Joint External Evaluation-Development and Scale-Up of Global Multisectoral Health Capacity Evaluation Process.

The Joint External Evaluation (JEE), a consolidation of the World Health Organization (WHO) International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and the Global Health Security Agenda country assessment tool, is an objective, voluntary, independent peer-to-peer multisectoral assessment of a country's health security preparedness and response capacity across 19 IHR technical areas. WHO approved the standardized JEE tool in February 2016. The JEE process is wholly transparent; countries request a JEE and are encouraged to make its findings public. Donors (e.g., member states, public and private partners, and other public health institutions) can support countries in addressing identified JEE gaps, and implementing country-led national action plans for health security. Through July 2017, 52 JEEs were completed, and 25 more countries were scheduled across WHO's 6 regions. JEEs facilitate progress toward IHR 2005 implementation, thereby building trust and mutual accountability among countries to detect and respond to public health threats.

Contact Tracing Activities during the Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic in Kindia and Faranah, Guinea, 2014.

The largest recorded Ebola virus disease epidemic began in March 2014; as of July 2015, it continued in 3 principally affected countries: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Control efforts include contact tracing to expedite identification of the virus in suspect case-patients. We examined contact tracing activities during September 20-December 31, 2014, in 2 prefectures of Guinea using national and local data about case-patients and their contacts. Results show less than one third of case-patients (28.3% and 31.1%) were registered as contacts before case identification; approximately two thirds (61.1% and 67.7%) had no registered contacts. Time to isolation of suspected case-patients was not immediate (median 5 and 3 days for Kindia and Faranah, respectively), and secondary attack rates varied by relationships of persons who had contact with the source case-patient and the type of case-patient to which a contact was exposed. More complete contact tracing efforts are needed to augment control of this epidemic.

Ebola Virus Disease in Health Care Workers--Guinea, 2014.

An outbreak of Ebola virus disease (Ebola) began in Guinea in December 2013 and has continued through September 2015. Health care workers (HCWs) in West Africa are at high risk for Ebola infection owing to lack of appropriate triage procedures, insufficient equipment, and inadequate infection control practices. To characterize recent epidemiology of Ebola infections among HCWs in Guinea, national Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) surveillance data were analyzed for HCW cases reported during January 1­December 31, 2014. During 2014, a total of 162 (7.9%) of 2,210 laboratory-confirmed or probable Ebola cases among Guinean adults aged ≥15 years occurred among HCWs, resulting in an incidence of Ebola infection among HCWs 42.2 times higher than among non-HCWs. The disproportionate burden of Ebola infection among HCWs taxes an already stressed health infrastructure, underscoring the need for increased understanding of transmission among HCWs and improved infection prevention and control measures to prevent Ebola infection among HCWs.

Pandemic influenza as 21st century urban public health crisis.

The percentage of the world's population living in urban areas will increase from 50% in 2008 to 70% (4.9 billion) in 2025. Crowded urban areas in developing and industrialized countries are uniquely vulnerable to public health crises and face daunting challenges in surveillance, response, and public communication. The revised International Health Regulations require all countries to have core surveillance and response capacity by 2012. Innovative approaches are needed because traditional local-level strategies may not be easily scalable upward to meet the needs of huge, densely populated cities, especially in developing countries. The responses of Mexico City and New York City to the initial appearance of influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus during spring 2009 illustrate some of the new challenges and creative response strategies that will increasingly be needed in cities worldwide.

Strengthening global health security by embedding the International Health Regulations requirements into national health systems.

The International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005, as the overarching instrument for global health security, are designed to prevent and cope with major international public health threats. But poor implementation in countries hampers their effectiveness. In the wake of a number of major international health crises, such as the 2014 Ebola and 2016 Zika outbreaks, and the findings of a number of high-level assessments of the global response to these crises, it has become clear that there is a need for more joined-up thinking between health system strengthening activities and health security efforts for prevention, alert and response. WHO is working directly with its Member States to promote this approach, more specifically around how to better embed the IHR (2005) core capacities into the main health system functions. This paper looks at how and where the intersections between the IHR and the health system can be best leveraged towards developing greater health system resilience. This merging of approaches is a key component in pursuit of Universal Health Coverage and strengthened global health security as two mutually reinforcing agendas.

Developing a multisectoral National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) to implement the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) in Tanzania.

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa precipitated a renewed momentum to ensure global health security through the expedited and full implementation of the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005) in all WHO member states. The updated IHR (2005) Monitoring and Evaluation Framework was shared with Member States in 2015 with one mandatory component, that is, States Parties annual reporting to the World Health Assembly (WHA) on compliance and three voluntary components: Joint External Evaluation (JEE), After Action Reviews and Simulation Exercises. In February 2016, Tanzania, was the first country globally to volunteer to do a JEE and the first to use the recommendations for priority actions from the JEE to develop a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) by February 2017. The JEE demonstrated that within the majority of the 47 indicators within the 19 technical areas, Tanzania had either 'limited capacity' or 'developed capacity'. None had 'sustainable capacity'. With JEE recommendations for priority actions, recommendations from other relevant assessments and complementary objectives, Tanzania developed the NAPHS through a nationwide consultative and participatory process. The 5-year cost estimate came out to approximately US$86.6 million (22 million for prevent, 50 million for detect, 4.8 million for respond and 9.2 million for other IHR hazards and points of entry). However, with the inclusion of vaccines for zoonotic diseases in animals increases the cost sevenfold. The importance of strong country ownership and committed leadership were identified as instrumental for the development of operationally focused NAPHS that are aligned with broader national plans across multiple sectors. Key lessons learnt by Tanzania can help guide and encourage other countries to translate their JEE priority actions into a realistic costed NAPHS for funding and implementation for IHR (2005).

Global public health security.

The framework of the newly revised International Health Regulations is a key driver in the effort to strengthen global public health security. Unanimously agreed upon by the World Health Assembly on May 23, 2005, the regulations are the result of experience gained and lessons learned during the past 30 years. This global legal framework includes a commitment from the World Health Organization (WHO) and from each WHO member state to improve capacity for disease prevention, detection, and response. It provides standards for addressing national public health threats that have the potential to become global emergencies. Its success will rely on the capacity and performance of national public health systems, anchored by strong national public health institutes (NPHIs). The new International Association of National Public Health Institutes aims to strengthen and invigorate existing NPHIs, to create new NPHIs where none exist, and to provide funded grants to support NPHI development priorities.

Conceptual framework of public health surveillance and action and its application in health sector reform.

BACKGROUND: Because both public health surveillance and action are crucial, the authors initiated meetings at regional and national levels to assess and reform surveillance and action systems. These meetings emphasized improved epidemic preparedness, epidemic response, and highlighted standardized assessment and reform. METHODS: To standardize assessments, the authors designed a conceptual framework for surveillance and action that categorized the framework into eight core and four support activities, measured with indicators. RESULTS: In application, country-level reformers measure both the presence and performance of the six core activities comprising public health surveillance (detection, registration, reporting, confirmation, analyses, and feedback) and acute (epidemic-type) and planned (management-type) responses composing the two core activities of public health action. Four support activities - communications, supervision, training, and resource provision - enable these eight core processes. National, multiple systems can then be concurrently assessed at each level for effectiveness, technical efficiency, and cost. CONCLUSIONS: This approach permits a cost analysis, highlights areas amenable to integration, and provides focused intervention. The final public health model becomes a district-focused, action-oriented integration of core and support activities with enhanced effectiveness, technical efficiency, and cost savings. This reform approach leads to sustained capacity development by an empowerment strategy defined as facilitated, process-oriented action steps transforming staff and the system.

Risk factors for Marburg hemorrhagic fever, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

We conducted two antibody surveys to assess risk factors for Marburg hemorrhagic fever in an area of confirmed Marburg virus transmission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Questionnaires were administered and serum samples tested for Marburg-specific antibodies by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay. Fifteen (2%) of 912 participants in a general village cross-sectional antibody survey were positive for Marburg immunoglobulin G antibody. Thirteen (87%) of these 15 were men who worked in the local gold mines. Working as a miner (odds ratio [OR] 13.9, 95% confidence interval [CI] 3.1 to 62.1) and receiving injections (OR 7.4, 95% CI 1.6 to 33.2) were associated with a positive antibody result. All 103 participants in a targeted antibody survey of healthcare workers were antibody negative. Primary transmission of Marburg virus to humans likely occurred via exposure to a still unidentified reservoir in the local mines. Secondary transmission appears to be less common with Marburg virus than with Ebola virus, the other known filovirus.