Ontario's school-based HPV immunization program: school board assent and parental consent.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the implementation of Ontario's publicly-funded, school-based HPV immunization program through a process evaluation. PARTICIPANTS: The immunization program targets grade 8 females. Ontario vaccine-preventable disease managers were the key informants for this evaluation. SETTING: Ontario, Canada. INTERVENTION: Ontario's Public Health Units (HUs) are responsible for the local implementation of the immunization program. The process evaluation involved a telephone-based, semi-structured questionnaire which included questions on stakeholder engagement; school and school board participation; communication strategies; and processes for obtaining informed consent. OUTCOMES: All 36 HUs participated; 16 (44%) reported difficulties receiving agreement from local school boards to administer HPV vaccine in schools. Two Catholic school boards have not permitted HPV vaccine clinics in their schools: 1 only during the first year and 1 in the second and third years. All HUs request parental consent for students to receive the HPV vaccine and 5/36 also request or encourage student consent; 14 HUs indicated they would immunize a grade 8 girl at a school clinic, in the absence of parental consent, if the student requested immunization and was judged capable of providing informed consent. CONCLUSION: Many HUs reported challenges in receiving support from local school boards. Despite this, vaccine clinics have been offered in all but 2 public school boards since 2007. All HUs request parental consent before HPV immunization at school-based clinics; 39% would consider immunizing in absence of parental consent. The results of this process evaluation will inform the HPV immunization program evaluation that is currently underway in Ontario.

Parotitis in a child infected with triple-reassortant influenza A virus in Canada in 2007.

Swine H3N2 influenza virus designated A/Ontario/1252/2007 was isolated from a child with parotitis. Diagnosis was confirmed by viral isolation and serological assays. A/Ontario/1252/2007 was related to H3N2 triple reassortants that emerged in swine in the United States in 1998. Three of five tested household members were also seropositive for A/Ontario/1252/2007.

A nosocomial outbreak of community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus among healthy newborns and postpartum mothers.

BACKGROUND: Community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) has increasingly been isolated from individuals with no predisposing risk factors; however, such strains have rarely been linked to outbreaks in the hospital setting. The present study describes the investigation of an outbreak of CA-MRSA that occurred in the maternal-newborn unit of a large community teaching hospital in Toronto, Ontario. METHODS: Screening and clinical specimens collected from mothers and newborns delivered during the outbreak period, as well as from staff on the affected unit, were submitted for microbiological testing. Computerized delivery logs and nursing notes were reviewed, and a case control study was conducted. RESULTS: Analysis by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis revealed 38 babies and seven mothers with MRSA colonization and/or infection by the same unique strain (Canadian MRSA-10-related) from September to December 2004. Isolates were characterized as having the staphylococcal chromosome cassette mec type IVa and were positive for the Panton-Valentine leukocidin gene. No one health care worker was associated with all cases; however, mothers and newborns exposed to one particular nurse (Nurse A) were almost 23 times (odds ratio 22.7, 95% CI 3.3 to 195.9) more likely to acquire MRSA than those with no such contact. MRSA was successfully isolated from Nurse A and from an environmental swab of a telephone recently used by Nurse A; both isolates matched the pulsed-field gel electrophoresis pattern of the outbreak strain. CONCLUSION: The first nosocomial outbreak of CA-MRSA among healthy newborns and postpartum mothers in Canada is described. Effective control of sustained MRSA transmission within an institution may require prompt identification, treatment and monitoring of colonized and/or infected staff.

Ensuring a broad and inclusive approach: a provincial perspective on pandemic preparedness.

The SARS crisis revealed critical gaps in Ontario's health emergency response capacity, and identified, in the starkest terms possible, the need for improved emergency response planning. This article reviews the development of the Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic (OHPIP), released in June 2005. Some key points arising from the provincial planning process include the necessity to: ensure a broad and inclusive development process; ensure the pandemic plan identifies: 1) clear roles and responsibilities of federal, provincial/territorial and municipal levels of government, 2) the approach to occupational health and safety issues and ethical decision-making, 3) a communications strategy linking all affected sectors and levels of government and health sector; 4) any commitments to antiviral stockpiling, vaccine and antiviral allocation and use, and an approach for drug delivery from provincial stockpiles to local public health units; 5) health human resource management and supplementation; and 6) key programs/services to be scaled back to maximize surge capacity; address best practices (e.g., involve all sectors of the health care system at the outset, acquire strategic expertise, coordinate/advocate with broader emergency response system, etc); and, outline future stages that include strengthening the delivery of clinical care to influenza cases; clarifying the role of primary care practitioners during a pandemic; leveraging Ontario's significant e-Health investments.

Risk factors for SARS transmission from patients requiring intubation: a multicentre investigation in Toronto, Canada.

BACKGROUND: In the 2003 Toronto SARS outbreak, SARS-CoV was transmitted in hospitals despite adherence to infection control procedures. Considerable controversy resulted regarding which procedures and behaviours were associated with the greatest risk of SARS-CoV transmission. METHODS: A retrospective cohort study was conducted to identify risk factors for transmission of SARS-CoV during intubation from laboratory confirmed SARS patients to HCWs involved in their care. All SARS patients requiring intubation during the Toronto outbreak were identified. All HCWs who provided care to intubated SARS patients during treatment or transportation and who entered a patient room or had direct patient contact from 24 hours before to 4 hours after intubation were eligible for this study. Data was collected on patients by chart review and on HCWs by interviewer-administered questionnaire. Generalized estimating equation (GEE) logistic regression models and classification and regression trees (CART) were used to identify risk factors for SARS transmission. RESULTS: 45 laboratory-confirmed intubated SARS patients were identified. Of the 697 HCWs involved in their care, 624 (90%) participated in the study. SARS-CoV was transmitted to 26 HCWs from 7 patients; 21 HCWs were infected by 3 patients. In multivariate GEE logistic regression models, presence in the room during fiberoptic intubation (OR = 2.79, p = .004) or ECG (OR = 3.52, p = .002), unprotected eye contact with secretions (OR = 7.34, p = .001), patient APACHE II score > or = 20 (OR = 17.05, p = .009) and patient Pa0(2)/Fi0(2) ratio < or = 59 (OR = 8.65, p = .001) were associated with increased risk of transmission of SARS-CoV. In CART analyses, the four covariates which explained the greatest amount of variation in SARS-CoV transmission were covariates representing individual patients. CONCLUSION: Close contact with the airway of severely ill patients and failure of infection control practices to prevent exposure to respiratory secretions were associated with transmission of SARS-CoV. Rates of transmission of SARS-CoV varied widely among patients.