Viral contamination in biologic manufacture and implications for emerging therapies.

Recombinant protein therapeutics, vaccines, and plasma products have a long record of safety. However, the use of cell culture to produce recombinant proteins is still susceptible to contamination with viruses. These contaminations cost millions of dollars to recover from, can lead to patients not receiving therapies, and are very rare, which makes learning from past events difficult. A consortium of biotech companies, together with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has convened to collect data on these events. This industry-wide study provides insights into the most common viral contaminants, the source of those contaminants, the cell lines affected, corrective actions, as well as the impact of such events. These results have implications for the safe and effective production of not just current products, but also emerging cell and gene therapies which have shown much therapeutic promise.

Biopharmaceutical Industry Approaches to Facility Segregation for Viral Safety: An Effort from the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing.

Appropriate segregation within manufacturing facilities is required by regulators and utilized by manufacturers to ensure that the final product has not been contaminated with (a) adventitious viruses, (b) another pre-/postviral clearance fraction of the same product, or (c) another product processed in the same facility. However, there is no consensus on what constitutes appropriate facility segregation to minimize these risks. In part, this is due to the fact that a wide variety of manufacturing facilities and operational practices exist, including single-product and multiproduct manufacturing, using traditional segregation strategies with separate rooms for specific operations that may use stainless steel or disposable equipment to more modern ballroom-style operations that use mostly disposable equipment (i.e., pre- and postviral clearance manufacturing operations are not physically segregated by walls). Further, consensus is lacking around basic definitions and approaches related to facility segregation. For example, given that several unit operations provide assurance of virus clearance during downstream processing, how does one define pre- and postviral clearance and at which point(s) should a viral segregation barrier be introduced? What is a "functionally closed" system? How can interventions be conducted so that the system remains functionally closed? How can functionally closed systems be used to adequately isolate a product stream and ensure its safety? To address these issues, the member companies of the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) have conducted a facility segregation project with the following goals: define "pre- and postviral clearance zones" and "pre- and postviral clearance materials"; define "functionally closed" manufacturing systems; and identify an array of facility segregation approaches that are used for the safe and effective production of recombinant biologics as well as plasma products. This article reflects the current thinking from this collaborative endeavor.LAY ABSTRACT: Operations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing are segregated to ensure that the final product has not been contaminated with adventitious viruses, another fraction of the same product, or with another product from within the same facility. Yet there is no consensus understanding of what appropriate facility segregation looks like. There are a wide variety of manufacturing facilities and operational practices. There are existing facilities with separate rooms and more modern approaches that use disposable equipment in an open ballroom without walls. There is also no agreement on basic definitions and approaches related to facility segregation approaches. For example, many would like to claim that their manufacturing process is functionally closed, yet exactly how a functionally closed system may be defined is not clear. To address this, the member companies of the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) have conducted a project with the goal of defining important manufacturing terms relevant to designing an appropriately segregated facility and identifying different facility segregation approaches that are used for the safe and effective production of recombinant biologics as well as plasma products.

Characterization of different strains of poliovirus and influenza virus by differential scanning calorimetry.

Vaccines against poliomyelitis and influenza contain inactivated forms of poliovirus and influenza virus. These antigens are generated on an industrial scale from the purified active viruses that have been analysed in this study by DSC (differential scanning calorimetry). Multiple unfolding transitions are seen for influenza virus A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1), A/Panama/2007/99 (H3N2) and B/Shangdong/7/97. These data, combined with previously reported data on other influenza viruses, indicates that each influenza virus strain has a characteristic unfolding behaviour. Only minor changes were seen in the thermogram of betaPL (beta-propiolactone)-inactivated influenza virus, which is consistent with the proposition that betaPL reacts mainly with the nucleotide fraction of the virus. We demonstrate that a peak annotation of the thermogram of the native virus is possible using bromelain-treated virus and virosomes. At pH 1.5-2.5, poliovirus of type I unfolds in a single unfolding event with respective Tm (midpoint of protein unfolding transition) values between 34 and 45 degrees C. At pH 2, polioviruses of type II unfold equally in a single event, but, compared with the type I virus, with a Tm value increased by 3.7 degrees C. At neutral pH, the DSC thermogram of type I poliovirus was very 'noisy'. Data obtained offer the possibility of precisely characterizing and identifying different viral strains.