SARS-CoV-2 inactivation in laboratory animal tissues with 4% formaldehyde or 5% glutaraldehyde for transfer to biosafety level 1 laboratories.

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic required the immediate need to transfer inactivated tissue from biosafety level (BSL)-3 to BSL-1 areas to enable downstream analytical methods. No validated SARS-CoV-2 inactivation protocols were available for either formaldehyde (FA)-fixed or glutaraldehyde (GA)-fixed tissues. Therefore, representative tissue from ferrets and hamsters was spiked with 2.2 × 106 tissue culture infectious dose 50% per ml (TCID50/ml) SARS-CoV-2 or were obtained from mice experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2. SARS-CoV-2 inactivation was demonstrated with 4% FA or 5% GA at room temperature for 72 hours by a titer reduction of up to 103.8 TCID50/ml in different animal tissues with a maximum protein content of 100 µg/mg and a thickness of up to 10 mm for FA and 8 mm for GA. Our protocols can be easily adapted for validating the inactivation of other pathogens to allow for the transfer of biological samples from BSL-3 areas to BSL-1 laboratories.

Preventing contamination of PCR-based multiplex assays including the use of a dedicated biosafety cabinet.

We retrospectively investigated cases of false-positive diagnoses using the BIOFIRE® FilmArray® meningitis/encephalitis (ME) panel to measure the impact of using a dedicated biosafety cabinet combined with preventive measures to reduce the prevalence of false-positive diagnoses due to pre-analytical in-laboratory contamination. False-positive results were identified by reviewing clinical data, biological parameters and cytology results of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples showing discrepant results between the FilmArray ME panel and routine PCR assays. A total of 327 CSF were analysed over 16 weeks in point-of-care (POC) A and B, over two 8-week periods, periods 1 and 2. The analysis yielded 30 (9·17%) detection of at least one pathogen including 21/30 (70%) viruses and 9/30 (30%) bacteria. During period 1, POC-A and POC-B manipulated CSF under a non-dedicated hood featuring laminar flow, whereas during period 2, CSFs were manipulated under a dedicated biosafety cabinet without any airflow in POC-A. During period 1, false positives were detected in 3/114 CSF (2·63%) in POC-A and 1/36 (2·77%) in POC-B (P = 0·97); during period 2, false positives were detected in 0/139 CSF (0%) in POC-A and 1/38 (2·63%) in POC-B (P = 0·23). All false positives were bacterial. The use of a dedicated cabinet without ventilation along with preventive measures during period 2 in POC-A significantly reduced the number of false-positive results (P = 0·05). Preventive measures described in this study can mitigate false positives when using PCR-based multiplex assays such as the BIOFIRE FilmArray ME Panel for the diagnosis of meningitis and other infectious diseases.

Costs and Benefits of Alternative Strategies to Control the Spread of Livestock-Acquired Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus From Pig Production.

BACKGROUND: Livestock-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (LA-MRSA) is a concern in healthcare and a political priority in some countries. OBJECTIVE: This study investigates the net societal costs of 2 alternative strategies for controlling LA-MRSA in Denmark: (1) eradicating LA-MRSA in all pig housing units, and (2) containing LA-MRSA within the units. METHODS: Benefits and costs are considered for affected economic sectors: healthcare, pig production, pig-related industries, and public administration. RESULTS: The cost to society of eradication is estimated at €2.3 to €2.5 billion (present value). Containment will cost €55 to €93 million. For both strategies, the main cost lies in primary pig production-for containment this is mainly due to establishing and operating anterooms and shower rooms, and for eradication it is due to production losses, loss of genetic resources, and costs of cleaning and disinfection. CONCLUSION: Compared with these costs, health economic benefits are moderate for both strategies. Containment is superior to eradication when measured by a benefit-cost ratio.

Biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary laboratories.

With recent outbreaks of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), anthrax, Nipah and the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, much emphasis has been placed on the rapid identification of infectious agents globally. As a result, laboratories are building capacity, conducting more advanced and sophisticated research, increasing their staff, and establishing reference collections of dangerous pathogens in an attempt to reduce the impact of infectious disease outbreaks and to characterise disease-causing agents. With this expansion, the global laboratory community has started to focus on laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in order to prevent the accidental and/or intentional release of these agents. Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity systems are used around the world to help to mitigate the risks posed by dangerous pathogens in the laboratory. Veterinary laboratories carry unique responsibilities with regard to workers and communities to handle disease-causing microorganisms safely and securely. Many microorganisms studied in veterinary laboratories not only infect animals, but also have the potential to infect humans. This paper will discuss the fundamentals of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity.

Suite aux nombreux foyers récents dus à divers agents pathogènes (coronavirus responsable du syndrome respiratoire du Moyen-Orient [MERS-CoV], agent de la fièvre charbonneuse, virus Nipah, virus de l'influenza aviaire hautement pathogène), la nécessité d'identifier rapidement les agents pathogènes en n'importe quel endroit de la planète est désormais au centre des préoccupations. Par conséquent, les efforts des laboratoires sont axés sur le renforcement des capacités, la conduite de travaux de recherche de pointe de plus en plus spécialisés, l'accroissement des effectifs et l'élaboration de référentiels d'agents pathogènes dangereux dans le but de réduire l'impact des foyers de maladies infectieuses et de caractériser les agents responsables de ces maladies. Dans ce contexte d'activité accrue, le réseau international des laboratoires a commencé à accorder une grande importance aux questions de biosûreté et de biosécurité afin de se prémunir contre le risque de libération accidentelle et/ou délibérée de ces agents pathogènes. Les systèmes de biosécurité et de biosûreté sont appliqués dans le monde entier pour contribuer à l'atténuation des risques liés aux agents pathogènes dangereux détenus par les laboratoires. Les laboratoires vétérinaires ont à l'égard de leur personnel et de la société tout entière la responsabilité majeure de garantir la sécurité et la sûreté de la manipulation des microorganismes pathogènes. En plus d'infecter les animaux, nombre des microorganismes analysés dans les laboratoires vétérinaires ont également un potentiel zoonotique. Les auteurs examinent les aspects essentiels de la biosécurité et de la biosûreté au laboratoire.

Los recientes brotes de coronavirus del síndrome respiratorio de Oriente Medio (MERS-CoV), carbunco bacteridiano, virus de Nipah y virus de la influenza aviar altamente patógena han llevado a hacer especial hincapié en la rápida identificación de agentes infecciosos a escala mundial. Obrando en consecuencia, los laboratorios están dotándose de medios de acción, llevando a cabo investigaciones más avanzadas y sofisticadas, reforzando su plantilla y creando colecciones de referencia de patógenos peligrosos con la voluntad de reducir los efectos de los brotes infecciosos y caracterizar a los agentes patógenos. Al mismo tiempo, en todo el mundo los profesionales del ramo han empezado a prestar atención a la seguridad y la protección biológicas en el laboratorio, con el fin de prevenir toda liberación accidental y/o deliberada de los mencionados agentes. Los laboratorios del mundo entero emplean sistemas de seguridad y protección biológicas como elemento auxiliar para reducir los riesgos derivados de la presencia de patógenos peligrosos en sus instalaciones. Los laboratorios veterinarios tienen una especial responsabilidad para con los trabajadores y las poblaciones por lo que respecta a la manipulación de microorganismos patógenos en las debidas condiciones de seguridad y protección. Muchos de los microorganismos estudiados en los laboratorios veterinarios infectan no solo a los animales, sino también, en potencia, al ser humano. Los autores examinan los aspectos fundamentales de la seguridad y la protección biológicas en laboratorio.

Characteristics of dairy calf ranches: morbidity, mortality, antibiotic use practices, and biosecurity and biocontainment practices.

The utilization of farming operations specializing in rearing dairy heifer calves has increased since the early 1990s. However, these operations have not been as well characterized as US dairy operations with respect to demographic and health-related measures, particularly during the preweaning period. The objective of this study was to characterize morbidity, mortality, antibiotic use, and biosecurity and biocontainment practices on operations rearing preweaned heifers only or preweaned heifer and bull calves (mixed) in the United States. A cross-sectional survey was performed using a standardized method that included a preletter, initial survey, postcard follow-up, and second survey delivered by mail. Additional follow-up contacts were attempted by telephone. Descriptive statistics for morbidity, mortality, antibiotic use, and biosecurity and biocontainment practices were computed at both the operation and calf levels. The overall response rate was 50%. Crude yearly mortality averaged 6.9% at the calf level, with the median operation reporting 3.6% mortality. Diarrhea was experienced by 18% of calves, with 73% receiving an antibiotic. The median operation reported 20% diarrhea morbidity with 83% receiving an antibiotic. Respiratory disease was experienced by 9.0% of calves, with 82% receiving an antibiotic. The median operation reported 5.3% respiratory morbidity, with 100% receiving an antibiotic. Heifer-only and mixed operations did not differ in operation median morbidity, mortality, or antibiotic treatment rates. Written antibiotic protocols were available on 65% of operations. Medicated milk replacer was used by 56% of operations. Passive immunity was routinely measured by 46% of operations. Direct contact between calves in housing units was not allowed by 45% of operations. Of all farms informed of disease concerns at the source farm, 76% changed their daily routine as a result. Almost all operations uniquely identified calves and recorded mortality. The heifer-only and mixed operations in this study were similar to US dairy operations for key health, antibiotic use, and biosecurity and biocontainment metrics. This research provides initial estimates of key demographics usable by calf ranches, veterinarians, and other professionals serving this segment of the US dairy industry.

Preparing an Insectary in Burkina Faso to Support Research in Genetic Technologies for Malaria Control.

The Institut de Recherche en Sciences de la Santé (IRSS) of Burkina Faso, West Africa, was the first African institution to import transgenic mosquitoes for research purposes. A shift from the culture of mosquito research to regulated biotechnology research and considerable management capacity is needed to set up and run the first insectary for transgenic insects in a country that applied and adapted the existing biosafety framework, first developed for genetically modified (GM) crops, to this new area of research. The additional demands arise from the separate regulatory framework for biotechnology, referencing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and the novelty of the research strain, making public understanding and acceptance early in the research pathway important. The IRSS team carried out extensive preparations following recommendations for containment of GM arthropods and invested efforts in local community engagement and training with scientific colleagues throughout the region. Record keeping beyond routine practice was established to maintain evidence related to regulatory requirements and risk assumptions. The National Biosafety Agency of Burkina Faso, Agence Nationale de Biosécurité (ANB), granted the permits for import of the self-limiting transgenic mosquito strain, which took place in November 2016, and for conducting studies in the IRSS facility in Bobo-Dioulasso. Compliance with permit terms and conditions of the permits and study protocols continued until the conclusion of studies, when the transgenic colonies were terminated. All this required close coordination between management and the insectary teams, as well as others. This article outlines the experiences of the IRSS to support others undertaking such studies. The IRSS is contributing to the ongoing development of genetic technologies for malaria control, as a partner of Target Malaria. The ultimate objective of the innovation is to reduce malaria transmission by using GM mosquitoes of the same species released to reduce the disease-vectoring native populations of Anopheles gambiae s.l.

Validation of a binary ethylenimine (BEI) inactivation procedure for biosafety treatment of foot-and-mouth disease viruses (FMDV), vesicular stomatitis viruses (VSV), and swine vesicular disease virus (SVDV).

Binary ethylenimine (BEI) has been widely used as a virucide to inactivate viruses. For regulatory exclusion of a select agent, the United States Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) requires an inactivation procedure that renders a select agent non-viable but allows the select agent to retain antigenic characteristics for future use must be validated, and the inactivated agent must be confirmed by a viability testing. In this curve-based validation study, we examined impacts of BEI concentration, treatment temperature, and time on our in-house inactivation procedures of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus (FMDV), Vesicular Stomatitis Virus (VSV), and Swine Vesicular Disease Virus (SVDV). The inactivation efficacy was confirmed by virus titration and 3 consecutive blind passages on the monolayers of susceptible cells. A linear correlation between the virus titer reduction and BEI concentration, treatment time, and temperature was established. The results confirmed our in-house BEI inactivation procedure of two doses of 1.5 mM BEI treatment at 37 °C, 1st dose for 24 h, then 2nd dose for 6 more hours for a total of 30 h BEI contact time, can ensure complete inactivation of FMDV, VSV, and SVDV.

Details to Attend to When Managing High-Risk Cattle.

This article provides insights into the management of bovine respiratory disease in high-risk cattle populations. Biocontainment strategies, records, procurement, transport, arrival/receiving management, vaccination, and treatment protocols are discussed from practical and systems-thinking perspectives regarding their impact on health in high-risk cattle. Arrival management considerations, such as facilities, nutritional management, metaphylaxis, bovine viral diarrhea virus persistent infection testing, parasite control, and castration, are also addressed. Caretaker morale and job satisfaction are suggested as important factors to consider when managing high-risk cattle. The inter-relationships of variables within the system are explored as contributing causative factors to bovine respiratory disease in high-risk cattle.

Biosecurity assessment of Argentinian pig farms.

The pig industry is growing very fast in Argentina with an increasing need for replacement animals, feedstuff and transportation of animals. One of the main competitive advantages of the Argentinian pig industry is its being free of most major pig diseases. Within this context, applying measures aimed to reduce the risk of introduction and spread of pathogens is critical. The aim of the present study was to assess the biosecurity of Argentinian pig farms. Two types of farms were assessed: firstly, all official suppliers of high-genetic-value (n = 110) and secondly, a sample from commercial farms (n = 192). Data on the external and internal biosecurity practices applied on the farms was collected with a questionnaire. Data was analysed using a correspondence analysis and a hierarchical clustering analysis, which allowed identification of types of farms with regard to the biosecurity measures applied. Key variables characterizing the clusters were identified through an indicator value analysis. In addition, the external biosecurity of the farms was evaluated by using risk assessment tools with respect to the potential introduction of porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus. Results made evident three clusters: the first one which, amongst other measures, applied several barriers to prevent the entry of people, trucks and other vehicles, and could be considered as a group of high biosecurity, and the two other groups which applied a lower number of external and internal biosecurity measures. The results of the risk assessment showed that the routes with the highest risk of disease introduction were: replacement animals, vehicles transporting feed or animals, and visitors. The assessment of the external biosecurity showed that most Argentinian farms were not prepared for the contingency of a pathogen such as porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus. Special efforts should be made in official suppliers of high-genetic-value farms with poor biosecurity scores since they are at the top of the pig production chain and can be key for the spread of diseases.

Dairy goat producers' understanding, knowledge and attitudes towards biosecurity and Q-fever in Australia.

The Australian dairy goat sector is an emerging animal industry undergoing rapid expansion. Limited information is available within this industry in relation to socio-demographic characteristics and biosecurity implementation. Q-Fever, caused by the bacterium Coxiella burnetii, is a zoonotic disease endemic in Australia, with a range of domestic and wild-animal reservoir species, including goats, with infected pregnant goats posing a significant public health risk. The aim of the current study was to investigate the socio-demographics of Australian dairy goat producers, their biosecurity implementation and levels of understanding, knowledge and attitudes towards Q-Fever. To achieve this aim, a cross-sectional study was conducted, using an online survey and follow-up semi-structured interviews among dairy goat producers. A total of 106 goat producers participated in the online survey (35.3% response rate) and 14 participated in the semi-structured interviews. Findings from this study suggest that most goat producers implement biosecurity practices related to direct animal husbandry, such as separating sick goats (86%), vaccinations (79%) and providing separate kidding space (75%); and, practices minimizing the risk of disease introduction, such as maintaining boundary fences (86%) and isolating incoming animals (67%). However, implementation of other biosecurity practices, such as keeping records of visitors and visitor biosecurity requirements, was inadequate. Furthermore, this study identifies a deficit of knowledge and understanding surrounding Q-Fever in the Australian dairy goat sector, and a disconnect between producers' perception of risk and implementation of known appropriate biosecurity measures. The research has identified that producers rely on 'trusted' community networks to provide advice on biosecurity implementation, due to a perceived absence of industry-specific, reputable information sources. Producers identified those outside of these networks as the 'other'. The creation of this other allows producers to deflect responsibility for individual biosecurity on to the other. A multifaceted approach is necessary to increase knowledge, understanding and perception of risk surrounding Q-fever, and promote positive uptake of biosecurity measures, for improved outcomes for animal and human health.

Creating a framework for the prioritization of biosecurity risks to the New Zealand dairy industry.

The New Zealand dairy sector relies on robust biosecurity measures to control and mitigate a wide range of threats to the industry. To optimize the prioritization of organisms and manage the risk they pose to the sector in a transparent and credible way, the Dairy Biosecurity Risk Evaluation Framework (D-BRiEF) was developed. This comprehensive framework was specifically designed for decision support, using a standardized approach to address the full spectrum of biosecurity threats to the sector, including exotic and endemic animal disease organisms, pest plants and insects. D-BRiEF is underpinned by three main processes, namely (i) hazard identification; (ii) multicriteria risk assessment; and (iii) communication for risk management. Expert knowledge and empirical data, including associated uncertainty, are harnessed in a standardized format. Results feed into a probability-impact model that was developed in close collaboration with dairy sector economists to provide overall comparative 10-year quantitative economic impact estimates for each assessed risk organism. A description of the overarching framework, which applies to diverse organism groups, is presented with detailed methodology on both endemic and exotic animal disease risk organisms. Examples of visual outputs are included, although actual ranking results are not reported due to industry confidentiality. D-BRiEF can provide a decision advantage to DairyNZ biosecurity risk managers and sector stakeholders by creating a transparent process that can be interrogated and updated at multiple levels to fully understand the layers of risk posed by different organisms.

SurF: an innovative framework in biosecurity and animal health surveillance evaluation.

Surveillance for biosecurity hazards is being conducted by the New Zealand Competent Authority, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) to support New Zealand's biosecurity system. Surveillance evaluation should be an integral part of the surveillance life cycle, as it provides a means to identify and correct problems and to sustain and enhance the existing strengths of a surveillance system. The surveillance evaluation Framework (SurF) presented here was developed to provide a generic framework within which the MPI biosecurity surveillance portfolio, and all of its components, can be consistently assessed. SurF is an innovative, cross-sectoral effort that aims to provide a common umbrella for surveillance evaluation in the animal, plant, environment and aquatic sectors. It supports the conduct of the following four distinct components of an evaluation project: (i) motivation for the evaluation, (ii) scope of the evaluation, (iii) evaluation design and implementation and (iv) reporting and communication of evaluation outputs. Case studies, prepared by MPI subject matter experts, are included in the framework to guide users in their assessment. Three case studies were used in the development of SurF in order to assure practical utility and to confirm usability of SurF across all included sectors. It is anticipated that the structured approach and information provided by SurF will not only be of benefit to MPI but also to other New Zealand stakeholders. Although SurF was developed for internal use by MPI, it could be applied to any surveillance system in New Zealand or elsewhere.

The changing world of biocontainment and biosecurity.

Since the 1980s, a number of key events have significantly altered our ideas on biosecurity and the role of biocontainment laboratories, such as the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreaks and the anthrax episode of 2001 in the USA. This has resulted in the development of plans to build "high containment" facilities around the world and an array of new regulations at both national and international levels regarding the management of pathogens, the operation of high containment facilities, the use of genetically modified material, and the transportation of such agents and personnel security issues. Considering the cost, however, it is debatable whether every country needs to build its own high containment facility. The Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) provides an example of what might be considered best practice in biocontainment while considering regulations, cost and need.

Using White-tailed Deer (Odocoileus virginianus) in Infectious Disease Research.

Between 1940 and 2004, more than 335 emerging infectious disease events were reported in the scientific literature. The majority (60%) of these events involved zoonoses, most of which (72%) were of wildlife origin or had an epidemiologically important wildlife host. Because this trend of increasing emerging diseases likely will continue, understanding the pathogenesis, transmission, and diagnosis of these diseases in the relevant wildlife host is paramount. Achieving this goal often requires using wild animals as research subjects, which are vastly different from the traditional livestock or laboratory animals used by most universities and institutions. Using wildlife in infectious disease research presents many challenges but also provides opportunities to answer questions impossible to address by using traditional models. Cervid species, especially white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), elk (Cervus canadensis), and red deer (Cervus elaphus), are hosts or sentinels for several important pathogens, some of which are zoonotic. The long history of infectious disease research using white-tailed deer, conducted at ever-increasing levels of sophisticated biosecurity, demonstrates that this type of research can be conducted safely and that valuable insights can be gained. The greatest challenges to using wildlife in infectious disease research include animal source, facility design, nutrition, animal handling, and enrichment and other practices that both facilitate animal care and enhance animal wellbeing. The study of Mycobacterium bovis infection in white-tailed deer at the USDA's National Animal Disease Center serves to illustrate one approach to address these challenges.

Hematologic Assessment in Pet Rats, Mice, Hamsters, and Gerbils: Blood Sample Collection and Blood Cell Identification.

Hamsters, gerbils, rats, and mice are presented to veterinary clinics and hospitals for prophylactic care and treatment of clinical signs of disease. Physical examination, history, and husbandry practice information can be supplemented greatly by assessment of hematologic parameters. As a resource for veterinarians and their technicians, this article describes the methods for collection of blood, identification of blood cells, and interpretation of the hemogram in mice, rats, gerbils, and hamsters.

Biosecurity and biocontainment of bovine viral diarrhea virus.

Infection of cattle with BVDV results in a variety of clinical illnesses costly to the cattle industry worldwide. The reservoir and primary source of transmission is cattle born PI with BVDV after transplacental infection in early gestation. It is a challenge to determine with certainty whether or not BVDV is circulating among a herd of cattle. If the virus is present in a herd,then biocontainment strategies are used to eliminate the virus by testing to removing PI cattle, preventing exposure of pregnant cattle to the virus, and increasing resistance to infection using vaccination. If it is clear that the virus is not present in a herd then, biosecurity actions must be taken to prevent introducing the virus into the herd.

Declawing of neonatal rabbits destined for use in animal biosafety level 4 containment studies.

To protect personnel and protective outerwear from damage by scratching, rabbits to be housed in an Animal Biosafety Level 4 (ABSL4) facility are declawed routinely. The objective of the study presented here was to establish a procedure for declawing all four feet of neonatal rabbits in preparation for use in ABSL4 studies. Combining procedures conducted in private veterinary practice to remove dewclaws of canine pups with those used to declaw cats, we declawed rabbit kits at 3 to 8 days of age. Declawing neonates was believed to be advantageous because they are non-ambulatory, have soft, cartilaginous digits, and do not have extensive hair growth. These features resulted in decreased surgical preparation and surgery time, minimal bleeding, and minimal aftercare. The optimal age for declawing a litter was 6 or 7 days. Declawing of neonatal rabbits is relatively simple and efficient to perform and offers advantages over declawing of older animals. By using the method described, rabbits can be introduced into ABSL4 facilities by 12 weeks of age with confidence that nail regrowth will not occur.

Biosseguridade para sistemas de produção de peixes em tanque-rede em função da colmatação agravada por Limnoperna fortunei / Biosecurity for fishfarming cage systems due to the highly clogged screen aggravated by Limnoperna fortunei

Este trabalho avaliou a colmatação por Limnoperna fortunei em diferentes materiais para confecção de telas de arame, a dinâmica da colmatação pelo molusco e a relação custo-benefício dos materiais usados em tanques-rede. Utilizaram-se amostras de telas de simples torção de malha 19mm, de cinco tipos diferentes de revestimentos, colocadas na barragem de Salto Caxias, no Rio Iguaçu, estado do Paraná, entre julho de 2012 e julho de 2014. A cada seis meses, foi verificado o ganho de peso das telas em razão da colmatação, além da contagem do número de mexilhões aderidos. Após as coletas dos dados, foi realizado o teste estatístico de Kruskal-Wallis para se avaliar o ganho de peso das telas devido à colmatação. Realizou-se também uma pesquisa com 21 empresas para se obter o preço comercializado de telas para confecção de tanques-rede e se avaliar a expectativa de durabilidade dos materiais. Verificou-se que os diferentes materiais avaliados para as telas influenciam na colmatação e aderência do mexilhão-dourado; além disso, constatou-se que a tela mais eficiente quanto ao custo/ano é a de arame galvanizado plastificado e, para baixa colmatação, a de arame Bezinal.(AU)

This research evaluated degree of clogging by Limnoperna fortunei in different materials for wire mesh fabrication, the dynamics of mollusk sealing and the cost-benefit ratio of these materials used in tank-nets. Samples of single-twist screens of 19 mm mesh were used, from five different types of coatings were placed in the Salto Caxias dam on the Iguaçu River in the Paraná state, between July 2012 and July 2014. Every six months, it was verified the weight gain of the screens due to clogging and counting of the number of mussels adhered. After the data collection was performed Kruskal-Wallis statistical test to evaluate the weight gain of the screens due to clogging. In addition, a survey was carried out with 21 companies to obtain the commercialized price of screens for the production of net tanks and to evaluate the expected durability of the materials. The different materials evaluated for the screens influenced the sealing and adhesion of the golden mussel. In addition, the most cost-per-year screen is that of plastic-coated galvanized wire and for low clogging it is the Bezinal wire.(AU)

Risk of exposure of farms and subsistence nurseries to contact with wild boar in southern Mato Grosso do Sul / Risco de exposição de granjas e criatórios de subsistência ao contato com javalis no sul do Mato Grosso do Sul

With the advancement of wild boar distribution in the rural environment, its impacts are not limited to health in the pig sector, but the requirements for monitoring and control of the species are requirements laid down by the OIE for the recognition of classical swine fever free zone status. The construction of ecological models of favorability or suitability for the occurrence of pest species are necessary tools for the decision making on priority areas of management aiming at risk management. This work aims to map the level of suitability for the occurrence of wild boar in the southern state of Mato Grosso do Sul, as well as to identify the main risk variables for contact with the wild boar and evaluate the biosecurity measures adopted by commercial farms integrated in the south of the State of Mato Grosso do Sul. To evaluate the risk potential of wild boar for commercial and subsistence swine farming in southern Mato Grosso do Sul, a model of environmental suitability was constructed for this species in the swine producing region. This model considered different environmental strata, being the selection of the layers considered the physiological and behavioral characteristics of the species. In parallel, interviews were carried out in a sample of commercial farms integrating the region to survey the perception of the presence of the invasive species and the biosafety measures adopted. The results of this work indicate that the risk of contact among wild boars and animals reared in closed production systems may be high in the study area and only establishment of appropriate biosecurity measures that consider the characteristics and habits of the boar may prevent the intrusion of this species and contact with domestic swine. The built model can be considered of high reliability and it is recommended to apply it to other areas of the state, being a useful tool for the productive sector, environmental agencies and decision makers.(AU)

Com o avanço da distribuição do javali no ambiente rural, seus impactos não se restringem somente a sanidade suidea, embora as exigências quanto ao monitoramento e controle da espécie sejam exigências previstas pela OIE, para o reconhecimento do status de zona livre de peste suína clássica. A construção de modelos ecológicos de favorabilidade ou adequabilidade para a ocorrência de espécies-praga são ferramentas necessárias para as tomadas de decisão sobre áreas prioritárias de manejo visando gestão de risco. Este trabalho objetiva mapear o nível de adequabilidade para a ocorrência de javalis no sul do Estado de Mato Grosso do Sul, bem como levantar as principais variáveis de risco para o contato com o javali asselvajado e avaliar as medidas de biosseguridade adotadas por granjas comerciais integradas no sul do Estado do Mato Grosso do Sul. Para avaliar o potencial de risco exercido pelos javalis para a suinocultura comercial e de subsistência nesta região foi construído um modelo de adequabilidade ambiental para essa espécie na região produtora de suínos. Esse modelo considerou diferentes estratos ambientais, sendo que para a seleção das camadas consideram-se características fisiológicas e comportamentais da espécie. Em paralelo, entrevistas foram realizadas em uma amostragem de granjas comerciais de integração da região para levantamento da percepção quanto a presença da espécie invasora e as medidas de biossegurança adotadas. Os resultados desse trabalho indicam que o risco de contato entre javalis de vida livre e os animais criados em sistemas de produção fechados pode ser alto na área de estudo e somente estabelecimento de medidas de biosseguridade apropriadas, que considerem as características e hábitos do javali poderá impedir a intrusão dessa espécie e o contato com os suínos domésticos. O modelo construído pode ser considerado de elevada confiabilidade e recomenda-se a sua aplicação para as outras áreas do estado, sendo uma ferramenta útil para o setor produtivo, os órgãos ambientais e os tomadores de decisão.(AU)

Avian influenza transmission risks: analysis of biosecurity measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming.

In the 2003 epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry, between-farm virus transmission continued for considerable time despite control measures. Gaining more insight into the mechanisms of this spread is necessary for the possible development of better control strategies. We carried out an in-depth interview study aiming to systematically explore all the poultry production activities to identify the activities that could potentially be related to virus introduction and transmission. One of the between-farm contact risks that were identified is the movement of birds between farms during thinning with violations of on-farm biosecurity protocols. In addition, several other risky management practices, risky visitor behaviours and biosecurity breaches were identified. They include human and fomite contacts that occurred without observing biosecurity protocols, poor waste management practices, presence of other animal species on poultry farms, and poor biosecurity against risks from farm neighbourhood activities. Among the detailed practices identified, taking cell phones and jewellery into poultry houses, not observing shower-in protocols and the exchange of unclean farm equipment were common. Also, sometimes certain protocols or biosecurity facilities were lacking. We also asked the interviewed farmers about their perception of transmission risks and found that they had divergent opinions about the visitor- and neighbourhood-associated risks. We performed a qualitative assessment of contact risks (as transmission pathways) based on contact type, corresponding biosecurity practices, and contact frequency. This assessment suggests that the most risky contact types are bird movements during thinning and restocking, most human movements accessing poultry houses and proximity to other poultry farms. The overall risk posed by persons and equipment accessing storage rooms and the premises-only contacts was considered to be medium. Most of the exposure risks are considered to be similar for layer and broiler farms. Our results, including those on farmer opinions, are relevant for the communication with farmers and poultry-related businesses about practices and risks. We conclude by providing recommendations for improvement of control strategies.