Elephants, Personhood, and Moral Status.

This essay uses the lens of moral status to explore the question of whether elephants ought to count as persons under the law. After distinguishing descriptive, moral, and legal concepts of personhood, the author argues that elephants are (descriptively) at least "borderline persons," justifying an attribution of full moral status and, thereby, a solid basis for legal personhood. A final section examines broad implications of elephant personhood.

Leveraging a Sturdy Norm: How Ethicists Really Argue?

Rarely do everyday discussions of ethical issues invoke ethical theories. Even ethicists deploy ethical theories less frequently than one might expect. In my experience, the most powerful ethical arguments rarely appeal to an ethical theory. How is this possible? I contend that ethical argumentation can proceed successfully without invoking any ethical theory because the structure of good ethical argumentation involves leveraging a sturdy norm, where the norm is usually far more specific than a complete ethical theory. To illustrate this idea, I present the argumentative structure of five powerful articles in the ethics literature. I further argue that the present model of ethical argumentation is consistent with the coherence model of ethical justification, but the former need not--and usually should not--invoke the latter explicitly for various practical reasons.

Robots with Moral Status?

Assuming robots of the future will be far more advanced than their present-day forebears, it is not premature to ask what they will have to be like in order to have moral status. This article first examines criteria for moral status, criticizing several models before briefly defending an interest-based account. It next investigates the epistemological challenge of applying criteria for moral status to robots, before eliciting implications with attention to basic moral status, rights, and respect for autonomy. The article concludes with reflections on species-based prejudice and an acute practical dilemma that will confront robotics.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) Infection Challenge Experiments in Nonhuman Primates: An Ethical Perspective.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has stimulated massive investment in biomedical research with the aims of understanding the disease and developing effective vaccine and therapeutic interventions. What role should animal research play in this scientific endeavor? Both the urgency to evaluate candidate interventions for human use and growing societal concern about ethical treatment of (nonhuman) animals put into question the justifiability of animal research as a precursor to clinical trials. Yet forgoing animal research in the rush to undertake human testing might expose human research participants to unacceptable risks. In this article, we apply a recently developed framework of principles for animal research ethics in exploring ethical questions raised by a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection challenge experiment involving rhesus macaques, which evaluated the protective efficacy of the mRNA-1273 vaccine that was recently approved for emergency use. Our aim is to illuminate the ethical issues while introducing, and illustrating the use of, the framework.

Should biomedical research with great apes be restricted? A systematic review of reasons.

BACKGROUND: The use of great apes (GA) in invasive biomedical research is one of the most debated topics in animal ethics. GA are, thus far, the only animal group that has frequently been banned from invasive research; yet some believe that these bans could inaugurate a broader trend towards greater restrictions on the use of primates and other animals in research. Despite ongoing academic and policy debate on this issue, there is no comprehensive overview of the reasons advanced for or against restricting invasive research with GA. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic review of the reasons reported in the academic literature on this topic. METHODS: Seven databases were searched for articles published in English. Two authors screened the titles, abstracts, and full texts of all articles. Two journals specialized in animal ethics, and the reference lists of included articles were subsequently also reviewed. RESULTS: We included 60 articles, most of which were published between 2006 and 2016. Twenty-five articles argued for a total ban of GA research, 21 articles defended partial restrictions, and 14 articles argued against restrictions. Overall, we identified 110 reason types, 74 for, and 36 against, restricting GA research. Reasons were grouped into nine domains: moral standing, science, welfare, public and expert attitudes, retirement and conservation, respect and rights, financial costs, law and legal status, and longer-term consequences. CONCLUSION: Our review generated five main findings. First, there is a trend in the academic debate in favor of restricting GA research that parallels worldwide policy changes in the same direction. Second, in several domains (e.g., moral standing, and respect and rights), the reasons were rather one-sided in favor of restrictions. Third, some prominent domains (e.g., science and welfare) featured considerable engagement between opposing positions. Fourth, there is low diversity and independence among authors, including frequent potential conflicts of interests in articles defending a strong position (i.e., favoring a total ban or arguing against restrictions). Fifth, scholarly discussion was not the norm, as reflected in a high proportion of non-peer-reviewed articles and authors affiliated to non-academic institutions.

Can Knowledge Itself Justify Harmful Research?

In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition.1 We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions.2 In particular, they argue for replacing the first condition-expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)-with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP).3 In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced.

Ethics of patient activation: exploring its relation to personal responsibility, autonomy and health disparities.

Discussions of patient-centred care and patient autonomy in bioethics have tended to focus on the decision-making context and the process of obtaining informed consent, leaving open the question of how patients ought to be counselled in the daily maintenance of their health and management of chronic disease. Patient activation is an increasingly prominent counselling approach and measurement tool that aims to improve patients' confidence and skills in managing their own health conditions. The strategy, which has received little conceptual or ethical analysis, raises important questions about how clinicians ought to foster confidence and a sense of control in their patients without exposing them to blame, stigma and other harms. In this paper, we describe patient activation, discuss its relationship to personal responsibility, autonomy and health disparities, and make recommendations regarding its use and measurement.

Defining the Boundaries of a Right to Adequate Protection: A New Lens on Pediatric Research Ethics.

We argue that the current ethical and regulatory framework for permissible risk levels in pediatric research can be helpfully understood in terms of children's moral right to adequate protection from harm. Our analysis provides a rationale for what we propose as the highest level of permissible risk in pediatric research without the prospect of direct benefit: what we call "relatively minor" risk. We clarify the justification behind the usual standards of "minimal risk" and "a minor increase over minimal risk" and explain why it is permissible to impose any risks at all on child participants who do not stand to benefit directly from enrollment in research. Finally, we illuminate some aspects of the concept of "best interests."

Sentient Nonpersons and the Disvalue of Death.

Implicit in our everyday attitudes and practices is the assumption that death ordinarily harms a person who dies. A far more contested matter is whether death harms sentient individuals who are not persons, a category that includes many animals and some human beings. On the basis of the deprivation account of the harm of death, I argue that death harms sentient nonpersons (whenever their lives would be worth continuing). I next consider possible bases for the commonsense judgment that death ordinarily harms persons more than it harms sentient nonpersons. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, it is doubtful that the familiar resources of prudential value theory can vindicate this judgment. I show that the approach that at first glance seems most promising for supporting this judgment - namely, invoking an objective account of well-being - faces substantial challenges, before arguing that McMahan's time-relative interest account supplies the needed theoretical basis. I then go on to extract a significant practical implication of the first thesis, that death ordinarily harms sentient nonpersons: We should find a way to discontinue the routine killing of animal subjects following their use in experiments.

Ethical Reflections on Genetic Enhancement with the Aim of Enlarging Altruism.

When it comes to caring about and helping those in need, our imaginations tend to be weak and our motivation tends to be parochial. This is a major moral problem in view of how much unmet need there is in the world and how much material capacity there is to address that need. With this problem in mind, the present paper will focus on genetic means to the enhancement of a moral capacity-a disposition to altruism-and of a cognitive capacity that facilitates use of the moral capacity: the ability to grasp vividly the needs of individuals who are unknown and not present. I will address two questions, with more extensive attention to the first question. First, assuming we had excellent reason to believe that the enhancements were safe, effective, and available to all who desired them, would seeking these enhancements be inherently morally acceptable-that is, free of inherent wrongness? Second, would it be wise for a society to pursue these enhancements? I will defend an affirmative answer to the first question while leaving the second question open.

Parents of Adults with Diminished Self-Governance.

Most theories of parenthood assume, at least implicitly, that a child will grow up to be an independent, autonomous adult. However, some children with cognitive limitations or psychiatric illness are unable to do so. For this reason, these accounts do not accommodate the circumstances and responsibilities of parents of such adult children. Our article attempts to correct this deficiency. In particular, we describe some of the common characteristics and experiences of this population of parents and children, examine the unique aspects of their relationships, review several philosophical accounts of parental obligations, consider how these accounts might be extrapolated to semiautonomous adult children, and provide suggestions about parental obligations to promote autonomy and independence in adult children with cognitive limitations or psychiatric illness. In extending accounts of parental responsibilities to the case of semiautonomous adults, we find that the parental role includes the duty to continue to provide care-indefinitely if necessary-while cultivating autonomy and independence.

Necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research.

In this article, we present three necessary conditions for morally responsible animal research that we believe people on both sides of this debate can accept. Specifically, we argue that, even if human beings have higher moral status than nonhuman animals, animal research is morally permissible only if it satisfies (1) an expectation of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. We then claim that, whether or not these necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for justified animal research, they are relatively demanding, with the consequence that many animal experiments may fail to satisfy them.

Moral enhancement, freedom, and what we (should) value in moral behaviour.

The enhancement of human traits has received academic attention for decades, but only recently has moral enhancement using biomedical means--moral bioenhancement (MB)--entered the discussion. After explaining why we ought to take the possibility of MB seriously, the paper considers the shape and content of moral improvement, addressing at some length a challenge presented by reasonable moral pluralism. The discussion then proceeds to this question: Assuming MB were safe, effective, and universally available, would it be morally desirable? In particular, would it pose an unacceptable threat to human freedom? After defending a negative answer to the latter question--which requires an investigation into the nature and value of human freedom--and arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with MB, the paper closes with reflections on what we should value in moral behaviour.

The case for moderate gun control.

In addressing the shape of appropriate gun policy, this essay assumes for the sake of discussion that there is a legal and moral right to private gun ownership. My thesis is that, against the background of this right, the most defensible policy approach in the United States would feature moderate gun control. The first section summarizes the American gun control status quo and characterizes what I call "moderate gun control." The next section states and rebuts six leading arguments against this general approach to gun policy. The section that follows presents a positive case for moderate gun control that emphasizes safety in the home and society as well as rights whose enforcement entails some limits or qualifications on the right to bear arms. A final section shows how the recommended gun regulations address legitimate purposes, rather than imposing arbitrary restrictions on gun rights, and offers concluding reflections.

Genetic enhancement, post-persons and moral status: a reply to Buchanan.

Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human beings that we might aptly describe them as post-persons. If such post-persons emerged, how should we understand their moral status in relation to ours? The answer depends in part on which of two general models of moral status--one based on respect and one based on interests--is more adequate. Buchanan tentatively argues that a respect-based model is preferable. I challenge Buchanan's view, along these lines: If we embrace a respect-based model of moral status featuring a threshold that divides persons, who are thought to have full and equal moral status, from sentient nonpersons, thought to have less moral status, then we should acknowledge a second threshold and a level of moral status higher than ours. A better option, I tentatively suggest, is to drop the idea of levels of moral status, accept that all sentient beings have moral status, and allow that some differences in interests and capacities justify some significant differences in how we should treat beings of different kinds.