Health burden and attributable economic damage of conflict and terrorism in the Eastern Mediterranean Region.

This study aimed to vividly describe the direct and severe health impacts of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) using data from the Global Burden of Disease (GBD). It also sought to quantify the staggering portion of economic damage attributable to the health burden of conflict and terrorism. From 1990 to 2019, the region endured the devastating effects of conflict and terrorism. These circumstances led to 64%, 50%, and 35% of all causes of Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) in Libya, Syria, and Palestine, respectively, in 2011, 2016, and 2008. These figures represent not just statistics but the profound human cost of these conflicts. The health-related economic burden (HEB) due to conflict was estimated at $4.6 billion in Iraq, $3.7 billion in Afghanistan, and $1.7 billion in Libya in current international dollars. However, due to missing data, the HEB could not be calculated for Yemen and Syria despite significant conflict-related DALYs. In 2019, the HEB to Current Health Expenditure (CHE) ratio, which indicates the proportion of the health-related economic burden compared to health expenditure, was 30% in Afghanistan and 25% in Iraq. This high ratio underscores the significant strain that conflict places on the health systems.

Climate change and the opportunity cost of conflict.

A growing empirical literature associates climate anomalies with increased risk of violent conflict. This association has been portrayed as a bellwether of future societal instability as the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events are predicted to increase. This paper investigates the theoretical foundation of this claim. A seminal microeconomic model of opportunity costs-a mechanism often thought to drive climate-conflict relationships-is extended by considering realistic changes in the distribution of climate-dependent agricultural income. Results advise caution in using empirical associations between short-run climate anomalies and conflicts to predict the effect of sustained shifts in climate regimes: Although war occurs in bad years, conflict may decrease if agents expect more frequent bad years. Theory suggests a nonmonotonic relation between climate variability and conflict that emerges as agents adapt and adjust their behavior to the new income distribution. We identify 3 measurable statistics of the income distribution that are each unambiguously associated with conflict likelihood. Jointly, these statistics offer a unique signature to distinguish opportunity costs from competing mechanisms that may relate climate anomalies to conflict.

Food Security, Conflict, and COVID-19: Perspective from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, a country challenged by war and conflicts, has been in a state of turmoil for several years. The prolonged suffering has brought many challenges to the country's inhabitants. Among these, food security is one important cause for concern. Food security occurs when people continuously have physical and economic access to adequate, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary requirements and food preferences for a functional and healthy life. Amid the pandemic, Afghanistan has witnessed a large increase in food shortages due to its dependence on neighboring countries. In light of current circumstances, food insecurity, coupled with political instability and the third wave of the COVID-19, have made it extremely hard for people to access daily provisions. Hence, people are left to navigate the COVID-19 pandemic with economic recession and poverty as the backdrop of the other health crises. To mitigate food security, international attempts are the required at this critical juncture. The aim of this article is to understand the causes leading to food insecurity and its implications in Afghanistan and to propose solutions that will improve the overall food security at the policy and implementation levels.

Oil, Gas and Conflict: A Mathematical Model for the Resource Curse.

Oil and natural gas are highly valuable natural resources, but many countries with large untapped reserves suffer from poor economic and social-welfare performance. This conundrum is known as the resource curse. The resource curse is a result of poor governance and wealth distribution structures that allow the elite to monopolize resources for self-gain. When rival social groups compete for natural resources, civil unrest soon follows. While conceptually easy to follow, there have been few formal attempts to study this phenomenon. Thus, we develop a mathematical model that captures the basic elements and dynamics of this dilemma. We show that when resources are monopolized by the elite, increased exportation leads to decreased domestic production. This is due to under-provision of the resource-embedded energy and industrial infrastructure. Decreased domestic production then lowers the marginal return on productive activities, and insurgency emerges. The resultant conflict further displaces human, built, and natural capital. It forces the economy into a vicious downward spiral. Our numerical results highlight the importance of governance reform and productivity growth in reducing oil-and-gas-related conflicts, and thus identify potential points of intervention to break the downward spiral.