Clinical Laboratory Biosafety Gaps: Lessons Learned from Past Outbreaks Reveal a Path to a Safer Future.

Patient care and public health require timely, reliable laboratory testing. However, clinical laboratory professionals rarely know whether patient specimens contain infectious agents, making ensuring biosafety while performing testing procedures challenging. The importance of biosafety in clinical laboratories was highlighted during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, where concerns about biosafety resulted in delayed diagnoses and contributed to patient deaths. This review is a collaboration between subject matter experts from large and small laboratories and the federal government to evaluate the capability of clinical laboratories to manage biosafety risks and safely test patient specimens. We discuss the complexity of clinical laboratories, including anatomic pathology, and describe how applying current biosafety guidance may be difficult as these guidelines, largely based on practices in research laboratories, do not always correspond to the unique clinical laboratory environments and their specialized equipment and processes. We retrospectively describe the biosafety gaps and opportunities for improvement in the areas of risk assessment and management; automated and manual laboratory disciplines; specimen collection, processing, and storage; test utilization; equipment and instrumentation safety; disinfection practices; personal protective equipment; waste management; laboratory personnel training and competency assessment; accreditation processes; and ethical guidance. Also addressed are the unique biosafety challenges successfully handled by a Texas community hospital clinical laboratory that performed testing for patients with Ebola without a formal biocontainment unit. The gaps in knowledge and practices identified in previous and ongoing outbreaks demonstrate the need for collaborative, comprehensive solutions to improve clinical laboratory biosafety and to better combat future emerging infectious disease outbreaks.

Outbreaks Associated with Treated Recreational Water - United States, 2000-2014.

Outbreaks associated with exposure to treated recreational water can be caused by pathogens or chemicals in venues such as pools, hot tubs/spas, and interactive water play venues (i.e., water playgrounds). During 2000-2014, public health officials from 46 states and Puerto Rico reported 493 outbreaks associated with treated recreational water. These outbreaks resulted in at least 27,219 cases and eight deaths. Among the 363 outbreaks with a confirmed infectious etiology, 212 (58%) were caused by Cryptosporidium (which causes predominantly gastrointestinal illness), 57 (16%) by Legionella (which causes Legionnaires' disease, a severe pneumonia, and Pontiac fever, a milder illness with flu-like symptoms), and 47 (13%) by Pseudomonas (which causes folliculitis ["hot tub rash"] and otitis externa ["swimmers' ear"]). Investigations of the 363 outbreaks identified 24,453 cases; 21,766 (89%) were caused by Cryptosporidium, 920 (4%) by Pseudomonas, and 624 (3%) by Legionella. At least six of the eight reported deaths occurred in persons affected by outbreaks caused by Legionella. Hotels were the leading setting, associated with 157 (32%) of the 493 outbreaks. Overall, the outbreaks had a bimodal temporal distribution: 275 (56%) outbreaks started during June-August and 46 (9%) in March. Assessment of trends in the annual counts of outbreaks caused by Cryptosporidium, Legionella, or Pseudomonas indicate mixed progress in preventing transmission. Pathogens able to evade chlorine inactivation have become leading outbreak etiologies. The consequent outbreak and case counts and mortality underscore the utility of CDC's Model Aquatic Health Code (https://www.cdc.gov/mahc) to prevent outbreaks associated with treated recreational water.

Vital Signs: Health Care-Associated Legionnaires' Disease Surveillance Data from 20 States and a Large Metropolitan Area - United States, 2015.

BACKGROUND: Legionnaires' disease, a severe pneumonia, is typically acquired through inhalation of aerosolized water containing Legionella bacteria. Legionella can grow in the complex water systems of buildings, including health care facilities. Effective water management programs could prevent the growth of Legionella in building water systems. METHODS: Using national surveillance data, Legionnaires' disease cases were characterized from the 21 jurisdictions (20 U.S. states and one large metropolitan area) that reported exposure information for ≥90% of 2015 Legionella infections. An assessment of whether cases were health care-associated was completed; definite health care association was defined as hospitalization or long-term care facility residence for the entire 10 days preceding symptom onset, and possible association was defined as any exposure to a health care facility for a portion of the 10 days preceding symptom onset. All other Legionnaires' disease cases were considered unrelated to health care. RESULTS: A total of 2,809 confirmed Legionnaires' disease cases were reported from the 21 jurisdictions, including 85 (3%) definite and 468 (17%) possible health care-associated cases. Among the 21 jurisdictions, 16 (76%) reported 1-21 definite health care-associated cases per jurisdiction. Among definite health care-associated cases, the majority (75, 88%) occurred in persons aged ≥60 years, and exposures occurred at 72 facilities (15 hospitals and 57 long-term care facilities). The case fatality rate was 25% for definite and 10% for possible health care-associated Legionnaires' disease. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE: Exposure to Legionella from health care facility water systems can result in Legionnaires' disease. The high case fatality rate of health care-associated Legionnaires' disease highlights the importance of case prevention and response activities, including implementation of effective water management programs and timely case identification.

Notes from the Field: Probable Mucormycosis Among Adult Solid Organ Transplant Recipients at an Acute Care Hospital - Pennsylvania, 2014-2015.

On September 17, 2015, the Pennsylvania Department of Health (PADOH) notified CDC of a cluster of three potentially health care-associated mucormycete infections that occurred among solid organ transplant recipients during a 12-month period at hospital A. On September 18, hospital B reported that it had identified an additional transplant recipient with mucormycosis. Hospitals A and B are part of the same health care system and are connected by a pedestrian bridge. PADOH requested CDC's assistance with an on-site investigation, which started on September 22, to identify possible sources of infection and prevent additional infections.

Hemodialysis and water quality.

Over 383,900 individuals in the U.S. undergo maintenance hemodialysis that exposes them to water, primarily in the form of dialysate. The quality of water and associated dialysis solutions have been implicated in adverse patient outcomes and is therefore critical. The Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation has published both standards and recommended practices that address both water and the dialyzing solutions. Some of these recommendations have been adopted into Federal Regulations by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services as part of the Conditions for Coverage, which includes limits on specific contaminants within water used for dialysis, dialysate, and substitution fluids. Chemical, bacterial, and endotoxin contaminants are health threats to dialysis patients, as shown by the continued episodic nature of outbreaks since the 1960s causing at least 592 cases and 16 deaths in the U.S. The importance of the dialysis water distribution system, current standards and recommendations, acceptable monitoring methods, a review of chemical, bacterial, and endotoxin outbreaks, and infection control programs are discussed.

Plumbing of hospital premises is a reservoir for opportunistically pathogenic microorganisms: a review.

Several bacterial species that are natural inhabitants of potable water distribution system biofilms are opportunistic pathogens important to sensitive patients in healthcare facilities. Waterborne healthcare-associated infections (HAI) may occur during the many uses of potable water in the healthcare environment. Prevention of infection is made more challenging by lack of data on infection rate and gaps in understanding of the ecology, virulence, and infectious dose of these opportunistic pathogens. Some healthcare facilities have been successful in reducing infections by following current water safety guidelines. This review describes several infections, and remediation steps that have been implemented to reduce waterborne HAIs.

Outbreak of hepatitis C virus infections at an outpatient hemodialysis facility: the importance of infection control competencies.

In the United States, the prevalence of hepatitis C virus infection among patients treated in hemodialysis facilities is five times higher than among the general population. This study investigated eight new hepatitis C virus infections among patients treated at an outpatient hemodialysis facility. Epidemiologic investigation and viral sequencing demonstrated that transmission likely occurred between patients typically treated during the same or consecutive shifts at the same or a nearby station. Several infection control breaches were observed including lapses involving the preparation, handling, and administration of parenteral medications. Improved infection control education and training for all hemodialysis facility staff is an important component of assuring adherence to appropriate procedures and preventing future outbreaks.

Vascular access hemorrhages contribute to deaths among hemodialysis patients.

In 2007 the Maryland Medical Examiner noted a potential cluster of fatal vascular access hemorrhages among hemodialysis patients, many of whom died outside of a health-care setting. To examine the epidemiology of fatal vascular access hemorrhages, we conducted a retrospective case review in District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia from January 2000 to July 2007 and a case-control study. Records from the Medical Examiner and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services were reviewed, from which 88 patients were identified as fatal vascular access hemorrhage cases. To assess risk factors, a subset of 20 cases from Maryland was compared to 38 controls randomly selected among hemodialysis patients who died from non-vascular access hemorrhage causes at the same Maryland facilities. Of the 88 confirmed cases, 55% hemorrhaged from arteriovenous grafts, 24% from arteriovenous fistulas, and 21% from central venous catheters. Of 82 case-patients with known location of hemorrhage, 78% occurred at home or in a nursing home. In the case-control analysis, statistically significant risk factors included the presence of an arteriovenous graft, access-related complications within 6 months of death, and hypertension; presence of a central venous catheter was significantly protective. Psychosocial factors and anticoagulant medications were not significant risk factors. Effective strategies to control vascular access hemorrhage in the home and further delineation of warning signs are needed.

Keeping health care linens clean: Underrecognized hazards and critical control points to avoid contamination of laundered health care textiles.

Outbreaks of health care-associated infections, particularly invasive mold infections, have been linked to environmental contamination of laundered health care textiles. Contamination may occur at the laundry or health care facility. This report highlights underrecognized hazards, control points, and actions that infection preventionists can take to help decrease the potential for patient exposure to contaminated health care textiles. Infection preventionists can use the checklists included in this report to assess laundry and health care facility management of laundered health care textiles.

Outbreak of adverse reactions associated with contaminated heparin.

BACKGROUND: In January 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention began a nationwide investigation of severe adverse reactions that were first detected in a single hemodialysis facility. Preliminary findings suggested that heparin was a possible cause of the reactions. METHODS: Information on clinical manifestations and on exposure was collected for patients who had signs and symptoms that were consistent with an allergic-type reaction after November 1, 2007. Twenty-one dialysis facilities that reported reactions and 23 facilities that reported no reactions were included in a case-control study to identify facility-level risk factors. Unopened heparin vials from facilities that reported reactions were tested for contaminants. RESULTS: A total of 152 adverse reactions associated with heparin were identified in 113 patients from 13 states from November 19, 2007, through January 31, 2008. The use of heparin manufactured by Baxter Healthcare was the factor most strongly associated with reactions (present in 100.0% of case facilities vs. 4.3% of control facilities, P<0.001). Vials of heparin manufactured by Baxter from facilities that reported reactions contained a contaminant identified as oversulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS). Adverse reactions to the OSCS-contaminated heparin were often characterized by hypotension, nausea, and shortness of breath occurring within 30 minutes after administration. Of 130 reactions for which information on the heparin lot was available, 128 (98.5%) occurred in a facility that had OSCS-contaminated heparin on the premises. Of 54 reactions for which the lot number of administered heparin was known, 52 (96.3%) occurred after the administration of OSCS-contaminated heparin. CONCLUSIONS: Heparin contaminated with OSCS was epidemiologically linked to adverse reactions in this nationwide outbreak. The reported clinical features of many of the cases further support the conclusion that contamination of heparin with OSCS was the cause of the outbreak.

Epidemiology, surveillance, and prevention of bloodstream infections in hemodialysis patients.

Infections cause significant morbidity and mortality in patients undergoing hemodialysis. Bloodstream infections (BSIs) are particularly problematic, accounting for a substantial number of hospitalizations in these patients. Hospitalizations for BSI and other vascular access infections appear to have increased dramatically in hemodialysis patients since 1993. These infections frequently are related to central venous catheter (CVC) use for dialysis access. Regional initiatives that have shown successful decreases in catheter-related BSIs in hospitalized patients have generated interest in replicating this success in outpatient hemodialysis populations. Several interventions have been effective in preventing BSIs in the hemodialysis setting. Avoiding the use of CVCs in favor of access types with lower associated BSI risk is among the most important. When CVCs are used, adherence to evidence-based catheter insertion and maintenance practices can positively influence BSI rates. In addition, facility-level surveillance to detect BSIs and stimulate examination of vascular access use and care practices is essential to a comprehensive approach to prevention. This article describes the current epidemiology of BSIs in hemodialysis patients and effective prevention strategies to decrease the incidence of these devastating infections.

Epidemiology, surveillance, and prevention of hepatitis C virus infections in hemodialysis patients.

Hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is the most common chronic blood-borne infection in the United States; the prevalence in maintenance hemodialysis patients substantially exceeds that in the general population. In hemodialysis patients, HCV infection has been associated with increased occurrence of cirrhosis and hepatocellular carcinoma and increased mortality. Injection drug use and receipt of blood transfusions before 1992 has accounted for most prevalent HCV infections in the United States. However, HCV transmission among patients undergoing hemodialysis has been documented frequently. Outbreak investigations have implicated lapses in infection control practices as the cause of HCV infections. Preventing these infections is an emerging priority for renal care providers, public health agencies, and regulators. Adherence to recommended infection control practices is effective in preventing HCV transmission in hemodialysis facilities. In addition, adoption of routine screening to facilitate the detection of incident HCV infections and hemodialysis-related transmission is an essential component of patient safety and infection prevention efforts. This article describes the current epidemiology of HCV infection in US maintenance hemodialysis patients and prevention practices to decrease its incidence and transmission.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Guidance on Flexible Gastrointestinal Endoscopes: Lessons Learned from Outbreaks, Infection Control.

Flexible endoscopes require cleaning, high-level disinfection, and sterilization between each patient use to reduce risk of transmitting pathogens. Public health investigations have identified concerns, including endoscope damage, mishandling, and reprocessing deficiencies, placing patients at risk for transmission of bacterial, viral, and other pathogens. Findings from outbreak investigations and other studies have led to innovations in endoscope design, use, and reprocessing, yet infection risks related to contaminated or damaged endoscopes remain. Strict adherence to infection control guidelines and manufacturer instructions for use, utilization of supplemental guidance, and training and oversight of reprocessing personnel, reduce risk of pathogen transmission by flexible endoscopes.

An outbreak of postoperative gram-negative bacterial endophthalmitis associated with contaminated trypan blue ophthalmic solution.

We report 6 cases of postsurgical endophthalmitis due to gram-negative bacteria associated with contaminated trypan blue dye from a compounding pharmacy. Unopened trypan blue syringes yielded Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Burkholderia cepacia complex on culture, with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns indistinguishable from patient isolates. Contamination of compounded medications should be considered when investigating outbreaks of postoperative endophthalmitis.

Variability of Burkholderia pseudomallei strain sensitivities to chlorine disinfection.

Burkholderia pseudomallei is a select agent and the causative agent of melioidosis. Variations in previously reported chlorine and monochloramine concentration time (Ct) values for disinfection of this organism make decisions regarding the appropriate levels of chlorine in water treatment systems difficult. This study identified the variation in Ct values for 2-, 3-, and 4-log(10) reductions of eight environmental and clinical isolates of B. pseudomallei in phosphate-buffered water. The greatest calculated Ct values for a 4-log(10) inactivation were 7.8 mg.min/liter for free available chlorine (FAC) at pH 8 and 5 degrees C and 550 mg.min/liter for monochloramine at pH 8 and 5 degrees C. Ionic strength of test solutions, culture hold times in water, and cell washing were ruled out as sources of the differences in prior observations. Tolerance to FAC was correlated with the relative amount of extracellular material produced by each isolate. Solid-phase cytometry analysis using an esterase-cleaved fluorochrome assay detected a 2-log(10)-higher level of organisms based upon metabolic activity than did culture, which in some cases increased Ct values by fivefold. Despite strain-to-strain variations in Ct values of 17-fold for FAC and 2.5-fold for monochloramine, standard FAC disinfection practices utilized in the United States should disinfect planktonic populations of these B. pseudomallei strains by 4 orders of magnitude in less than 10 min at the tested temperatures and pH levels.

Structural analysis of biofilm formation by rapidly and slowly growing nontuberculous mycobacteria.

Mycobacterium avium complex (MAC) and rapidly growing mycobacteria (RGM) such as M. abscessus, M. mucogenicum, M. chelonae, and M. fortuitum, implicated in health care-associated infections, are often isolated from potable water supplies as part of the microbial flora. To understand factors that influence growth in their environmental source, clinical RGM and slowly growing MAC isolates were grown as biofilm in a laboratory batch system. High and low nutrient levels were compared, as well as stainless steel and polycarbonate surfaces. Biofilm growth was measured after 72 h of incubation by enumeration of bacteria from disrupted biofilms and by direct quantitative image analysis of biofilm microcolony structure. RGM biofilm development was influenced more by nutrient level than by substrate material, though both affected biofilm growth for most of the isolates tested. Microcolony structure revealed that RGM develop several different biofilm structures under high-nutrient growth conditions, including pillars of various shapes (M. abscessus and M. fortuitum) and extensive cording (M. abscessus and M. chelonae). Although it is a slowly growing species in the laboratory, a clinical isolate of M. avium developed more culturable biofilm in potable water in 72 h than any of the 10 RGM examined. This indicates that M. avium is better adapted for growth in potable water systems than in laboratory incubation conditions and suggests some advantage that MAC has over RGM in low-nutrient environments.

Recovery efficiency and limit of detection of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis Sterne from environmental surface samples.

After the 2001 anthrax incidents, surface sampling techniques for biological agents were found to be inadequately validated, especially at low surface loadings. We aerosolized Bacillus anthracis Sterne spores within a chamber to achieve very low surface loading (ca. 3, 30, and 200 CFU per 100 cm(2)). Steel and carpet coupons seeded in the chamber were sampled with swab (103 cm(2)) or wipe or vacuum (929 cm(2)) surface sampling methods and analyzed at three laboratories. Agar settle plates (60 cm(2)) were the reference for determining recovery efficiency (RE). The minimum estimated surface concentrations to achieve a 95% response rate based on probit regression were 190, 15, and 44 CFU/100 cm(2) for sampling steel surfaces and 40, 9.2, and 28 CFU/100 cm(2) for sampling carpet surfaces with swab, wipe, and vacuum methods, respectively; however, these results should be cautiously interpreted because of high observed variability. Mean REs at the highest surface loading were 5.0%, 18%, and 3.7% on steel and 12%, 23%, and 4.7% on carpet for the swab, wipe, and vacuum methods, respectively. Precision (coefficient of variation) was poor at the lower surface concentrations but improved with increasing surface concentration. The best precision was obtained with wipe samples on carpet, achieving 38% at the highest surface concentration. The wipe sampling method detected B. anthracis at lower estimated surface concentrations and had higher RE and better precision than the other methods. These results may guide investigators to more meaningfully conduct environmental sampling, quantify contamination levels, and conduct risk assessment for humans.

Investigation of healthcare infection risks from water-related organisms: Summary of CDC consultations, 2014-2017.

OBJECTIVE: Water exposures in healthcare settings and during healthcare delivery can place patients at risk for infection with water-related organisms and can potentially lead to outbreaks. We aimed to describe Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) consultations involving water-related organisms leading to healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). DESIGN: Retrospective observational study. METHODS: We reviewed internal CDC records from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2017, using water-related terms and organisms, excluding Legionella, to identify consultations that involved potential or confirmed transmission of water-related organisms in healthcare. We determined plausible exposure pathways and routes of transmission when possible. RESULTS: Of 620 consultations during the study period, we identified 134 consultations (21.6%), with 1,380 patients, that involved the investigation of potential water-related HAIs or infection control lapses with the potential for water-related HAIs. Nontuberculous mycobacteria were involved in the greatest number of investigations (n = 40, 29.9%). Most frequently, investigations involved medical products (n = 48, 35.8%), and most of these products were medical devices (n = 40, 83.3%). We identified a variety of plausible water-exposure pathways, including medication preparation near water splash zones and water contamination at the manufacturing sites of medications and medical devices. CONCLUSIONS: Water-related investigations represent a substantial proportion of CDC HAI consultations and likely represent only a fraction of all water-related HAI investigations and outbreaks occurring in US healthcare facilities. Water-related HAI investigations should consider all potential pathways of water exposure. Finally, healthcare facilities should develop and implement water management programs to limit the growth and spread of water-related organisms.

RETRACTED: Structural analysis of biofilm formation by rapidly and slowly growing nontuberculous mycobacteria.

This article has been retracted.