Should the Use of Adaptive Machine Learning Systems in Medicine be Classified as Research?

A novel advantage of the use of machine learning (ML) systems in medicine is their potential to continue learning from new data after implementation in clinical practice. To date, considerations of the ethical questions raised by the design and use of adaptive machine learning systems in medicine have, for the most part, been confined to discussion of the so-called "update problem," which concerns how regulators should approach systems whose performance and parameters continue to change even after they have received regulatory approval. In this paper, we draw attention to a prior ethical question: whether the continuous learning that will occur in such systems after their initial deployment should be classified, and regulated, as medical research? We argue that there is a strong prima facie case that the use of continuous learning in medical ML systems should be categorized, and regulated, as research and that individuals whose treatment involves such systems should be treated as research subjects.

Expanded terminal sedation in end-of-life care.

Despite advances in palliative care, some patients still suffer significantly at the end of life. Terminal Sedation (TS) refers to the use of sedatives in dying patients until the point of death. The following limits are commonly applied: (1) symptoms should be refractory, (2) sedatives should be administered proportionally to symptoms and (3) the patient should be imminently dying. The term 'Expanded TS' (ETS) can be used to describe the use of sedation at the end of life outside one or more of these limits.In this paper, we explore and defend ETS, focusing on jurisdictions where assisted dying is lawful. We argue that ETS is morally permissible: (1) in cases of non-refractory suffering where earlier treatments are likely to fail, (2) where gradual sedation is likely to be ineffective or where unconsciousness is a clinically desirable outcome, (3) where the patient meets all criteria for assisted dying or (4) where the patient has greater than 2 weeks to live, is suffering intolerably, and sedation is considered to be the next best treatment option for their suffering.While remaining two distinct practices, there is scope for some convergence between the criteria for assisted dying and the criteria for ETS. Dying patients who are currently ineligible for TS, or even assisted dying, should not be left to suffer. ETS provides one means to bridge this gap.

When (if ever) may doctors discuss religion with their patients?

There is ongoing debate within the bioethics literature regarding to what extent (if any) it is ethically justifiable for doctors to engage in religious discussion with their patients, in cases where patients cite religious considerations as influencing their medical decision-making. In this paper, we concede that certain forms of religious discussion between doctors and patients are morally permissible (though not necessarily morally obligatory), insofar as patients' religious beliefs may comprise an important part of their overall wellbeing and can influence their medical decisions. However, we argue that it is not morally permissible for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with their patients, beyond simply inquiring about the patient's values (which may include their religious values) or referring patients to a chaplain or religious figure for further discussion. In support of this claim, we put forward two key arguments which have remained relatively unaddressed in the current debate. First, we argue that it is not practical for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with patients, and hence it cannot be morally obligatory for them to do so. Second, we argue that, while doctors might have a professional duty to ensure that their patient's religious interests (if any) are addressed, this does not entail that doctors themselves are the ones who should directly address these interests. Along the way, we anticipate and respond to some possible objections to these two key arguments.

Prospective Intention-Based Lifestyle Contracts: mHealth Technology and Responsibility in Healthcare.

As the rising costs of lifestyle-related diseases place increasing strain on public healthcare systems, the individual's role in disease may be proposed as a healthcare rationing criterion. Literature thus far has largely focused on retrospective responsibility in healthcare. The concept of prospective responsibility, in the form of a lifestyle contract, warrants further investigation. The responsibilisation in healthcare debate also needs to take into account innovative developments in mobile health technology, such as wearable biometric devices and mobile apps, which may change how we hold others accountable for their lifestyles. Little is known about public attitudes towards lifestyle contracts and the use of mobile health technology to hold people responsible in the context of healthcare. This paper has two components. Firstly, it details empirical findings from a survey of 81 members of the United Kingdom general public on public attitudes towards individual responsibility and rationing healthcare, prospective and retrospective responsibility, and the acceptability of lifestyle contracts in the context of mobile health technology. Secondly, we draw on the empirical findings and propose a model of prospective intention-based lifestyle contracts, which is both more aligned with public intuitions and less ethically objectionable than more traditional, retrospective models of responsibility in healthcare.

Payment in challenge studies: ethics, attitudes and a new payment for risk model.

Controlled Human Infection Model (CHIM) research involves the infection of otherwise healthy participants with disease often for the sake of vaccine development. The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasised the urgency of enhancing CHIM research capability and the importance of having clear ethical guidance for their conduct. The payment of CHIM participants is a controversial issue involving stakeholders across ethics, medicine and policymaking with allegations circulating suggesting exploitation, coercion and other violations of ethical principles. There are multiple approaches to payment: reimbursement, wage payment and unlimited payment. We introduce a new Payment for Risk Model, which involves paying for time, pain and inconvenience and for risk associated with participation. We give philosophical arguments based on utility, fairness and avoidance of exploitation to support this. We also examine a cross-section of the UK public and CHIM experts. We found that CHIM participants are currently paid variable amounts. A representative sample of the UK public believes CHIM participants should be paid approximately triple the UK minimum wage and should be paid for the risk they endure throughout participation. CHIM experts believe CHIM participants should be paid more than double the UK minimum wage but are divided on the payment for risk. The Payment for Risk Model allows risk and pain to be accounted for in payment and could be used to determine ethically justifiable payment for CHIM participants.Although many research guidelines warn against paying large amounts or paying for risk, our empirical findings provide empirical support to the growing number of ethical arguments challenging this status quo. We close by suggesting two ways (value of statistical life or consistency with risk in other employment) by which payment for risk could be calculated.

Good medical ethics, from the inside out--and back again.

I argue here that good medical ethics requires an empirically-informed moral psychology of medical virtue along with sound action-guiding prescriptions for virtuous medical practice. After distinguishing between three levels of justification, I indicate how medical virtue ethics can draw constructively on relevant empirical research in developing feasible and realistic aspirational standards for doctors, and in evaluating how policymakers can support doctors in acting on the virtues that doctors agreed to be guided by when they joined the profession.

Surgeon report cards, clinical realities, and the quality of patient care.

In this article, I respond to Alan Henderson's critique of the quality of care argument for surgeon report cards. I discuss some significant US and UK studies demonstrating that surgeon report cards improve clinical outcomes. I also indicate that surgeon report cards are in any case supported by other important ethical arguments, such as arguments from surgeons' professional accountability obligations, and from patients' entitlements to be informed about the risks of surgery upon them.