Airport exit and entry screening for Ebola--August-November 10, 2014.

In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented.

Unsuspected recent transmission of tuberculosis among high-risk groups: implications of universal tuberculosis genotyping in its detection.

BACKGROUND: The initiation of universal genotyping revealed 3 clusters of 19 patients with tuberculosis (TB) in Wisconsin, with no apparent epidemiologic links among most of them. An epidemiologic investigation was conducted to determine whether genotype clustering resulted from recent transmission. METHODS: We conducted additional interviews with patients and reviewed medical records. Places frequented by the patients while they were infectious were visited to identify contacts. RESULTS: Our investigation revealed several previously unrecognized possible sites of TB transmission: a single-room occupancy hotel, 2 homeless shelters, 1 bar, and 2 crack houses. Seven patients with previously diagnosed TB were added to the clusters. Of 26 patients, we identified epidemiologic links for all but 1. Common risk factors among patients included alcohol abuse, crack cocaine use, homelessness, and unemployment. Additionally, 98 contacts missed during routine contact investigation were identified. CONCLUSIONS: Transmission of TB, particularly among high-risk groups, may go undetected for years. Our investigation demonstrated the value of universal genotyping in revealing unsuspected recent TB transmission and previously unrecognized sites of transmission, which can be targeted for specific TB interventions.