Genetic solutions to cultural problems?

In theory, observed correlations between genetic information and behaviour might be useful to members of the WEIRD (western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) populations. Guiding young people to choose educational opportunities that best match their abilities would benefit both the individual and society. In practice, however, such choices are far more profoundly limited by the culture people have inherited than their genes.

Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence.

Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is "no," then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is "yes" and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.

Cultural group selection follows Darwin's classic syllogism for the operation of selection.

The main objective of our target article was to sketch the empirical case for the importance of selection at the level of groups on cultural variation. Such variation is massive in humans, but modest or absent in other species. Group selection processes acting on this variation is a framework for developing explanations of the unusual level of cooperation between non-relatives found in our species. Our case for cultural group selection (CGS) followed Darwin's classic syllogism regarding natural selection: If variation exists at the level of groups, if this variation is heritable, and if it plays a role in the success or failure of competing groups, then selection will operate at the level of groups. We outlined the relevant domains where such evidence can be sought and characterized the main conclusions of work in those domains. Most commentators agree that CGS plays some role in human evolution, although some were considerably more skeptical. Some contributed additional empirical cases. Some raised issues of the scope of CGS explanations versus competing ones.

Individual consistency and flexibility in human social information use.

Copying others appears to be a cost-effective way of obtaining adaptive information, particularly when flexibly employed. However, adult humans differ considerably in their propensity to use information from others, even when this 'social information' is beneficial, raising the possibility that stable individual differences constrain flexibility in social information use. We used two dissimilar decision-making computer games to investigate whether individuals flexibly adjusted their use of social information to current conditions or whether they valued social information similarly in both games. Participants also completed established personality questionnaires. We found that participants demonstrated considerable flexibility, adjusting social information use to current conditions. In particular, individuals employed a 'copy-when-uncertain' social learning strategy, supporting a core, but untested, assumption of influential theoretical models of cultural transmission. Moreover, participants adjusted the amount invested in their decision based on the perceived reliability of personally gathered information combined with the available social information. However, despite this strategic flexibility, participants also exhibited consistent individual differences in their propensities to use and value social information. Moreover, individuals who favoured social information self-reported as more collectivist than others. We discuss the implications of our results for social information use and cultural transmission.

Cultural versus reproductive success: Why does economic development bring new tradeoffs?

Achievements that attract social rewards in developed countries, such as educational qualifications, a prestigious career, and the ability to acquire prestige goods, interfere with a woman's ability to achieve reproductive success. This tradeoff between cultural and reproductive success may have developed because economic development creates an evolutionarily novel social environment. In the social environment of developed countries, a far smaller proportion of social exchange is between kin than in the small-scale communities in which the human brain and behavior evolved. Evidence suggests that social interaction between non-kin is less likely to encourage behavior that enhances inclusive fitness. A model of the cultural change that is likely to result from this change in social influence suggests that beliefs and values will become increasingly less consistent with the pursuit of fitness (Newson et al. [2007]: Evol Hum Behav 28: 199-210). Responses to the World Value Survey, which has been carried out in over 70 countries, confirm a number of the predictions of this model. In countries where fertility began to decline more recently, people appear to perceive the costs of having children to be lower relative to the cost of childlessness and the benefits of being a parent.

Who was helping? The scope for female cooperative breeding in early Homo.

Derived aspects of our human life history, such as short interbirth intervals and altricial newborns, have been attributed to male provisioning of nutrient-rich meat within monogamous relationships. However, many primatologists and anthropologists have questioned the relative importance of pair-bonding and biparental care, pointing to evidence that cooperative breeding better characterizes human reproductive and child-care relationships. We present a mathematical model with empirically-informed parameter ranges showing that natural selection favors cooperation among mothers over a wide range of conditions. In contrast, our analysis provides a far more narrow range of support for selection favoring male coalition-based monogamy over more promiscuous independent males, suggesting that provisioning within monogamous relationships may fall short of explaining the evolution of Homo life history. Rather, broader cooperative networks within and between the sexes provide the primary basis for our unique life history.

Simulating the evolution of the human family: cooperative breeding increases in harsh environments.

Verbal and mathematical models that consider the costs and benefits of behavioral strategies have been useful in explaining animal behavior and are often used as the basis of evolutionary explanations of human behavior. In most cases, however, these models do not account for the effects that group structure and cultural traditions within a human population have on the costs and benefits of its members' decisions. Nor do they consider the likelihood that cultural as well as genetic traits will be subject to natural selection. In this paper, we present an agent-based model that incorporates some key aspects of human social structure and life history. We investigate the evolution of a population under conditions of different environmental harshness and in which selection can occur at the level of the group as well as the level of the individual. We focus on the evolution of a socially learned characteristic related to individuals' willingness to contribute to raising the offspring of others within their family group. We find that environmental harshness increases the frequency of individuals who make such contributions. However, under the conditions we stipulate, we also find that environmental variability can allow groups to survive with lower frequencies of helpers. The model presented here is inevitably a simplified representation of a human population, but it provides a basis for future modeling work toward evolutionary explanations of human behavior that consider the influence of both genetic and cultural transmission of behavior.

Why are modern families small? Toward an evolutionary and cultural explanation for the demographic transition.

As societies modernize, they go through what has become known as "the demographic transition;" couples begin to limit the size of their families. Models to explain this change assume that reproductive behavior is either under individual control or under social control. The evidence that social influence plays a role in the control of reproduction is strong, but the models cannot adequately explain why the development of small family norms always accompanies modernization. We suggest that the widening of social networks, which has been found to occur with modernization, is sufficient to explain the change in reproductive norms if it is assumed that (a) advice and comment on reproduction that passes among kin is more likely to encourage the creation of families than that which passes among nonkin and (b) this advice and comment influence the social norms induced from the communications. This would, through a process of cultural evolution, lead to the development of norms that make it increasingly difficult to have large families.