result, we computed a Bayes factor (BF01) for the 2 comparisons of interest. We found a BF01of 5.76 for the UT versus immediate comparison and of 3.61 for the UT versus CT comparison. Both BFs provide substantial evidence in favor of the null hypothesis: physicians' diagnoses made after distraction are no better than diagnoses made either immediately or after self-paced deliberation.

Differential impact of affective and cognitive attributes on preference under deliberation and distraction.

Two experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that affective information looms relatively larger than cognitive information when individuals are distracted for a period of time compared to when they engage in deliberative thinking. In two studies, participants were presented with information about 4 decision alternatives: An affective alternative that scored high on affective attributes but low on cognitive attributes, a cognitive alternative with the opposite trade-off, and two fillers. They were then asked to indicate their attitudes toward each of four decision alternatives either immediately, after a period of deliberation, or after a period of distraction. The results of both experiments demonstrated that participants significantly preferred the affective alternative to the cognitive alternative after distraction, but not after deliberation. The implications for understanding when and how unconscious thought may lead to better decisions are being discussed.

Can lies be detected unconsciously?

People are typically poor at telling apart truthful and deceptive statements. Based on the Unconscious Thought Theory, it has been suggested that poor lie detection arises from the intrinsic limitations of conscious thinking and can be improved by facilitating the contribution of unconscious thought (UT). In support of this hypothesis, Reinhard et al. (2013) observed improved lie detection among participants engaging in UT. The present study aimed to replicate this UT advantage using a similar experimental procedure but with an important improvement in a key control condition. Specifically, participants judged the truthfulness of eight video recordings in three thinking modes: immediately after watching them or after a period of unconscious or conscious deliberation. Results from two experiments (combined N = 226) failed to reveal a significant difference in lie detection accuracy between the thinking modes, even after efforts were made to facilitate the occurrence of an UT advantage in Experiment 2. The results imply that the UT advantage in deception detection is not a robust phenomenon.

A critical review and meta-analysis of the unconscious thought effect in medical decision making.

Based on research on the increasingly popular unconscious thought effect (UTE), it has been suggested that physicians might make better diagnostic decisions after a period of distraction than after an equivalent amount of time of conscious deliberation. However, published attempts to demonstrate the UTE in medical decision making have yielded inconsistent results. In the present study, we report the results of a meta-analysis of all the available evidence on the UTE in medical decisions made by expert and novice clinicians. The meta-analysis failed to find a significant contribution of unconscious thought (UT) to the accuracy of medical decisions. This result cannot be easily attributed to any of the potential moderators of the UTE that have been discussed in the literature. Furthermore, a Bayes factor analysis shows that most experimental conditions provide positive support for the null hypothesis, suggesting that these null results do not reflect a simple lack of statistical power. We suggest ways in which new studies could usefully provide further evidence on the UTE. Unless future research shows otherwise, the recommendation of using UT to improve medical decisions lacks empirical support.