The shared ethical framework to allocate scarce medical resources: a lesson from COVID-19.

The COVID-19 pandemic has helped to clarify the fair and equitable allocation of scarce medical resources, both within and among countries. The ethical allocation of such resources entails a three-step process: (1) elucidating the fundamental ethical values for allocation, (2) using these values to delineate priority tiers for scarce resources, and (3) implementing the prioritisation to faithfully realise the fundamental values. Myriad reports and assessments have elucidated five core substantive values for ethical allocation: maximising benefits and minimising harms, mitigating unfair disadvantage, equal moral concern, reciprocity, and instrumental value. These values are universal. None of the values are sufficient alone, and their relative weight and application will vary by context. In addition, there are procedural principles such as transparency, engagement, and evidence-responsiveness. Prioritising instrumental value and minimising harms during the COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread agreement on priority tiers to include health-care workers, first responders, people living in congregate housing, and people with an increased risk of death, such as older adults and individuals with medical conditions. However, the pandemic also revealed problems with the implementation of these values and priority tiers, such as allocation on the basis of population rather than COVID-19 burden, and passive allocation that exacerbated disparities by requiring recipients to spend time booking and travelling to appointments. This ethical framework should be the starting point for the allocation of scarce medical resources in future pandemics and other public health conditions. For instance, allocation of the new malaria vaccine among sub-Saharan African countries should be based not on reciprocity to countries that participated in research, but on maximally reducing serious illness and deaths, especially among infants and children.

Association of Race and Ethnicity With High Longevity Deceased Donor Kidney Transplantation Under the US Kidney Allocation System.

RATIONALE & OBJECTIVE: The US Kidney Allocation System (KAS) prioritizes candidates with a≤20% estimated posttransplant survival (EPTS) to receive high-longevity kidneys defined by a≤20% Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI). Use of EPTS in the KAS deprioritizes candidates with older age, diabetes, and longer dialysis durations. We assessed whether this use also disadvantages race and ethnicity minority candidates, who are younger but more likely to have diabetes and longer durations of kidney failure requiring dialysis. STUDY DESIGN: Observational cohort study. SETTING & PARTICIPANTS: Adult candidates for and recipients of kidney transplantation represented in the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients from January 2015 through December 2020. EXPOSURE: Race and ethnicity. OUTCOME: Age-adjusted assignment to≤20% EPTS, transplantation of a≤20% KDPI kidney, and posttransplant survival in longevity-matched recipients by race and ethnicity. ANALYTIC APPROACH: Multivariable logistic regression, Fine-Gray competing risks survival analysis, and Kaplan-Meier and Cox proportional hazards methods. RESULTS: The cohort included 199,444 candidates (7% Asian, 29% Black, 19% Hispanic or Latino, and 43% White) listed for deceased donor kidney transplantation. Non-White candidates had significantly higher rates of diabetes, longer dialysis duration, and were younger than White candidates. Adjusted for age, Asian, Black, and Hispanic or Latino candidates had significantly lower odds of having a ETPS score of≤20% (odds ratio, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.81-0.91], 0.52 [95% CI, 0.50-0.54], and 0.49 [95% CI, 0.47-0.51]), and were less likely to receive a≤20% KDPI kidney (sub-hazard ratio, 0.70 [0.66-0.75], 0.89 [0.87-0.92], and 0.73 [0.71-0.76]) compared with White candidates. Among recipients with≤20% EPTS scores transplanted with a≤20% KDPI deceased donor kidney, Asian and Hispanic recipients had lower posttransplant mortality (HR, 0.45 [0.27-0.77] and 0.63 [0.47-0.86], respectively) and Black recipients had higher but not statistically significant posttransplant mortality (HR, 1.22 [0.99-1.52]) compared with White recipients. LIMITATIONS: Provider reported race and ethnicity data and 5-year post transplant follow-up period. CONCLUSIONS: The US kidney allocation system is less likely to identify race and ethnicity minority candidates as having a≤20% EPTS score, which triggers allocation of high-longevity deceased donor kidneys. These findings should inform the Organ Procurement and Transplant Network about how to remedy the race and ethnicity disparities introduced through KAS's current approach of allocating allografts with longer predicted longevity to recipients with longer estimated posttransplant survival. PLAIN-LANGUAGE SUMMARY: The US Kidney Allocation System prioritizes giving high-longevity, high-quality kidneys to patients on the waiting list who have a high estimated posttransplant survival (EPTS) score. EPTS is calculated based on the patient's age, whether the patient has diabetes, whether the patient has a history of organ transplantation, and the number of years spent on dialysis. Our analyses show that Asian, Black or African American, and Hispanic or Latino patients were less likely to receive high-longevity kidneys compared with White patients, despite having similar or better posttransplant survival outcomes.

Bioethicists Today: Results of the Views in Bioethics Survey.

Bioethicists influence practices and policies in medicine, science, and public health. However, little is known about bioethicists' views. We recently surveyed 824 U.S. bioethicists on a wide range of ethical issues, including topics related to abortion, medical aid in dying, and resource allocation, among others. We also asked bioethicists about their demographic, religious, academic, and professional backgrounds. We find that bioethicists' normative commitments predict their views on bioethical issues. We also find that, in important ways, bioethicists' views do not align with those of the U.S. public: for instance, bioethicists are more likely than members of the public to think abortion is ethically permissible but are less likely to believe compensating organ donors is. Our demographic results indicate the field of bioethics is far less diverse than the U.S. population-less diverse even than other academic disciplines-suggesting far more work needs to be done to build an inclusive field.

Fair Allocation of Scarce Therapies for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).

The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued emergency use authorizations (EUAs) for monoclonal antibodies (mAbs) for nonhospitalized patients with mild or moderate coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) disease and for individuals exposed to COVID-19 as postexposure prophylaxis. EUAs for oral antiviral drugs have also been issued. Due to increased demand because of the Delta variant, the federal government resumed control over the supply and asked states to ration doses. As future variants (eg, the Omicron variant) emerge, further rationing may be required. We identify relevant ethical principles (ie, benefiting people and preventing harm, equal concern, and mitigating health inequities) and priority groups for access to therapies based on an integrated approach to population health and medical factors (eg, urgently scarce healthcare workers, persons in disadvantaged communities hard hit by COVID-19). Using priority categories to allocate scarce therapies effectively operationalizes important ethical values. This strategy is preferable to the current approach of categorical exclusion or inclusion rules based on vaccination, immunocompromise status, or older age, or the ad hoc consideration of clinical risk factors.

Incorporating Health Equity Into COVID-19 Reopening Plans: Policy Experimentation in California.

California has focused on health equity in the state's COVID-19 reopening plan. The Blueprint for a Safer Economy assigns each of California's 58 counties into 1 of 4 tiers based on 2 metrics: test positivity rate and adjusted case rate. To advance to the next less-restrictive tier, counties must meet that tier's test positivity and adjusted case rate thresholds. In addition, counties must have a plan for targeted investments within disadvantaged communities, and counties with more than 106 000 residents must meet an equity metric. California's explicit incorporation of health equity into its reopening plan underscores the interrelated fate of its residents during the COVID-19 pandemic and creates incentives for action. This article evaluates the benefits and challenges of this novel health equity focus, and outlines recommendations for other US states to address disparities in their reopening plans.

Allocating scarce life-saving resources: the proper role of age.

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced clinicians, policy-makers and the public to wrestle with stark choices about who should receive potentially life-saving interventions such as ventilators, ICU beds and dialysis machines if demand overwhelms capacity. Many allocation schemes face the question of whether to consider age. We offer two underdiscussed arguments for prioritising younger patients in allocation policies, which are grounded in prudence and fairness rather than purely in maximising benefits: prioritising one's younger self for lifesaving treatments is prudent from an individual perspective, and prioritising younger patients works to narrow health disparities by giving priority to patients at risk of dying earlier in life, who are more likely to be subject to systemic disadvantage. We then identify some confusions in recent arguments against considering age.

Tailoring Public Health Policies.

In an effort to contain the spread of COVID-19, many states and countries have adopted public health restrictions on activities previously considered commonplace: crossing state borders, eating indoors, gathering together, and even leaving one's home. These policies often focus on specific activities or groups, rather than imposing the same limits across the board. In this Article, I consider the law and ethics of these policies, which I call tailored policies.In Part II, I identify two types of tailored policies: activity-based and group-based. Activity-based restrictions respond to differences in the risks and benefits of specific activities, such as walking outdoors and dining indoors. Group-based restrictions consider differences between groups with respect to risk and benefit. Examples are policies that treat children or senior citizens differently, policies that require travelers to quarantine when traveling to a new destination, and policies that treat individuals differently based on whether they have COVID-19 symptoms, have tested positive for COVID-19, have previous COVID-19 infection, or have been vaccinated against COVID-19. In Part III, I consider the public health law grounding of tailored policies in the principles of "least restrictive means" and "well-targeting." I also examine how courts have analyzed tailored policies that have been challenged on fundamental rights or equal protection grounds. I argue that fundamental rights analyses typically favor tailored policies and that equal protection does not preclude the use of tailored policies even when imperfectly crafted. In Part IV, I consider three critiques of tailored policies, centering on the claims that they produce inequity, cause harm, or unacceptably limit liberty. I argue that we must evaluate restrictions comparatively: the question is not whether tailored policies are perfectly equitable, wholly prevent harm, or completely protect liberty, but whether they are better than untailored ones at realizing these goals in a pandemic. I also argue that evaluation must consider indirect harms and benefits as well as direct and apparent ones.

Eliminating Categorical Exclusion Criteria in Crisis Standards of Care Frameworks.

During public health crises including the COVID-19 pandemic, resource scarcity and contagion risks may require health systems to shift-to some degree-from a usual clinical ethic, focused on the well-being of individual patients, to a public health ethic, focused on population health. Many triage policies exist that fall under the legal protections afforded by "crisis standards of care," but they have key differences. We critically appraise one of the most fundamental differences among policies, namely the use of criteria to categorically exclude certain patients from eligibility for otherwise standard medical services. We examine these categorical exclusion criteria from ethical, legal, disability, and implementation perspectives. Focusing our analysis on the most common type of exclusion criteria, which are disease-specific, we conclude that optimal policies for critical care resource allocation and the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should not use categorical exclusions. We argue that the avoidance of categorical exclusions is often practically feasible, consistent with public health norms, and mitigates discrimination against persons with disabilities.

Authority without identity: defending advance directives via posthumous rights over one's body.

This paper takes a novel approach to the active bioethical debate over whether advance medical directives have moral authority in dementia cases. Many have assumed that advance directives would lack moral authority if dementia truly produced a complete discontinuity in personal identity, such that the predementia individual is a separate individual from the postdementia individual. I argue that even if dementia were to undermine personal identity, the continuity of the body and the predementia individual's rights over that body can support the moral authority of advance directives. I propose that the predementia individual retains posthumous rights over her body that she acquired through historical embodiment in that body, and further argue that claims grounded in historical embodiment can sometimes override or exclude moral claims grounded in current embodiment. I close by considering how advance directives grounded in historical embodiment might be employed in practice and what they would and would not justify.

Differential payment to research participants in the same study: an ethical analysis.

Recognising that offers of payment to research participants can serve various purposes-reimbursement, compensation and incentive-helps uncover differences between participants, which can justify differential payment of participants within the same study. Participants with different study-related expenses will need different amounts of reimbursement to be restored to their preparticipation financial baseline. Differential compensation can be acceptable when some research participants commit more time or assume greater burdens than others, or if inter-site differences affect the value of compensation. Finally, it may be permissible to offer differential incentive payments if necessary to advance the goals of a study. We encourage investigators and Institutional Review Boards to think about whether to offer payment, in what amounts and for what purpose, and also to consider whether differential payment can help promote the scientific and ethical goals of clinical research.

Will more organs save more lives? Cost-effectiveness and the ethics of expanding organ procurement.

The assumption that procuring more organs will save more lives has inspired increasingly forceful calls to increase organ procurement. This project, in contrast, directly questions the premise that more organ transplantation means more lives saved. Its argument begins with the fact that resources are limited and medical procedures have opportunity costs. Because many other lifesaving interventions are more cost-effective than transplantation and compete with transplantation for a limited budget, spending on organ transplantation consumes resources that could have been used to save a greater number of other lives. This argument has not yet been advanced in debates over expanded procurement and could buttress existing concerns about expanded procurement. To support this argument, I review existing empirical data on the cost-effectiveness of transplantation and compare them to data on interventions for other illnesses. These data should motivate utilitarians and others whose primary goal is maximizing population-wide health benefits to doubt the merits of expanding organ procurement. I then consider two major objections: one makes the case that transplant candidates have a special claim to medical resources, and the other challenges the use of cost-effectiveness to set priorities. I argue that there is no reason to conclude that transplant candidates' medical interests should receive special priority, and that giving some consideration to cost-effectiveness in priority setting requires neither sweeping changes to overall health priorities nor the adoption of any specific, controversial metric for assessing cost-effectiveness. Before searching for more organs, we should first ensure the provision of cost-effective care.