Positively framing mind wandering does not increase mind wandering in older adults.

Age-related differences in mind wandering are robust, with older adults reporting less mind wandering compared to younger adults. While several theories have been put forth to explain this difference, one view has received less attention than others. Specifically, age-related differences in mind wandering might occur because older adults are reluctant to report on their mind wandering. The aim of the current study was to explicitly test this hypothesis. Older and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with intermittent thought probes to assess mind wandering. In one condition, participants were provided with standard instructions about how to respond to questions about their thoughts. In a second condition, participants were provided with a positive framing of mind wandering. Mind wandering was assessed both subjectively (i.e., via thought probes) and objectively (i.e., using different behavioral measures from the go/no-go task). The results of the study suggest that positively framing mind wandering did not impact rates of mind wandering or objective indicators of mind wandering for older or younger adults. Older adults reported less mind wandering, regardless of condition, compared to younger adults. Older adults also had generally better performance on the go/no-go task compared to younger adults. Bayesian analyses suggested that the main effect of framing condition, although not significant in Frequentist terms, did provide moderate evidence of an overall effect on mind wandering rates. We interpret the results as evidence against the reluctance hypothesis, consistent with previous work.

On the psychometric evaluation of cognitive control tasks: An Investigation with the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) battery.

The domain of cognitive control has been a major focus of experimental, neuroscience, and individual differences research. Currently, however, no theory of cognitive control successfully unifies both experimental and individual differences findings. Some perspectives deny that there even exists a unified psychometric cognitive control construct to be measured at all. These shortcomings of the current literature may reflect the fact that current cognitive control paradigms are optimized for the detection of within-subject experimental effects rather than individual differences. In the current study, we examine the psychometric properties of the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) task battery, which was designed in accordance with a theoretical framework that postulates common sources of within-subject and individual differences variation. We evaluated both internal consistency and test-retest reliability, and for the latter, utilized both classical test theory measures (i.e., split-half methods, intraclass correlation) and newer hierarchical Bayesian estimation of generative models. Although traditional psychometric measures suggested poor reliability, the hierarchical Bayesian models indicated a different pattern, with good to excellent test-retest reliability in almost all tasks and conditions examined. Moreover, within-task, between-condition correlations were generally increased when using the Bayesian model-derived estimates, and these higher correlations appeared to be directly linked to the higher reliability of the measures. In contrast, between-task correlations remained low regardless of theoretical manipulations or estimation approach. Together, these findings highlight the advantages of Bayesian estimation methods, while also pointing to the important role of reliability in the search for a unified theory of cognitive control.

A Representational Similarity Analysis of Cognitive Control during Color-Word Stroop.

Progress in understanding the neural bases of cognitive control has been supported by the paradigmatic color-word Stroop task, in which a target response (color name) must be selected over a more automatic, yet potentially incongruent, distractor response (word). For this paradigm, models have postulated complementary coding schemes: dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) is proposed to evaluate the demand for control via incongruency-related coding, whereas dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) is proposed to implement control via goal and target-related coding. Yet, mapping these theorized schemes to measured neural activity within this task has been challenging. Here, we tested for these coding schemes relatively directly, by decomposing an event-related color-word Stroop task via representational similarity analysis. Three neural coding models were fit to the similarity structure of multivoxel patterns of human fMRI activity, acquired from 65 healthy, young-adult males and females. Incongruency coding was predominant in DMFC, whereas both target and incongruency coding were present with indistinguishable strength in DLPFC. In contrast, distractor information was strongly encoded within early visual cortex. Further, these coding schemes were differentially related to behavior: individuals with stronger DLPFC (and lateral posterior parietal cortex) target coding, but weaker DMFC incongruency coding, exhibited less behavioral Stroop interference. These results highlight the utility of the representational similarity analysis framework for investigating neural mechanisms of cognitive control and point to several promising directions to extend the Stroop paradigm.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How the human brain enables cognitive control - the ability to override behavioral habits to pursue internal goals - has been a major focus of neuroscience research. This ability has been frequently investigated by using the Stroop color-word naming task. With the Stroop as a test-bed, many theories have proposed specific neuroanatomical dissociations, in which medial and lateral frontal brain regions underlie cognitive control by encoding distinct types of information. Yet providing a direct confirmation of these claims has been challenging. Here, we demonstrate that representational similarity analysis, which estimates and models the similarity structure of brain activity patterns, can successfully establish the hypothesized functional dissociations within the Stroop task. Representational similarity analysis may provide a useful approach for investigating cognitive control mechanisms.

Transfer of learned cognitive control settings within and between tasks.

Cognitive control is modulated based on learned associations between conflict probability and stimulus features such as color. We investigated whether such learning-guided control transfers to novel stimuli and/or a novel task. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants experienced an item-specific proportion congruence (ISPC) manipulation in a Stroop (Experiment 1) or Flanker (Experiment 2) task with mostly congruent (MC) and mostly incongruent (MI) colors in training blocks. During a transfer block, participants performed the same task and encountered novel transfer stimuli paired with MC or MI colors. Evidencing within-task transfer, in both experiments, responses were faster to incongruent transfer stimuli comprising an MI color compared with an MC color. In Experiment 3, we investigated between-task transfer from Stroop to Flanker. After training with an ISPC manipulation in the Stroop task, a Flanker task was completed with the same colors but without an ISPC manipulation (i.e., 50% congruent). Responses were faster to incongruent transfer stimuli paired with the previously-MI colors compared with the previously-MC colors. Additionally, transfer was evident in the first half of the Flanker task but not the second half. The evidence for within-task transfer, in combination with the novel evidence for between-task transfer, suggests learned control settings are flexibly retrieved and executed when predictive cues signaling these control settings are encountered in novel stimuli or a novel task. Theoretical implications are discussed alongside potential neural mechanisms mediating transfer of learning-guided control.

The effect of context on mind-wandering in younger and older adults.

Older adults report less mind-wandering (MW) during tasks of sustained attention than younger adults. The control failure × current concerns account argues that this is due to age differences in how contexts cue personally relevant task-unrelated thoughts. For older adults, the university laboratory contains few reminders of their current concerns and unfinished goals. For younger adults, however, the university laboratory is more directly tied to their current concerns. Therefore, if the context for triggering current concerns is the critical difference between younger and older adults' reported MW frequencies, then testing the two groups in contexts that equate the salience of self-relevant cues (i.e., their homes) should result in an increase in older but not younger adults' MW rates. The present study directly compared rates of MW and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) in the home versus in the lab for younger and older adults using a within-subjects manipulation of context. Inconsistent with the control failure × current concerns account, no significant reduction in the age-gap in MW was found. Suggesting a lack of cues rather than an abundance of cues elicits MW, participants in both age groups reported more MW in the lab than at home. The number of IAMs recalled did not differ across contexts but was lower in older than younger adults. These findings suggest that a cognitive rather than an environmental mechanism may be behind the reduction in spontaneous cognition in aging.

Meaningful boundaries create boundary conditions for control.

Recent research demonstrated that control states learned via experience in inducer locations were retrieved in novel, unbiased (i.e., diagnostic) locations positioned nearby. Such transfer has been observed even in the presence of a visual boundary (a line) separating inducer and diagnostic locations. One aim of the present study was to assess whether a meaningful boundary might disrupt retrieval of control states in diagnostic locations. Supporting this possibility, in Experiment 1 learned control states did not transfer from inducer locations superimposed on a university's quad to diagnostic locations superimposed on buildings outside the quad. Similarly, in Experiment 2 transfer was not observed for diagnostic locations positioned on a track outside of the field where inducer locations were positioned; however, transfer was also not observed for diagnostic locations on the field (inside the boundary). The latter finding helped motivate Experiments 3a and 3b, which tackled the second aim by examining whether a meaningful boundary might attenuate learning of control states for inducer locations within the boundary. Consistent with this hypothesis, a CSPC effect was observed only when a meaningful boundary was not present. Taken together, the findings provide evidence that meaningful boundaries influence how conflict experiences are organized during a task thereby impacting learning and transfer of context-specific control states.

The Timescale of Control: A Meta-Control Property that Generalizes across Tasks but Varies between Types of Control.

Prominent models of control assume that conflict and the probability of conflict are signals used by control processes that regulate attention. For example, when conflict is frequent across preceding trials (i.e., high probability of conflict), control processes bias attention toward goal-relevant information on subsequent trials. An important but underspecified question regards the meta-control property of timescale-that is, how far back does the control system "look" to determine the probability of conflict? To address this question, Aben, Verguts, and Van den Bussche (2017) developed a statistical model quantifying the timescale of control. In a flanker task, they observed short timescales for lists with a low probability of conflict (which induce reactive control) and long timescales for lists with a high probability of conflict (which induce proactive control). To investigate the domain generality of these timescales, we applied their model to two additional conflict tasks that manipulated the list-wide probability of conflict. Our findings replicated Aben et al. suggesting meta-control may be task general with respect to timescales operating on the list level. We subsequently modified their model to examine timescale differences for items in the same list that differed in their probability of conflict but not the type of control engaged. We failed to detect a difference in timescales between items. Collectively, the findings demonstrate that differences in the timescale of control are task general and suggest that timescale differences are driven by the type of control engaged and not by the probability of conflict per se.

Deactivation of prospective memory intentions: Examining the role of the stimulus-response link.

Successful prospective remembering involves formation of a stimulus (e.g., bottle of medication and/or place where the bottle is kept)-response (e.g., taking a medication) link. We investigated the role of this link in the deactivation of no-longer-relevant prospective memory intentions, as evidenced by commission error risk. Experiment 1a contrasted two hypotheses of intention deactivation (degree of fulfillment and response frequency) by holding constant the degree of intention fulfillment (e.g., participants responded to one of two target words) while manipulating the number of times the intention was performed. Findings supported the response frequency hypothesis. Experiment 1b employed novel lure trials to examine what "stimulus" participants link the prospective memory response to-target words and/or the salient contextual cue-and compared commission errors to Experiment 1a. Findings suggested the salient context alone does not always function as the stimulus. Collectively these findings, in conjunction with those of Experiment 2 (a within-experiment replication) and a combined analysis, suggest that (a) intention deactivation is facilitated by prior responding (formation/strengthening of stimulus-response links), but additional research is needed to establish the robustness of this effect, and (b) when responding frequently to targets, participants are more likely to bind the response to the context alone than to the target or target/context combination, possibly because they learn to rely on context to predict target occurrence. The latter finding was robust and indicates that deactivation of the appropriate stimulus (target and/or context)-response link may be a critical component of reducing commission errors.

Attentional control transfers beyond the reference frame.

Much research has shown that humans can allocate attentional control differentially to multiple locations based on the amount of conflict historically associated with a given location. Additionally, once established, these control settings can transfer to nearby locations that themselves have no conflict bias. Here we examined if these control settings also extend to nearby locations that are presented outside of the original frame of reference of biased stimuli. During training, participants first responded to biased flanker stimuli that were likely high conflict in one location and low conflict in another location. Then they were exposed to two sets of unbiased stimuli presented in novel transfer locations outside of the established reference frame of biased stimuli. Across three experiments, attentional control settings transferred beyond the reference frame including when there was a visual border (Experiment 2) or meaningful categorical distinction (Experiment 3) delineating training and transfer locations. These novel findings further support the idea that stimulus-driven attention control can be flexibly allocated, perhaps in a categorical manner.

Aging and strategic prospective memory monitoring.

Monitoring the environment for the occurrence of prospective memory (PM) targets is a resource-demanding process that produces cost (e.g., slowing) to ongoing activities. Prior research has shown that older adults are able to monitor strategically, which involves the activation of monitoring when contextually appropriate and deactivation of monitoring when it is not thereby affording conservation of limited-capacity attentional resources. However, the time course and efficiency with which these processes operate with increased age are unknown. In the current study, participants performed an ongoing lexical decision task in which words/nonwords were blocked by font color in sets of ten trials (ten red trials followed by ten blue trials). Importantly, participants were informed that PM targets ("TOR" syllable) would only occur in red trials. Replicating previous work, both younger and older adults were successfully able to disengage monitoring upon encountering the unexpected (i.e., blue) context. However, while younger adults completely disengaged monitoring in the unexpected context, older adults continued to show monitoring across the majority of trials. Additionally, younger, but not older, adults showed a re-engagement of monitoring at the end of the unexpected context in preparation for the upcoming expected context. These findings suggest that while strategic monitoring generally remains intact with increased age, the disengagement and preparatory re-engagement of strategic monitoring may operate less optimally for older adults.

The strategic control of prospective memory monitoring in response to complex and probabilistic contextual cues.

Participants use simple contextual cues to reduce deployment of costly monitoring processes in contexts in which prospective memory (PM) targets are not expected. This study investigated whether this strategic monitoring pattern is observed in response to complex and probabilistic contextual cues. Participants performed a lexical decision task in which words or nonwords were presented in upper or lower locations on screen. The specific condition was informed that PM targets ("tor" syllable) would occur only in words in the upper location, whereas the nonspecific condition was informed that targets could occur in any location or word type. Context was blocked such that word type and location changed every 8 trials. In Experiment 1, the specific condition used the complex contextual cue to reduce monitoring in unexpected contexts relative to the nonspecific condition. This pattern largely was not evidenced when the complex contextual cue was probabilistic (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 confirmed that strategic monitoring is observed for a complex cue that is deterministic, but not one that is probabilistic. Additionally, Experiments 1 and 3 demonstrated a disadvantage associated with strategic monitoring-namely, that the specific condition was less likely to respond to a PM target in an unexpected context. Experiment 3 provided evidence that this disadvantage is attributable to impaired noticing of the target. The novel findings suggest use of a complex contextual cue per se is not a boundary condition for the strategic, context-specific allocation of monitoring processes to support prospective remembering; however, strategic monitoring is constrained by the predictive utility of the complex contextual cue.

The next trial will be conflicting! Effects of explicit congruency pre-cues on cognitive control.

The dual mechanisms of control account proposed a role for proactive and reactive mechanisms in minimizing or resolving interference in conflict tasks. Proactive mechanisms are activated in advance of stimulus onset and lead to preparatory biasing of attention in a goal-directed fashion. Reactive mechanisms are triggered post-stimulus onset. Using an explicit, trial-by-trial pre-cueing procedure in a 4-choice color-word Stroop task, we investigated effects of congruency pre-cues on cognitive control. Under conditions of stimulus uncertainty (i.e., each word was associated with multiple, equally probable responses), pre-cue benefits were observed on incongruent trials when cues were 100% valid but not when they were 75% valid. These benefits were selectively found at the longest cue-to-stimulus interval (2,000 ms), consistent with a preparation-dependent proactive control mechanism. By contrast, when a reactive strategy of switching attention to the irrelevant dimension to predict the single correlated response was viable, pre-cue benefits were observed on incongruent trials for all cue-to-stimulus intervals including the shortest that afforded only 500 ms to prepare. The findings (a) suggest a restricted role for the preparation-dependent biasing of attention via proactive control in response to explicit, trial-by-trial pre-cues while (b) highlighting strategies that lead to pre-cue benefits but which appear to reflect primarily reactive use of the information afforded by the pre-cues. We conclude that pre-cues, though available in advance of stimulus onset, may stimulate proactive or reactive minimization of interference.

Proactive control of irrelevant task rules during cued task switching.

In task-switching paradigms, participants are often slower on incongruent than congruent trials, a pattern known as the task-rule congruency effect. This effect suggests that irrelevant task rules or associated responses may be retrieved automatically in spite of task cues. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether the task-rule congruency effect may be modulated via manipulations intended to induce variation in proactive control. Manipulating the proportion of congruent to incongruent trials strongly influenced the magnitude of the task-rule congruency effect. The effect was significantly reduced in a mostly incongruent list relative to a mostly congruent list, a pattern that was observed for not only biased but also 50 % congruent items. This finding implicates a role for global attentional control processes in the task-rule congruency effect. In contrast, enhancing the preparation of relevant (cued) task rules by the provision of a monetary incentive substantially reduced mixing costs but did not affect the task-rule congruency effect. These patterns support the view that there may be multiple routes by which proactive control can influence task-switching performance; however, only select routes appear to influence the automatic retrieval of irrelevant task rules.

Dissociating proactive and reactive control in the Stroop task.

The Dual Mechanisms of Control framework posits the existence of two distinct control mechanisms, proactive and reactive, which may operate independently. However, this independence has been difficult to study with most experimental paradigms. The Stroop task may provide a useful way of assessing the independence of control mechanisms because the task elicits two types of proportion congruency effects, list-wide and item-specific, thought to reflect proactive and reactive control respectively. The present research tested whether these two proportion congruency effects can be used to dissociate proactive and reactive control. In 2 separate participant samples, we demonstrate that list-wide and item-specific proportion congruency effects are stable, exist in the same participants, and appear in different task conditions. Moreover, we identify two distinct behavioral signatures, the congruency cost and the transfer cost, which doubly dissociate the two effects. Together, the results are consistent with the view that proactive and reactive control reflect independent mechanisms.

Age-Related Differences in Mind Wandering: The Role of Emotional Valence.

OBJECTIVES: Older adults consistently report fewer experiences of mind wandering compared to younger adults. Aging is also associated with a shift in the emotional focus of our thoughts, with older adults tending to experience an increase in attention toward positive information, or a "positivity bias," relative to younger adults. Here, we tested if the positivity bias associated with aging can also predict age-related changes in the content of older adults' mind wandering. METHOD: Older adults and younger adults completed a go/no-go task with periodic thought probes to assess rates of emotionally valenced mind wandering. RESULTS: Older adults reported significantly less negatively and neutrally valenced mind wandering compared to younger adults, but there was no age difference in reports of positively valenced mind wandering. Overall rates of mind wandering predicted poorer task performance for both age groups: Individuals who mind wandered more, performed worse, but this did not differ by the emotional valence. Both older adults and younger adults showed similar in-the-moment performance deficits, with mind wandering reports being associated with worse immediate no-go accuracy and faster reaction times, consistent with mindless responding. DISCUSSION: Focusing on different dimensions of thought content, such as emotional valence, can provide new insight into age-related differences in mind wandering. Older adults' mind wandering reports were less negative and neutral compared to younger adults' reports suggesting a positivity bias for older adults. However, this positivity bias does not seem to affect task performance. We discuss the implications of the findings for mind wandering theories and the positivity bias.

Between-task transfer of item-specific control is replicable and extends to novel conditions.

Learning-guided control refers to adjustments of cognitive control settings based on learned associations between predictive cues and the likelihood of conflict. In three preregistered experiments, we examined transfer of item-specific control settings beyond conditions under which they were learned. In Experiment 1, an item-specific proportion congruence (ISPC) manipulation was applied in a training phase in which target color in a Flanker task was biased (mostly congruent or mostly incongruent). In a subsequent transfer phase, participants performed a color-word Stroop task in which the same target colors were unbiased (50% congruent). The same design was implemented in Experiment 2, but training and transfer tasks were intermixed within blocks. Between-task transfer was evidenced in both experiments, suggesting learned control settings associated with the predictive cues were retrieved when encountering unbiased transfer items. In Experiment 3, we investigated a farther version of between-task transfer by using training (color-word Stroop) and transfer (picture-word Stroop) tasks that did not share the relevant (to-be-named) dimension or response sets. Despite the stronger, between-task boundary, we observed an ISPC effect for the transfer items, but it did not emerge until the second half of the experiment. The results provided converging evidence for the flexibility and automaticity of item-specific control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

When is context used to guide prospective memory monitoring?

Monitoring the environment for prospective memory (PM) targets can be attentionally demanding, such as searching for a pharmacy to pick up medication while driving in traffic. It is therefore optimal to increase monitoring in contexts when the probability of encountering a PM target is high (e.g., business plaza) and decrease monitoring in contexts when the probability is low (e.g., residential area), referred to as strategic monitoring. In some instances, though, identifying whether the context is appropriate for monitoring can be attentionally demanding. For example, when contextual information varies unpredictably, it may be easier to continuously monitor rather than dynamically increase and decrease monitoring on a moment-by-moment basis. The current study extends previous research by showing that participants strategically monitor when the ongoing task automatically orients attention to contextual information (i.e., focal context cues), regardless of the difficulty of checking for PM targets (Experiment 1). In contrast, when ongoing task processing does not orient attention to contextual information (i.e., nonfocal context cues), participants only strategically monitor when the demands of target checking are high (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that the decision to utilize context to adjust monitoring is driven by a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the perceived efforts of context identification relative to the expected benefit of not having to check for PM targets on half of the trials. When the perceived effort of identifying context on each trial is outweighed by the benefit of reducing target checking on a subset of trials, strategic monitoring occurs.

Humans do not avoid reactively implementing cognitive control.

The ability to exert cognitive control allows us to achieve goals in the face of distraction and competing actions. However, control is costly-people generally aim to minimize its demands. Because control takes many forms, it is important to understand whether such costs apply universally. Specifically, reactive control, which is recruited in response to stimulus or contextual features, is theorized to be deployed automatically, and not depend on attentional resources. Here, we investigated whether people avoided implementing reactive control in three experiments. In all, participants performed a Stroop task in which certain items were mostly incongruent (MI), that is, associated with a high likelihood of conflict (triggering a focused control setting). Other items were mostly congruent, that is, associated with a low likelihood of conflict (triggering a relaxed control setting). Experiment 1 demonstrated that these control settings transfer to a subsequent unbiased transfer phase. In Experiments 2-3, we used a demand selection task to investigate whether people would avoid choice options that yielded items that were previously MI. In all, participants continued to retrieve focused control settings for previously MI items, but they did not avoid them in the demand selection task. Critically, we only found demand avoidance when there was an objective difference in demand between options. These findings are consistent with the idea that implementing reactive control does not register as costly. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Sequence effects and speech processing: cognitive load for speaker-switching within and across accents.

Prior work in speech processing indicates that listening tasks with multiple speakers (as opposed to a single speaker) result in slower and less accurate processing. Notably, the trial-to-trial cognitive demands of switching between speakers or switching between accents have yet to be examined. We used pupillometry, a physiological index of cognitive load, to examine the demands of processing first (L1) and second (L2) language-accented speech when listening to sentences produced by the same speaker consecutively (no switch), a novel speaker of the same accent (within-accent switch), and a novel speaker with a different accent (across-accent switch). Inspired by research on sequential adjustments in cognitive control, we aimed to identify the cognitive demands of accommodating a novel speaker and accent by examining the trial-to-trial changes in pupil dilation during speech processing. Our results indicate that switching between speakers was more cognitively demanding than listening to the same speaker consecutively. Additionally, switching to a novel speaker with a different accent was more cognitively demanding than switching between speakers of the same accent. However, there was an asymmetry for across-accent switches, such that switching from an L1 to an L2 accent was more demanding than vice versa. Findings from the present study align with work examining multi-talker processing costs, and provide novel evidence that listeners dynamically adjust cognitive processing to accommodate speaker and accent variability. We discuss these novel findings in the context of an active control model and auditory streaming framework of speech processing.

Controlling intentions: the surprising ease of stopping after going relative to stopping after never having gone.

Decades of cognitive-control research have highlighted the difficulty of controlling a prepotent response. We examined whether having prepotent prospective-memory intentions similarly heightens the difficulty associated with stopping an intention once a prospective-memory task is finished. In three experiments, participants encoded a prospective-memory intention (e.g., press Q in response to the targets corn and dancer) and subsequently encountered either four targets or zero targets. Instructions then indicated that the prospective-memory task was finished. In a follow-up task, the targets appeared, and commission errors were recorded. Surprisingly, it was easier for participants to stop the intention when it had been fulfilled (four-target condition) than when it had gone unfulfilled (zero-target condition; Experiments 1 and 2). This was true even after intention cancellation (Experiment 2). Although repeatedly performing an intention strengthens target-action links, it appears to enable deactivation of the intention, a process that is largely target specific (Experiment 3). We relate these findings to the Zeigarnik effect, target-action deactivation, and reconsolidation theories.