Implementing the national suicide prevention strategy: Time for action to flatten the curve.

Since 1999, the Office of the United States Surgeon General has identified suicide prevention as a national public health priority. The National Strategy on Suicide Prevention, coordinated by the public-private Action Alliance, was most recently updated in 2012. In early 2021, the Surgeon General's office released a Call to Action to fully implement the national strategy. Six core types of actions to prevent suicide include adopting a broad public health approach, addressing upstream factors including social determinants of health, reducing access to multiple forms of lethal means, adopting evidence-based care for persons at risk, enhancing crisis care and care transitions, and improving the quality and use of suicide-related data. From 1999 through 2018, suicide rates in the U.S. increased by approximately one-third, and suicide had become the tenth leading cause of death. While most recent national data indicate a small reduction in the suicide rate, decreases were not seen across all demographic groups. Population groups which may require special emphasis or outreach efforts include adolescents, working age adults, military veterans, and American Indians/Alaskan Natives. Increases in social isolation, mental distress, and economic hardship during the COVID-19 pandemic indicate clear needs to address the full spectrum of suicidal behavior. This will require a multisector and whole of government approach, using contemporary evidence-informed approaches and best practices as well as innovative methods including those based on predictive analytics.

Successful Scientific Writing and Publishing: A Step-by-Step Approach.

Scientific writing and publication are essential to advancing knowledge and practice in public health, but prospective authors face substantial challenges. Authors can overcome barriers, such as lack of understanding about scientific writing and the publishing process, with training and resources. The objective of this article is to provide guidance and practical recommendations to help both inexperienced and experienced authors working in public health settings to more efficiently publish the results of their work in the peer-reviewed literature. We include an overview of basic scientific writing principles, a detailed description of the sections of an original research article, and practical recommendations for selecting a journal and responding to peer review comments. The overall approach and strategies presented are intended to contribute to individual career development while also increasing the external validity of published literature and promoting quality public health science.

CDC Grand Rounds: Getting Smart About Antibiotics.

Each year in the United States, approximately two million persons become infected with antibiotic-resistant bacteria, at least 23,000 persons die as a direct result of these infections, and many more die from conditions complicated by a resistant infection. Antibiotic-resistant infections contribute to poor health outcomes, higher health care costs, and use of more toxic treatments. Although emerging resistance mechanisms are being identified and resistant infections are on the rise, new antibiotic development has slowed considerably.

Wastewater Surveillance of US Coast Guard Installations and Seagoing Military Vessels to Mitigate the Risk of COVID-19 Outbreaks, March 2021-August 2022.

OBJECTIVES: Military training centers and seagoing vessels are often environments at high risk for the spread of COVID-19 and other contagious diseases, because military trainees and personnel arrive after traveling from many parts of the country and live in congregate settings. We examined whether levels of SARS-CoV-2 genetic material in wastewater correlated with SARS-CoV-2 infections among military personnel living in communal barracks and vessels at US Coast Guard training centers in the United States. METHODS: The Coast Guard developed and established 3 laboratories with wastewater testing capability at Coast Guard training centers from March 2021 through August 2022. We analyzed wastewater from barracks housing trainees and from 4 Coast Guard vessels for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 genes N and E and quantified the results relative to levels of a fecal indicator virus, pepper mild mottle virus. We compared quantified data with the timing of medically diagnosed COVID-19 infection among (1) military personnel who had presented with symptoms or had been discovered through contact tracing and had medical tests and (2) military personnel who had been discovered through routine surveillance by positive SARS-CoV-2 antigen or polymerase chain reaction test results. RESULTS: Levels of viral genes in wastewater at Coast Guard locations were best correlated with diagnosed COVID-19 cases when wastewater testing was performed twice weekly with passive samplers deployed for the entire week; such testing detected ≥1 COVID-19 case 69.8% of the time and ≥3 cases 88.3% of the time. Wastewater assessment in vessels did not continue because of logistical constraints. CONCLUSION: Wastewater testing is an effective tool for measuring the presence and patterns of SARS-CoV-2 infections among military populations. Success with wastewater testing for SARS-CoV-2 infections suggests that other diseases may be assessed with similar approaches.

Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness and Test-Negative Study Design Within the Department of Defense.

Test-negative observational studies are routinely used to assess vaccine effectiveness. This test method consistently shows lower annual vaccine effectiveness in the highly vaccinated U.S. military compared to the general population. Incorporating other test designs and broader impact measures may better estimate influenza vaccine benefits in highly vaccinated groups.

Assessment of One Health Knowledge, Animal Welfare Implications, and Emergency Preparedness Considerations for Effective Public Health Response.

OBJECTIVES: Information on knowledge of public health professionals about health aspects of the human-animal interface, referred to as One Health, is limited. The objective of this study was to identify factors associated with animal welfare attitudes, practices, and One Health awareness among US Public Health Service (USPHS) officers to assess preparedness for public health response. METHODS: USPHS officers participated in an online, self-administered survey from February 15 through March 2, 2018. A total of 1133 of 6474 (17.5%) USPHS officers responded. We collected information on officers' demographic characteristics, animal welfare attitudes and practices, volunteer and work exposure to animals, and One Health knowledge. We compared (1) One Health knowledge and animal work exposure (deployment, regular assignment, or none) and (2) animal welfare importance and animal work exposure. To adjust for demographic characteristics associated with One Health knowledge, we used multivariable logistic regression. RESULTS: One-third of nonveterinary officers reported encountering animals during deployment, and 65% reported that animal welfare was very or extremely important. We found no difference in One Health knowledge between nonveterinary officers who participated in deployments involving animals and nonveterinary officers who had no work exposure to animals (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.11; 95% CI, 0.71-1.75). Nonveterinary officers who participated in animal-related public health activities during regular assignment were more likely to have One Health knowledge than nonveterinary officers who had no work exposure to animals (aOR = 7.88; 95% CI, 5.36-11.59). CONCLUSIONS: One Health knowledge and awareness should be further explored in the current US public health workforce to identify training needs for emergency preparedness and other collaborative opportunities.

Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2010.

This report updates the 2009 recommendations by CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of influenza vaccine for the prevention and control of influenza (CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2009;58[No. RR-8] and CDC. Use of influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine---recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP], 2009. MMWR 2009;58:[No. RR-10]). The 2010 influenza recommendations include new and updated information. Highlights of the 2010 recommendations include 1) a recommendation that annual vaccination be administered to all persons aged >or=6 months for the 2010-11 influenza season; 2) a recommendation that children aged 6 months--8 years whose vaccination status is unknown or who have never received seasonal influenza vaccine before (or who received seasonal vaccine for the first time in 2009-10 but received only 1 dose in their first year of vaccination) as well as children who did not receive at least 1 dose of an influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine regardless of previous influenza vaccine history should receive 2 doses of a 2010-11 seasonal influenza vaccine (minimum interval: 4 weeks) during the 2010--11 season; 3) a recommendation that vaccines containing the 2010-11 trivalent vaccine virus strains A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)-like (the same strain as was used for 2009 H1N1 monovalent vaccines), A/Perth/16/2009 (H3N2)-like, and B/Brisbane/60/2008-like antigens be used; 4) information about Fluzone High-Dose, a newly approved vaccine for persons aged >or=65 years; and 5) information about other standard-dose newly approved influenza vaccines and previously approved vaccines with expanded age indications. Vaccination efforts should begin as soon as the 2010-11 seasonal influenza vaccine is available and continue through the influenza season. These recommendations also include a summary of safety data for U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines. These recommendations and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu); any updates or supplements that might be required during the 2010-11 influenza season also will be available at this website. Recommendations for influenza diagnosis and antiviral use will be published before the start of the 2010-11 influenza season. Vaccination and health-care providers should be alert to announcements of recommendation updates and should check the CDC influenza website periodically for additional information.

Prevention and control of seasonal influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2009.

This report updates the 2008 recommendations by CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of influenza vaccine for the prevention and control of seasonal influenza (CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2008;57[No. RR-7]). Information on vaccination issues related to the recently identified novel influenza A H1N1 virus will be published later in 2009. The 2009 seasonal influenza recommendations include new and updated information. Highlights of the 2009 recommendations include 1) a recommendation that annual vaccination be administered to all children aged 6 months-18 years for the 2009-10 influenza season; 2) a recommendation that vaccines containing the 2009-10 trivalent vaccine virus strains A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)-like, A/Brisbane/10/2007 (H3N2)-like, and B/Brisbane/60/2008-like antigens be used; and 3) a notice that recommendations for influenza diagnosis and antiviral use will be published before the start of the 2009-10 influenza season. Vaccination efforts should begin as soon as vaccine is available and continue through the influenza season. Approximately 83% of the United States population is specifically recommended for annual vaccination against seasonal influenza; however, <40% of the U.S. population received the 2008-09 influenza vaccine. These recommendations also include a summary of safety data for U.S. licensed influenza vaccines. These recommendations and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu); any updates or supplements that might be required during the 2009-10 influenza season also can be found at this website. Vaccination and health-care providers should be alert to announcements of recommendation updates and should check the CDC influenza website periodically for additional information.

Safety assessment of recalled Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) conjugate vaccines--United States, 2007-2008.

PURPOSE: On 13 December 2007, Merck & Co., Inc. voluntarily recalled 1.2 million doses of Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccines that had been distributed since April 2007 for concerns regarding potential Bacillus cereus contamination. Enhanced postrecall surveillance was conducted to detect vaccine-associated B. cereus infections. METHODS: We reviewed reports involving recalled Hib vaccines received by the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) during 1 April 2007-29 February 2008. For each reported death, autopsy review sought evidence of B. cereus infections. For each specified outcome, the proportional reporting ratios (PRRs) were calculated to compare the recalled Hib vaccines with the manufacturer's nonrecalled Hib vaccines in the VAERS databases. On 20 December 2007, we used the Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) to solicit nongastrointestinal vaccine-associated B. cereus infections, and requested B. cereus isolates for genotyping to compare with the manufacturing facility isolate. RESULTS: VAERS received 75 reports involving recalled Hib vaccines; none described a confirmed B. cereus infection. Comparative analyses did not reveal disproportionate reporting of specified outcomes for recalled Hib vaccines. The Epi-X posting triggered one report of vaccine-associated B. cereus bacteremia from a child who received a nonrecalled Hib vaccine manufactured by Merck; the genotypes of isolates from the patient and the manufacturing facility differed. CONCLUSIONS: No evidence of vaccine-associated B. cereus infection had been found in recipients of recalled Hib vaccines. Conducting laboratory surveillance through Epi-X was feasible and may enhance public health response capacities for future vaccine safety emergencies.

Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008.

This report updates the 2007 recommendations by CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of influenza vaccine and antiviral agents (CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2007;56[No. RR-6]). The 2008 recommendations include new and updated information. Principal updates and changes include 1) a new recommendation that annual vaccination be administered to all children aged 5--18 years, beginning in the 2008--09 influenza season, if feasible, but no later than the 2009--10 influenza season; 2) a recommendation that annual vaccination of all children aged 6 months through 4 years (59 months) continue to be a primary focus of vaccination efforts because these children are at higher risk for influenza complications compared with older children; 3) a new recommendation that either trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine or live, attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) be used when vaccinating healthy persons aged 2 through 49 years (the previous recommendation was to administer LAIV to person aged 5--49 years); 4) a recommendation that vaccines containing the 2008--09 trivalent vaccine virus strains A/Brisbane/59/2007 (H1N1)-like, A/Brisbane/10/2007 (H3N2)-like, and B/Florida/4/2006-like antigens be used; and, 5) new information on antiviral resistance among influenza viruses in the United States. Persons for whom vaccination is recommended are listed in boxes 1 and 2. These recommendations also include a summary of safety data for U.S. licensed influenza vaccines. This report and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu), including any updates or supplements to these recommendations that might be required during the 2008--09 influenza season. Vaccination and health-care providers should be alert to announcements of recommendation updates and should check the CDC influenza website periodically for additional information.

Prevention of pertussis, tetanus, and diphtheria among pregnant and postpartum women and their infants recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).

In 2005, two tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid, and acellular pertussis (Tdap) vaccines were licensed and recommended for use in adults and adolescents in the United States: ADACEL (sanofi pasteur, Swiftwater, Pennsylvania), which is licensed for use in persons aged 11--64 years, and BOOSTRIX (GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium), which is licensed for use in persons aged 10-18 years. Both Tdap vaccines are licensed for single-dose use to add protection against pertussis and to replace the next dose of tetanus and diphtheria toxoids vaccine (Td). Available evidence does not address the safety of Tdap for pregnant women, their fetuses, or pregnancy outcomes sufficiently. Available data also do not indicate whether Tdap-induced transplacental maternal antibodies provide early protection against pertussis to infants or interfere with an infant's immune responses to routinely administered pediatric vaccines. Until additional information is available, CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommends that pregnant women who were not vaccinated previously with Tdap: 1) receive Tdap in the immediate postpartum period before discharge from hospital or birthing center, 2) may receive Tdap at an interval as short as 2 years since the most recent Td vaccine, 3) receive Td during pregnancy for tetanus and diphtheria protection when indicated, or 4) defer the Td vaccine indicated during pregnancy to substitute Tdap vaccine in the immediate postpartum period if the woman is likely to have sufficient protection against tetanus and diphtheria. Although pregnancy is not a contraindication for receiving Tdap vaccine, health-care providers should weigh the theoretical risks and benefits before choosing to administer Tdap vaccine to a pregnant woman. This report 1) describes the clinical features of pertussis, tetanus, and diphtheria among pregnant and postpartum women and their infants, 2) reviews available evidence of pertussis vaccination during pregnancy as a strategy to prevent infant pertussis, 3) summarizes Tdap vaccination policy in the United States, and 4) presents recommendations for use of Td and Tdap vaccines among pregnant and postpartum women.

A process for sentinel case review to assess causal relationships between smallpox vaccination and adverse outcomes, 2003-2004.

The US Department of Defense requested that the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices-Armed Forces Epidemiological Board joint Smallpox Vaccine Safety Working Group define the likelihood that smallpox vaccination played a causal role in the fatal illness of an Army reservist. Reported serious adverse events for which there was no a priori reason to discount the existence of a causal association with smallpox vaccine were reviewed to assess whether they were signals of constellations of vaccine-associated adverse events. A causal relationship between the immunization experience and the index patient's death was favored, but the implication of an individual vaccine was precluded. No new smallpox vaccine-associated clinical syndromes were identified. The data supported neutrality regarding the hypothesis that dilated cardiomyopathy was causally associated with smallpox vaccine-induced myocarditis. This review of sentinel cases augmented the ongoing safety review process and was transparent, but it shares limitations with other case-based causality-assessment methods.

Prevention and control of influenza. Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2007.

This report updates the 2006 recommendations by CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of influenza vaccine and antiviral agents (CDC. Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2006;55[No. RR-10]). The groups of persons for whom vaccination is recommended and the antiviral medications recommended for chemoprophylaxis or treatment (oseltamivir or zanamivir) have not changed. Estimated vaccination coverage remains <50% among certain groups for whom routine annual vaccination is recommended, including young children and adults with risk factors for influenza complications, health-care personnel (HCP), and pregnant women. Strategies to improve vaccination coverage, including use of reminder/recall systems and standing orders programs, should be implemented or expanded. The 2007 recommendations include new and updated information. Principal updates and changes include 1) reemphasizing the importance of administering 2 doses of vaccine to all children aged 6 months--8 years if they have not been vaccinated previously at any time with either live, attenuated influenza vaccine (doses separated by > or =6 weeks) or trivalent inactivated influenza vaccine (doses separated by > or =4 weeks), with single annual doses in subsequent years; 2) recommending that children aged 6 months--8 years who received only 1 dose in their first year of vaccination receive 2 doses the following year, with single annual doses in subsequent years; 3) highlighting a previous recommendation that all persons, including school-aged children, who want to reduce the risk of becoming ill with influenza or of transmitting influenza to others should be vaccinated; 4) emphasizing that immunization providers should offer influenza vaccine and schedule immunization clinics throughout the influenza season; 5) recommending that health-care facilities consider the level of vaccination coverage among HCP to be one measure of a patient safety quality program and implement policies to encourage HCP vaccination (e.g., obtaining signed statements from HCP who decline influenza vaccination); and 6) using the 2007--2008 trivalent vaccine virus strains A/Solomon Islands/3/2006 (H1N1)-like (new for this season), A/Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2)-like, and B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like antigens. This report and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu). Updates or supplements to these recommendations (e.g., expanded age or risk group indications for currently licensed vaccines) might be required. Immunization providers should be alert to announcements of recommendation updates and should check the CDC influenza website periodically for additional information.

Preventing tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis among adults: use of tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid and acellular pertussis vaccine recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and recommendation of ACIP, supported by the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), for use of Tdap among health-care personnel.

On June 10, 2005, a tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid and acellular pertussis vaccine (Tdap) formulated for use in adults and adolescents was licensed in the United States for persons aged 11-64 years (ADACEL, manufactured by sanofi pasteur, Toronto, Ontario, Canada). Prelicensure studies demonstrated safety and efficacy, inferred through immunogenicity, against tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis when Tdap was administered as a single booster dose to adults. To reduce pertussis morbidity among adults and maintain the standard of care for tetanus and diphtheria prevention and to reduce the transmission of pertussis to infants and in health-care settings, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends that: 1) adults aged 19-64 years should receive a single dose of Tdap to replace tetanus and diphtheria toxoids vaccine (Td) for booster immunization against tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis if they received their last dose of Td >or=10 years earlier and they have not previously received Tdap; 2) intervals shorter than 10 years since the last Td may be used for booster protection against pertussis; 3) adults who have or who anticipate having close contact with an infant aged <12 months (e.g., parents, grandparents aged <65 years, child-care providers, and health-care personnel) should receive a single dose of Tdap to reduce the risk for transmitting pertussis. An interval as short as 2 years from the last Td is suggested; shorter intervals can be used. When possible, women should receive Tdap before becoming pregnant. Women who have not previously received Tdap should receive a dose of Tdap in the immediate postpartum period; 4) health-care personnel who work in hospitals or ambulatory care settings and have direct patient contact should receive a single dose of Tdap as soon as feasible if they have not previously received Tdap. An interval as short as 2 years from the last dose of Td is recommended; shorter intervals may be used. These recommendations for use of Tdap in health-care personnel are supported by the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). This statement 1) reviews pertussis, tetanus and diphtheria vaccination policy in the United States; 2) describes the clinical features and epidemiology of pertussis among adults; 3) summarizes the immunogenicity, efficacy, and safety data of Tdap; and 4) presents recommendations for the use of Tdap among adults aged 19-64 years.

Preventing tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis among adolescents: use of tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid and acellular pertussis vaccines recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).

During spring 2005, two tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid and acellular pertussis vaccine (Tdap) products formulated for use in adolescents (and, for one product, use in adults) were licensed in the United States (BOOSTRIX, GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals, Rixensart, Belgium [licensed May 3, 2005, for use in persons aged 10-18 years], and ADACEL, sanofi pasteur, Toronto, Ontario, Canada [licensed June 10, 2005, for use in persons aged 11-64 years]). Prelicensure studies demonstrated safety and efficacy against tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis when Tdap was administered as a single booster dose to adolescents. To reduce pertussis morbidity in adolescents and maintain the standard of care for tetanus and diphtheria protection, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends that: 1) adolescents aged 11-18 years should receive a single dose of Tdap instead of tetanus and diphtheria toxoids vaccine (Td) for booster immunization against tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis if they have completed the recommended childhood diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and whole cell pertussis vaccine (DTP)/ diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP) vaccination series (five doses of pediatric DTP/DTaP before the seventh birthday; if the fourth dose was administered on or after the fourth birthday, the fifth dose is not needed) and have not received Td or Tdap. The preferred age for Tdap vaccination is 11-12 years; 2) adolescents aged 11-18 years who received Td, but not Tdap, are encouraged to receive a single dose of Tdap to provide protection against pertussis if they have completed the recommended childhood DTP/DTaP vaccination series. An interval of at least 5 years between Td and Tdap is encouraged to reduce the risk for local and systemic reactions after Tdap vaccination. However, an interval less than 5 years between Td and Tdap can be used; and 3) vaccine providers should administer Tdap and tetravalent meningococcal conjugate vaccine (Menactra, sanofi pasteur, Swiftwater, Pennsylvania) to adolescents aged 11-18 years during the same visit if both vaccines are indicated and available. This statement 1) reviews tetanus, diphtheria and pertussis vaccination policy in the United States, with emphasis on adolescents; 2) describes the clinical features and epidemiology of pertussis among adolescents; 3) summarizes the immunogenicity, efficacy, and safety data of the two Tdap vaccines licensed for use among adolescents; and 4) presents recommendations for tetanus, diphtheria, and pertussis vaccination among adolescents aged 11-18 years.

Public Health Surveillance: At the Core of the Global Health Security Agenda.

Global health security involves developing the infrastructure and capacity to protect the health of people and societies worldwide. The acceleration of global travel and trade poses greater opportunities for infectious diseases to emerge and spread. The International Health Regulations (IHR) were adopted in 2005 with the intent of proactively developing public health systems that could react to the spread of infectious disease and provide better containment. Various challenges delayed adherence to the IHR. The Global Health Security Agenda came about as an international collaborative effort, working multilaterally among governments and across sectors, seeking to implement the IHR and develop the capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to public health emergencies of international concern. When examining the recent West African Ebola epidemic as a case study for global health security, both strengths and weaknesses in the public health response are evident. The central role of public health surveillance is a lesson reiterated by Ebola. Through further implementation of the Global Health Security Agenda, identified gaps in surveillance can be filled and global health security strengthened.

Adverse events associated with smallpox vaccination in the United States, January-October 2003.

CONTEXT: On January 24, 2003, the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) implemented a preparedness program in which smallpox (vaccinia) vaccine was administered to federal, state, and local volunteers who might be first responders during a bioterrorism event. OBJECTIVE: To describe results from the comprehensive DHHS smallpox vaccine safety monitoring and response system. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Descriptive study of adverse event reports from the DHHS smallpox vaccine safety monitoring and response system received between January 24 and October 31, 2003, through the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. A total of 37,901 volunteers in 55 jurisdictions received at least 1 dose of smallpox vaccine. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Number of vaccinations administered and description of adverse events and reporting rates. RESULTS: A total of 38,885 smallpox vaccinations were administered, with a take rate of 92%. VAERS received 822 reports of adverse events following smallpox vaccination (overall reporting rate, 217 per 10,000 vaccinees). A total of 590 adverse events (72%) were reported within 14 days of vaccination. Nonserious adverse events (n = 722) included multiple signs and symptoms of mild and self-limited local reactions. One hundred adverse events (12%) were designated as serious, resulting in 85 hospitalizations, 2 permanent disabilities, 10 life-threatening illnesses, and 3 deaths. Among the serious adverse events, 21 cases were classified as myocarditis and/or pericarditis and 10 as ischemic cardiac events that were not anticipated based on historical data. Two cases of generalized vaccinia and 1 case of postvaccinial encephalitis were detected. No preventable life-threatening adverse reactions, contact transmissions, or adverse reactions that required treatment with vaccinia immune globulin were identified. Serious adverse events were more common among older revaccinees than younger first-time vaccinees. CONCLUSIONS: Rigorous smallpox vaccine safety screening, educational programs, and older vaccinees may have contributed to low rates of preventable life-threatening adverse reactions. Other rare, clinically significant, or unexpected cardiac adverse events were detected by timely review of VAERS data and intensive clinical case investigation.