Conversations that warm the heart: positive and negative links to the mental health challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: Public-health precautions to curb Covid-19 (e.g. lockdowns) threaten mental health and emotional wellbeing, especially for today's youngest adults. Their overuse of solitary, screen-mediated social media, plus underdeveloped in-person conversation skills, heighten their vulnerability to mental health problems such as loneliness, anxiety and depression. METHODS: To explore interconnections among variables such as social media use, empathic skills for in-person conversation and strategies for coping with Covid-19 anxiety, Australian 18- to 26-year-olds took several novel in-depth questionnaire measures that were purpose-built for the present research. RESULTS: Main findings were threefold: (i) Individuals who most frequently and wholeheartedly enjoyed live in-person conversations with friends suffered the most Covid-19 anxiety, worry and stress during periods of pandemic restriction. (ii) Empathic conversational skills were highest among those who conversed in-person (by phone or face-to-face) most often and were lowest for those who rarely did so and/or had little skill with in-person conversation. (iii) Those who gained the greatest relief from anxiety (e.g. about Covid-19) through solitary use of screen-based social media and games had the fewest empathic conversational skills. CONCLUSIONS: Implications of these findings for suggesting possible future interventions to help young people cope with public health measures such as lockdowns and to foster community health and wellbeing are discussed.

Theory of Mind (ToM) Development in Thai Deaf Children.

This study explored theory of mind (ToM) development in school-aged deaf children. To address new questions, we gave a standard, well-controlled false-belief test to a large (n = 200) sample of severely-to-profoundly deaf children aged 8-15 years in a non-Western culture (Thailand). There were 190 deaf children of hearing parents and 10 deaf native signers with signing deaf parents, consistent with overall population ratios. Comparing our Thai sample's ToM performance on standard tests of false-belief understanding with that reported in past studies, our results showed a 67% ToM success rate for Thai severely-to-profoundly deaf children of hearing parents similar to collective findings from past research on smaller samples in Australia, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and the United States. Our Thai deaf native signers likewise performed equivalently to native signers of similar age studied in past research in Australia and the United States. Collectively, the detailed findings of our study suggest promising new directions for future studies to pursue in order to build upon this novel and theoretically provocative evidence about how ToM development and ToM delay unfold for school-aged deaf children growing up in varied cultures, school settings, and family circumstances.

Longitudinal Theory of Mind (ToM) Development From Preschool to Adolescence With and Without ToM Delay.

Longitudinal tracking of 107 three- to-thirteen-year-olds in a cross-sequential design showed a 6-step theory of mind (ToM) sequence identified by a few past cross-sectional studies validly depicted longitudinal ToM development from early to middle childhood for typically developing (TD) children and those with ToM delays owing to deafness or autism. Substantively, all groups showed ToM progress throughout middle childhood. Atypical development was more extended and began and ended at lower levels than for TD children. Yet most children in all groups progressed over the study's mean 1.5 years. Findings help resolve theoretical debates about ToM development for children with and without delay and gain strength and weight via their applicability to three disparate groups varying in ToM timing and sequencing.

Explaining the Unpredictable: The Development of Causal Theories of Mind in Deaf and Hearing Children.

Two studies of 100 children aged 3-12 years examined theory of mind (ToM) understanding via explanations and predictions in hearing preschoolers and ToM-delayed deaf children. Study 1's 75 children (31 deaf; 44 hearing) displayed an "explanation advantage," devising valid epistemic ToM explanations despite failing simpler forced-choice false-belief (FB) prediction tests. This novel discovery for deaf children extended to unexpectedly frequent cognitive ("think" or "know") explanations. Study 2 (with 25 additional deaf children; Mage  = 9) showed that microgenetic FB explanation practice resulted in significant gains on FB prediction posttests that were absent in a non-ToM control group. Implications for (a) explanation's interconnection with conceptual development, (b) designing ToM interventions, and (c) teaching deaf and hearing children are discussed.

Deaf and hearing children's development of theory of mind, peer popularity, and leadership during middle childhood.

This study had two primary aims. First, we compared deaf and hearing children during middle and late childhood on (a) cognitive understanding of basic and advanced theory of mind (ToM) and (b) social dimensions of peer group relations, including popularity, isolation, leadership, and the disposition to interact positively with peers. Second, using correlational analyses, we examined ToM's connections with these social variables to see whether and how ToM impacts children's social lives. A total of 57 children (36 deaf children of hearing parents and 21 hearing children) 6 to 14years of age completed a 6-step developmental ToM Scale, and their teachers reported on the social variables. Hearing children outperformed deaf children on ToM and all teacher-rated variables. For deaf children, popularity correlated positively, and social isolation correlated negatively, with ToM even after controlling for age, gender, and language ability. For hearing children, the only ToM link was a weak correlation with leadership. Possible reasons for the differences between deaf and hearing groups are discussed, together with the likelihood of bidirectional causal links and implications for deaf children's social development in school.

Empathy and Theory of Mind in Deaf and Hearing Children.

Empathy (or sharing another's emotion) and theory of mind (ToM: the understanding that behavior is guided by true and false beliefs) are cornerstones of human social life and relationships. In contrast to ToM, there has been little study of empathy's development, especially in deaf children. Two studies of a total of 117 children (52 hearing; 65 deaf children of hearing parents) aged 4-13 years were therefore designed to (a) compare levels of empathy in deaf and hearing children, and (b) explore correlations of ToM with empathy in deaf and hearing groups. Results showed that (a) deaf children scored lower in empathy than their hearing peers and (b) empathy and ToM were significantly correlated for deaf children but not for the hearing. Possible reasons for these divergent developmental patterns were considered, along with implications for future research.

Meta-Analysis of Theory of Mind and Peer Popularity in the Preschool and Early School Years.

It has been argued that children who possess an advanced theory of mind (ToM) are viewed positively by their peers, but the empirical findings are mixed. This meta-analysis of 20 studies including 2,096 children (aged from 2 years, 8 months to 10 years) revealed a significant overall association (r = .19) indicating that children with higher ToM scores were also more popular in their peer group. The effect did not vary with age. The effect was weaker for boys (r = .12) compared to girls (r = .30). ToM was more strongly associated with popularity (r = .23) than with rejection (r = .13). These findings confirm that ToM development has significant implications for children's peer relationships.

Children with autism spectrum disorder are skilled at reading emotion body language.

Autism is commonly believed to impair the ability to perceive emotions, yet empirical evidence is mixed. Because face processing may be difficult for those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), we developed a novel test of recognizing emotion via static body postures (Body-Emotion test) and evaluated it with children aged 5 to 12 years in two studies. In Study 1, 34 children with ASD and 41 typically developing (TD) controls matched for age and verbal intelligence (VIQ [verbal IQ]) were tested on (a) our new Body-Emotion test, (b) a widely used test of emotion recognition using photos of eyes as stimuli (Baron-Cohen et al.'s "Reading Mind in the Eyes: Child" or RMEC [Journal of Developmental and Learning Disorders, 2001, Vol. 5, pp. 47-78]), (c) a well-validated theory of mind (ToM) battery, and (d) a teacher-rated empathy scale. In Study 2 (33 children with ASD and 31 TD controls), the RMEC test was simplified to the six basic human emotions. Results of both studies showed that children with ASD performed as well as their TD peers on the Body-Emotion test. Yet TD children outperformed the ASD group on ToM and on both the standard RMEC test and the simplified version. VIQ was not related to perceiving emotions via either body posture or eyes for either group. However, recognizing emotions from body posture was correlated with ToM, especially for children with ASD. Finally, reading emotions from body posture was easier than reading emotions from eyes for both groups.

Children with autism can track others' beliefs in a competitive game.

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via 'litmus' false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the 'Dot-Midge task'). Ninety-six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4-year-olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3-year-olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard 'Sally-Ann' false belief test, the Dot-Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally-Ann task procedure) and a norm-referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot-Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally-Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners' beliefs in the context of a competitive game.

Siblings, theory of mind, and executive functioning in children aged 3-6 years: new longitudinal evidence.

Longitudinal data were obtained from 157 children aged 3 years 3 months to 5 years 6 months at Time 1. At Time 2 these children had aged an average of 12 months. Theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) were measured at both time points. Results suggest that Time 1 ToM scores predict Time 2 EF scores. Detailed examination of sibling influences suggests that benefits-in terms of advanced ToM development-accrue to children with siblings versus without, and to those with a larger number of child-aged siblings. Any advance in either area (ToM or EF) is likely to benefit the other, and early sibling interaction appears to act as a catalyst.

The mind behind the message: advancing theory-of-mind scales for typically developing children, and those with deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome.

Children aged 3-12 years (n = 184) with typical development, deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome took a series of theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks to confirm and extend previous developmental scaling evidence. A new sarcasm task, in the format of H. M. Wellman and D. Liu's (2004) 5-step ToM Scale, added a statistically reliable 6th step to the scale for all diagnostic groups. A key previous finding, divergence in task sequencing for children with autism, was confirmed. Comparisons among diagnostic groups, controlling age, and language ability, showed that typical developers mastered the 6 ToM steps ahead of each of the 3 disabled groups, with implications for ToM theories. The final (sarcasm) task challenged even nondisabled 9-year-olds, demonstrating the new scale's sensitivity to post-preschool ToM growth.

Altruism, hypocrisy and theory of mind in autistic and nonautistic children.

Children make choices between generosity and greed every day. Often they must also choose between confession or denial of antisocial acts like greed, thereby displaying either honesty or hypocrisy. Such choices pose cognitive challenges that, in theory, might reflect children's developing social-cognitions and affect their daily social lives and developmental opportunities. Individual differences in altruism and hypocrisy were examined in relation to theory of mind (ToM) in 102 school-age children (44 autistic; 58 typically developing) using ecologically valid altruism and hypocrisy tests where generosity had lasting real-life costs and hypocrisy was self-serving. Selfless altruism was abundant for autistic and nonautistic children alike and was significantly predicted by ToM over and above other predictors like age, gender, and language. More nonautistic (74%) than autistic children (41%) displayed hypocrisy, although individual ToM differences among ASD children were not significantly correlated with it. Findings extend to new instances (altruism and hypocrisy) evidence of ToM's importance for everyday social behaviors that impact upon peer relations while also extending past evidence that: (a) unexpected sociomoral strengths can coexist with ToM delays, (b) attention to individual differences is crucial, and (c) autistic children's capacity to develop sociomoral reasoning should not be underestimated. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Sibling influences on theory of mind development for children with ASD.

BACKGROUND: Research indicates that having child siblings is positively associated with theory of mind (ToM) in typically developing children. As ToM is important to everyday social behaviours it is important to extend this research to examine whether there are similar sibling effects for children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). METHODS: Theory of mind and executive functioning abilities of 60 children clinically diagnosed with ASD were assessed with batteries of standard tasks. Verbal mental age (VMA) and severity of autism symptoms were also measured together with number of child-aged siblings (1 to 12 years) and position in the sibling constellation. RESULTS: Having older siblings was a significant negative predictor of ToM performance for children with ASD, even after controlling for age, VMA, executive function and autism symptom severity. A weaker ToM benefit of younger siblings was not statistically significant independently of control variables. CONCLUSIONS: In sharp contrast to findings for typically developing preschoolers, having an older sibling was a disadvantage for ToM development in children with ASD. Conceivably, older siblings may over-compensate for their younger ASD siblings in social interactions, thereby limiting opportunities for social-cognitive growth. Parental attitudes, family resources, cultural norms and access to educational interventions may also conceivably be relevant and clearly warrant further research.

Sequential progressions in a theory-of-mind scale: longitudinal perspectives.

Consecutive retestings of 92 U.S. preschoolers (n=30), Chinese preschoolers (n=31), and deaf children (n=31) examined whether the sequences of development apparent in cross-sectional results with a theory-of-mind scale also appeared in longitudinal assessment. Longitudinal data confirmed that theory-of-mind progressions apparent in cross-sectional scaling data also characterized longitudinal sequences of understanding for individual children. The match between cross-sectional and longitudinal sequences appeared for children who exhibit different progressions across cultures (United States vs. China) and for children with substantial delays (deaf children of hearing parents). Moreover, greater scale distances reflected larger longitudinal age differences.

Everyday social and conversation applications of theory-of-mind understanding by children with autism-spectrum disorders or typical development.

Children with autism-spectrum disorders (ASD) often fail laboratory false-belief tests of theory of mind (ToM). Yet how this impacts on their everyday social behavior is less clear, partly owing to uncertainty over which specific everyday conversational and social skills require ToM understanding. A new caregiver-report scale of these everyday applications of ToM was developed and validated in two studies. Study 1 obtained parent ratings of 339 children (85 with autism; 230 with Asperger's; 24 typically-developing) on the new scale and results revealed (a) that the scale had good psychometric properties and (b) that children with ASD had significantly more everyday mindreading difficulties than typical developers. In Study 2, we directly tested links between laboratory ToM and everyday mindreading using teacher ratings on the new scale. The sample of 25 children included 15 with autism and 10 typical developers aged 5-12 years. Children in both groups who passed laboratory ToM tests had fewer everyday mindreading difficulties than those of the same diagnosis who failed. Yet, intriguingly, autistic ToM-passers still had more problems with everyday mindreading than younger typically-developing ToM-failers. The possible roles of family conversation and peer interaction, along with ToM, in everyday social functioning were considered.

Development of social-cognitive and communication skills in children born deaf.

Central to the interface of social-cognitive and communicative development is the growth of a theory of mind (ToM). ToM is mastered by most hearing children and deaf children of signing deaf parents by the age of 5 or 6 but is often seriously delayed in deaf children of hearing parents. This paper reviews recently published research on deaf children's ToM development and presents an original study consisting of eight longitudinal case histories that collectively map late-signing deaf children's ToM performance from 44 to 158 months of age. While five tentative conclusions can be posited from the collective research so far, further investigation of each of these possibilities is clearly needed.

From fancy to reason: scaling deaf and hearing children's understanding of theory of mind and pretence.

We examined deaf and hearing children's progression of steps in theory of mind (ToM) development including their understanding of social pretending. Ninety-three children (33 deaf; 60 hearing) aged 3-13 years were tested on a set of six closely matched ToM tasks. Results showed that deaf children were delayed substantially behind hearing children in understanding pretending, false belief (FB) and other ToM concepts, in line with their delayed uptake of social pretend (SP) play. By using a scaling methodology, we confirmed previous evidence of a consistent five-step developmental progression for both groups. Moreover, by including social pretence understanding, both deaf and hearing children's ToM sequences were shown to extend reliably to six sequential developmental steps. Finally and focally, even though both groups' sequences were six steps long, the placement of pretence relative to other ToM milestones varied with hearing status. Deaf children understood social pretending at an earlier step in the ToM sequence than hearing children, albeit at a later chronological age. Theoretically, the findings are relevant to questions about how universal developmental progressions come together along with culturally distinctive inputs and biological factors (such as hearing loss) to set the pace for ToM development.

Maternal mental state talk and infants' early gestural communication.

Twenty-four infants were tested monthly for the production of imperative and declarative gestures between 0 ; 9 and 1 ; 3 and concurrent mother-infant free-play sessions were conducted at 0 ; 9, 1 ; 0 and 1 ; 3 (Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998). Free-play transcripts were subsequently coded for maternal talk about mental states. Results revealed that the earlier infants produced imperative gestures, the more frequently their mothers made reference to the infants' own volitional states (want, try, need, etc.) at 1 ; 3. The same relation also emerged using maternal reports of their infants' gestural communication on a standard language development measure. These results indicate that mothers' talk about desires and intentions is linked to their infants' early developing communicative competence.

Nimble negotiators: How theory of mind (ToM) interconnects with persuasion skills in children with and without ToM delay.

Persuasion is an essential social skill. Yet its development and underpinnings are poorly understood. In 2 studies, a total of 167 children aged 3 to 12 years took theory of mind (ToM) tests and participated in unscripted, seminaturalistic persuasive conversations. Children were typically developing (TD) or had deafness or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). High-level, informationally rich persuasive arguments increased with age in all groups in both studies, as did ToM. In both studies, ToM scores predicted persuasion skill over and above age, language ability, and deafness/ASD status. In Study 1, TD 8-year-olds outperformed age-matched deaf and autistic children in ToM but only equaled them in persuasive skill. Study 2 employed more challenging persuasion tasks and revealed superior persuasion performance by school-aged TD children compared with same-aged children with deafness or ASD. Deaf and ASD groups did better on Study 1's straightforward persuasion tasks than on Study 2's more challenging ones, whereas TD children rose to the added challenge without their persuasion performance suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record

Mind and body: concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development.

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.