Explosive Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Higher-Order Networks.

Understanding how cooperative behaviors can emerge from competitive interactions is an open problem in biology and social sciences. While interactions are usually modeled as pairwise networks, the units of many real-world systems can also interact in groups of three or more. Here, we introduce a general framework to extend pairwise games to higher-order networks. By studying social dilemmas on hypergraphs with a tunable structure, we find an explosive transition to cooperation triggered by a critical number of higher-order games. The associated bistable regime implies that an initial critical mass of cooperators is also required for the emergence of prosocial behavior. Our results show that higher-order interactions provide a novel explanation for the survival of cooperation.

Emergence of innovations in networked populations with reputation-driven interactions.

In this work, we analyze how reputation-based interactions influence the emergence of innovations. To do so, we make use of a dynamic model that mimics the discovery process by which, at each time step, a pair of individuals meet and merge their knowledge to eventually result in a novel technology of higher value. The way in which these pairs are brought together is found to be crucial for achieving the highest technological level. Our results show that when the influence of reputation is weak or moderate, it induces an acceleration of the discovery process with respect to the neutral case (purely random coupling). However, an excess of reputation is clearly detrimental, because it leads to an excessive concentration of knowledge in a small set of people, which prevents a diversification of the technologies discovered and, in addition, leads to societies in which a majority of individuals lack technical capabilities.

Evolutionary game selection creates cooperative environments.

The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how strategic decisions coevolve with the environment has so far mostly been overlooked. Here, we consider a game selection model where not only the strategies but also the game can change over time following evolutionary principles. Our results show that coevolutionary dynamics of games and strategies can induce novel collective phenomena, fostering the emergence of cooperative environments. When the model is taken on structured populations the architecture of the interaction network can significantly amplify pro-social behavior, with a critical role played by network heterogeneity and the presence of clustered groups of similar players, distinctive features observed in real-world populations. By unveiling the link between the evolution of strategies and games for different structured populations, our model sheds new light on the origin of social dilemmas ubiquitously observed in real-world social systems.

Organización funcional versus Organización dinámica en el cerebro del gato / No disponible

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