Primate hemorrhagic fever-causing arteriviruses are poised for spillover to humans.

Simian arteriviruses are endemic in some African primates and can cause fatal hemorrhagic fevers when they cross into primate hosts of new species. We find that CD163 acts as an intracellular receptor for simian hemorrhagic fever virus (SHFV; a simian arterivirus), a rare mode of virus entry that is shared with other hemorrhagic fever-causing viruses (e.g., Ebola and Lassa viruses). Further, SHFV enters and replicates in human monocytes, indicating full functionality of all of the human cellular proteins required for viral replication. Thus, simian arteriviruses in nature may not require major adaptations to the human host. Given that at least three distinct simian arteriviruses have caused fatal infections in captive macaques after host-switching, and that humans are immunologically naive to this family of viruses, development of serology tests for human surveillance should be a priority.

Identification of novel bat coronaviruses sheds light on the evolutionary origins of SARS-CoV-2 and related viruses.

Despite the discovery of animal coronaviruses related to SARS-CoV-2, the evolutionary origins of this virus are elusive. We describe a meta-transcriptomic study of 411 bat samples collected from a small geographical region in Yunnan province, China, between May 2019 and November 2020. We identified 24 full-length coronavirus genomes, including four novel SARS-CoV-2-related and three SARS-CoV-related viruses. Rhinolophus pusillus virus RpYN06 was the closest relative of SARS-CoV-2 in most of the genome, although it possessed a more divergent spike gene. The other three SARS-CoV-2-related coronaviruses carried a genetically distinct spike gene that could weakly bind to the hACE2 receptor in vitro. Ecological modeling predicted the co-existence of up to 23 Rhinolophus bat species, with the largest contiguous hotspots extending from South Laos and Vietnam to southern China. Our study highlights the remarkable diversity of bat coronaviruses at the local scale, including close relatives of both SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV.

Farmed fur animals harbour viruses with zoonotic spillover potential.

Animals such as raccoon dogs, mink and muskrats are farmed for fur and are sometimes used as food or medicinal products1,2, yet they are also potential reservoirs of emerging pathogens3. Here we performed single-sample metatranscriptomic sequencing of internal tissues from 461 individual fur animals that were found dead due to disease. We characterized 125 virus species, including 36 that were novel and 39 at potentially high risk of cross-species transmission, including zoonotic spillover. Notably, we identified seven species of coronaviruses, expanding their known host range, and documented the cross-species transmission of a novel canine respiratory coronavirus to raccoon dogs and of bat HKU5-like coronaviruses to mink, present at a high abundance in lung tissues. Three subtypes of influenza A virus-H1N2, H5N6 and H6N2-were detected in the lungs of guinea pig, mink and muskrat, respectively. Multiple known zoonotic viruses, such as Japanese encephalitis virus and mammalian orthoreovirus4,5, were detected in guinea pigs. Raccoon dogs and mink carried the highest number of potentially high-risk viruses, while viruses from the Coronaviridae, Paramyxoviridae and Sedoreoviridae families commonly infected multiple hosts. These data also reveal potential virus transmission between farmed animals and wild animals, and from humans to farmed animals, indicating that fur farming represents an important transmission hub for viral zoonoses.

Shifts in receptors during submergence of an encephalitic arbovirus.

Western equine encephalitis virus (WEEV) is an arthropod-borne virus (arbovirus) that frequently caused major outbreaks of encephalitis in humans and horses in the early twentieth century, but the frequency of outbreaks has since decreased markedly, and strains of this alphavirus isolated in the past two decades are less virulent in mammals than strains isolated in the 1930s and 1940s1-3. The basis for this phenotypic change in WEEV strains and coincident decrease in epizootic activity (known as viral submergence3) is unclear, as is the possibility of re-emergence of highly virulent strains. Here we identify protocadherin 10 (PCDH10) as a cellular receptor for WEEV. We show that multiple highly virulent ancestral WEEV strains isolated in the 1930s and 1940s, in addition to binding human PCDH10, could also bind very low-density lipoprotein receptor (VLDLR) and apolipoprotein E receptor 2 (ApoER2), which are recognized by another encephalitic alphavirus as receptors4. However, whereas most of the WEEV strains that we examined bind to PCDH10, a contemporary strain has lost the ability to recognize mammalian PCDH10 while retaining the ability to bind avian receptors, suggesting WEEV adaptation to a main reservoir host during enzootic circulation. PCDH10 supports WEEV E2-E1 glycoprotein-mediated infection of primary mouse cortical neurons, and administration of a soluble form of PCDH10 protects mice from lethal WEEV challenge. Our results have implications for the development of medical countermeasures and for risk assessment for re-emerging WEEV strains.

Pathogenicity and transmissibility of bovine H5N1 influenza virus.

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza (HPAI H5N1) viruses occasionally infect, but typically do not transmit, in mammals. In the spring of 2024, an unprecedented outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in bovine herds occurred in the USA, with virus spread within and between herds, infections in poultry and cats, and spillover into humans, collectively indicating an increased public health risk1-4. Here we characterize an HPAI H5N1 virus isolated from infected cow milk in mice and ferrets. Like other HPAI H5N1 viruses, the bovine H5N1 virus spread systemically, including to the mammary glands of both species, however, this tropism was also observed for an older HPAI H5N1 virus isolate. Bovine HPAI H5N1 virus bound to sialic acids expressed in human upper airways and inefficiently transmitted to exposed ferrets (one of four exposed ferrets seroconverted without virus detection). Bovine HPAI H5N1 virus thus possesses features that may facilitate infection and transmission in mammals.

BTN3A3 evasion promotes the zoonotic potential of influenza A viruses.

Spillover events of avian influenza A viruses (IAVs) to humans could represent the first step in a future pandemic1. Several factors that limit the transmission and replication of avian IAVs in mammals have been identified. There are several gaps in our understanding to predict which virus lineages are more likely to cross the species barrier and cause disease in humans1. Here, we identified human BTN3A3 (butyrophilin subfamily 3 member A3)2 as a potent inhibitor of avian IAVs but not human IAVs. We determined that BTN3A3 is expressed in human airways and its antiviral activity evolved in primates. We show that BTN3A3 restriction acts primarily at the early stages of the virus life cycle by inhibiting avian IAV RNA replication. We identified residue 313 in the viral nucleoprotein (NP) as the genetic determinant of BTN3A3 sensitivity (313F or, rarely, 313L in avian viruses) or evasion (313Y or 313V in human viruses). However, avian IAV serotypes, such as H7 and H9, that spilled over into humans also evade BTN3A3 restriction. In these cases, BTN3A3 evasion is due to substitutions (N, H or Q) in NP residue 52 that is adjacent to residue 313 in the NP structure3. Thus, sensitivity or resistance to BTN3A3 is another factor to consider in the risk assessment of the zoonotic potential of avian influenza viruses.

Climate change increases cross-species viral transmission risk.

At least 10,000 virus species have the ability to infect humans but, at present, the vast majority are circulating silently in wild mammals1,2. However, changes in climate and land use will lead to opportunities for viral sharing among previously geographically isolated species of wildlife3,4. In some cases, this will facilitate zoonotic spillover-a mechanistic link between global environmental change and disease emergence. Here we simulate potential hotspots of future viral sharing, using a phylogeographical model of the mammal-virus network, and projections of geographical range shifts for 3,139 mammal species under climate-change and land-use scenarios for the year 2070. We predict that species will aggregate in new combinations at high elevations, in biodiversity hotspots, and in areas of high human population density in Asia and Africa, causing the cross-species transmission of their associated viruses an estimated 4,000 times. Owing to their unique dispersal ability, bats account for the majority of novel viral sharing and are likely to share viruses along evolutionary pathways that will facilitate future emergence in humans. Notably, we find that this ecological transition may already be underway, and holding warming under 2 °C within the twenty-first century will not reduce future viral sharing. Our findings highlight an urgent need to pair viral surveillance and discovery efforts with biodiversity surveys tracking the range shifts of species, especially in tropical regions that contain the most zoonoses and are experiencing rapid warming.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-ranging white-tailed deer.

Humans have infected a wide range of animals with SARS-CoV-21-5, but the establishment of a new natural animal reservoir has not been observed. Here we document that free-ranging white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) are highly susceptible to infection with SARS-CoV-2, are exposed to multiple SARS-CoV-2 variants from humans and are capable of sustaining transmission in nature. Using real-time PCR with reverse transcription, we detected SARS-CoV-2 in more than one-third (129 out of 360, 35.8%) of nasal swabs obtained from O. virginianus in northeast Ohio in the USA during January to March 2021. Deer in six locations were infected with three SARS-CoV-2 lineages (B.1.2, B.1.582 and B.1.596). The B.1.2 viruses, dominant in humans in Ohio at the time, infected deer in four locations. We detected probable deer-to-deer transmission of B.1.2, B.1.582 and B.1.596 viruses, enabling the virus to acquire amino acid substitutions in the spike protein (including the receptor-binding domain) and ORF1 that are observed infrequently in humans. No spillback to humans was observed, but these findings demonstrate that SARS-CoV-2 viruses have been transmitted in wildlife in the USA, potentially opening new pathways for evolution. There is an urgent need to establish comprehensive 'One Health' programmes to monitor the environment, deer and other wildlife hosts globally.

Close relatives of MERS-CoV in bats use ACE2 as their functional receptors.

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and several bat coronaviruses use dipeptidyl peptidase-4 (DPP4) as an entry receptor1-4. However, the receptor for NeoCoV-the closest known MERS-CoV relative found in bats-remains unclear5. Here, using a pseudotype virus entry assay, we found that NeoCoV and its close relative, PDF-2180, can efficiently bind to and use specific bat angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) orthologues and, less favourably, human ACE2 as entry receptors through their receptor-binding domains (RBDs) on the spike (S) proteins. Cryo-electron microscopy analysis revealed an RBD-ACE2 binding interface involving protein-glycan interactions, distinct from those of other known ACE2-using coronaviruses. We identified residues 337-342 of human ACE2 as a molecular determinant restricting NeoCoV entry, whereas a NeoCoV S pseudotyped virus containing a T510F RBD mutation efficiently entered cells expressing human ACE2. Although polyclonal SARS-CoV-2 antibodies or MERS-CoV RBD-specific nanobodies did not cross-neutralize NeoCoV or PDF-2180, an ACE2-specific antibody and two broadly neutralizing betacoronavirus antibodies efficiently inhibited these two pseudotyped viruses. We describe MERS-CoV-related viruses that use ACE2 as an entry receptor, underscoring a promiscuity of receptor use and a potential zoonotic threat.

Lessons from the host defences of bats, a unique viral reservoir.

There have been several major outbreaks of emerging viral diseases, including Hendra, Nipah, Marburg and Ebola virus diseases, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)-as well as the current pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Notably, all of these outbreaks have been linked to suspected zoonotic transmission of bat-borne viruses. Bats-the only flying mammal-display several additional features that are unique among mammals, such as a long lifespan relative to body size, a low rate of tumorigenesis and an exceptional ability to host viruses without presenting clinical disease. Here we discuss the mechanisms that underpin the host defence system and immune tolerance of bats, and their ramifications for human health and disease. Recent studies suggest that 64 million years of adaptive evolution have shaped the host defence system of bats to balance defence and tolerance, which has resulted in a unique ability to act as an ideal reservoir host for viruses. Lessons from the effective host defence of bats would help us to better understand viral evolution and to better predict, prevent and control future viral spillovers. Studying the mechanisms of immune tolerance in bats could lead to new approaches to improving human health. We strongly believe that it is time to focus on bats in research for the benefit of both bats and humankind.

Independent infections of porcine deltacoronavirus among Haitian children.

Coronaviruses have caused three major epidemics since 2003, including the ongoing SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. In each case, the emergence of coronavirus in our species has been associated with zoonotic transmissions from animal reservoirs1,2, underscoring how prone such pathogens are to spill over and adapt to new species. Among the four recognized genera of the family Coronaviridae, human infections reported so far have been limited to alphacoronaviruses and betacoronaviruses3-5. Here we identify porcine deltacoronavirus strains in plasma samples of three Haitian children with acute undifferentiated febrile illness. Genomic and evolutionary analyses reveal that human infections were the result of at least two independent zoonoses of distinct viral lineages that acquired the same mutational signature in the genes encoding Nsp15 and the spike glycoprotein. In particular, structural analysis predicts that one of the changes in the spike S1 subunit, which contains the receptor-binding domain, may affect the flexibility of the protein and its binding to the host cell receptor. Our findings highlight the potential for evolutionary change and adaptation leading to human infections by coronaviruses outside of the previously recognized human-associated coronavirus groups, particularly in settings where there may be close human-animal contact.

Broad sarbecovirus neutralization by a human monoclonal antibody.

The recent emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern1-10 and the recurrent spillovers of coronaviruses11,12 into the human population highlight the need for broadly neutralizing antibodies that are not affected by the ongoing antigenic drift and that can prevent or treat future zoonotic infections. Here we describe a human monoclonal antibody designated S2X259, which recognizes a highly conserved cryptic epitope of the receptor-binding domain and cross-reacts with spikes from all clades of sarbecovirus. S2X259 broadly neutralizes spike-mediated cell entry of SARS-CoV-2, including variants of concern (B.1.1.7, B.1.351, P.1, and B.1.427/B.1.429), as well as a wide spectrum of human and potentially zoonotic sarbecoviruses through inhibition of angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) binding to the receptor-binding domain. Furthermore, deep-mutational scanning and in vitro escape selection experiments demonstrate that S2X259 possesses an escape profile that is limited to a single substitution, G504D. We show that prophylactic and therapeutic administration of S2X259 protects Syrian hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus) against challenge with the prototypic SARS-CoV-2 and the B.1.351 variant of concern, which suggests that this monoclonal antibody is a promising candidate for the prevention and treatment of emergent variants and zoonotic infections. Our data reveal a key antigenic site that is targeted by broadly neutralizing antibodies and will guide the design of vaccines that are effective against all sarbecoviruses.

Resurgence of Ebola virus in 2021 in Guinea suggests a new paradigm for outbreaks.

Seven years after the declaration of the first epidemic of Ebola virus disease in Guinea, the country faced a new outbreak-between 14 February and 19 June 2021-near the epicentre of the previous epidemic1,2. Here we use next-generation sequencing to generate complete or near-complete genomes of Zaire ebolavirus from samples obtained from 12 different patients. These genomes form a well-supported phylogenetic cluster with genomes from the previous outbreak, which indicates that the new outbreak was not the result of a new spillover event from an animal reservoir. The 2021 lineage shows considerably lower divergence than would be expected during sustained human-to-human transmission, which suggests a persistent infection with reduced replication or a period of latency. The resurgence of Zaire ebolavirus from humans five years after the end of the previous outbreak of Ebola virus disease reinforces the need for long-term medical and social care for patients who survive the disease, to reduce the risk of re-emergence and to prevent further stigmatization.

Cell binding tropism of rat hepatitis E virus is a pivotal determinant of its zoonotic transmission to humans.

Classically, all hepatitis E virus (HEV) variants causing human infection belong to the genus Paslahepevirus (HEV-A). However, the increasing cases of rat HEV infection in humans since 2018 challenged this dogma, posing increasing health threats. Herein, we investigated the underlying mechanisms dictating the zoonotic potentials of different HEV species and their possible cross-protection relationships. We found that rat HEV virus-like particles (HEVVLPs) bound to human liver and intestinal cells/tissues with high efficiency. Moreover, rat HEVVLPs and infectious rat HEV particles penetrated the cell membrane and entered human target cells postbinding. In contrast, ferret HEVVLPs showed marginal cell binding and entry ability, bat HEVVLPs and avian HEVVLPs exhibited no binding and entry potency. Structure-based three-dimensional mapping identified that the surface spike domain of rat HEV is crucial for cell binding. Antigenic cartography indicated that rat HEV exhibited partial cross-reaction with HEV-A. Intriguingly, sera of HEV-A infected patients or human HEV vaccine Hecolin® immunized individuals provided partial cross-protection against the binding of rat HEVVLPs to human target cells. In summary, the interactions between the viral capsid and cellular receptor(s) regulate the distinct zoonotic potentials of different HEV species. The systematic characterization of antigenic cartography and serological cross-reactivity of different HEV species provide valuable insights for the development of species-specific diagnosis and protective vaccines against zoonotic HEV infection.

Chapare Hemorrhagic Fever and Virus Detection in Rodents in Bolivia in 2019.

BACKGROUND: In June 2019, the Bolivian Ministry of Health reported a cluster of cases of hemorrhagic fever that started in the municipality of Caranavi and expanded to La Paz. The cause of these cases was unknown. METHODS: We obtained samples for next-generation sequencing and virus isolation. Human and rodent specimens were tested by means of virus-specific real-time quantitative reverse-transcriptase-polymerase-chain-reaction assays, next-generation sequencing, and virus isolation. RESULTS: Nine cases of hemorrhagic fever were identified; four of the patients with this illness died. The etiologic agent was identified as Mammarenavirus Chapare mammarenavirus, or Chapare virus (CHAPV), which causes Chapare hemorrhagic fever (CHHF). Probable nosocomial transmission among health care workers was identified. Some patients with CHHF had neurologic manifestations, and those who survived had a prolonged recovery period. CHAPV RNA was detected in a variety of human body fluids (including blood; urine; nasopharyngeal, oropharyngeal, and bronchoalveolar-lavage fluid; conjunctiva; and semen) and in specimens obtained from captured small-eared pygmy rice rats (Oligoryzomys microtis). In survivors of CHHF, viral RNA was detected up to 170 days after symptom onset; CHAPV was isolated from a semen sample obtained 86 days after symptom onset. CONCLUSIONS: M. Chapare mammarenavirus was identified as the etiologic agent of CHHF. Both spillover from a zoonotic reservoir and possible person-to-person transmission were identified. This virus was detected in a rodent species, O. microtis. (Funded by the Bolivian Ministry of Health and others.).

Porcine deltacoronavirus nsp5 antagonizes type I interferon signaling by cleaving IFIT3.

Porcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV) has caused enormous economic losses to the global pig industry. However, the immune escape mechanism of PDCoV remains to be fully clarified. Transcriptomic analysis revealed a high abundance of interferon (IFN)-induced protein with tetratricopeptide repeats 3 (IFIT3) transcripts after PDCoV infection, which initially implied a correlation between IFIT3 and PDCoV. Further studies showed that PDCoV nsp5 could antagonize the host type I interferon signaling pathway by cleaving IFIT3. We demonstrated that PDCoV nsp5 cleaved porcine IFIT3 (pIFIT3) at Gln-406. Similar cleavage of endogenous IFIT3 has also been observed in PDCoV-infected cells. The pIFIT3-Q406A mutant was resistant to nsp5-mediated cleavage and exhibited a greater ability to inhibit PDCoV infection than wild-type pIFIT3. Furthermore, we found that cleavage of IFIT3 is a common characteristic of nsp5 proteins of human coronaviruses, albeit not alphacoronavirus. This finding suggests that the cleavage of IFIT3 is an important mechanism by which PDCoV nsp5 antagonizes IFN signaling. Our study provides new insights into the mechanisms by which PDCoV antagonizes the host innate immune response.IMPORTANCEPorcine deltacoronavirus (PDCoV) is a potential emerging zoonotic pathogen, and studies on the prevalence and pathogenesis of PDCoV are ongoing. The main protease (nsp5) of PDCoV provides an excellent target for antivirals due to its essential and conserved function in the viral replication cycle. Previous studies have revealed that nsp5 of PDCoV antagonizes type I interferon (IFN) production by targeting the interferon-stimulated genes. Here, we provide the first demonstration that nsp5 of PDCoV antagonizes IFN signaling by cleaving IFIT3, which affects the IFN response after PDCoV infection. Our findings reveal that PDCoV nsp5 is an important interferon antagonist and enhance the understanding of immune evasion by deltacoronaviruses.

Complex N-glycans are important for interspecies transmission of H7 influenza A viruses.

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) can overcome species barriers by adaptation of the receptor-binding site of the hemagglutinin (HA). To initiate infection, HAs bind to glycan receptors with terminal sialic acids, which are either N-acetylneuraminic acid (NeuAc) or N-glycolylneuraminic acid (NeuGc); the latter is mainly found in horses and pigs but not in birds and humans. We investigated the influence of previously identified equine NeuGc-adapting mutations (S128T, I130V, A135E, T189A, and K193R) in avian H7 IAVs in vitro and in vivo. We observed that these mutations negatively affected viral replication in chicken cells but not in duck cells and positively affected replication in horse cells. In vivo, the mutations reduced virus virulence and mortality in chickens. Ducks excreted high viral loads longer than chickens, although they appeared clinically healthy. To elucidate why these viruses infected chickens and ducks despite the absence of NeuGc, we re-evaluated the receptor binding of H7 HAs using glycan microarray and flow cytometry studies. This re-evaluation demonstrated that mutated avian H7 HAs also bound to α2,3-linked NeuAc and sialyl-LewisX, which have an additional fucose moiety in their terminal epitope, explaining why infection of ducks and chickens was possible. Interestingly, the α2,3-linked NeuAc and sialyl-LewisX epitopes were only bound when presented on tri-antennary N-glycans, emphasizing the importance of investigating the fine receptor specificities of IAVs. In conclusion, the binding of NeuGc-adapted H7 IAV to tri-antennary N-glycans enables viral replication and shedding by chickens and ducks, potentially facilitating interspecies transmission of equine-adapted H7 IAVs.IMPORTANCEInfluenza A viruses (IAVs) cause millions of deaths and illnesses in birds and mammals each year. The viral surface protein hemagglutinin initiates infection by binding to host cell terminal sialic acids. Hemagglutinin adaptations affect the binding affinity to these sialic acids and the potential host species targeted. While avian and human IAVs tend to bind to N-acetylneuraminic acid (sialic acid), equine H7 viruses prefer binding to N-glycolylneuraminic acid (NeuGc). To better understand the function of NeuGc-specific adaptations in hemagglutinin and to elucidate interspecies transmission potential NeuGc-adapted viruses, we evaluated the effects of NeuGc-specific mutations in avian H7 viruses in chickens and ducks, important economic hosts and reservoir birds, respectively. We also examined the impact on viral replication and found a binding affinity to tri-antennary N-glycans containing different terminal epitopes. These findings are significant as they contribute to the understanding of the role of receptor binding in avian influenza infection.

Detection of clade 2.3.4.4b highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus in New York City.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b were detected in North America in the winter of 2021/2022. These viruses have spread across the Americas, causing morbidity and mortality in both wild and domestic birds as well as some mammalian species, including cattle. Many surveillance programs for wildlife as well as commercial poultry operations have detected these viruses. In this study, we conducted surveillance of avian species in the urban environment in New York City. We detected highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses in six samples from four different bird species and performed whole-genome sequencing. Sequencing analysis showed the presence of multiple different genotypes. Our work highlights that the interface between animals and humans that may give rise to zoonotic infections or even pandemics is not limited to rural environments and commercial poultry operations but extends into the heart of our urban centers.IMPORTANCEWhile surveillance programs for avian influenza viruses are often focused on migratory routes and their associated stop-over locations or commercial poultry operations, many bird species-including migratory birds-frequent or live in urban green spaces and wetlands. This brings them into contact with a highly dense population of humans and pets, providing an extensive urban animal-human interface in which the general public may have little awareness of circulating infectious diseases. This study focuses on virus surveillance of this interface, combined with culturally responsive science education and community outreach.