Voter emotional responses and voting behaviour in the 2020 US presidential election.

Political polarisation in the United States offers opportunities to explore how beliefs about candidates - that they could save or destroy American society - impact people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. Participants forecast their future emotional responses to the contentious 2020 U.S. presidential election, and reported their actual responses after the election outcome. Stronger beliefs about candidates were associated with forecasts of greater emotion in response to the election, but the strength of this relationship differed based on candidate preference. Trump supporters' forecast happiness more strongly related to beliefs that their candidate would save society than for Biden supporters. Biden supporters' forecast anger and fear were more strongly related to beliefs that Trump would destroy society than vice versa. These forecasts mattered: predictions of lower happiness and greater anger if the non-preferred candidate won predicted voting, with Biden supporters voting more than Trump supporters. Generally, participants forecast more emotion than they experienced, but beliefs altered this tendency. Stronger beliefs predicted experiencing more happiness or more anger and fear about the election outcome than had been forecast. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms through which political polarisation and rhetoric can influence voting behaviour.

Experimental elicitations of awe: a meta-analysis.

A meta-analytic review of studies that experimentally elicited awe and compared the emotion to other conditions (84; 487 effects; 17,801 participants) examined the degree to which experimentally elicited awe (1) affects outcomes relative to other positive emotions (2) affects experience, judgment, behaviour, and physiology, and (3) differs in its effects if the awe state was elicited through positive or threatening contexts. The efficacy of methods that have been used to experimentally elicit awe and the possibility of assessing changes in the state of the self with experimental awe elicitations were also examined. Meta-analyses with robust variance estimation revealed that awe affected outcomes compared to other positive emotions and control conditions; affected experience, judgment, and behaviour; and had similar effects if elicited through positive or threatening contexts. The ability to compare awe to negative emotion states and its effects on physiology was limited by a small number of available effects. Images, videos, autobiographical recall, and naturalistic exposure were effective in eliciting awe. Exploratory analyses suggested that some processes involved in changes in the self can be related to experimental awe elicitations. These findings suggest awe is a discrete emotion and identifies areas for future investigation.

Remembering facts versus feelings in the wake of political events.

Amid rising political polarisation, inaccurate memory for facts and exaggerated memories of grievances can drive individuals and groups further apart. We assessed whether people with more accurate memories of the facts concerning political events were less susceptible to bias when remembering how events made them feel. Study 1 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election (N = 571), and included 33 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Study 2 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland (N = 733). Participants rated how happy, angry, and scared they felt days after these events. Six months later, they recalled their feelings and factual information. In both studies, participants overestimated how angry they had felt but underestimated happiness and fear. Adjusting for importance, no association was found between the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings. Accuracy in remembering facts was predicted by media exposure. Accuracy in remembering feelings was predicted by consistency over time in feelings and appraisals about past events. HSAM participants in Study 1 remembered election-related facts better than others, but not their feelings. Thus, having a good grasp of the facts did not protect against bias in remembering feelings about political events.

Predicted and remembered emotion: tomorrow's vividness trumps yesterday's accuracy.

People rely on predicted and remembered emotion to guide important decisions. But how much can they trust their mental representations of emotion to be accurate, and how much do they trust them? In this investigation, participants (N = 957) reported their predicted, experienced, and remembered emotional response to the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. They also reported how accurate and vivid they perceived their predictions and memories to be, and the importance of the election. Participants remembered their emotional responses more accurately than they predicted them. But, strikingly, they perceived their predictions to be more accurate than their memories. This perception was explained by the greater importance and vividness of anticipated versus remembered experience. We also assessed whether individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory for personal and public events (N = 33) showed superior ability to predict or remember their emotional responses to events. They did not and, even for this group, predicting emotion was a more intense experience than remembering emotion. These findings reveal asymmetries in the phenomenological experience of predicting and remembering emotion. The vividness of predicted emotion serves as a powerful subjective signal of accuracy even when predictions turn out to be wrong.

Building a house of sentiment on sand: Epistemological issues with contempt.

Contempt shares its features with other emotions, indicating that there is no justification for creating "sentiment" as a new category of feelings. Scientific categories must be created or updated on the basis of evidence. Building a new category on the currently limited contempt literature would be akin to building a house on sand - likely to fall at any moment.

Distraction from emotional information reduces biased judgements.

Biases arising from emotional processes are some of the most robust behavioural effects in the social sciences. The goal of this investigation was to examine the extent to which the emotion regulation strategy of distraction could reduce biases in judgement known to result from emotional information. Study 1 explored lay views regarding whether distraction is an effective strategy to improve decision-making and revealed that participants did not endorse this strategy. Studies 2-5 focused on several established, robust biases that result from emotional information: loss aversion, desirability bias, risk aversion and optimistic bias. Participants were prompted to divert attention away from their feelings while making judgements, and in each study this distraction strategy resulted in reduced bias in judgement relative to control conditions. The findings provide evidence that distraction can improve choice across several situations that typically elicit robustly biased responses, even though participants are not aware of the effectiveness of this strategy.

Experiencing versus contemplating: Language use during descriptions of awe and wonder.

Awe and wonder are theorised to be distinct from other positive emotions, such as happiness. Yet little empirical or theoretical work has focused on these emotions. This investigation explored differences in language used to describe experiences of awe and wonder. Such analyses can provide insight into how people conceptualise these emotional experiences, and whether they conceptualise these emotions to be distinct from other positive emotions, and each other. Participants wrote narratives about experiences of awe, wonder and happiness. There were differences in the language used to describe these positive emotional states, consistent with the theorised functions of each emotion. Awe was related to observing the world, reflected in greater use of perception words. Wonder was related to trying to understand the world, reflected in greater use of cognitive complexity and tentative words. Language use for both emotions reflected an environmental focus, whereas language use for happiness reflected a social/relationship focus.

Strength of affective reaction as a signal to think carefully.

Analytic processes reduce biases, but it is not known how or when these processes will be deployed. Based on an affective signal hypothesis, relatively strong affective reactions were expected to result in increased analytic processing and reduced bias in judgement. The valence and strength of affective reactions were manipulated through varying outcomes in a game or evaluative conditioning of a stimulus. Relatively strong positive or negative affective reactions resulted in less desirability bias. Bias reduction only occurred if participants had time to deploy analytic processes and indicators of the degree of analytic processing (in the form of attentional control) predicted less bias. Affective processes have long been acknowledged as a source of bias, but these findings suggest affective processes are also integral to bias reduction.

An alternative approach to analysis of mental states in experimental social cognition research.

Establishing the mental states that affect human behavior is a primary goal of experiments on social cognitive processes. Such mental states can be manipulated only indirectly; therefore, after delivering a manipulation, researchers attempt to verify that the mental state of interest, the representation of a mental state, was in fact changed by the manipulation and that this change caused the observed effect. The usual procedure is to examine mean differences in a measure of the mental state of interest (a manipulation check) among experimental conditions and to infer whether the manipulation was effective. We describe a procedure that strengthens the construct validity of manipulations and, hence, causal inferences in experiments that focus on mental states using analyses familiar to most researchers. This procedure employs a traditional manipulation check that assesses the relationship between manipulations and mental states but, additionally, tests the relationship between the manipulation check and dependent measure.

Anger has benefits for attaining goals.

Functional accounts of emotion have guided research for decades, with the core assumption that emotions are functional-they improve outcomes for people. Based on functional accounts of emotion, we theorized that anger should improve goal attainment in the presence of challenges. In seven studies, goal attainment was assessed in situations that involved varying levels of challenges to goal attainment. Across studies, anger compared to a neutral condition resulted in behavior that facilitated greater goal attainment on tasks that involved challenges. With a goal to solve difficult puzzles, anger resulted in more puzzles correctly solved (Study 1). With a goal to attain prizes, anger increased cheating rates and numbers of unearned prizes (Study 2). With a goal to do well in a video game, anger increased scores on a game with challenges to be avoided, but not other scores (Study 3). In two studies, examining the consequences of anger in response to the challenging task that was the focus of that anger, anger decreased reaction time with goals to win trials (Study 4), and predicted making the effort to vote in two contentious elections (Study 5). With a goal to protect financial resources, anger increased action taken to prevent loss compared to a physiological arousal condition (Study 6). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Using emotion to guide decisions: the accuracy and perceived value of emotional intensity forecasts.

Forecasts about future emotion are often inaccurate, so why do people rely on them to make decisions? People may forecast some features of their emotional experience better than others, and they may report relying on forecasts that are more accurate to make decisions. To test this, four studies assessed the features of emotion people reported forecasting to make decisions about their careers, education, politics, and health. In Study 1, graduating medical students reported relying more on forecast emotional intensity than frequency or duration to decide how to rank residency programs as part of the process of being matched with a program. Similarly, participants reported relying more on forecast emotional intensity than frequency or duration to decide which universities to apply to (Study 2), which presidential candidate to vote for (Study 3), and whether to travel as Covid-19 rates declined (Study 4). Studies 1 and 3 also assessed forecasting accuracy. Participants forecast emotional intensity more accurately than frequency or duration. People make better decisions when they can anticipate the future. Thus, people's reports of relying on forecast emotional intensity to guide life-changing decisions, and the greater accuracy of these forecasts, provide important new evidence of the adaptive value of affective forecasts.

The Struggle to Entertain Yourself: Consequences of the Internal Stimulation Factor of Boredom Proneness during Pandemic Lockdown.

Boredom is a ubiquitous human experience that most people try to avoid feeling. People who are prone to boredom experience negative consequences. This study examined the impact of individual differences in the ability to entertain the self (the internal stimulation factor) on boredom experiences during the COVID-19 lockdown in the United States. The internal and external stimulation factors predicted greater boredom frequency, boredom duration, and boredom intensity, each of which reflected a different aspect of emotional experience. The relationship among these factors was complex. A serial mediation analysis indicated the internal stimulation factor predicted the frequency of boredom, which in turn predicted the duration of boredom, which predicted boredom intensity. This pattern of relationships is potentially unique to boredom among emotional experiences. These findings provide insight into how boredom functions during a period in which daily activities and coping resources that would normally be available became severely limited.

Medical residency match applicants undervalue factors that predict stress and burnout.

In the medical residency match process, applicants' ranking decisions are influenced by multiple factors related to training, geography, and lifestyle expectations. Ranking decisions directly impact match results, with implications for emotional outcomes such as happiness and stress. The present study explored the decision factors considered most important by applicants when creating rank order lists (ROLs), and how match outcomes and program factors predicted happiness, enthusiasm, stress, and life satisfaction. Senior medical students (n = 182) at a large public university in California completed surveys at three timepoints, spanning from shortly before Match Day to several months into PGY-1. Study findings support that both program-related (e.g., training quality, program size) and non-program-related (e.g., geography, work life balance) factors are important to applicants when making ROL decisions. Applicants who matched with their top choice program initially experienced emotional benefits, but these emotional differences did not persist into PGY-1, where all matched applicants had similar levels of emotion and life satisfaction. The emotional cost and benefits of matching with programs of different ROL positions (e.g., matching with top-choice program or not) were most apparent shortly after matching but in the long-term, a stronger predictor of PGY-1 emotions was perceived person-program alignment. Person-program alignment (e.g., call schedule, patient caseload) also predicted burnout in the first few months of a residency program. These findings show that, when applicants are making ranking decisions, they undervalue factors that predict stress and burnout during residency.

Optimistic expectations have benefits for effort and emotion with little cost.

The present investigation examined the potential benefits and costs of optimistic expectations about future events through the lens of error management theory (EMT). Decades of evidence have shown that optimism about the likelihood of future events is pervasive and difficult to correct. From an EMT perspective, this perpetuation of inaccurate beliefs is possible because optimism offers benefits greater than the costs. The present investigation examined this possibility for controllable important life events with a known time at which they would occur. College students taking their first exam (n = 1,061) and medical students being matched with residency placements (n = 182) reported their expectations and emotions weeks before the event and their responses after they knew the outcome of the event. Optimistic expectations predicted the quality of effort investment before an event occurred-students were more satisfied with their studying, medical students were more satisfied with their decision making, and optimism predicted better performance. Optimistic expectations also predicted less emotional distress before the event. There was no evidence that optimistic expectations related to longer-term greater distress when participants experienced an unexpected negative outcome; the valence of the outcome itself predicted distress. These results are consistent with the EMT-derived hypothesis that optimistic expectations have benefits for effort and emotion before an event occurs, with little cost after the outcome occurs. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Automatic optimism: the affective basis of judgments about the likelihood of future events.

People generally judge that the future will be consistent with their desires, but the reason for this desirability bias is unclear. This investigation examined whether affective reactions associated with future events are the mechanism through which desires influence likelihood judgments. In 4 studies, affective reactions were manipulated for initially neutral events. Compared with a neutral condition, events associated with positive reactions were judged as likely to occur, and events associated with negative reactions were judged as unlikely to occur. Desirability biases were reduced when participants could misattribute affective reactions to a source other than future events, and the relationship between affective reactions and judgments was influenced when approach and avoidance motivations were independently manipulated. Together, these findings demonstrate that positive and negative affective reactions to potential events cause the desirability bias in likelihood judgments and suggest that this effect occurs because of a tendency to approach positive possibilities and avoid negative possibilities.

Boredom as a seeking state: Boredom prompts the pursuit of novel (even negative) experiences.

Building on functional models of emotion, we propose that boredom creates a seeking state that prompts people to explore new experiences, even if those experiences are hedonically negative. Specifically, as emotional responses fade, boredom motivates the pursuit of alternative experiences that differ from the experience that resulted in boredom. Participants who reported a higher degree of boredom after a neutral task were more likely to choose negative experiences (Study 1). Compared with a low-boredom condition, participants in a high-boredom condition desired novel experiences and, as a result of this desire, were more likely to choose novel negative experiences (Study 2). In Study 3, participants were made bored by positive or negative stimuli. Participants in the positive-boredom conditions were more likely to choose a novel experience that was more negative; participants in the negative-boredom conditions were more likely to choose a novel experience that was more positive. These findings reveal that boredom motivates people to seek out novel experiences that elicit different (even more negative) feelings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

A meta-analysis of the facial feedback literature: Effects of facial feedback on emotional experience are small and variable.

The facial feedback hypothesis suggests that an individual's experience of emotion is influenced by feedback from their facial movements. To evaluate the cumulative evidence for this hypothesis, we conducted a meta-analysis on 286 effect sizes derived from 138 studies that manipulated facial feedback and collected emotion self-reports. Using random effects meta-regression with robust variance estimates, we found that the overall effect of facial feedback was significant but small. Results also indicated that feedback effects are stronger in some circumstances than others. We examined 12 potential moderators, and 3 were associated with differences in effect sizes: (a) Type of emotional outcome: Facial feedback influenced emotional experience (e.g., reported amusement) and, to a greater degree, affective judgments of a stimulus (e.g., the objective funniness of a cartoon). Three publication bias detection methods did not reveal evidence of publication bias in studies examining the effects of facial feedback on emotional experience, but all 3 methods revealed evidence of publication bias in studies examining affective judgments. (b) Presence of emotional stimuli: Facial feedback effects on emotional experience were larger in the absence of emotionally evocative stimuli (e.g., cartoons). (c) Type of stimuli: When participants were presented with emotionally evocative stimuli, facial feedback effects were larger in the presence of some types of stimuli (e.g., emotional sentences) than others (e.g., pictures). The available evidence supports the facial feedback hypothesis' central claim that facial feedback influences emotional experience, although these effects tend to be small and heterogeneous. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Changes in subjective well-being following the U.S. Presidential election of 2016.

This investigation examined predictors of changes over time in subjective well-being (SWB) after the 2016 United States presidential election. Two indicators of SWB-general happiness and life satisfaction-were assessed three weeks before the election, the week of the election, three weeks later, and six months later. Partisanship predicted both indicators of SWB, with Trump supporters experiencing improved SWB after the election, Clinton supporters experiencing worsened SWB after the election, and those who viewed both candidates as bad also experiencing worsened SWB after the election. The impact of the election on SWB decreased over time, with all participants returning to baseline life satisfaction six months after the election. Trump supporters and those who viewed both candidates as bad for the country also returned to baseline general happiness six months after the election. Clinton supporters, in contrast, remained below baseline levels of general happiness six months after the election. Moral and political values, and exposure to media inconsistent with those values, predicted lasting change in subjective well-being. National events can affect how people perceive the overall quality of their lives and these effects are exacerbated when moral and political values are involved. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

When and why people misestimate future feelings: Identifying strengths and weaknesses in affective forecasting.

People try to make decisions that will improve their lives and make them happy, and to do so, they rely on affective forecasts-predictions about how future outcomes will make them feel. Decades of research suggest that people are poor at predicting how they will feel and that they commonly overestimate the impact that future events will have on their emotions. Recent work reveals considerable variability in forecasting accuracy. This investigation tested a model of affective forecasting that captures this variability in bias by differentiating emotional intensity, emotional frequency, and mood. Two field studies examined affective forecasting in college students receiving grades on a midterm exam (Study 1, N = 643), and U.S. citizens after the outcome of the 2016 presidential election (Study 2, N = 706). Consistent with the proposed model, participants were more accurate in forecasting the intensity of their emotion and less accurate in forecasting emotion frequency and mood. Overestimation of the effect of the event on mood increased over time since the event. Three experimental studies examined mechanisms that contribute to differential forecasting accuracy. Biases in forecasting intensity were caused by changes in perceived event importance; biases in forecasting frequency of emotion were caused by changes in the frequency of thinking about the event. This is the first direct evidence mapping out strengths and weaknesses for different types of affective forecasts and the factors that contribute to this pattern. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotion regulation deficits in persons with body-focused repetitive behavior disorders.

BACKGROUND: Conceptualizations of emotion dysregulation (ED) and body-focused repetitive behavior disorders (BFRBDs) imply that ED may be a central component of BFRBDs as well as a factor that distinguishes BFRBDs from non-impairing, subclinical body-focused repetitive behaviors (BFRBs). The current study empirically tested these observations. METHODS: One hundred thirty-eight undergraduates (of 1900 who completed a screening survey) completed self-report measures assessing four emotion regulation (ER) deficits hypothesized to underlie ED (alexithymia, maladaptive emotional reactivity, experiential avoidance, and response inhibition when distressed); 34 of these participants had BFRBDs, 64 had subclinical BFRBs, and 42 were unaffected by BFRBs. RESULTS: Results indicated that participants with BFRBDs reported higher levels of maladaptive emotional reactivity, experiential avoidance, and response inhibition when distressed than participants with subclinical BFRBs and participants unaffected by BFRBs. These results held even when controlling for comorbidity and total number of reported BFRBs. Participants did not differ on alexithymia. LIMITATIONS: Limitations of the current study include the BFRB groups' different distributions of BFRB types (e.g., hair pulling versus skin picking), the sample's demographic uniformity, and the fact that negative affectivity was not controlled when exploring BFRB group differences on ER deficits. Future research should improve on these limitations. CONCLUSIONS: The current results suggest that ED is a factor that differentiates BFRBDs from subclinical BFRBs. Such results may be useful for generating hypotheses regarding mechanisms responsible for BFRBs' development into BFRBDs. Furthermore, these results may provide insight into factors that explain the efficacy of more contemporary behavioral treatments for BFRBDs.