Blackout of my nights: Contentless, timeless and selfless report from the night in patients with central hypersomnias.

At the extreme spectrum of consciousness during sleep, some patients with rare hypersomnias reported experiencing a specific night 'blackout' when sleeping, i.e., an absence of experiences or recall of them from sleep onset to offset. Thus, we explored through questionnaires the conscious experiences (dreaming experience, mind, self) during the night in 133 patients with idiopathic hypersomnia, 108 patients with narcolepsy, and 128 healthy controls. The night blackout was more frequent in idiopathic hypersomnia than in narcolepsy and control groups. Patients with idiopathic hypersomnia and frequent night amnesia had lower dream recall frequencies, and felt more often sleep as deep and mind as blank during the night. They had a higher proportion of slow wave sleep on their (retrospectively collected) sleep recordings than those without night blackout. This night blackout provides a new model for studying loss of consciousness during sleep, here as a contentless, selfless and timeless feeling upon awakening.

Behavioral and brain responses to verbal stimuli reveal transient periods of cognitive integration of the external world during sleep.

Sleep has long been considered as a state of behavioral disconnection from the environment, without reactivity to external stimuli. Here we questioned this 'sleep disconnection' dogma by directly investigating behavioral responsiveness in 49 napping participants (27 with narcolepsy and 22 healthy volunteers) engaged in a lexical decision task. Participants were instructed to frown or smile depending on the stimulus type. We found accurate behavioral responses, visible via contractions of the corrugator or zygomatic muscles, in most sleep stages in both groups (except slow-wave sleep in healthy volunteers). Across sleep stages, responses occurred more frequently when stimuli were presented during high cognitive states than during low cognitive states, as indexed by prestimulus electroencephalography. Our findings suggest that transient windows of reactivity to external stimuli exist during bona fide sleep, even in healthy individuals. Such windows of reactivity could pave the way for real-time communication with sleepers to probe sleep-related mental and cognitive processes.

Real-time dialogue between experimenters and dreamers during REM sleep.

Dreams take us to a different reality, a hallucinatory world that feels as real as any waking experience. These often-bizarre episodes are emblematic of human sleep but have yet to be adequately explained. Retrospective dream reports are subject to distortion and forgetting, presenting a fundamental challenge for neuroscientific studies of dreaming. Here we show that individuals who are asleep and in the midst of a lucid dream (aware of the fact that they are currently dreaming) can perceive questions from an experimenter and provide answers using electrophysiological signals. We implemented our procedures for two-way communication during polysomnographically verified rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep in 36 individuals. Some had minimal prior experience with lucid dreaming, others were frequent lucid dreamers, and one was a patient with narcolepsy who had frequent lucid dreams. During REM sleep, these individuals exhibited various capabilities, including performing veridical perceptual analysis of novel information, maintaining information in working memory, computing simple answers, and expressing volitional replies. Their responses included distinctive eye movements and selective facial muscle contractions, constituting correctly answered questions on 29 occasions across 6 of the individuals tested. These repeated observations of interactive dreaming, documented by four independent laboratory groups, demonstrate that phenomenological and cognitive characteristics of dreaming can be interrogated in real time. This relatively unexplored communication channel can enable a variety of practical applications and a new strategy for the empirical exploration of dreams.

Color Categorization Independent of Color Naming.

Color is continuous, yet we group colors into discrete categories associated with color names (e.g., yellow, blue). Color categorization is a case in point in the debate on how language shapes human cognition. Evidence suggests that color categorization depends on top-down input from the language system to the visual cortex. We directly tested this hypothesis by assessing color categorization in a stroke patient, RDS, with a rare, selective deficit in naming visually presented chromatic colors, and relatively preserved achromatic color naming. Multimodal MRI revealed a left occipito-temporal lesion that directly damaged left color-biased regions, and functionally disconnected their right-hemisphere homologs from the language system. The lesion had a greater effect on RDS's chromatic color naming than on color categorization, which was relatively preserved on a nonverbal task. Color categorization and naming can thus be independent in the human brain, challenging the mandatory involvement of language in adult human cognition.