Measurement Invariance of Moral Foundations across Population Strata.

A representative sample (n = 2282) of Swedish adults completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, which measures moral intuitions concerning care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity. A subset (n = 607) completed a measure of intuitions about liberty. Measurement invariance was estimated across sex, age, education, income, left-right placement, religiosity, and party preference groups, based on multigroup confirmatory factor analyses of two-, three-, five-, six-, and eight-factor models, as well as bifactor models (with methods factors or a general factor). Acceptable configural, metric, and scalar invariance was obtained for most group comparisons, particularly based on the more complex models. The clearest exceptions were (1) configural non-invariance in comparisons involving participants with very low education or income, and (2) scalar non-invariance in comparisons of ideological groups based on three- and six-factor models but not the eight-factor model, which distinguished lifestyle liberty from government liberty.

Opening Pandora's Box: Person-Sensitive Conceptualization and Measurement in Psychological Science.

Although distinctions between the study of persons, the study of populations, and the study of mechanisms are helpful for illuminating mismatches between research assumptions, problems, and methods, it may be difficult to construe these as entirely discrete branches of psychological science. I suggest that it is more appropriate to view person-levelness (or person-sensitivity) as an ideal we should actively aspire toward, within the constraints placed by other goals such as generalizability and feasibility, when pursuing knowledge about individuals. It is an ideal that we can never hope to perfectly realize-the degree to which it is realized will always be a matter of degree, and there is therefore no clear line of demarcation between the person level and other branches of psychology. This ideal can nonetheless stimulate more person-sensitive conceptualizations, measurements, and analyses.

Rediscovering Tomkins' polarity theory: Humanism, normativism, and the psychological basis of left-right ideological conflict in the U.S. and Sweden.

According to Silvan Tomkins' polarity theory, ideological thought is universally structured by a clash between two opposing worldviews. On the left, a humanistic worldview seeks to uphold the intrinsic value of the person; on the right, a normative worldview holds that human worth is contingent upon conformity to rules. In this article, we situate humanism and normativism within the context of contemporary models of political ideology as a function of motivated social cognition, beliefs about the social world, and personality traits. In four studies conducted in the U.S. and Sweden, normativism was robustly associated with rightist (or conservative) self-placement; conservative issue preferences; resistance to change and acceptance of inequality; right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation; system justification and its underlying epistemic and existential motives to reduce uncertainty and threat; and a lack of openness, emotionality, and honesty-humility. Humanism exhibited the opposite relations to most of these constructs, but it was largely unrelated to epistemic and existential needs. Humanism was strongly associated with preferences for equality, openness to change, and low levels of authoritarianism, social dominance, and general and economic system justification. We conclude that polarity theory possesses considerable potential to explain how conflicts between worldviews shape contemporary politics.

The Complex Relation Between Receptivity to Pseudo-Profound Bullshit and Political Ideology.

This research systematically mapped the relationship between political ideology and receptivity to pseudo-profound bullshit-that is, obscure sentences constructed to impress others rather than convey truth. Among Swedish adults (N = 985), bullshit receptivity was (a) robustly positively associated with socially conservative (vs. liberal) self-placement, resistance to change, and particularly binding moral intuitions (loyalty, authority, purity); (b) associated with centrism on preference for equality and even leftism (when controlling for other aspects of ideology) on economic ideology self-placement; and (c) lowest among right-of-center social liberal voters and highest among left-wing green voters. Most of the results held up when we controlled for the perceived profundity of genuine aphorisms, cognitive reflection, numeracy, information processing bias, gender, age, education, religiosity, and spirituality. The results are supportive of theoretical accounts that posit ideological asymmetries in cognitive orientation, while also pointing to the existence of bullshit receptivity among both right- and left-wingers.

A Q-methodological study of personal worldviews.

Psychological research on personal worldviews has relied almost exclusively on a quantitative approach that is ill-equipped to fully capture human subjectivity. Using Q-methodology, this study revealed the multiplicity of meanings and internal structures of the worldviews of eighty Swedish adults across the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, human nature, morality, and values. Four coherent worldview Q-factors were extracted and interpreted qualitatively. Ontological and epistemological beliefs proved to be the highest in terms of subjective significance and divergence between worldviews, although they have been largely ignored in past research. The results were in part supportive of polarity theory, which describes the structure of worldviews in terms of the opposition between humanistic and normativistic positions, while also suggesting amendments to this theory, by illuminating the differences between hedonistic and openness-focused forms of humanism and between empiricist and rationalist, as well as religious and atheistic, forms of normativism, and the ways in which elements of both positions are combined or rejected. The findings illustrate how Q-methodology can be used to elaborate and correct the understandings of personal worldviews that are produced by traditional quantitative forms of inquiry.

Bullshit-sensitivity predicts prosocial behavior.

Bullshit-sensitivity is the ability to distinguish pseudo-profound bullshit sentences (e.g. "Your movement transforms universal observations") from genuinely profound sentences (e.g. "The person who never made a mistake never tried something new"). Although bullshit-sensitivity has been linked to other individual difference measures, it has not yet been shown to predict any actual behavior. We therefore conducted a survey study with over a thousand participants from a general sample of the Swedish population and assessed participants' bullshit-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven bullshit sentences) and profoundness-receptivity (i.e. their perceived meaningfulness of seven genuinely profound sentences), and used these variables to predict two types of prosocial behavior (self-reported donations and a decision to volunteer for charity). Despite bullshit-receptivity and profoundness-receptivity being positively correlated with each other, logistic regression analyses showed that profoundness-receptivity had a positive association whereas bullshit-receptivity had a negative association with both types of prosocial behavior. These relations held up for the most part when controlling for potentially intermediating factors such as cognitive ability, time spent completing the survey, sex, age, level of education, and religiosity. The results suggest that people who are better at distinguishing the pseudo-profound from the actually profound are more prosocial.